How many conflict deaths will there be in Sudan in 2025?
Jeremy’s most recent version of his Multi-AI Oracle is a side competitor with the machine forecasting bots of the VIEWS competition.
Obtaining outside data. Checking internet sources, using keywords: Sudan conflict deaths 2025
Results from around the web: {think}
Okay, I need to answer the user’s query about Sudan conflict deaths in 2025 using the provided search results. Let me start by going through each of the sources to find relevant information.
Looking at source [1], the UN Human Rights Office reports a sharp increase in civilian deaths from artillery shelling, airstrikes, and drone attacks. From January 31 to February 5, 2025, they documented 275 civilian deaths, which is three times higher than the previous week’s 89 deaths. This indicates a significant escalation in violence.
Source [4] from Genocide Watch mentions that by November 2024, LeMonde estimated at least 150,000 civilian deaths. It also notes that in Khartoum alone, over 61,000 people were killed, with 26,000 directly from the war. However, 90% of deaths in Khartoum were unrecorded, suggesting actual numbers are much higher. The RSF’s ethnically targeted massacres, especially against the Masalit people, and the use of starvation as a weapon are highlighted here.
Source [7], the ACLED Conflict Watchlist 2025, states that by the end of November 2024, over 28,700 fatalities were reported, including 7,500 civilians. But they acknowledge this is an underestimate, with some estimates as high as 150,000. The displacement numbers are staggering, with over 14 million displaced, making up 30% of Sudan’s population.
Source [10] from Science.org discusses the challenges in data gathering due to the government’s hostility. It cites ACLED’s estimate of 28,700 intentional injury deaths, while a London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine study suggests Khartoum state alone had over 26,000 intentional deaths and 61,000 total deaths by June 2024. This source emphasizes that many deaths go unrecorded, especially those from starvation and disease.
Wikipedia entries [2], [5], [8] provide background on the conflict, including historical context, participant groups, and casualty figures. Source [2] mentions over 12,000 deaths by December 2023, but this seems outdated compared to 2024-2025 data. Source [8] updates this to 61,000 killed in Khartoum by November 2024, aligning with other sources.
Now, compiling the data into tables. The time series data from [1] shows weekly increases: 89 deaths from Jan 24-30, then 275 from Jan 31-Feb 5. The mean, median, etc., can be calculated from these two data points. The overall estimates from [4], [7], [10] give a range of 150,000 total deaths, with ACLED’s intentional deaths at 28,700 and Khartoum’s total deaths at 61,000.
I need to present this information clearly, citing each source appropriately. Highlight the escalation in violence, the underreporting issues, and the methods causing deaths (direct violence vs. starvation/disease). Also, mention the humanitarian crisis with displacement and blocked aid.
The Sudan conflict in 2025 has seen a dramatic escalation in violence and civilian casualties, with multiple sources reporting sharply rising death tolls and widespread humanitarian crises. Here’s a summary of key findings from recent reports:
### Escalating Civilian Deaths
– **February 2025**: The UN documented **275 civilian deaths** from artillery shelling, airstrikes, and drone attacks between January 31 and February 5[1]. This represents a **threefold increase** from the prior week (89 deaths from January 24–30)[1].
– **Khartoum State**: Over 61,000 deaths were recorded by November 2024, including 26,000 direct war fatalities. Experts estimate **90% of deaths go unrecorded** due to data suppression[4][10].
– **Total Estimates**: Le Monde and independent researchers suggest **≥150,000 total civilian deaths** nationwide by late 2024, though official counts remain fragmented[4][7][10].
### Key Drivers of Mortality
1. **Direct Violence**:
– Indiscriminate shelling/airstrikes in Khartoum, Darfur, and Kordofan[1][4].
– RSF-led ethnic massacres (e.g., 10,000–15,000 Masalit killed in El Geneina in 2023)[4].
2. **Starvation and Disease**:
– 65% of Darfur’s population lacks medical access due to **145 destroyed healthcare facilities**[4].
– Cholera outbreaks (546 deaths) and malnutrition crises in IDP camps[10].
### Humanitarian Impact
– **Displacement**: 14 million internally displaced (30% of population)[7], with 2.9 million refugees in Chad/South Sudan[4].
– **Aid Blockades**: Both SAF and RSF systematically block food/medical supplies, triggering famine alerts[4][10].
### Conflict Parties and Foreign Involvement
## Key Drivers of Mortality
### Data Challenges
– The Sudanese government restricts access to conflict zones and suppresses mortality reporting[10].
– ACLED’s **28,700 documented fatalities** (to November 2024) are considered a severe undercount[7][10].
– The conflict shows no signs of abatement, with SAF and RSF rejecting negotiations and foreign powers continuing to supply arms[7][8].
OpenAI gives a base rate of probability of the number of deaths being more than 12,000 in 2025.
The question difficulty is rated 8 (0 to 10)
Sufficient news to provide a good forecast? 1 (0 or 1)
News is relevant, topical and unbiased? 1 (0 or 1)
Question classification: reference_class
Expected time (days) until question close: 365 (Carolyn’s note: Yesterday the Oracle got the numbner of days left almost right. Today, not so much. Oopsie.)
The following were considered in order to produce this base rate:
Given historical data of escalating violence and civilian casualties, the base rate is derived from the significant death tolls provided by multiple sources. Both direct conflict and indirect factors like starvation contribute heavily to fatalities. Despite underreporting, estimates suggest a drastically high number of deaths by the end of 2024.
Ideally, the news feed would contain the following sorts of information for a better forecast:
Access to real-time, independent reporting from within Sudan could provide a clearer picture of ongoing casualties. Confirmation of international diplomatic efforts and potential peace agreements would adjust forecasts.
Some potential divergent considerations that might affect the base rate:
The situation could change if there is a sudden ceasefire or peace agreement mediated by international bodies. A significant reduction in violence could also occur if decisive action is taken by foreign powers or through effective diplomatic means.
The following chain of events are necessary for the question to resolve positively:
Continued escalation in violence across multiple regions in Sudan Likely
– Sustained high rates of civilian casualties from airstrikes, shelling, and direct combat Very Likely
– Persistent blockades and humanitarian aid restrictions leading to starvation and preventable disease Likely
– Limited international intervention to suppress violence or broker peace Likely
Querying Claude (AI predicts: [“Less than 1000”: 0.01, “Between 1000 and 3000”: 0.02, “Between 3000 and 5000”: 0.05, “Between 5000 and 8000”: 0.12, “Between 8000 and 12000”: 0.2, “More than 12000”: 0.6] – confidence: 6)
Querying Mistral (AI predicts: [“Less than 1000”: 0.01, “Between 1000 and 3000”: 0.05, “Between 3000 and 5000”: 0.1, “Between 5000 and 8000”: 0.15, “Between 8000 and 12000”: 0.25, “More than 12000”: 0.44] – confidence: 7)
Querying OpenAI (AI predicts: [“Less than 1000”: 0.01, “Between 1000 and 3000”: 0.05, “Between 3000 and 5000”: 0.08, “Between 5000 and 8000”: 0.15, “Between 8000 and 12000”: 0.2, “More than 12000”: 0.51] – confidence: 7)
Question Type: Multiple Choice
Confidence: 7
# LLM responses: 3
Model value:
* Less than 1000: 1% (Carolyn’s note: Although currently there are reports of over 1000 fatalities, sometimes these numbers are adjusted downward due to new information)
* Between 1000 and 3000: 5%
* Between 3000 and 5000: 8%
* Between 5000 and 8000: 15%
* Between 8000 and 12000: 20%
* More than 12000: 51%
The analysis of the escalating conflict in Sudan reveals a grim outlook with high casualty rates and significant underreporting of deaths due to restricted access and data suppression. Recent reports document a sharp increase in violence with both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces heavily involved, aided by external military support, making de-escalation unlikely. Continued airstrikes, artillery shelling, and ethnic violence exacerbate the humanitarian crisis, reflected in the high civilian death tolls reported. However, several factors could potentially alter this trajectory: international pressure and diplomatic interventions may lead to ceasefires or peace agreements, while the establishment of humanitarian corridors might mitigate the impact of blockades. Furthermore, inaccuracies in death counts and external power dynamics could influence outcomes, suggesting that the future remains uncertain despite current trends of escalating violence.
Past forecasts on Sudan’s conflict fatalities —>
Guide to Multi-AI Oracle’s Reports (some of these only apply to older versions)
Median: We collect the output values from the LLMs in an array. We then take the median value. This is between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0.15 = 15%).
Base rate: Currently we take OpenAI’s value as the base rate. We are working on a better value using a different prompt that takes into account process. The base rate helps to determine if the median makes sense.
SD: The standard deviation between the median and the base rate.
Confidence: We query each of the LLMs on how confident they are of their predictions (between 0 and 10) and take a median. Because the LLMs tend to be overconfident, we take anything lower than 6 as being low confidence. This factors into the overall model.
Conf Mode: Based on the confidence value. >=9 is high confidence. Below 6 is low confidence (this is also triggered by an exceptionally high SD).
Mellers: This refers to Barbara Mellers, specifically a paper she wrote that includes a formula for moving values towards an extreme (i.e. 0 or 1).
Reverse Mellers: This uses the formula from above, but with a sub-1 coefficient to move the values closer to 50%.
Theory of Mind: We ask the LLMs what they think other LLMs would predict. We hope that this makes them consider the questions more deeply.
Beta Distribution: Currently unused, but possibly of interest. This is based on the median, the base rate and the SD.
Close Type: We noticed that the appropriate base case for some questions is closer to the extremes, while others are closer to 50%. When we have a low confidence value, this helps us to determine whether to extremize or de-extremize the value. ‘A’ implies closer to zero. ‘B’ implies closer to 50%. ‘C’ implies closer to 100%.
# LLM Responses: The count of LLMs that responded. We query 5 currently, but they have a relatively high API failure rate.
Model value: For normal confidence mode, this is the median. For high confidence, this is the Mellers value. For low confidence, this is either the Mellers or Revers
Background on VIEWS: Near the end of 2024, the latest forecasting competition of the Violence and Impacts Early-Warning System (VIEWS) was launched. On Dec. 4, 2024, during a telecon, a group of machine forecasting experts involved in VIEWS observed Jeremy’s demonstration of his Multi-AI Oracle. Although it was too late for Jeremy to sign up as a VIEWS competitor, they urged him to run a side competition for everyone’s benefit. Jeremy chose their Sudan conflict deaths question.
Background on the Sudan conflict, as evaluated by the team of Jeremy Lichtman and Carolyn Meinel:
(1) The importance of the Sahel, a region in Africa that includes Sudan:
Why the Sahel Actually Matters (Possibly To You, Too)
(2) April 29, 2024: Today, a Russian diplomat is negotiating gold mining with the Sudanese Minister of Minerals.
(3) June 3, 2024: Today the African Union Announced Plans to Mediate in Sudan’s Civil War
(4) Sept. 11, 2024 Over 100K starvation deaths 96% likely in Sudan by 1 Jan 2025
Carolyn has checked Sudan’s news sites below to ensure that they are still in operation. However, given the widespread violence in Sudan, any of these could go offline without warning.
https://www.alnilin.com/
https://www.alrakoba.net/
https://www.altaghyeer.info/ar/
https://www.altaghyeer.info/en/
https://www.alttahrer.com/
https://www.alzaeemsd.com/
https://www.assayha.net
https://www.cover-sd.com/
https://kushnews.net/
https://rakobanews.com
https://www.sudanakhbar.com/
https://sudanjem.com/
https://suna-sd.net/en
https://sudantimes.net/
https://www.sudantribune.net/
https://www.sudantribune.com/
https://sudaneseonline.com/
https://www.sudanile.com/
https://sudanow-magazine.net/
https://www.sudaress.com/
https://www.tagpress.net/
Below, a screenshot from VIEWS forecasting conflict fatalities in Sudan through January 2028. Below that, satellite images of the devastation in Sudan.
Below, before and after pictures of the devastation of the civil war in Sudan.
