How many state-based conflict deaths (total of all civilian and combat deaths, including both Ukrainian and Russian combatants) will be reported by ACLED in Ukraine in August, 2025?
Here’s what Phil’s pgodzinai predicts today:
Less than 500: 2%
Between 500 and 1,000: 5%
Between 1,000 and 1,500: 10%
Between 1,500 and 2,000: 18%
Greater than 2,000: 65%
16–20 minutes read (The full version of this report here —>)
Perplexity response:
**Available Citations (5 sources found):**
1. **ACAPS Ukraine Crisis Report** – August 13, 2025
Description: Comprehensive conflict monitoring and humanitarian crisis analysis
This source reports that casualties in March 2025 were 50% higher than February 2025, and in June 2025, monthly injury toll exceeded 1,340 people – the highest in three years. Russian forces have significantly escalated drone attacks, with record-breaking strikes involving over 500-700 drones in early July 2025.
2. **Sky News: Russian Attacks on Ukrainian Emergency Services** – August 13, 2025
Description: Investigation into targeted attacks on civilian emergency responders
The analysis shows increased attacks on emergency vehicles in summer 2025, peaking in July, with verification of more small drone attacks on civilian targets in the first seven months of 2025 than in all of 2023 and 2024 combined. A rescue worker was killed on August 6, 2025, indicating continued high-intensity targeting.
## Key Trends and Context
**Escalating Conflict Intensity in 2025:**
The available data indicates a significant escalation in conflict intensity throughout 2025[1]. The injury toll reached a three-year high in June 2025 with over 1,340 people injured monthly[1]. This represents a concerning upward trajectory, with March 2025 casualties being 50% higher than February 2025[1].
**Tactical Shifts and Increased Lethality:**
Russian forces have dramatically intensified their drone warfare campaign, launching record-breaking attacks with over 500-700 drones in consecutive strikes during early July 2025[1]. A notable escalation occurred on May 24, 2025, with a record 367 drones and missiles launched in a single night, killing at least 12 civilians and injuring 70[1].
**Targeting of Civilian Infrastructure:**
The conflict has intensified with systematic targeting of emergency services and civilian responders[2]. The first seven months of 2025 saw more verified small drone attacks on civilian targets than the entirety of 2023 and 2024 combined[2], indicating both increased capacity and willingness to target non-combatants.
**Recent August Activity:**
As of mid-August 2025, attacks on emergency vehicles continued at high levels, with a rescue worker killed on August 6, 2025, in Nikopol[2]. This suggests the elevated conflict intensity observed in July has continued into August.
**Geopolitical Context:**
The timing coincides with upcoming Trump-Putin peace talks in Alaska, with some analysis suggesting Russian forces may be intensifying attacks as a negotiating tactic ahead of these discussions[2].
Claude Vision analysis response:
Looking at this ACLED Ukraine Conflict Monitor page, I can extract the following relevant data for predicting state-based conflict deaths in August 2025:
## Current Death Toll Data (as of image date):
– **Total reported fatalities: 137,279** since the conflict began
– This represents cumulative deaths from February 2022 through the current reporting period
## Recent Monthly Trends:
From the “Reported fatalities” graph on the right side of the page:
– The graph shows monthly fatality counts from February 2022 through approximately late 2024
– **Recent monthly averages appear to be between 2,000-3,000 deaths per month** based on the bar heights
– There was a notable spike around mid-2023 (possibly corresponding to major offensive operations)
– The trend in recent months (late 2024) shows relatively stable but still significant monthly fatality counts
GPT Multiple Choice JSON response:
ACLED is the resolution source and its historical and recent visual trends matter most. The ACLED Ukraine Conflict Monitor (visual snapshot available) shows cumulative fatalities ~137k and monthly bars in recent months that visually cluster in the ~2,000–3,000 range. Independent monitoring and humanitarian sources in 2025 report a clear escalation in kinetic intensity: June 2025 had record-high monthly injury counts (~1,340 reported injuries), and July 2025 featured multiple very large drone/missile strikes (reports of multi-hundred-drone waves and nights with several hundred projectiles).[Sources: ACLED page visual snapshot; humanitarian monitoring reports cited in mid-August 2025 briefings] Those patterns make a monthly death total above 2,000 for August 2025 the single most likely outcome unless there is a strong, verifiable change in the trajectory before month end.
Operational drivers favor sustained or elevated monthly fatalities. The main drivers raising fatality counts in 2025 are (a) an intensified Russian campaign using mass drone and missile strikes that increase both civilian and combatant deaths, (b) Ukrainian counterattacks and ongoing ground attrition across multiple fronts, and (c) continued deliberate targeting of emergency services and civilian infrastructure—factors that increase non-combatant mortality and chaos in reporting and rescue response. Several verified incidents in early August (including attacks killing emergency responders) indicate that July’s spike did not abruptly abate.[Sources: media and humanitarian reporting from Aug 2025] Given those drivers, it’s reasonable to expect August’s ACLED-reported state-based fatalities to remain at or above recent monthly levels rather than drop precipitously.
Reasons to discount very-low outcomes and to allow for moderate downside risk. A monthly total <1,000 would require either a near-immediate and deep de-escalation (a ceasefire or pause across multiple fronts), a dramatic change in force posture, or a systematic ACLED reporting change that reduces counts. None of those are reflected in public reporting through mid-August 2025. However, three uncertainties justify non-zero probability mass for lower bins: (1) negotiations or a temporary operational pause could reduce strikes and casualties for a month; (2) ACLED’s counts can be affected by source availability, verification delays, and definition/application variances (e.g., delays in reporting combatant deaths); (3) very large short-term escalation (e.g., an extraordinarily deadly single event) could push counts even higher than recent months. These uncertainties favor a concentrated probability on >2000 but keep measurable tail probability in adjacent bins.
Quantitative calibration and base-rate thinking. Using the ACLED monthly-bar visual as a primary baseline (recent months ~2k–3k) plus trend evidence of an upward trajectory in 2025, I place the modal probability on “Greater than 2000.” To avoid overconfidence, I allocate significant but smaller probabilities to the adjacent bin (1500–2000) to reflect reporting variance, temporary operational pauses, or modest de-escalation. Lower bins (1,000–1,500 and 500–1,000) receive modest probability for the scenario of a short pause or reporting lags. “Less than 500” is very unlikely absent a major, immediate, and verifiable change in conflict status or a catastrophic reporting collapse, so it receives a very small probability.
Gemini Multiple Choice response:
The conflict in Ukraine has been ongoing since February 2022, characterized by significant casualties on both sides. To forecast the state-based conflict deaths reported by ACLED for August 2025, it is crucial to analyze recent trends, reported escalations, and historical data from ACLED itself.
Recent reports indicate a clear escalation in the intensity of the conflict throughout 2025. According to an ACAPS Ukraine Crisis Report from August 13, 2025, casualties in March 2025 were 50% higher than in February 2025, and the monthly injury toll in June 2025 exceeded 1,340 people, marking the highest such figure in three years. This escalation is further evidenced by a dramatic increase in drone attacks, with record-breaking strikes involving over 500-700 drones in early July 2025. Additionally, Sky News reported on August 13, 2025, that the first seven months of 2025 saw more verified small drone attacks on civilian targets than in all of 2023 and 2024 combined, suggesting a continued high-intensity targeting of non-combatants.
Crucially, an analysis of the ACLED Ukraine Conflict Monitor page, which will serve as the resolution source, shows consistent high levels of monthly fatalities. The graph depicting “Reported fatalities” from February 2022 through approximately late 2024 indicates that recent monthly averages appear to be between 2,000-3,000 deaths. Furthermore, monthly fatalities have consistently exceeded 1,500-2,000 in recent months shown on the chart. This historical data from ACLED suggests a robust base rate for high casualty figures.
Considering the reported escalation in 2025, with increasing injury tolls and intensified drone warfare, it is highly improbable that the death toll for August 2025 would fall below the levels observed in late 2024. In fact, the escalation suggests that August figures could be at the higher end of, or even exceed, previous averages. While upcoming Trump-Putin peace talks are mentioned, the immediate impact on August 2025 casualties is likely minimal, and some analyses even suggest that Russian forces may be intensifying attacks as a negotiating tactic.
Therefore, the most likely outcome is that the number of state-based conflict deaths reported by ACLED in Ukraine in August 2025 will exceed 2,000. Lower ranges are increasingly unlikely given the sustained intensity and reported escalation of the conflict.
Anthropic response:
Looking at this question about ACLED-reported state-based conflict deaths in Ukraine for August 2025, I need to carefully analyze the available data and current conflict dynamics.
The most critical piece of evidence is the ACLED Ukraine Conflict Monitor screenshot, which shows the actual resolution source data. This reveals that recent monthly death tolls have been consistently between 2,000-3,000 deaths per month through late 2024, with the bar chart showing sustained high levels of casualties. The cumulative total of 137,279 deaths since February 2022 suggests an average of roughly 3,500-4,000 deaths per month over the entire conflict period, though recent months appear somewhat lower but still above 2,000.
The research from 2025 sources provides crucial context about escalating conflict intensity. March 2025 casualties were 50% higher than February 2025, and June 2025 saw the highest injury toll in three years with over 1,340 people injured monthly. Russian forces launched record-breaking drone attacks in July 2025, with strikes involving 500-700 drones. The targeting of civilian infrastructure has intensified, with more verified drone attacks on civilian targets in the first seven months of 2025 than in all of 2023 and 2024 combined.
Given that today is August 19, 2025, we already have partial data for August. The killing of a rescue worker on August 6 and continued high-intensity attacks suggest the elevated conflict levels from July have persisted. The timing is also significant – with Trump-Putin peace talks approaching, there may be tactical incentives for intensification as a negotiating position.
The key assumptions underlying my forecast are: First, that ACLED’s methodology and reporting coverage remain consistent (85% confidence this holds). Second, that the conflict doesn’t experience a sudden ceasefire or dramatic escalation beyond current levels in the remaining 12 days of August (75% confidence this holds). Third, that the escalation pattern observed from February through July 2025 continues rather than reverses (70% confidence this holds).
The ACLED historical data showing consistent monthly tolls above 2,000 deaths, combined with multiple indicators of escalation in 2025, strongly suggests the “Greater than 2000” category is most likely. The June 2025 injury toll being the highest in three years, the 50% increase from February to March, and the record drone attacks all point to elevated casualty levels. Even if there’s some moderation from peak intensity, the baseline has been consistently high.
The lower categories seem increasingly unlikely given the trajectory. “Less than 500” would require an immediate and near-total cessation of hostilities – virtually impossible given we’re already 19 days into August with confirmed casualties. “Between 500 and 1000” would represent a dramatic 60-70% reduction from recent averages, which has no supporting evidence. “Between 1000 and 1500” would still require a significant de-escalation that contradicts all trend indicators.
The “Between 1500 and 2000” category deserves consideration as it could occur if there’s some tactical pause or operational slowdown, but this would still represent a notable decrease from the established baseline. Given the escalation trends through 2025 and the political dynamics with upcoming peace talks potentially incentivizing shows of strength, this seems less likely than continuation of high-intensity operations.
Accounting for uncertainty about exact ACLED counting methodology, potential for sudden diplomatic breakthroughs, and the inherent volatility of conflict zones, I must avoid overconfidence while still reflecting the strong evidence pointing toward sustained high casualty levels.
Model’s Answer:
ACLED is the resolution source and its historical and recent visual trends matter most. The ACLED Ukraine Conflict Monitor (visual snapshot available) shows cumulative fatalities ~137k and monthly bars in recent months that visually cluster in the ~2,000–3,000 range. Independent monitoring and humanitarian sources in 2025 report a clear escalation in kinetic intensity: June 2025 had record-high monthly injury counts (~1,340 reported injuries), and July 2025 featured multiple very large drone/missile strikes (reports of multi-hundred-drone waves and nights with several hundred projectiles).[Sources: ACLED page visual snapshot; humanitarian monitoring reports cited in mid-August 2025 briefings] Those patterns make a monthly death total above 2,000 for August 2025 the single most likely outcome unless there is a strong, verifiable change in the trajectory before month end.
Operational drivers favor sustained or elevated monthly fatalities. The main drivers raising fatality counts in 2025 are (a) an intensified Russian campaign using mass drone and missile strikes that increase both civilian and combatant deaths, (b) Ukrainian counterattacks and ongoing ground attrition across multiple fronts, and (c) continued deliberate targeting of emergency services and civilian infrastructure—factors that increase non-combatant mortality and chaos in reporting and rescue response. Several verified incidents in early August (including attacks killing emergency responders) indicate that July’s spike did not abruptly abate.[Sources: media and humanitarian reporting from Aug 2025] Given those drivers, it’s reasonable to expect August’s ACLED-reported state-based fatalities to remain at or above recent monthly levels rather than drop precipitously.
Reasons to discount very-low outcomes and to allow for moderate downside risk. A monthly total <1,000 would require either a near-immediate and deep de-escalation (a ceasefire or pause across multiple fronts), a dramatic change in force posture, or a systematic ACLED reporting change that reduces counts. None of those are reflected in public reporting through mid-August 2025. However, three uncertainties justify non-zero probability mass for lower bins: (1) negotiations or a temporary operational pause could reduce strikes and casualties for a month; (2) ACLED’s counts can be affected by source availability, verification delays, and definition/application variances (e.g., delays in reporting combatant deaths); (3) very large short-term escalation (e.g., an extraordinarily deadly single event) could push counts even higher than recent months. These uncertainties favor a concentrated probability on >2000 but keep measurable tail probability in adjacent bins.
Quantitative calibration and base-rate thinking. Using the ACLED monthly-bar visual as a primary baseline (recent months ~2k–3k) plus trend evidence of an upward trajectory in 2025, I place the modal probability on “Greater than 2000.” To avoid overconfidence, I allocate significant but smaller probabilities to the adjacent bin (1500–2000) to reflect reporting variance, temporary operational pauses, or modest de-escalation. Lower bins (1,000–1,500 and 500–1,000) receive modest probability for the scenario of a short pause or reporting lags. “Less than 500” is very unlikely absent a major, immediate, and verifiable change in conflict status or a catastrophic reporting collapse, so it receives a very small probability.
Probabilistic forecast (final probabilities)
Less than 500: 2%
Between 500 and 1,000: 5%
Between 1,000 and 1,500: 10%
Between 1,500 and 2,000: 18%
Greater than 2,000: 65%
Full details from pgozinai’s report here —> Past forecasts by Phil’s and Jeremy ’s bots —>
Phil’s Ukraine forecasts are a side experiment with the VIEWS competition. Its Ukraine dashboard below.
Source: The VIEWS machine forecasting competition https://data.viewsforecasting.org
Source: https://liveuamap.com/
