How many conflict deaths will there be in Sudan in 2025?
Phil’s pgodzinai is a side competitor with the machine forecasting bots of the VIEWS competition.
Here’s what Phil’s pgodzinai predicts:
* Less than 1000: 1%
* Between 1000 and 3000: 3%
* Between 3000 and 5000: 5%
* Between 5000 and 8000: 12%
* Between 8000 and 12000: 24%
* More than 12000: 55%
Details on what pgodzinai says about how it created the above forecasts:
Perplexity response:
First, I need to check the search results provided. The dates here are all around mid-April 2025, so they’re very recent. Let’s go through each source.
Result 1 from IFRC, dated April 15, 2025, talks about the outlook for 2025 being troubling with continued conflict and destruction. They mention expert sources indicating ongoing issues. No specific death numbers here, but sets a tone of escalation.
Result 2 from FAO on April 15, 2025, states that famine is confirmed in multiple areas. They mention over 3.2 million children under five facing malnutrition. While this is about food insecurity, it’s relevant because famine can lead to increased deaths. However, direct death counts aren’t provided here.
Result 3 from MEI, no date but mentions as of January 2025, 150,000 deaths. Since the current date is April 2025, this is a few months old. The article also notes that fighting continues, and the SAF has made gains but peace isn’t near. The RSF commander vowed to return, indicating ongoing conflict. This source gives a baseline death toll up to January, but we need to project from there.
Result 4 from Spectrum Local News, April 14, 2025, reports over 300 civilian deaths in two days in Darfur. This is a recent spike. The UN cited local sources, but verification is tough. The article also mentions that at least 24,000 deaths have been tallied by the UN, but activists say it’s higher. Wait, this conflicts with Result 3 which said 150,000 as of January. Maybe there’s a discrepancy between official UN numbers and other estimates. Need to check which is more recent. The UN here is reporting 24,000, but MEI from January says 150,000. That’s a big difference. Maybe the UN figure is lower because they only count confirmed deaths, while others include estimates. The user needs to know which source is more authoritative.
Result 5 from CFR, April 14, 2025, mentions up to 150,000 deaths in the entire country, with 61,000 in Khartoum alone. This aligns with Result 3. So even as of April, estimates are over 150k. But the user is asking about 2025 totals. Since we’re in April 2025, the annual total would build on previous years. The question is about 2025, not cumulative. Wait, the conflict started in April 2023, so 2025 would be the third year. The death toll in 2023 and 2024 would be part of the total. But the question is specifically about 2025. So we need to estimate the number of deaths occurring in 2025 from January to December.
But the sources don’t break down annual deaths, they give cumulative totals. So, for example, MEI says as of January 2025, 150,000 deaths. If the conflict is intensifying, as per the recent reports, then 2025’s death toll could be higher. However, without explicit data, we have to infer.
Result 4 from April 14 mentions over 300 deaths in two days in Darfur. That’s a very high rate. If such incidents continue, the monthly death toll could be in the thousands. For example, 300 deaths in two days is 150 per day. If similar incidents happen monthly, that’s 1,500 deaths per month, leading to 18,000 annually. But that’s speculative. However, the recent spike indicates increased violence.
The options given are ranges. The possible options are between less than 1000 up to more than 12,000. Given that the conflict is escalating, with reports of recent high casualties, and famine worsening, it’s unlikely that 2025’s total would be under 1000. The UN reports at least 24,000 deaths, but that’s cumulative. If the conflict continues, even if the death rate slows, the numbers would add up. But the user is asking for 2025’s total. Let’s see:
If as of January 2025, there were 150,000 deaths (from MEI), but the UN says 24,000 as of April 2025, there’s inconsistency. Probably, the 150k is an estimate that includes all deaths, including indirect ones from famine, while the UN’s 24k is a lower count. The user needs to know which source to prioritize. Since the Resolution Criteria says to prioritize the source that will be used for resolution. If the question’s resolution criteria use UN data, then the 24k is the official number, but that’s cumulative. However, the query is about 2025’s deaths. Since the conflict is ongoing and intensifying, with recent spikes, the death toll for 2025 could be high.
But the options are ranges. The recent reports of 300 deaths in two days in April, and the FAO’s mention of famine, suggest that 2025 is seeing a significant increase. If such events continue, the death toll could be in the thousands. However, without a direct projection, it’s hard to say. The options given include ‘More than 12000’. Given that in two days, 300 died, extrapolating that to the entire year would be 300 * 182.5 = ~54,750, which is way over the options. But that’s not realistic because other factors might reduce the death rate. However, the recent spike and ongoing conflict suggest that the death toll in 2025 could be high. Given the options, ‘More than 12000’ seems plausible if the conflict continues at this rate. But the user’s options don’t include that high. Wait, the options go up to ‘More than 12000’. So if the death toll is, say, 15,000 in 2025, that would be ‘More than 12000’. But without explicit data, it’s a guess. However, considering the recent escalation and the high numbers in specific incidents, it’s likely that the death toll in 2025 would be on the higher side of the options. The UN reported over 300 deaths in two days, which is about 150 per day. If that rate continues, it’s 54,750, but that’s unlikely. More realistically, maybe a few thousand per month. So in a year, maybe 30,000-50,000, but the options don’t go that high. The highest option is ‘More than 12000’, which would include 15k+. However, the recent reports and the ongoing conflict suggest that the death toll in 2025 is likely to be in the higher range. Therefore, the answer would lean towards ‘More than 12000’.
1. **Sudan Conflict: Two Years On — A Nation at Breaking Point** (IFRC, April 15, 2025)
– Highlights ongoing destruction and expert projections of continued conflict in 2025, with no specific death toll but emphasizes worsening humanitarian conditions[1].
2. **Severe Food Security Catastrophe** (FAO, April 15, 2025)
– Notes famine confirmed in multiple areas, with 30.4 million people needing aid and 3.2 million children facing acute malnutrition. Agriculture collapse threatens food production, exacerbating mortality risks[2].
3. **Two Years On, Sudan’s War Seems Further from Resolution** (MEI, Undated)
– Reports **150,000 deaths** as of January 2025, with SAF regaining Khartoum and RSF vowing retaliation. Fighting persists in Darfur and Omdurman, indicating sustained violence[3].
4. **UN Reports 300+ Civilian Deaths in Darfur Over Two Days** (Spectrum Local News, April 14, 2025)
– Recent escalation: Over **300 civilians killed in two days** in North Darfur attacks. UN cites local sources, though verification is limited. Total UN tallied deaths: **24,000**, but activists estimate higher numbers[4].
5. **Third Year of War: Dried-Up Aid Pulls Sudan Further Into Chaos** (CFR, April 14, 2025)
– Estimates **up to 150,000 deaths nationwide**, with **61,000 in Khartoum alone** (April 2023–June 2024). Notes ongoing famines and unrelenting violence[5].
—
### **Key Takeaways for 2025 Death Toll Projections**
– **Recent Death Spikes**: April 14, 2025, saw **300+ deaths in 48 hours** in Darfur[4], reflecting heightened violence.
– **Cumulative Estimates**: As of January 2025, deaths reached **150,000**[3], with UN data lagging at **24,000**[4].
– **Humanitarian Crisis**: Famine, displacement, and aid blockages escalate mortality risks, particularly in conflict zones like Darfur and Khartoum[2][3].
—
### **Analysis of Projected Ranges**
| **Option Range** | **Rationale** |
|————————-|—————————————————|
| **Less than 1000** | Unlikely: Recent spikes (e.g., 300 deaths in 2 days[4]) suggest higher numbers; cumulative deaths already exceed projections. |
| **1,000–3,000** | Unlikely: Pre-2025 cumulative deaths (e.g., 150,000[3]) imply 2025 itself would surpass these ranges. |
| **3,000–5,000** | Unlikely: Sustained conflict intensity and recent mass killings (e.g., 300+ in 2 days[4]) indicate higher totals. |
| **5,000–8,000** | Unlikely: Pre-2025 cumulative data and recent spikes suggest 2025 alone may exceed this. |
| **8,000–12,000** | Possible but low probability: While plausible if violence slightly moderates, recent escalations (e.g., Khartoum retaken[3], Darfur attacks[4]) suggest higher risk. |
| **More than 12,000** | **Most Likely**: Recent spikes, unresolved conflict, and humanitarian collapse align with this range. Pre-2025 totals and ongoing violence support this projection. |
**Critical Drivers**: Continued clashes, famine, and aid blockages justify projections toward the higher end. The recent **300+ deaths in 48 hours**[4] exemplify the conflict’s lethality.
—
**Recommendation for Superforecaster**: Prioritize **“More than 12,000”** due to escalating violence, recent mass casualties, and the unresolved nature of the conflict[3][4].
GPT News Summary:
The conflict in Sudan, which began in April 2023, continues to cause severe devastation as it enters its third year. Here is a summary of the most recent developments:
1. **Humanitarian Crisis and Death Toll**: The conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has led to a humanitarian catastrophe, described by the UN as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis (April 15, 2025, Algeria 48). Estimates suggest that around 150,000 people have been killed since the conflict began (April 18, 2025, Tfiglobalnews), although some sources place the death toll at nearly 40,000 (April 15, 2025, Folha de S.Paulo). There are reports of recent heavy clashes in El Fasher, North Darfur, resulting in at least 57 deaths (April 17, 2025, En Son Haber), with 400 people killed in recent attacks (April 17, 2025, Haberler).
2. **Displacement and Aid Needs**: The conflict has displaced about 13 to 15 million people, with millions forced to flee their homes (April 13, 2025, DW; April 15, 2025, Arabic Euronews). Approximately 30 million people, including 16 million children, are in dire need of humanitarian aid due to the compounded effects of warfare, food insecurity, and disease outbreaks (April 19, 2025, France TV Info; March 13, 2025, Hindustan Times).
3. **Control and Military Situation**: The army has regained control of Khartoum, while the RSF controls most of Darfur and parts of the south (April 17, 2025, En Son Haber). However, the conflict remains intense with no peace agreement in sight, and the country could split into rival administrations (April 13, 2025, DW). The UN Fact-Finding Mission cautions that the conflict’s darkest chapters have yet to unfold, indicating potential for increased violence (April 18, 2025, Tfiglobalnews).
4. **Famine and Health Crises**: Famine has been declared in North Darfur, with malnutrition rates among the highest globally. The WHO highlights severe health crises exacerbated by attacks on healthcare facilities (April 17, 2025, WHO). Roughly 770,000 children under five are expected to suffer from severe malnutrition in 2025 (February 21, 2025, UNOCHA).
5. **International Response and Funding Gaps**: The UN has called for substantial humanitarian assistance, but funding remains severely inadequate. Only a fraction of the required aid for 2025 has been secured, with significant gaps impacting relief operations (April 13, 2025, DW; April 15, 2025, Migazin).
Overall, the ongoing conflict in Sudan poses grave risk for further fatalities in 2025, driven by continuous violence, displacement, disease outbreaks, and severe food insecurity. The situation remains highly volatile with limited prospects for resolution in the immediate future.
Extracted resolution criteria links:
[]
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Anthropic response:
# Analysis of Sudan Conflict Deaths in 2025
To forecast the number of conflict deaths in Sudan for 2025, I need to carefully analyze recent developments alongside historical patterns while considering we’re already in mid-April 2025, with approximately 8.5 months remaining in the year.
## Current State of the Conflict
The Sudan conflict, which began in April 2023, is now in its third year with no signs of resolution. Multiple sources confirm that the situation remains severe:
1. **Death Toll to Date**: Sources indicate that cumulative deaths since the conflict began in April 2023 range from 24,000 (UN’s conservative count) to approximately 150,000 (higher estimates from MEI and CFR). This discrepancy likely reflects differences in counting methodology, with the UN typically reporting only verified deaths.
2. **Recent Escalation**: Particularly concerning is the report of over 300 civilian deaths in just two days in North Darfur in mid-April 2025. This suggests an intensification of violence. Additional reports mention 57 deaths in El Fasher and 400 killed in recent attacks.
3. **Territorial Control**: The SAF has regained control of Khartoum, while the RSF controls most of Darfur and parts of the south. This territorial split increases the likelihood of continued fighting.
4. **Humanitarian Crisis**: Famine has been declared in North Darfur, with 30.4 million people needing aid and 3.2 million children facing acute malnutrition. These conditions typically increase mortality beyond direct combat deaths.
## Death Rate Estimation
To estimate the 2025 death toll, I need to consider:
1. **Deaths Already Occurred**: Since we’re in mid-April, approximately 3.5 months of 2025 have elapsed. If we assume the conflict has maintained relatively consistent intensity, a significant portion of the annual death toll has already occurred.
2. **Recent Death Rate**: The report of 300+ deaths in two days indicates a potential rate of 150 deaths per day in high-intensity periods. While this rate may not be sustained throughout the year, it suggests that even brief periods of intense fighting can substantially increase the death toll.
3. **Indirect Deaths**: The famine and collapse of healthcare systems will contribute to the overall death toll, though these may be counted differently depending on the source.
## Calculation Approach
Let’s consider different scenarios:
1. **Conservative Scenario**: Assuming a lower average of 30 direct conflict deaths per day for the remainder of 2025 (about 20% of the recently reported peak):
– 30 deaths/day × 255 days remaining ≈ 7,650 deaths
– Plus an estimated 3,000-4,000 deaths from January through mid-April
– Total: 10,650-11,650 deaths
2. **Moderate Scenario**: Assuming an average of 50 direct conflict deaths per day:
– 50 deaths/day × 255 days remaining ≈ 12,750 deaths
– Plus an estimated 5,000-6,000 deaths from January through mid-April
– Total: 17,750-18,750 deaths
3. **High-Intensity Scenario**: Assuming periods of intense fighting similar to recent reports:
– 75 deaths/day × 255 days remaining ≈ 19,125 deaths
– Plus an estimated 7,000-9,000 deaths from January through mid-April
– Total: 26,125-28,125 deaths
Given the recent escalation, territorial divisions, and humanitarian crisis, I believe the moderate to high-intensity scenarios are more likely than the conservative one.
## Forecast Confidence and Adjustments
Several factors increase uncertainty in this forecast:
1. **Potential Peace Process**: Although unlikely given recent reports, a successful peace agreement could dramatically reduce deaths in the latter part of 2025.
2. **Seasonal Variations**: Conflict intensity may vary with seasonal factors like weather conditions.
3. **Data Reliability**: The significant discrepancy between reported death counts (24,000 vs. 150,000) indicates substantial uncertainty in mortality data.
4. **Humanitarian Crisis Acceleration**: The worsening famine could cause indirect deaths to increase exponentially.
Given these uncertainties and to avoid overconfidence, I need to distribute probability across multiple outcomes while weighing heavily toward the higher death toll ranges given recent trends.
## Final Forecast
Based on the analysis of recent developments, historical patterns, and the current trajectory of the conflict, my forecast for Sudan conflict deaths in 2025 is:
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 3
Option_C: 5
Option_D: 12
Option_E: 24
Option_F: 55
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.05, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.24, ‘More than 12000’: 0.55}
________________________
Anthropic response:
# Forecasting Conflict Deaths in Sudan for 2025
## Context Analysis
The Sudan conflict, which began in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF), is now in its third year. This analysis will focus specifically on projecting the number of conflict-related deaths that will occur in Sudan during the 2025 calendar year.
## Recent Death Toll Data
There’s some discrepancy in the reported cumulative death tolls:
– Higher estimates suggest approximately 150,000 total deaths since April 2023 (MEI, CFR, Tfiglobalnews)
– Lower UN estimates indicate around 24,000 confirmed deaths
– Recent spikes include 300+ civilian deaths in just two days in North Darfur (April 2025)
– Reports of 57 deaths in El Fasher and 400 killed in recent attacks (April 2025)
The significant difference between the 24,000 UN figure and the 150,000 higher estimate likely reflects the challenges in death documentation during conflict and whether indirect deaths (from disease, starvation) are included.
## Current Conflict Dynamics
Several factors point to continued or escalating violence in 2025:
1. **No Peace Process**: No viable peace agreement is in sight
2. **Territorial Control**: SAF has regained Khartoum while RSF controls most of Darfur
3. **Military Posturing**: RSF has vowed retaliation for lost territory
4. **UN Assessment**: The UN Fact-Finding Mission warns that “the conflict’s darkest chapters have yet to unfold”
5. **Humanitarian Collapse**: Widespread famine and healthcare system breakdown will contribute to indirect deaths
## Monthly Death Rate Estimation
Based on the recent reports of 300+ deaths in two days in Darfur, and similar incidents throughout the country, we can attempt to estimate a monthly death toll:
– If this incident represents an extreme spike, and normal days see substantially fewer deaths, the monthly toll might be 1,000-2,000
– If similar incidents occur in multiple regions simultaneously or repeatedly, the monthly toll could reach 3,000-5,000
– With famine conditions worsening and 30+ million needing aid, indirect deaths will likely increase throughout 2025
## Temporal Considerations
Today is April 19, 2025, meaning:
1. We already have nearly 4 months of data for 2025
2. There are approximately 8 months remaining in the year
3. The rainy season (typically June-September) may affect fighting intensity but could worsen humanitarian conditions
## Probabilistic Forecast Rationale
**Less than 1,000 deaths**: Extremely unlikely given that recent single incidents have resulted in hundreds of deaths. Even if the conflict unexpectedly ended tomorrow, the deaths from January-April 2025 likely already exceed this number.
**Between 1,000-3,000 deaths**: Very unlikely. The recent spike of 300+ deaths in two days in just one region suggests the annual toll is already trending significantly higher. Even at a much-reduced rate of conflict, this threshold would likely be surpassed.
**Between 3,000-5,000 deaths**: Unlikely. Given the reported 300+ deaths in two days in a single region, and ongoing fighting across multiple regions, this range would require a significant and sustained de-escalation that isn’t indicated by any current intelligence.
**Between 5,000-8,000 deaths**: Somewhat possible but still unlikely. This would require a notable reduction in violence from current levels for the remainder of 2025. Given the absence of peace talks and continued territorial contestation, this level of reduction seems improbable.
**Between 8,000-12,000 deaths**: Possible. If the conflict maintains its current intensity without further escalation, and if humanitarian conditions don’t significantly worsen beyond current projections, this range becomes plausible.
**More than 12,000 deaths**: Highly probable. The combination of direct conflict deaths (which appear to be increasing), worsening humanitarian conditions, expanding famine, and the UN’s warning that “the darkest chapters have yet to unfold” all point toward this outcome. Recent death spikes suggest this threshold could be exceeded even without further escalation.
Given the intensity of recent violence and considering that approximately 150,000 deaths have occurred over the roughly 24-month period from April 2023 to April 2025 (averaging over 6,000 deaths per month), the 2025 total is highly likely to exceed 12,000, potentially by a significant margin. Even using the more conservative UN estimate of 24,000 cumulative deaths, the annual death toll would still trend toward the higher ranges.
## Final Probability Distribution
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 3
Option_C: 5
Option_D: 10
Option_E: 16
Option_F: 65
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.05, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.1, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.16, ‘More than 12000’: 0.65}
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Anthropic response:
# Analysis of Sudan Conflict Deaths in 2025
## Current Situation Assessment
The Sudan conflict has been ongoing since April 2023 and is now in its third year. Based on the most recent sources, the situation remains extremely grave. Multiple reliable sources indicate the conflict has caused approximately 150,000 deaths cumulatively as of early 2025, though there is some variance in estimates with the UN reporting a more conservative 24,000-40,000 tallied deaths (likely reflecting confirmed deaths only, while higher estimates include indirect deaths from famine and disease).
Recent developments show an alarming escalation. Just in mid-April 2025, reports indicate over 300 civilian deaths in a 48-hour period in Darfur, with another source citing 400 deaths in recent attacks and 57 deaths in El Fasher. This suggests a sustained or potentially increasing death rate.
## Structural Factors Influencing 2025 Death Toll
Several critical factors will likely drive conflict-related deaths through the remainder of 2025:
1. **Ongoing Military Operations**: The SAF has regained control of Khartoum, but the RSF controls most of Darfur and parts of the south. The RSF commander has vowed to return to areas lost, indicating continued fighting. The UN Fact-Finding Mission warns that “the darkest chapters have yet to unfold.”
2. **Humanitarian Crisis**: Famine has been declared in North Darfur with malnutrition rates among the highest globally. Approximately 30 million people (two-thirds of the population) need humanitarian assistance, with 16 million being children. About 770,000 children under five are expected to suffer from severe malnutrition in 2025.
3. **Healthcare Collapse**: The WHO reports attacks on healthcare facilities, exacerbating health crises. Disease outbreaks in displacement camps will likely contribute to indirect conflict deaths.
4. **Funding Gaps**: UN aid for 2025 is severely underfunded, limiting humanitarian response capacity during critical months ahead.
## Quantitative Assessment
To forecast the remaining months of 2025 (from April 19 to December 31), I need to estimate the potential death rate:
– Recent spike of 300+ deaths in 48 hours equates to approximately 150 deaths per day in active conflict zones
– Even at a more conservative average of 40-50 deaths per day nationwide for the remainder of 2025 (accounting for periods of lower intensity), this would project to:
– 256 remaining days × 40-50 deaths/day = 10,240-12,800 additional deaths
This is a baseline estimate focusing on direct violence. Adding indirect deaths from famine, disease, and lack of healthcare access would likely push the total significantly higher.
## Historical Context and Trend Analysis
The Sudan conflict has been characterized by fluctuating intensity but has shown no signs of resolution. The military situation remains volatile with multiple territorial contests ongoing. Given that we’re already in April 2025 with nearly 4 months of the year completed, we must account for deaths that have already occurred in January-April 2025.
If the 300+ deaths in 48 hours from mid-April is representative of recent intensity, the first 3.5 months of 2025 may have already seen several thousand conflict-related deaths.
## Forecast Reasoning
The evidence strongly suggests that conflict deaths in Sudan for 2025 will likely exceed 12,000. This conclusion is supported by:
1. Recent spike in violence with hundreds killed in just days
2. Worsening humanitarian conditions including famine
3. Continued military operations with no peace process advancing
4. Lack of adequate humanitarian funding
5. The conflict entering a third year with potential for new patterns of violence
While there is uncertainty in any forecast, the recent escalation patterns, reports from major humanitarian organizations, and the structural factors driving the conflict all point toward a high death toll continuing throughout 2025.
The lower ranges (under 8,000 deaths) would only be plausible if there were an immediate and sustained ceasefire or dramatic de-escalation in the coming weeks, which available evidence does not support. Even the 8,000-12,000 range would require a significant reduction in current violence levels.
Given that we’re already in mid-April 2025 with high-intensity conflict continuing and reported famine conditions spreading, the “More than 12,000” option represents the most probable outcome based on all available evidence.
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 2
Option_C: 4
Option_D: 8
Option_E: 15
Option_F: 70
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.04, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.08, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.15, ‘More than 12000’: 0.7}
________________________
Anthropic response:
# Analysis of Conflict Deaths in Sudan for 2025
## Current Conflict Status Assessment
The Sudan conflict, which began in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has entered its third year with unabated violence. To forecast conflict deaths for the remainder of 2025, I need to carefully analyze recent developments and mortality trends.
Based on the most current information (as of April 19, 2025), the conflict shows no signs of resolution. The SAF has regained control of Khartoum, while the RSF maintains dominance in Darfur and portions of southern Sudan. This territorial division suggests continued armed confrontation throughout 2025.
## Recent Death Toll Indicators
Several recent indicators are particularly concerning:
1. In mid-April 2025, over 300 civilian deaths were reported in North Darfur in just 48 hours, suggesting an extremely high daily casualty rate in active combat zones.
2. Reports from El Fasher indicate at least 57 deaths in recent clashes, with some sources reporting up to 400 killed in attacks.
3. The cumulative death toll from April 2023 through early 2025 is estimated at approximately 150,000 by multiple sources, though UN officially confirmed counts are lower at around 24,000, likely due to verification challenges.
## Mortality Drivers for Remainder of 2025
Four key factors will drive mortality in the remaining 8+ months of 2025:
1. **Direct Combat Deaths**: The recent intensity of fighting (300+ deaths in 48 hours) suggests high ongoing combat mortality.
2. **Famine Impact**: Famine has been officially declared in North Darfur, with malnutrition affecting over 770,000 children under five. Historical data suggests famine substantially increases conflict-related mortality.
3. **Disease Outbreaks**: The WHO reports severe health crises exacerbated by attacks on healthcare facilities, which will contribute to indirect conflict mortality.
4. **Humanitarian Access Constraints**: Aid funding is severely inadequate, with only a fraction of required assistance secured for 2025, limiting life-saving interventions.
## Statistical Projection for 2025
Since we’re in April 2025 and need to forecast deaths for the entire year, I need to:
1. Estimate deaths already occurred (January-April 2025)
2. Project deaths for the remaining 8+ months
Given recent death rates:
– The spike of 300+ deaths in 48 hours equates to 150 deaths per day in conflict hotspots
– More conservative estimates might place the average closer to 40-60 deaths per day countrywide
For a moderate projection using 50 deaths per day:
– January-April 2025 (approximately 110 days): ~5,500 deaths
– May-December 2025 (approximately 245 days): ~12,250 deaths
– Total 2025 projection: ~17,750 deaths
For a lower projection using 30 deaths per day:
– Total 2025 projection: ~10,650 deaths
For a high-intensity projection using 75 deaths per day:
– Total 2025 projection: ~26,625 deaths
## Assessing Range Probabilities
The death toll projections must be evaluated against our answer options:
**Less than 1,000**: Extremely unlikely given that we’re already in April 2025 with escalating conflict. Recent spikes in a single location (300+ deaths in 48 hours) already approach this threshold.
**Between 1,000 and 3,000**: Highly unlikely given reported death rates. Even with significant de-escalation, deaths from January-April already approach or exceed this range.
**Between 3,000 and 5,000**: Unlikely. The conflict would need to dramatically de-escalate immediately and remain minimal for the rest of the year to fall in this range.
**Between 5,000 and 8,000**: Low probability. This would require substantial de-escalation and significantly improved humanitarian access throughout the remainder of 2025.
**Between 8,000 and 12,000**: Moderate probability. This range aligns with our lower projection and would require some moderation of current violence levels.
**More than 12,000**: Highest probability. This range aligns with our moderate and high projections, considering current intensity, humanitarian crisis, and limited prospects for peace.
## Uncertainty Factors
Several factors introduce uncertainty:
– Limited verification capacity in conflict zones
– Potential for peace negotiations (though currently unlikely)
– Seasonal variations in conflict intensity
– Indirect mortality attribution challenges
Given these considerations and the evidence available, here is my probability distribution:
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 2
Option_C: 7
Option_D: 14
Option_E: 26
Option_F: 50
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.14, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.26, ‘More than 12000’: 0.5}
GPT Multiple Choice JSON response:
Option_A: 2
Option_B: 7
Option_C: 10
Option_D: 20
Option_E: 28
Option_F: 33
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.07, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.2, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.28, ‘More than 12000’: 0.33}
GPT Multiple Choice JSON response:
Option_A: 2
Option_B: 12
Option_C: 17
Option_D: 19
Option_E: 18
Option_F: 32
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.12, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.17, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.19, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.18, ‘More than 12000’: 0.32}
Gemini Multiple Choice response:
Based on the analysis of the current situation in Sudan as of April 19, 2025, the conflict dynamics, and the humanitarian catastrophe, here is the rationale for the forecast regarding conflict deaths in 2025:
1. **Ongoing High-Intensity Conflict:** The war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which began in April 2023, continues unabated into its third year. Recent reports from mid-April 2025 highlight significant escalations and heavy fighting, particularly in North Darfur, with hundreds of deaths reported in just a few days. There are no credible signs of imminent de-escalation or a lasting peace agreement. The UN warns that the worst may be yet to come.
2. **Cumulative Death Toll & Implied Rate:** While estimates of the total death toll since April 2023 vary (from UN’s 24,000 to other estimates of 150,000), even the lower figures imply substantial violence. Using the higher, more frequently cited estimate of ~150,000 deaths by early 2025 (over roughly 21 months), the implied average monthly death rate was significant (around 7,000, potentially including indirect deaths). Even if only a fraction of this rate represents direct conflict deaths and continues through 2025, it points towards a high annual total for 2025. The recent spikes in violence (hundreds killed in days) reinforce the likelihood of continued high casualty rates.
3. **Aggravating Humanitarian Factors:** The conflict has created one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, characterized by mass displacement (13-15 million), collapsing healthcare, widespread disease outbreaks, and severe food insecurity. Famine has been declared or is imminent in several areas. These factors significantly increase the risk of death, both directly from violence and indirectly from starvation and disease exacerbated by the conflict. While the question likely focuses on direct conflict deaths, the overall environment increases population vulnerability and potential casualty counts in attacks.
4. **Assessment of Probability Ranges:**
* **< 5000 deaths:** These lower ranges appear extremely unlikely given the conflict’s current intensity and scale, recent casualty reports, and the duration remaining in 2025. Achieving such low numbers would require an almost immediate and widespread cessation of hostilities, which is contrary to all available evidence.
* **5000-12000 deaths:** These mid-ranges are possible but seem improbable. They would imply a significant reduction in conflict intensity compared to the inferred historical average or recent peaks, or potentially rely on a very conservative methodology for counting deaths by the resolving source. While some uncertainty exists regarding data collection and future events, the current trajectory doesn’t favour these outcomes.
* **> 12000 deaths:** This range appears highly likely. An average of just over 1000 deaths per month (12000/12) is needed to reach this threshold. Given the historical context, the recent spikes (hundreds dead in days), the ongoing military operations, the humanitarian collapse, and the lack of peace prospects, it is probable that direct conflict deaths in 2025 will substantially exceed this number.
5. **Accounting for Uncertainty:** Despite the strong evidence pointing towards >12,000 deaths, the forecast incorporates uncertainty regarding the precise definition of “conflict deaths,” the reliability and methodology of the resolving data source (given the discrepancies in current estimates), and the possibility, however remote, of unforeseen changes in the conflict dynamics before year-end. Therefore, while the highest probability is assigned to the “> 12000” category, non-negligible probabilities are assigned to the lower categories (particularly 8k-12k) to reflect this uncertainty and mitigate overconfidence risk under Brier scoring. The probabilities assigned reflect a strong conviction, based on current information, that the death toll will be high, significantly exceeding 12,000 for the calendar year 2025.
Less than 1000: 1
Between 1000 and 3000: 1
Between 3000 and 5000: 2
Between 5000 and 8000: 4
Between 8000 and 12000: 10
More than 12000: 82
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.01, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.02, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.04, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.1, ‘More than 12000’: 0.82}
GPT Multiple Choice JSON response:
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 4
Option_C: 7
Option_D: 13
Option_E: 30
Option_F: 45
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.04, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.13, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.3, ‘More than 12000’: 0.45}
________________________
Anthropic response:
# Analysis of Conflict Deaths in Sudan for 2025
## Current Context Assessment
To forecast Sudan’s conflict deaths for 2025, I need to carefully analyze the current situation while acknowledging we’re already in April 2025, meaning approximately one-third of the year has passed.
The Sudan conflict, which began in April 2023, has now entered its third year with devastating humanitarian consequences. Recent reports provide somewhat conflicting death toll figures, which is common in active conflicts:
– MEI and CFR report approximately 150,000 cumulative deaths as of January-April 2025
– UN tallies show around 24,000 deaths (likely representing only verified casualties)
– Recent escalation includes over 300 civilian deaths in just two days in Darfur (April 2025)
– Other sources report 57-400 deaths in recent attacks (April 2025)
## Current Violence Intensity and Patterns
The conflict shows signs of intensifying rather than abating:
– Recent SAF recapture of Khartoum has prompted RSF vows of retaliation
– Continued heavy fighting in Darfur with mass casualties (300+ in two days)
– The UN Fact-Finding Mission warns that “the conflict’s darkest chapters have yet to unfold”
– El Fasher in North Darfur is experiencing particularly intense fighting
The daily death rate appears to be spiking based on recent incidents. If the 300 deaths in 48 hours (150/day) in just one region were representative of the conflict’s overall intensity, this would project to extremely high annual totals. However, such intense periods are typically interspersed with lower-casualty periods.
## Humanitarian Crisis as a Death Multiplier
Beyond direct combat deaths, several factors are amplifying mortality:
– Widespread famine has been officially declared in North Darfur
– 30.4 million people require humanitarian assistance
– 3.2 million children face acute malnutrition
– 770,000 children expected to suffer severe malnutrition in 2025
– Healthcare system collapse with attacks on medical facilities
– Severe funding gaps for humanitarian response
– Agricultural collapse threatening food production
These factors suggest indirect conflict deaths (from disease, malnutrition, and lack of healthcare) will significantly contribute to the total.
## Forecasting Methodology
Looking at the daily death rates from recent reports:
– 300+ deaths in 2 days (150+/day) in one region
– 57-400 deaths in “recent attacks” (timing unclear)
Even if the highest intensity (150/day) is not sustained throughout the year, and accounting for reporting gaps, the violence appears severe. If we conservatively estimate an average of 50-100 deaths per day across all regions (both direct and indirect) for the remainder of 2025, this would project to:
– Remaining days in 2025 (approx. 256 days) × 50-100 deaths/day = 12,800-25,600 deaths
Additionally, we must account for deaths that have already occurred in the first 1/3 of 2025 (January-April), which would add several thousand more to the total.
## Forecast for Conflict Deaths in Sudan in 2025
Given the recent spike in violence, humanitarian collapse, and expert warnings about the conflict worsening, the most probable outcome is that conflict deaths in Sudan for 2025 will exceed 12,000. The lower ranges seem highly implausible given current intensity and the fact that we’re already in April with significant casualties reported.
While there’s some uncertainty due to conflicting death tolls and the challenge of comprehensive reporting in conflict zones, the evidence strongly suggests that 2025’s death toll will be in the highest category among the options provided.
Even if peace negotiations began immediately (which seems unlikely), the humanitarian crisis alone would continue to cause significant mortality throughout 2025.
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 2
Option_C: 5
Option_D: 7
Option_E: 15
Option_F: 70
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.05, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.07, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.15, ‘More than 12000’: 0.7}
All predictions:
[{‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.12, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.17, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.19, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.18, ‘More than 12000’: 0.32}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.07, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.2, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.28, ‘More than 12000’: 0.33}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.04, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.13, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.3, ‘More than 12000’: 0.45}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.14, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.26, ‘More than 12000’: 0.5}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.05, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.24, ‘More than 12000’: 0.55}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.05, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.1, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.16, ‘More than 12000’: 0.65}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.04, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.08, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.15, ‘More than 12000’: 0.7}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.05, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.07, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.15, ‘More than 12000’: 0.7}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.01, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.02, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.04, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.1, ‘More than 12000’: 0.82}]
Filtered predictions:
[{‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.04, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.13, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.3, ‘More than 12000’: 0.45}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.14, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.26, ‘More than 12000’: 0.5}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.05, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.24, ‘More than 12000’: 0.55}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.05, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.1, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.16, ‘More than 12000’: 0.65}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.04, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.08, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.15, ‘More than 12000’: 0.7}]
Averaged predictions:
{‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.04, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.13, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.3, ‘More than 12000’: 0.45}
Median reasoning:
All Predictions:
[{‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.12, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.17, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.19, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.18, ‘More than 12000’: 0.32}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.07, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.2, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.28, ‘More than 12000’: 0.33}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.04, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.13, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.3, ‘More than 12000’: 0.45}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.14, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.26, ‘More than 12000’: 0.5}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.05, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.24, ‘More than 12000’: 0.55}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.05, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.1, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.16, ‘More than 12000’: 0.65}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.04, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.08, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.15, ‘More than 12000’: 0.7}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.05, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.07, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.15, ‘More than 12000’: 0.7}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.01, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.02, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.04, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.1, ‘More than 12000’: 0.82}]
Median Reasoning:
EXTRACTED_PROBABILITIES: [1, 3, 5, 12, 24, 55]
Model’s Answer:
# Analysis of Sudan Conflict Deaths in 2025
To forecast the number of conflict deaths in Sudan for 2025, I need to carefully analyze recent developments alongside historical patterns while considering we’re already in mid-April 2025, with approximately 8.5 months remaining in the year.
## Current State of the Conflict
The Sudan conflict, which began in April 2023, is now in its third year with no signs of resolution. Multiple sources confirm that the situation remains severe:
1. **Death Toll to Date**: Sources indicate that cumulative deaths since the conflict began in April 2023 range from 24,000 (UN’s conservative count) to approximately 150,000 (higher estimates from MEI and CFR). This discrepancy likely reflects differences in counting methodology, with the UN typically reporting only verified deaths.
2. **Recent Escalation**: Particularly concerning is the report of over 300 civilian deaths in just two days in North Darfur in mid-April 2025. This suggests an intensification of violence. Additional reports mention 57 deaths in El Fasher and 400 killed in recent attacks.
3. **Territorial Control**: The SAF has regained control of Khartoum, while the RSF controls most of Darfur and parts of the south. This territorial split increases the likelihood of continued fighting.
4. **Humanitarian Crisis**: Famine has been declared in North Darfur, with 30.4 million people needing aid and 3.2 million children facing acute malnutrition. These conditions typically increase mortality beyond direct combat deaths.
## Death Rate Estimation
To estimate the 2025 death toll, I need to consider:
1. **Deaths Already Occurred**: Since we’re in mid-April, approximately 3.5 months of 2025 have elapsed. If we assume the conflict has maintained relatively consistent intensity, a significant portion of the annual death toll has already occurred.
2. **Recent Death Rate**: The report of 300+ deaths in two days indicates a potential rate of 150 deaths per day in high-intensity periods. While this rate may not be sustained throughout the year, it suggests that even brief periods of intense fighting can substantially increase the death toll.
3. **Indirect Deaths**: The famine and collapse of healthcare systems will contribute to the overall death toll, though these may be counted differently depending on the source.
## Calculation Approach
Let’s consider different scenarios:
1. **Conservative Scenario**: Assuming a lower average of 30 direct conflict deaths per day for the remainder of 2025 (about 20% of the recently reported peak):
– 30 deaths/day × 255 days remaining ≈ 7,650 deaths
– Plus an estimated 3,000-4,000 deaths from January through mid-April
– Total: 10,650-11,650 deaths
2. **Moderate Scenario**: Assuming an average of 50 direct conflict deaths per day:
– 50 deaths/day × 255 days remaining ≈ 12,750 deaths
– Plus an estimated 5,000-6,000 deaths from January through mid-April
– Total: 17,750-18,750 deaths
3. **High-Intensity Scenario**: Assuming periods of intense fighting similar to recent reports:
– 75 deaths/day × 255 days remaining ≈ 19,125 deaths
– Plus an estimated 7,000-9,000 deaths from January through mid-April
– Total: 26,125-28,125 deaths
Given the recent escalation, territorial divisions, and humanitarian crisis, I believe the moderate to high-intensity scenarios are more likely than the conservative one.
## Forecast Confidence and Adjustments
Several factors increase uncertainty in this forecast:
1. **Potential Peace Process**: Although unlikely given recent reports, a successful peace agreement could dramatically reduce deaths in the latter part of 2025.
2. **Seasonal Variations**: Conflict intensity may vary with seasonal factors like weather conditions.
3. **Data Reliability**: The significant discrepancy between reported death counts (24,000 vs. 150,000) indicates substantial uncertainty in mortality data.
4. **Humanitarian Crisis Acceleration**: The worsening famine could cause indirect deaths to increase exponentially.
Given these uncertainties and to avoid overconfidence, I need to distribute probability across multiple outcomes while weighing heavily toward the higher death toll ranges given recent trends.
## Final Forecast
Based on the analysis of recent developments, historical patterns, and the current trajectory of the conflict, my forecast for Sudan conflict deaths in 2025 is:
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 3
Option_C: 5
Option_D: 12
Option_E: 24
Option_F: 55
=== Forecast Result ===
{
“probability_yes”: null,
“probability_yes_per_category”: {
“Less than 1000”: 0.01,
“Between 1000 and 3000”: 0.027999999999999997,
“Between 3000 and 5000”: 0.055999999999999994,
“Between 5000 and 8000”: 0.11399999999999999,
“Between 8000 and 12000”: 0.22200000000000003,
“More than 12000”: 0.57
},
“continuous_cdf”: null
}
=== Reasoning ===
All Predictions:
[{‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.12, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.17, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.19, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.18, ‘More than 12000’: 0.32}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.07, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.2, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.28, ‘More than 12000’: 0.33}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.04, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.13, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.3, ‘More than 12000’: 0.45}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.14, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.26, ‘More than 12000’: 0.5}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.05, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.24, ‘More than 12000’: 0.55}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.05, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.1, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.16, ‘More than 12000’: 0.65}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.04, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.08, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.15, ‘More than 12000’: 0.7}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.05, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.07, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.15, ‘More than 12000’: 0.7}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.01, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.02, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.04, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.1, ‘More than 12000’: 0.82}]
Median Reasoning:
EXTRACTED_PROBABILITIES: [1, 3, 5, 12, 24, 55]
Model’s Answer:
# Analysis of Sudan Conflict Deaths in 2025
To forecast the number of conflict deaths in Sudan for 2025, I need to carefully analyze recent developments alongside historical patterns while considering we’re already in mid-April 2025, with approximately 8.5 months remaining in the year.
## Current State of the Conflict
The Sudan conflict, which began in April 2023, is now in its third year with no signs of resolution. Multiple sources confirm that the situation remains severe:
1. **Death Toll to Date**: Sources indicate that cumulative deaths since the conflict began in April 2023 range from 24,000 (UN’s conservative count) to approximately 150,000 (higher estimates from MEI and CFR). This discrepancy likely reflects differences in counting methodology, with the UN typically reporting only verified deaths.
2. **Recent Escalation**: Particularly concerning is the report of over 300 civilian deaths in just two days in North Darfur in mid-April 2025. This suggests an intensification of violence. Additional reports mention 57 deaths in El Fasher and 400 killed in recent attacks.
3. **Territorial Control**: The SAF has regained control of Khartoum, while the RSF controls most of Darfur and parts of the south. This territorial split increases the likelihood of continued fighting.
4. **Humanitarian Crisis**: Famine has been declared in North Darfur, with 30.4 million people needing aid and 3.2 million children facing acute malnutrition. These conditions typically increase mortality beyond direct combat deaths.
## Death Rate Estimation
To estimate the 2025 death toll, I need to consider:
1. **Deaths Already Occurred**: Since we’re in mid-April, approximately 3.5 months of 2025 have elapsed. If we assume the conflict has maintained relatively consistent intensity, a significant portion of the annual death toll has already occurred.
2. **Recent Death Rate**: The report of 300+ deaths in two days indicates a potential rate of 150 deaths per day in high-intensity periods. While this rate may not be sustained throughout the year, it suggests that even brief periods of intense fighting can substantially increase the death toll.
3. **Indirect Deaths**: The famine and collapse of healthcare systems will contribute to the overall death toll, though these may be counted differently depending on the source.
## Calculation Approach
Let’s consider different scenarios:
1. **Conservative Scenario**: Assuming a lower average of 30 direct conflict deaths per day for the remainder of 2025 (about 20% of the recently reported peak):
– 30 deaths/day × 255 days remaining ≈ 7,650 deaths
– Plus an estimated 3,000-4,000 deaths from January through mid-April
– Total: 10,650-11,650 deaths
2. **Moderate Scenario**: Assuming an average of 50 direct conflict deaths per day:
– 50 deaths/day × 255 days remaining ≈ 12,750 deaths
– Plus an estimated 5,000-6,000 deaths from January through mid-April
– Total: 17,750-18,750 deaths
3. **High-Intensity Scenario**: Assuming periods of intense fighting similar to recent reports:
– 75 deaths/day × 255 days remaining ≈ 19,125 deaths
– Plus an estimated 7,000-9,000 deaths from January through mid-April
– Total: 26,125-28,125 deaths
Given the recent escalation, territorial divisions, and humanitarian crisis, I believe the moderate to high-intensity scenarios are more likely than the conservative one.
## Forecast Confidence and Adjustments
Several factors increase uncertainty in this forecast:
1. **Potential Peace Process**: Although unlikely given recent reports, a successful peace agreement could dramatically reduce deaths in the latter part of 2025.
2. **Seasonal Variations**: Conflict intensity may vary with seasonal factors like weather conditions.
3. **Data Reliability**: The significant discrepancy between reported death counts (24,000 vs. 150,000) indicates substantial uncertainty in mortality data.
4. **Humanitarian Crisis Acceleration**: The worsening famine could cause indirect deaths to increase exponentially.
Given these uncertainties and to avoid overconfidence, I need to distribute probability across multiple outcomes while weighing heavily toward the higher death toll ranges given recent trends.
## Final Forecast
Based on the analysis of recent developments, historical patterns, and the current trajectory of the conflict, my forecast for Sudan conflict deaths in 2025 is:
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 3
Option_C: 5
Option_D: 12
Option_E: 24
Option_F: 55
Model’s Answer: # Analysis of Sudan Conflict Deaths in 2025
To forecast the number of conflict deaths in Sudan for 2025, I need to carefully analyze recent developments alongside historical patterns while considering we’re already in mid-April 2025, with approximately 8.5 months remaining in the year.
## Current State of the Conflict
The Sudan conflict, which began in April 2023, is now in its third year with no signs of resolution. Multiple sources confirm that the situation remains severe:
1. **Death Toll to Date**: Sources indicate that cumulative deaths since the conflict began in April 2023 range from 24,000 (UN’s conservative count) to approximately 150,000 (higher estimates from MEI and CFR). This discrepancy likely reflects differences in counting methodology, with the UN typically reporting only verified deaths.
2. **Recent Escalation**: Particularly concerning is the report of over 300 civilian deaths in just two days in North Darfur in mid-April 2025. This suggests an intensification of violence. Additional reports mention 57 deaths in El Fasher and 400 killed in recent attacks.
3. **Territorial Control**: The SAF has regained control of Khartoum, while the RSF controls most of Darfur and parts of the south. This territorial split increases the likelihood of continued fighting.
4. **Humanitarian Crisis**: Famine has been declared in North Darfur, with 30.4 million people needing aid and 3.2 million children facing acute malnutrition. These conditions typically increase mortality beyond direct combat deaths.
## Death Rate Estimation
To estimate the 2025 death toll, I need to consider:
1. **Deaths Already Occurred**: Since we’re in mid-April, approximately 3.5 months of 2025 have elapsed. If we assume the conflict has maintained relatively consistent intensity, a significant portion of the annual death toll has already occurred.
2. **Recent Death Rate**: The report of 300+ deaths in two days indicates a potential rate of 150 deaths per day in high-intensity periods. While this rate may not be sustained throughout the year, it suggests that even brief periods of intense fighting can substantially increase the death toll.
3. **Indirect Deaths**: The famine and collapse of healthcare systems will contribute to the overall death toll, though these may be counted differently depending on the source.
## Calculation Approach
Let’s consider different scenarios:
1. **Conservative Scenario**: Assuming a lower average of 30 direct conflict deaths per day for the remainder of 2025 (about 20% of the recently reported peak):
– 30 deaths/day × 255 days remaining ≈ 7,650 deaths
– Plus an estimated 3,000-4,000 deaths from January through mid-April
– Total: 10,650-11,650 deaths
2. **Moderate Scenario**: Assuming an average of 50 direct conflict deaths per day:
– 50 deaths/day × 255 days remaining ≈ 12,750 deaths
– Plus an estimated 5,000-6,000 deaths from January through mid-April
– Total: 17,750-18,750 deaths
3. **High-Intensity Scenario**: Assuming periods of intense fighting similar to recent reports:
– 75 deaths/day × 255 days remaining ≈ 19,125 deaths
– Plus an estimated 7,000-9,000 deaths from January through mid-April
– Total: 26,125-28,125 deaths
Given the recent escalation, territorial divisions, and humanitarian crisis, I believe the moderate to high-intensity scenarios are more likely than the conservative one.
## Forecast Confidence and Adjustments
Several factors increase uncertainty in this forecast:
1. **Potential Peace Process**: Although unlikely given recent reports, a successful peace agreement could dramatically reduce deaths in the latter part of 2025.
2. **Seasonal Variations**: Conflict intensity may vary with seasonal factors like weather conditions.
3. **Data Reliability**: The significant discrepancy between reported death counts (24,000 vs. 150,000) indicates substantial uncertainty in mortality data.
4. **Humanitarian Crisis Acceleration**: The worsening famine could cause indirect deaths to increase exponentially.
Given these uncertainties and to avoid overconfidence, I need to distribute probability across multiple outcomes while weighing heavily toward the higher death toll ranges given recent trends.
## Final Forecast
Based on the analysis of recent developments, historical patterns, and the current trajectory of the conflict, my forecast for Sudan conflict deaths in 2025 is:
Model value:
* Less than 1000: 1%
* Between 1000 and 3000: 3%
* Between 3000 and 5000: 5%
* Between 5000 and 8000: 12%
* Between 8000 and 12000: 24%
* More than 12000: 55%
Details on how Phil’s bot arrived at these forecasts –>
–>
Past forecasts by both Phil and Jeremy on Sudan’s conflict fatalities —>
Background on VIEWS: Near the end of 2024, the latest forecasting competition of the Violence and Impacts Early-Warning System (VIEWS) was launched. On Dec. 4, 2024, during a telecon, a group of machine forecasting experts involved in VIEWS observed Jeremy’s demonstration of his Multi-AI Oracle. Although it was too late for Jeremy to sign up as a VIEWS competitor, they urged him to run a side competition for everyone’s benefit. Jeremy chose their Sudan conflict deaths question.
Below, map of control in Sudan’s civil war as of April 15, 2025.
Below, before and after pictures of the devastation of the civil war in Sudan.
Carolyn has checked Sudan’s news sites below to ensure that they are still in operation. However, given the widespread violence in Sudan, any of these could go offline without warning.
https://www.alnilin.com/
https://www.alrakoba.net/
https://www.altaghyeer.info/ar/
https://www.altaghyeer.info/en/
https://www.alttahrer.com/
https://www.alzaeemsd.com/
https://www.assayha.net
https://www.cover-sd.com/
https://kushnews.net/
https://rakobanews.com
https://www.sudanakhbar.com/
https://sudanjem.com/
https://suna-sd.net/en
https://sudantimes.net/
https://www.sudantribune.net/
https://www.sudantribune.com/
https://sudaneseonline.com/
https://www.sudanile.com/
https://sudanow-magazine.net/
https://www.sudaress.com/
https://www.tagpress.net/
