Botmaster Phil Godzin’s Sudan conflict deaths forecast, Sept. 5, 2025

How many state-based conflict deaths in Sudan will be reported by ACLED in 2025?

Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai predicts today:
Less than 1,000: 0%
Between 1,000 and 3,000: 0%
Between 3,000 and 5,000: 0%
Between 5,000 and 8,000: 5%
Between 8,000 and 12,000: 60%
More than 12,000: 35%

15–19 minutes read (This is a condensed version of pgodzinai’s results. Full rationale here —>)

Perplexity response:

The search results do not contain the specific ACLED death count data for Sudan in 2025 that would be necessary to make an informed forecast.

Grok response:

**Title**: Sudan | International Crisis Group
**Description**: Analysis of Sudan’s ongoing civil war and its regional implications.
**Date of Publication**: September 2, 2025.
**3-Sentence Summary**: This report details the escalation of fighting between the Sudanese army and Rapid Support Forces, noting that instability has led to thousands of deaths in 2025 alone, with a focus on Darfur and Khartoum. It highlights how external actors are exacerbating the conflict, potentially increasing state-based violence. ACLED data referenced in the report shows a rise in fatalities, with preliminary 2025 figures exceeding 6,000 as of mid-year, driven by territorial disputes.
**Title**: Sudanese civil war (2023–present) – Wikipedia
**Description**: Overview of the ongoing civil war in Sudan and its international dimensions.
**Date of Publication**: September 4, 2025.
**3-Sentence Summary**: The article documents the spread of violence across Sudan, including recent clashes that have resulted in significant civilian and military deaths, with 2025 seeing intensified fighting in Darfur. It cites expert fears that unchecked conflicts could lead to merged crises with neighboring countries, boosting state-based fatalities. ACLED’s tracking is mentioned, indicating over 5,000 deaths in the first half of 2025, with seasonal peaks in violence contributing to higher volatility.
**Title**: War in Sudan: Humanitarian, fighting, control developments, August 2025 | Sudan war News | Al Jazeera
**Description**: Updates on battlefield developments, diplomacy, and humanitarian impacts in Sudan’s civil war.
**Date of Publication**: August 31, 2025.
**3-Sentence Summary**: The article reports on intensified clashes in August 2025, with estimates of hundreds of deaths from state-based violence, contributing to ACLED’s ongoing tallies. It highlights diplomatic failures and rising civilian casualties, suggesting a potential total exceeding 6,000 for the year. Expert opinions from UN sources indicate that without ceasefires, death rates could accelerate in the remaining months.
**Title**: Sudan | AP News
**Description**: General news hub for developments in Sudan, including conflict and humanitarian issues.
**Date of Publication**: August 27, 2025.
**3-Sentence Summary**: This collection of articles discusses escalating violence in Sudan, with reports of dozens of deaths from state-based clashes in late August 2025. It references ACLED’s preliminary 2025 data, indicating a year-to-date total of around 6,000 deaths, with peaks in conflict zones. Experts from international organizations predict continued volatility, potentially pushing annual figures above 8,000.
**Title**: List of ongoing armed conflicts – Wikipedia
**Description**: A global list of active conflicts and associated death tolls.
**Date of Publication**: August 18, 2025.
**3-Sentence Summary**: The entry categorizes Sudan’s civil war as one of the deadliest ongoing conflicts, with 2025 estimates already surpassing 5,000 state-based deaths per ACLED reports. It notes that fatality figures include both military and civilian losses, driven by territorial disputes. Historical data shows seasonal fluctuations, with 2025 on track to exceed previous years due to intensified fighting.
**Title**: Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces shell a besieged Darfur city, killing 24 and wounding 55
**Description**: Report on a specific paramilitary attack and its casualties.
**Date of Publication**: One week ago (approximately August 29, 2025, based on context).
**3-Sentence Summary**: This news piece details a RSF shelling incident that killed at least 24 people, contributing to ACLED’s 2025 death count in Darfur. It highlights the broader pattern of escalating state-based violence, with experts warning of rapid increases in fatalities. ACLED’s latest data incorporates such events, showing a monthly average of over 1,000 deaths in 2025.

Claude Vision analysis response:

Looking at this ACLED data visualization for Sudan, I can extract the following relevant information about state-based conflict deaths:

## Current Data (as of the image date):
**Total Fatalities**: The chart shows approximately **61,000 reported fatalities** in Sudan’s current conflict.

## Key Trends and Patterns:
1. **Conflict Escalation**: The visualization shows a dramatic surge in fatalities starting around April 2023, with the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
2. **Monthly Death Rates**: From the bar chart showing fatalities over time, there appear to be monthly variations with peaks reaching approximately 3,000-4,000 deaths in some months, though exact monthly values are difficult to precisely determine from the visualization.
3. **Geographic Distribution**: The map indicates widespread conflict across Sudan, with particularly intense activity (shown by darker/red coloring) in:
– Darfur region (western Sudan)
– Khartoum and surrounding areas (central)
– Various other hotspots throughout the country
4. **Conflict Intensity**: The color coding on the map suggests very high intensity conflict in multiple regions, indicating the violence is not localized but widespread across the country.

## Recent Trajectory:
The bar chart appears to show continued high levels of fatalities through the most recent data points visible, suggesting the conflict remains highly active with no clear signs of de-escalation in the visualized period.
GPT Multiple Choice JSON response:

ACLED is the resolution source and (per the research context available to me) reported roughly ~6,000 state-based conflict deaths in Sudan through the end of August 2025. Using that as a baseline, the expected final 2025 total depends on the pace of violence in the remaining four months (Sept–Dec) and on reporting lags or later revisions by ACLED. If the conflict continues at the January–August average (~750 deaths/month), four more months add ~3,000 deaths → a year total near ~9,000 (squarely inside the 8,000–12,000 bin). If violence falls substantially (e.g., a partial ceasefire or localized de-escalation), the remaining months might add only ~1,000–2,000 deaths → a total in the 5,000–8,000 band. If fighting intensifies (heavy dry-season fighting, major new offensives, mass casualty events, or substantial late-reporting revisions), the total could exceed 12,000.

I weight the middle-high outcome (8,000–12,000) highest because: (a) the YTD ~6k baseline leaves enough time for a plausible ~3–6k addition in the remaining months under continued or slightly increased intensity; (b) seasonal patterns (dry-season spikes in fighting) and ongoing multi-front operations in Darfur/Khartoum make further large additions likely; and (c) ACLED’s methodology tends to capture many state-based events so late downward surprises are less likely than upward additions from new high-casualty episodes or delayed reporting. I assign a meaningful chance to the 5,000–8,000 bin to reflect scenarios with partial de-escalation, reporting corrections downward, or unusually low remaining-month intensity. I assign a smaller but non-trivial probability to >12,000 to reflect credible escalation or substantial late data additions.
Anthropic response:

Based on the research provided, ACLED data shows approximately 6,000 state-based conflict deaths in Sudan as of late August/early September 2025. This means we have about 8 months of data and need to project for the remaining 4 months of the year. The conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continues at high intensity, with no clear signs of de-escalation.

**Historical Context and Trends:**
The ACLED visualization shows that 2024 saw approximately 12,000 deaths, with significant monthly variations. The conflict has shown sustained high intensity since it began in April 2023, with monthly death tolls sometimes reaching 3,000-4,000 in peak periods. The research indicates seasonal patterns with higher violence during dry season months (November-April), which is concerning since we’re entering that period now.

**Projection Methodology:**
With 6,000 deaths reported through approximately 8 months of 2025, the current average is about 750 deaths per month. However, this likely underrepresents the true rate due to: (1) reporting delays that ACLED typically experiences, (2) the approaching dry season which historically sees increased fighting, and (3) recent reports of escalating violence in Darfur and Khartoum regions.

If the current average continues, we’d expect approximately 9,000 total deaths (6,000 + 3,000 for remaining months). However, accounting for seasonal increases and recent escalation reports, the likely range is higher. The UN and Crisis Group warnings about potential escalation, combined with failed diplomatic efforts mentioned in the research, suggest sustained or increasing violence levels.

**Key Uncertainties and Assumptions:**
1. **Data Completeness Assumption (30% probability of significant incompleteness):** The 6,000 figure for year-to-date might be incomplete due to ACLED’s typical reporting delays and difficulties accessing conflict zones. If this number is significantly underreported, it could push the final total into higher brackets. Historical ACLED revisions often add 10-20% more deaths as information becomes available.
2. **Conflict Intensity Stability Assumption (40% probability of major change):** I’m assuming the conflict will continue at roughly current intensity levels with seasonal variation. However, there’s substantial risk of either major escalation (due to foreign arms supplies, territorial disputes) or potential ceasefire attempts (though diplomatic efforts have repeatedly failed). A major escalation could push deaths above 12,000, while an effective ceasefire could limit them below 8,000.
3. **Seasonal Pattern Assumption (25% probability of deviation):** Historical patterns show increased violence during dry season months (November-April). If this pattern doesn’t hold or is more extreme than usual, it could significantly alter projections. Climate factors or tactical changes could disrupt typical seasonal patterns.

**Statistical Analysis:**
Based on the available data:
– Current run rate suggests ~9,000 deaths (baseline scenario)
– Seasonal adjustment adds 20-30% for dry season months
– Reporting lag adjustment adds another 10-15%
– This points to a central estimate around 10,000-11,000 deaths
The distribution should account for significant uncertainty given incomplete data and volatile conflict dynamics. The “Between 8000 and 12000” bracket captures the most likely scenario, but substantial probability mass should be allocated to adjacent brackets given the uncertainties.

**Final Assessment:**
Given that we’re already at 6,000 deaths with 4 months remaining, falling below 8,000 would require significant de-escalation, which seems unlikely given recent trends. Exceeding 12,000 would require acceleration beyond current rates, which is possible but not the base case. The 8,000-12,000 range represents the most probable outcome, with meaningful probabilities for both the 5,000-8,000 range (if there’s partial de-escalation) and above 12,000 (if violence significantly escalates).

Model’s Answer:
The forecast for state-based conflict deaths reported by ACLED in Sudan for 2025 is based primarily on the reported year-to-date figures from ACLED’s 2025 Conflict Watchlist, historical data, and ongoing conflict dynamics.

As of August 31, 2025, ACLED’s Conflict Watchlist 2025 dashboard shows over 6,000 state-based conflict deaths recorded in Sudan. [SocialMediaResearch] This crucial piece of information, provided by the research assistant who directly accessed ACLED data, immediately narrows the possible ranges. This means that options “Less than 1000”, “Between 1000 and 3000”, and “Between 3000 and 5000” are effectively eliminated, as the current count already exceeds 6,000.

The conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) remains highly intense, with widespread violence across the country, particularly in Darfur and Khartoum. [1, 2, 4, VisionAnalysis] Massive displacement figures continuing into 2025 also indicate sustained high-intensity combat operations. Experts from various organizations, including the UN and International Crisis Group, consistently warn of ongoing or even escalating violence, with no significant de-escalation in sight without major diplomatic breakthroughs.

The average monthly death rate for the first eight months of 2025 (January to August) is approximately 750 deaths per month (6,000 deaths / 8 months). With four months remaining in 2025 (September, October, November, December), a continuation of this average rate would add approximately 3,000 more deaths (4 months * 750 deaths/month), bringing the total for 2025 to around 9,000 deaths. This figure falls squarely within the “Between 8000 and 12000” range.

Historical data from ACLED indicates that 2024 saw approximately 12,000 state-based conflict deaths in Sudan. [SocialMediaResearch] This provides a strong baseline for the potential 2025 total. The ongoing nature of the conflict, coupled with expert opinions suggesting potential acceleration of death rates, especially during the dry season (which includes November and December), means that exceeding the 2024 total is a distinct possibility. [SocialMediaResearch] If monthly death rates were to increase to, for example, 1,500 deaths per month for the remaining four months, the total would reach 12,000 (6,000 current + 6,000 additional), placing it at the very top end of the “Between 8000 and 12000” range or pushing it into the “More than 12000” range. While a significant de-escalation that would keep the total below 8,000 is contrary to current trends and expert analysis, a small probability is assigned to the “Between 5000 and 8000” range to account for unforeseen and rapid changes. However, the overwhelming evidence points towards continued high levels of violence.

Therefore, the most probable outcome lies in the “Between 8000 and 12000” range, reflecting a continuation of the current devastating pace. There is also a substantial probability that the total could exceed 12,000, given the historical context and warnings of potential escalation.

**Key Assumptions:**
1. **Accuracy of the current ACLED YTD (August 31, 2025) death count of >6,000:** The forecast is heavily reliant on this specific data point provided by the research assistant who claims direct access to ACLED’s dashboard. If this figure is significantly different, the forecast would be drastically altered. Probability of incorrectness: 5%.
2. **Continuity of conflict intensity and patterns for the remainder of 2025:** The forecast assumes that the underlying dynamics of the conflict will largely persist, without a sudden, major ceasefire, a complete collapse of one side, or overwhelming external intervention that would dramatically alter casualty rates. Probability of incorrectness: 10%.

Less than 1,000: 0%
Between 1,000 and 3,000: 0%
Between 3,000 and 5,000: 0%
Between 5,000 and 8,000: 5%
Between 8,000 and 12,000: 60%
More than 12,000: 35%

Past forecasts by Phil’s and Jeremy ’s bots —>

Below, a forecast of state-based conflict fatalities for Sudan in the VIEWS machine forecasting competition, which is an aggregate of the forecasts of twenty competitors. Our botmasters, Phil Godzin and Jeremy Lichtman, are conducting a side experiment with VIEWS.