Sudan updates from AI Botmaster Jeremy Lichtman of March 31, 2025

How many conflict deaths will there be in Sudan in 2025?

Jeremy’s most recent version of his Multi-AI Oracle is a side competitor with the machine forecasting bots of the VIEWS competition.

Obtaining outside data. Checking internet sources, using keywords: Sudan conflict deaths 2025
Results from around the web: {think}

Okay, let me try to figure out how to approach this query. The user is asking for current web results related to the Sudan conflict in 2025, including any relevant data tables and a time series if applicable.

First, I need to look through the provided search results to find information about the conflict in 2025. The search results include articles from March 2025, which is the current date. Let me check each source:

1. **Source [1]**: Vatican News from March 30, 2025, mentions the escalation in Sudan’s civil war and South Sudan’s renewed threat. Key points: SAF retook the presidential palace in Khartoum, significant victory against RSF. The UN describes it as the largest humanitarian crisis with famine and displacement.

2. **Source [4]**: Understanding War.org’s Africa File from March 27, 2025. Details SAF fully retaking central Khartoum, clearing RSF pockets. Foreign involvement from Russia, UAE, Iran, etc. Also, SAF planning a new government post-victory.

3. **Source [6]**: Wikipedia page on the Sudanese civil war (2023–present) updated as of March 30, 2025. Highlights SAF regaining control in Khartoum North by February 2025, RSF declaring a rival government in Nairobi. Casualty figures: 61,000 killed in Khartoum State, 8.8 million displaced.

4. **Source [8]**: Timeline from Wikipedia for 2024, but includes events up to March 2025. Mentions SAF’s major offensives, airstrikes, and humanitarian issues like famine in Zamzam camp.

Other sources provide background on past conflicts but don’t have 2025 data.

Now, compiling the main developments in 2025:

**Military Advances**: SAF recaptured central Khartoum, presidential palace, and Khartoum International Airport by March 2025. RSF is retreating but still holds parts of Omdurman.
**Humanitarian Crisis**: Famine in Zamzam camp, millions displaced, 12,000+ killed.
**Foreign Involvement**: Russia, UAE, Iran, Turkey supplying weapons. SAF using drones from Egypt and Turkey.
**Political Moves**: SAF plans a new government; RSF declared a rival government in Nairobi.

The user also asked for tables. The relevant data includes military control areas, foreign support, and casualty statistics.

For the time series table, maybe use the timeline from source [8] but it’s up to August 2024. Since the current info is March 2025, the time series might not be feasible unless there’s monthly data for 2025. The available data is more about events than numerical time series, so maybe skip that part.

Let me summarize the key points with citations, create tables for military control and foreign involvement, and mention the humanitarian stats. I need to ensure all info is from 2025 sources and cited properly. As of March 2025, Sudan’s civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has reached a critical phase, marked by SAF’s military gains, escalating foreign involvement, and catastrophic humanitarian conditions.

## Key Developments in 2025
**SAF Retakes Khartoum**:
– The SAF recaptured central Khartoum in March 2025, including the Presidential Palace and Khartoum International Airport, marking its largest victory since the civil war began[4][6].
– RSF fighters retreated to southwestern Khartoum and Omdurman, where they continue shelling and drone strikes[4].

**Foreign Military Involvement**:


This proxy conflict has intensified battlefield dynamics, with Russia switching allegiance from RSF to SAF in 2024[4][6].

**Humanitarian Crisis**:
– **Famine**: Over 3 million face famine in Darfur and South Kordofan[8], with families in Zamzam camp eating grass[1].
– **Casualties**: At least 12,000 killed, 33,000+ injured, and 8.8 million displaced nationwide[2][6].
## Recent Strategic Shifts
– The SAF announced plans to form a transitional government after securing Khartoum, potentially reopening parliament[4].
– The RSF declared a rival government in Nairobi, Kenya, though it lacks international recognition[6].

## Military Control as of March 2025


The RSF aims to enforce a de facto partition, while the SAF seeks to reestablish centralized authority[4][6].

**Ongoing Risks**:
– Both factions reject negotiations, opting for “total war”[6].
– SAF increasingly relies on Islamist militias like the Al-Bara’ ibn Malik Battalion[6].
– This conflict remains the world’s largest humanitarian emergency, with no clear resolution in sight[1][4].

OpenAI gives a base rate of Likely scenarios
The question difficulty is rated 8 (0 to 10)
Sufficient news to provide a good forecast? 1 (0 or 1)
News is relevant, topical and unbiased? 1 (0 or 1)
Question classification: scenario_based_forecast
Expected time (days) until question close: 180

The following were considered in order to produce this base rate:
Based on historical precedence, similar conflicts without strong international intervention tend to protract. The military gains by the SAF suggest a continuation of current control dynamics, while the RSF’s lack of international recognition for a government and sustained famine conditions are significant indicators.

Ideally, the news feed would contain the following sorts of information for a better forecast:
Additional information on internal faction strategies, possible peace talks under discussion, or any changes in foreign governments’ foreign policy towards Sudan would improve the forecast accuracy.

Some potential divergent considerations that might affect the base rate: Potential unforeseen international intervention could alter the stability or lead to peace agreements. Additionally, a significant policy shift from key supporting nations like Russia or Egypt may affect ongoing support.

The following chain of events are necessary for the question to resolve positively:
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) must maintain control over the key regions in Khartoum and other strategic areas. Likely – The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) must be unable to reclaim or consolidate control over significant territories. Likely – Humanitarian crisis remains unabated with continued international aid dependency. Very likely – Foreign countries continue their military and strategic support to either of the factions. Very likely – No significant peace treaty or negotiations occur within the considered time frame. Very likely

Querying Claude (AI predicts: [“Less than 1000”: 0.02, “Between 1000 and 3000”: 0.08, “Between 3000 and 5000”: 0.15, “Between 5000 and 8000”: 0.25, “Between 8000 and 12000”: 0.3, “More than 12000”: 0.2] – confidence: 6)

Querying Mistral (AI predicts: [“Less than 1000”: 0.01, “Between 1000 and 3000”: 0.05, “Between 3000 and 5000”: 0.2, “Between 5000 and 8000”: 0.35, “Between 8000 and 12000”: 0.3, “More than 12000”: 0.09] – confidence: 6)

Querying OpenAI (AI predicts: [“Less than 1000”: 0.01, “Between 1000 and 3000”: 0.05, “Between 3000 and 5000”: 0.1, “Between 5000 and 8000”: 0.2, “Between 8000 and 12000”: 0.3, “More than 12000”: 0.34] – confidence: 6)

Question Type: Multiple Choice
Confidence: 6
# LLM responses: 3

Model value:
* Less than 1000: 1%
* Between 1000 and 3000: 5%
* Between 3000 and 5000: 16%
* Between 5000 and 8000: 26%
* Between 8000 and 12000: 31%
* More than 12000: 21%

The current situation in Sudan, as of March 2025, is marked by ongoing intense fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), with SAF gaining ground in Khartoum while RSF holds other regions. A severe humanitarian crisis, including widespread famine and displacement, exacerbates the conflict, with foreign military support from countries like Russia, UAE, Iran, and Egypt contributing to the violence. Historical precedents suggest high casualty rates, with over 12,000 killed in similar conflicts. Negotiations are unlikely as both sides reject talks, and the introduction of advanced weaponry like drones intensifies the situation. However, unexpected international interventions or shifts in foreign support could alter the trajectory, potentially leading to peace agreements or changes in combat dynamics. The outcome remains uncertain due to these variable factors..

Past forecasts on Sudan’s conflict fatalities —>

Guide to Multi-AI Oracle’s Reports (some of these only apply to older versions)
Median: We collect the output values from the LLMs in an array. We then take the median value. This is between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0.15 = 15%).
Base rate: Currently we take OpenAI’s value as the base rate. We are working on a better value using a different prompt that takes into account process. The base rate helps to determine if the median makes sense.
SD: The standard deviation between the median and the base rate.
Confidence: We query each of the LLMs on how confident they are of their predictions (between 0 and 10) and take a median. Because the LLMs tend to be overconfident, we take anything lower than 6 as being low confidence. This factors into the overall model.
Conf Mode: Based on the confidence value. >=9 is high confidence. Below 6 is low confidence (this is also triggered by an exceptionally high SD).
Mellers: This refers to Barbara Mellers, specifically a paper she wrote that includes a formula for moving values towards an extreme (i.e. 0 or 1).
Reverse Mellers: This uses the formula from above, but with a sub-1 coefficient to move the values closer to 50%.
Theory of Mind: We ask the LLMs what they think other LLMs would predict. We hope that this makes them consider the questions more deeply.
Beta Distribution: Currently unused, but possibly of interest. This is based on the median, the base rate and the SD.
Close Type: We noticed that the appropriate base case for some questions is closer to the extremes, while others are closer to 50%. When we have a low confidence value, this helps us to determine whether to extremize or de-extremize the value. ‘A’ implies closer to zero. ‘B’ implies closer to 50%. ‘C’ implies closer to 100%.
# LLM Responses: The count of LLMs that responded. We query 5 currently, but they have a relatively high API failure rate.
Model value: For normal confidence mode, this is the median. For high confidence, this is the Mellers value. For low confidence, this is either the Mellers or Revers


Background on VIEWS: Near the end of 2024, the latest forecasting competition of the Violence and Impacts Early-Warning System (VIEWS) was launched. On Dec. 4, 2024, during a telecon, a group of machine forecasting experts involved in VIEWS observed Jeremy’s demonstration of his Multi-AI Oracle. Although it was too late for Jeremy to sign up as a VIEWS competitor, they urged him to run a side competition for everyone’s benefit. Jeremy chose their Sudan conflict deaths question.

Background on the Sudan conflict, as evaluated by the team of Jeremy Lichtman and Carolyn Meinel:
(1) The importance of the Sahel, a region in Africa that includes Sudan:
Why the Sahel Actually Matters (Possibly To You, Too)
(2) April 29, 2024: Today, a Russian diplomat is negotiating gold mining with the Sudanese Minister of Minerals.
(3) June 3, 2024: Today the African Union Announced Plans to Mediate in Sudan’s Civil War
(4) Sept. 11, 2024 Over 100K starvation deaths 96% likely in Sudan by 1 Jan 2025
Carolyn has checked Sudan’s news sites below to ensure that they are still in operation. However, given the widespread violence in Sudan, any of these could go offline without warning.

https://www.alnilin.com/
https://www.alrakoba.net/
https://www.altaghyeer.info/ar/
https://www.altaghyeer.info/en/
https://www.alttahrer.com/
https://www.alzaeemsd.com/
https://www.assayha.net
https://www.cover-sd.com/
https://kushnews.net/
https://rakobanews.com
https://www.sudanakhbar.com/
https://sudanjem.com/
https://suna-sd.net/en
https://sudantimes.net/
https://www.sudantribune.net/
https://www.sudantribune.com/
https://sudaneseonline.com/
https://www.sudanile.com/
https://sudanow-magazine.net/
https://www.sudaress.com/
https://www.tagpress.net/

Below, a screenshot from VIEWS forecasting conflict fatalities in Sudan through January 2028. Below that, satellite images of the devastation in Sudan.





Below, before and after pictures of the devastation of the civil war in Sudan.

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