Will there be a ceasefire declared between Israel and Hamas in the month of September 2025?
Here’s what Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai predicts today:
Probability: 20%
43–54 minutes read Condensed version here —>
Perplexity response:
{think}
Let me analyze this query step by step. This is a forecast question about whether there will be a ceasefire declared between Israel and Hamas in September 2025. The current date is September 3, 2025, so we’re already in the month in question.
Let me plan what kind of information I need:
1. Current status of hostilities between Israel and Hamas
2. Recent ceasefire negotiations and their outcomes
3. Positions of both parties regarding ceasefire terms
4. International diplomatic efforts
5. Recent military operations and their timelines
6. Any announced ceasefire proposals or agreements
Looking at the search results:
1. ABC News (Sept 2, 2025) – Reports Israel beginning ground operation in Gaza City
2. Mufti AK Hoosen (Aug 21, 2025) – Reports on Hamas positions and ceasefire framework
3. Wikipedia on 2025 Gaza City offensive – Mentions ceasefire proposals and military plans
4. Crisis Group flashpoints (various dates in 2025) – Regional context
5. UK Foreign Secretary statement – Calls for immediate ceasefire
This appears to be a Political Event type question, so I should look for polling data, diplomatic positions, and recent developments.
Let me start with the 10 citations as requested in the personalization instructions.
Looking at this forecasting question about a potential Israel-Hamas ceasefire in September 2025, I need to examine current military operations, diplomatic negotiations, and stated positions from both parties.
## Key Information Sources
**Citations and Summaries:**
1. **ABC News – “Israel begins ground operation in Gaza City, IDF says”** (September 2, 2025) – Reports Israel launching new ground operations in Gaza City just yesterday. The article details Israel’s five principles for ending the war including Hamas dismantling, hostage release, and Gaza demilitarization. At least 76 people were killed in Gaza in the last 24 hours according to Hamas health ministry.
2. **Wikipedia – “2025 Gaza City offensive”** (Multiple recent updates) – Documents ongoing fighting with a main Israeli offensive planned for mid-September 2025, approved on August 21. A 60-day ceasefire plan presented by Egyptian and Qatari mediators on August 17 was accepted by Hamas, but Netanyahu has not responded publicly and faces pressure from far-right allies to reject it.
3. **Mufti AK Hoosen Updates** (August 21, 2025) – Reports Netanyahu stating Israel will occupy Gaza even if signing a ceasefire agreement. Hamas offered concessions in July 23 amendments to the US 60-day framework, focusing on food/medicine access, Israeli withdrawal, and prisoner exchanges (10 living Israeli captives for 200 Palestinians serving life sentences and 2,000 Palestinians captured since October 7).
4. **International Crisis Group – Tehran Flashpoints** (August 12-13, 2025) – Documents regional tensions with Iran dismissing US uranium enrichment demands while stating readiness for negotiations. European E3 ministers warned of triggering snapback mechanisms if Iran doesn’t engage diplomatically before end of August 2025.
5. **UK Foreign Secretary Middle East Statement** (Recent) – Calls for immediate ceasefire with unconditional hostage release by Hamas, demands halt to Israeli Gaza City operations. Emphasizes need for monitoring mechanism, Hamas disarmament, and new Gaza governance framework for lasting peace.
## Current Military and Diplomatic Status
Israel launched a new ground operation in Gaza City on September 2, 2025, just one day ago[1]. This represents a significant escalation, with Israeli defense officials having argued for “a limited hostage release deal” rather than military takeover of Gaza City[3]. The timing is particularly notable since a main Israeli offensive is planned for mid-September 2025[3].
## Ceasefire Negotiations Status
A 60-day ceasefire framework presented by Egyptian and Qatari mediators on August 17 was **accepted by Hamas** but remains unanswered by Israel[3]. Hamas had submitted amendments on July 23 to a US-drafted framework, offering significant concessions including readiness to “hand over the government” and integrate fighters into a Palestinian army[2].
Israel’s stated demands remain extensive: complete dismantling of Hamas military and political capabilities, immediate release of all hostages, Gaza demilitarization, Israeli “overriding security control” for the “foreseeable future,” and civil authority excluding both Hamas and the Palestinian Authority[1].
## Key Obstacles to September 2025 Ceasefire
**Israeli Position Challenges:**
– Netanyahu has never agreed to fully withdraw Israeli troops from Gaza[1]
– Far-right political allies heavily pressure him to reject ceasefire proposals[3]
– Netanyahu reportedly stated Israel will occupy Gaza even if signing a ceasefire[2]
**Hamas Red Lines:**
– Refuses demilitarization while occupation continues, stating “No one can deny us the right to resist the occupation as long as we have the occupation here”[2]
– Demands permanent ceasefire guarantees, not temporary truces[1]
– Requires complete Israeli withdrawal, though willing to accept buffer zones[2]
## International Diplomatic Pressure
The UK Foreign Secretary has demanded “an immediate halt” to the Gaza City operation, emphasizing that “further Israeli military operations in Gaza city will only prolong and deepen the crisis”[5]. International partners are working intensively on ceasefire mechanisms including monitoring, Hamas disarmament, and new governance frameworks[5].
## Assessment Indicators
**Factors Against September Ceasefire:**
– Active military escalation launched September 2
– Fundamental disagreement on core terms (occupation vs. withdrawal)
– Planned mid-September offensive already approved
– Political pressure on Netanyahu from far-right coalition
**Factors Supporting Potential Agreement:**
– Hamas acceptance of existing framework from August 17
– International diplomatic pressure intensifying
– Defense officials preferring limited hostage deal over military operations
– Humanitarian crisis reaching critical levels with starvation deaths reported[1]
The launch of new ground operations on September 2, combined with planned mid-September offensive and irreconcilable positions on key issues like Israeli withdrawal and Hamas disarmament, suggests significant obstacles to achieving a ceasefire within the remainder of September 2025.
Grok response:
Below is a detailed rundown of the most relevant news and information concerning the question of whether there will be a ceasefire declared between Israel and Hamas in September 2025. As a research assistant, my role is to provide context based on recent and authoritative sources, emphasizing updates, expert opinions, and any available data up to the current date (September 3, 2025). This question pertains to a political event involving geopolitical negotiations, so I have prioritized sources discussing ceasefire talks, proposals, and related developments from a variety of outlets, including news articles, analyses, and social media sentiment (treated as inconclusive for factual evidence).
First, I reviewed the available sources, which include recent articles on ongoing negotiations, Hamas proposals, and Israeli positions. These sources highlight complications such as Israel’s demands for comprehensive deals, Hamas’s concessions, and external pressures from mediators like Egypt and the U.S. There are no authoritative resolution sources (e.g., official UN or government declarations) confirming a ceasefire as of September 3, 2025, but recent updates indicate stalled progress despite proposals. Expert opinions from analysts and scholars suggest that while Hamas has shown flexibility, Israel’s leadership may prioritize military objectives, potentially delaying any agreement. I focused on the most recent sources, such as those from early September, and included historical context from mid-2025 to show patterns in negotiations.
### List of 10 Citations
Here is a curated list of 10 relevant citations, drawn from a variety of sources including news articles, analyses, and Wikipedia pages. For each, I include the title, a brief description, the date of publication, and a three-sentence summary of the content most pertinent to the question. I prioritized sources from the past two weeks for timeliness, while including a mix for broader context.
1. **Title:** 2025 Gaza war ceasefire – Wikipedia
**Description:** An overview of ceasefire negotiations in the ongoing Gaza conflict, including diplomatic efforts and obstacles.
**Date:** September 2, 2025
**Summary:** This page details recent complications in ceasefire talks, noting Egypt’s opposition to Israeli presence in the Philadelphi corridor and Hamas’s reluctance to accept certain proposals as of August 2025. It highlights that Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has reportedly decided against a deal weeks earlier, potentially prolonging the conflict into September. Overall, it underscores the lack of progress toward a formal ceasefire declaration, with ongoing military operations in Gaza City as a major barrier.
2. **Title:** Israel’s Push for a Permanent Gaza Deal May Mean a Longer War, Experts Say – The New York Times
**Description:** An analysis of Israel’s negotiation strategy and its implications for ceasefire prospects.
**Date:** September 1, 2025
**Summary:** The article discusses how Israel’s insistence on a permanent ceasefire deal, including full hostage releases, could extend the war beyond September 2025. Experts warn that continued military operations in Gaza City are jeopardizing talks, with no immediate signs of agreement. It emphasizes that mediators like the U.S. are pushing for resolutions, but Netanyahu’s hardline stance suggests minimal progress in the near term.
3. **Title:** Gaza war – Wikipedia
**Description:** A comprehensive history of the conflict, including recent ceasefire attempts and their failures.
**Date:** September 1, 2025
**Summary:** The entry covers the breakdown of previous ceasefires, such as the January 2025 truce, and notes escalating violence as of mid-2025 with over 93,000 estimated deaths from traumatic injuries by May 2025. It points to Hamas’s acceptance of proposals in August 2025 contrasted with Israel’s refusal, indicating that a September ceasefire remains uncertain due to ongoing offensives. This reflects a pattern of stalled negotiations that could influence current dynamics.
4. **Title:** Hamas strategy is end war with Israel and survive – NPR
**Description:** A report on Hamas’s approach to ceasefire negotiations and survival tactics amid international pressure.
**Date:** August 21, 2025
**Summary:** The piece explains how Hamas has endorsed ceasefire proposals to secure its survival, including a recent offer for phased hostage releases. It highlights Arab countries’ pressure on Hamas to concede, but notes Israel’s rejection of these terms as a key obstacle. Overall, it suggests that without Israeli reciprocity, a September declaration is unlikely, based on expert interviews with negotiators.
5. **Title:** Following Trump’s lead, Netanyahu shifts strategy on ceasefire even after Hamas accepts – CNN
**Description:** Coverage of changes in Israeli policy influenced by U.S. politics and Hamas’s responses.
**Date:** August 25, 2025
**Summary:** This article details Netanyahu’s demand for a comprehensive ceasefire deal after Hamas accepted a proposal, tying it to external influences like former U.S. President Trump’s involvement. It reports that despite Hamas’s concessions, Israel has not responded positively, with ongoing military actions in Gaza. Experts indicate this shift could delay any agreement past September 2025.
6. **Title:** August 26, 2025: Israel-Hamas war, Gaza hostage deal protests, Nasser Hospital attack – CNN
**Description:** Live updates on the conflict, including protests and attacks amid ceasefire discussions.
**Date:** August 27, 2025
**Summary:** The update covers widespread protests in Israel demanding a hostage deal and ceasefire, alongside reports of attacks that killed civilians, intensifying calls for negotiations. It notes Hamas’s repeated willingness to engage but highlights Israel’s mobilization of reservists as a sign of continued conflict. This suggests that as of late August, momentum for a September ceasefire is waning due to escalating tensions.
7. **Title:** Gaza latest: Israel mobilises thousands of reservists as scholars say Gaza offensive is ‘genocide’ – Sky News
**Description:** News on military escalations and international criticisms of the conflict.
**Date:** September 2, 2025
**Summary:** The article reports on Israel’s reservist mobilization for a Gaza offensive, with 500 scholars labeling the actions as genocide, adding pressure for a ceasefire. It mentions ongoing talks but no breakthroughs, with mediators frustrated by the lack of agreement. This indicates that expert opinions are increasingly critical, potentially influencing but not guaranteeing a September resolution.
8. **Title:** What to know about talks on Israel-Hamas ceasefire – AP News
**Description:** A summary of the latest ceasefire proposals and their status.
**Date:** Approximately mid-August 2025 (published about two weeks ago as of September 3)
**Summary:** The piece outlines Hamas’s acceptance of an Arab-mediated ceasefire proposal in late July 2025, which included provisions for hostage releases and aid. It details Israel’s hesitation and demands for more control, with no final agreement reached. Experts view this as a missed opportunity, suggesting that without renewed efforts, a September ceasefire is improbable.
9. **Title:** Details emerge on Gaza ceasefire proposal as Netanyahu heads to White House – POLITICO
**Description:** Insights into a specific ceasefire framework and U.S. involvement.
**Date:** July 6, 2025
**Summary:** This article reveals details of a ceasefire proposal involving phased withdrawals and hostage exchanges, with Trump’s personal guarantee aimed at reassuring Hamas. It notes Israel’s partial acceptance but ultimate rejection, leading to continued fighting. The analysis from diplomats indicates a pattern of delays that could extend into September 2025.
10. **Title:** Posts on X regarding ceasefire sentiments (various users)
**Description:** A collection of social media posts reflecting public and expert opinions on ceasefire negotiations.
**Date:** Various, with the most recent from August 30–31, 2025
**Summary:** These posts, including from analysts and journalists, express frustration over Israel’s non-response to Hamas’s concessions, with some claiming a deal is imminent while others predict delays. They highlight widespread sentiment for a ceasefire but lack concrete evidence, as social media often amplifies unverified claims. Treated as inconclusive, they show growing public pressure but do not confirm any official developments for September.
### Detailed Rundown of Relevant News and Context
Based on the citations above, the context for a potential ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in September 2025 centers on ongoing negotiations that have shown mixed progress. Recent updates from early September 2025, such as those in the Wikipedia pages and Sky News articles, indicate no formal declaration as of September 3, but there are signs of movement: Hamas has made significant concessions in proposals accepted in late August, including offers for hostage releases and phased withdrawals, as reported by NPR and CNN. However, Israel’s insistence on comprehensive terms and continued military operations, as detailed in The New York Times and AP News, have stalled talks, with experts warning that offensives in Gaza City could prolong the conflict.
Key recent developments include Egypt’s refusal to pass certain proposals in August 2025, as noted in the Wikipedia citation, and international pressure from scholars and mediators labeling the situation as a potential genocide (Sky News). Expert opinions, such as those from analysts in POLITICO and NPR, emphasize that while Hamas appears flexible to end the war, Netanyahu’s strategy—possibly influenced by U.S. politics—priorizes long-term security, making a September agreement uncertain. There are no recent statistics on approval ratings or polling specific to ceasefire support, as this is not an election-focused query, but historical data from the sources shows a pattern of failed truces (e.g., the January and November 2023 ceasefires breaking down), with casualty figures from the Gaza war page estimating over 93,000 deaths by May 2025, underscoring the urgency.
No authoritative sources, such as UN resolutions or official statements, provide current values for a ceasefire declaration, but the cited articles suggest that without a breakthrough in the next few days, the window for September is narrowing. For instance, posts on X reflect sentiment of frustration and calls for action, indicating public demand but not factual evidence. In summary, while there are indicators of potential progress, the overall context points to a stalemate, with experts advising caution based on historical fluctuations in negotiations. This information is derived from the reviewed sources and should be used for contextual understanding only.
Extracted resolution criteria links:
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Extracted resolution criteria links:
[]
GPT Binary response:
Gemini Binary response:
### Reasoning Rationale:
The likelihood of a ceasefire being declared between Israel and Hamas in September 2025 is assessed as very low, given the prevailing conditions and stated intentions of the involved parties.
1. **Active Military Escalation:** As of September 2, 2025, Israel has launched a new ground operation in Gaza City, and a major Israeli offensive is planned for mid-September 2025. This active and escalating military action directly contradicts the concept of a ceasefire within the forecast month. The mobilization of thousands of reservists further indicates a commitment to continued military operations rather than a cessation of hostilities.
2. **Fundamental Disagreements on Core Terms:** Despite Hamas accepting a 60-day ceasefire framework on August 17, 2025 and offering concessions, Israel has not publicly responded to this proposal. The core demands of both sides remain irreconcilable. Israel’s stated goals include dismantling Hamas, demilitarization of Gaza, and retaining “overriding security control”. Conversely, Hamas refuses demilitarization while occupation continues and demands a complete Israeli withdrawal and permanent ceasefire guarantees. Netanyahu has reportedly stated Israel will occupy Gaza even if signing a ceasefire, further highlighting the divergence in definitions of a “ceasefire”.
3. **Lack of Political Will from Israel:** Netanyahu faces significant pressure from his far-right political allies to reject ceasefire proposals and has reportedly decided against a deal in the weeks leading up to September. His demand for a “comprehensive ceasefire deal” that aligns with Israel’s long-term security objectives, rather than immediate cessation, suggests a protracted conflict.
4. **Short Timeframe and Historical Precedent:** With only 27 days remaining in September, the window for complex negotiations to resolve deeply entrenched disagreements, lead to a public declaration, and halt ongoing military operations is extremely narrow. Historical patterns show previous ceasefires breaking down, and despite international pressure and internal Israeli protests for a hostage deal, these factors have not, as of September 3, 2025, been sufficient to prevent or halt the current offensive.
While Hamas has demonstrated a willingness to agree to a ceasefire framework, the actions and stated positions of the Israeli government indicate a strong commitment to military objectives that preclude a mutual declaration of ceasefire within the specified timeframe. A ceasefire would require an abrupt and complete reversal of current military strategy and policy from Israel, which is highly improbable under the current circumstances.
Given these factors, the probability of a ceasefire being declared in September 2025 is very low.
Probability: 1%
The extracted probability is: 1%
________________________
Anthropic Binary response:
Looking at this question about whether there will be a ceasefire declared between Israel and Hamas in September 2025, I need to carefully analyze the current situation as of September 3, 2025, with less than 4 weeks remaining in the month.
## Current Military Situation
The most critical development is that Israel launched a new ground operation in Gaza City on September 2, 2025 – just yesterday. This represents a significant military escalation rather than de-escalation. Additionally, Israeli military officials have approved plans for a major offensive in mid-September 2025, which was greenlit on August 21.
## Status of Negotiations
There is a 60-day ceasefire framework on the table:
– Presented by Egyptian and Qatari mediators on August 17, 2025
– **Accepted by Hamas**
– **No public response from Netanyahu** as of September 3
Hamas has shown flexibility, offering significant concessions in July including:
– Readiness to “hand over the government”
– Integration of fighters into a Palestinian army
– Acceptance of phased hostage releases (10 Israeli captives for 200 Palestinians serving life sentences)
## Key Obstacles
**Israeli Position:**
– Netanyahu has reportedly stated Israel will occupy Gaza even if signing a ceasefire
– Far-right coalition partners are pressuring him to reject any ceasefire
– Israel demands complete Hamas dismantling, full hostage release, and permanent security control
– Netanyahu has never agreed to fully withdraw Israeli troops from Gaza
**Hamas Position:**
– Refuses demilitarization while occupation continues
– Demands permanent ceasefire guarantees, not temporary truces
– Requires complete Israeli withdrawal (though willing to accept buffer zones)
## Critical Assumptions to Test
1. **Assumption: Current military escalation precludes near-term ceasefire (80% confidence)**
– Failure probability: 20%
– If incorrect: Israel might be using military pressure to force better terms before agreeing to ceasefire
2. **Assumption: Netanyahu’s non-response to the August 17 framework indicates rejection (75% confidence)**
– Failure probability: 25%
– If incorrect: Negotiations might be happening secretly with announcement planned
3. **Assumption: The planned mid-September offensive will proceed as scheduled (70% confidence)**
– Failure probability: 30%
– If incorrect: International pressure or breakthrough in talks could halt offensive
## Time Factor Analysis
With only 27 days remaining in September:
– Week 1 (Sept 1-7): Already seeing military escalation, not de-escalation
– Week 2 (Sept 8-14): Would need dramatic shift from current trajectory
– Week 3 (Sept 15-21): Planned Israeli offensive makes ceasefire highly unlikely
– Week 4 (Sept 22-30): Limited window after offensive, but unlikely for immediate ceasefire
## Historical Context
Previous ceasefires in this conflict have typically required:
– Weeks or months of negotiations after initial framework acceptance
– Military exhaustion or stalemate (not present with new offensive)
– Strong international pressure with concrete incentives
– Both parties simultaneously ready to compromise
The January 2025 ceasefire that broke down shows the fragility of agreements even when reached.
## Probability Assessment
Factors supporting ceasefire (20% weight):
– Hamas has accepted framework
– International pressure increasing
– Humanitarian crisis severe
– Some Israeli defense officials prefer limited deal
Factors against ceasefire (80% weight):
– Active military escalation as of September 2
– Planned mid-September offensive
– No Israeli response to accepted framework
– Fundamental disagreements on core issues remain
– Political pressure on Netanyahu from far-right
– Historical pattern shows negotiations take months after framework acceptance
Given:
– The immediate military escalation
– Less than 4 weeks remaining
– No Israeli engagement with accepted framework
– Planned offensive in 2 weeks
– Base rate of ~35% positive resolution historically
The probability of a ceasefire being declared in September 2025 is very low. Even if secret negotiations were occurring, the combination of active military operations, planned offensive, and fundamental disagreements make a September declaration highly unlikely.
Probability: 8%
The extracted probability is: 8%
GPT Binary response:
Reasoning and judgment
Summary judgment: the balance of evidence as of 3 Sept 2025 points toward a low but non-trivial chance of a ceasefire being declared at some point in September 2025. Key drivers cut both ways: Hamas has reportedly accepted an August-mediated 60‑day framework (increasing the chance), but Israel has launched a fresh ground operation (2 Sept) and has a planned mid‑September offensive and political incentives that make an Israeli acceptance unlikely in the near term (decreasing the chance). The month left to reach an agreement is short, and military escalation makes talks harder; but intense international pressure and the hostage issue keep a pathway open for a limited or temporary ceasefire negotiated rapidly.
How I weighed evidence
– Military facts (high weight, recent): Israel began a ground operation in Gaza City on 2 Sept and had approved plans for a mid‑September offensive. This materially reduces the chance of a ceasefire in September because operations tend to continue while offensive objectives are pursued. (Strong negative)
– Negotiation facts (high weight, recent): Hamas accepted an August 60‑day ceasefire framework brokered by Egypt/Qatar; Israel has not accepted and has signalled demanding much tougher terms. Hamas acceptance raises the ceiling for a deal but is insufficient without Israeli buy‑in. (Mixed)
– Political incentives (high weight): Netanyahu’s coalition pressure from hard‑liners and public statements about occupying Gaza even if a deal is signed make Israeli acceptance harder. Conversely, domestic protests and international condemnation create pressure to secure hostage releases and humanitarian pauses. (Net negative overall)
– Time window and base rates (medium‑high weight): Only ~27 days remain in September; historically, surprise short deals happen but are rare when large offensives are underway. Short windows favor the status quo. (Negative)
– International diplomacy (medium weight): U.S., Egypt, Qatar and European pressure increases probability of a rapid negotiated pause for hostage deals, but their leverage may be limited. (Slight positive)
Probability profile across the month (my conditional, cumulative reasoning)
– By Sept 10 (very short timeframe, immediately after a new ground operation): low chance — I estimate ~8%. Rapid emergency deals are possible but unlikely while a new operation is underway.
– By Sept 20 (covers the planned mid‑September offensive window): higher but still modest chance — I estimate ~15%. This reflects a possible limited hostage exchange/pause negotiated under intense pressure, or the offensive being paused if it stalls or political costs spike.
– By Sept 30 (end of month): cumulative chance is higher than earlier slices because more negotiation time accumulates — I estimate ~20%. This represents the overall chance of any formal ceasefire declaration occurring sometime in September (temporary or longer), given the mix of Hamas acceptance, diplomatic pressure, but strong Israeli reluctance and active operations.
Key assumptions whose failure would most change the forecast
1) Assumption: Israel’s political leadership (Netanyahu and coalition) will resist agreeing to any ceasefire that implies major concessions (withdrawal/demilitarization) during an offensive.
– Estimated probability this assumption is wrong (i.e., they decide to accept or agree to a deal quickly): 25%.
– If false (i.e., Israel quickly accepts a mediated deal because of domestic/international pressure or battlefield developments), my ceasefire probability would jump substantially (add ~+40–50 points), because Hamas has already signaled acceptance.
2) Assumption: Military operations (including the mid‑September offensive) will continue and escalate sufficiently to impede negotiations during September.
– Estimated probability this assumption is wrong (i.e., operations are paused, bog down, or are scaled back): 30%.
– If false (operations pause or fail quickly), probability of a ceasefire in September would increase (add ~+20–30 points) as bargaining leverage and urgency shift toward a mediated pause.
3) Assumption: Hamas will maintain its acceptance of the August framework and not withdraw or raise new demands.
– Estimated probability this assumption is wrong (i.e., Hamas retracts or hardens demands): 20%.
– If false (Hamas withdraws acceptance), probability of a September ceasefire would fall (subtract ~10–20 points) because negotiators would need to restart talks.
Calibration and uncertainty
– I’ve penalized overconfidence and accounted for the historical fact that sudden ceasefires do sometimes occur even late in escalations, especially around hostage deals. Given the short remaining timeframe and the active offensive, I remain cautious.
– There is substantial tail risk on both sides: a surprise rapid hostage deal could produce a sudden ceasefire (upside), or a rapid military breakthrough could make talks impossible (downside). That uncertainty keeps the probability away from extreme values.
Final integrated probability
Taking all factors into account (recent ground offensive; Hamas acceptance of a framework; Israeli political constraints and plans for a mid‑September offensive; intense international pressure; short time window), my best point estimate for the probability that a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas will be declared at some point during September 2025 is:
Probability: 20%
The extracted probability is: 20%
GPT Binary response:
Reasoning and judgment
Summary of the situation (as of 3 Sept 2025)
– Hamas accepted an Arab-/Qatari-/Egypt-mediated 60-day ceasefire framework in mid‑August and made substantive concessions in those talks. Mediators remain active.
– Israel has not accepted that framework and senior Israeli leaders (including Netanyahu and far‑right coalition partners) have publicly and privately signaled unwillingness to agree to terms that leave Hamas politically or militarily intact.
– Israel launched a new ground operation in Gaza City on 2 Sept and has mobilized forces for a planned mid‑September offensive — an operational escalation that reduces the near‑term bargaining space.
– International pressure for a ceasefire (humanitarian pauses, hostage exchanges) is high, and mediators typically broker last‑minute pauses when hostages or humanitarian conditions spike. Historically such deals sometimes occur even during major offensives, but usually require rapid shifts in political will or clear reciprocal incentives.
Key factors pushing the probability down
– Active Israeli offensive and planned mid‑September operation make a negotiated pause less likely in the immediate term.
– Netanyahu’s domestic coalition incentives and public rhetoric make a politically durable acceptance of a ceasefire harder.
– Core disagreements remain (withdrawal/occupation, demilitarization, sovereignty, monitoring), and resolving those in a few weeks is difficult.
Key factors pushing the probability up
– Hamas has signaled willingness to accept a mediated framework and to trade hostages for concessions.
– Intense international pressure (U.S., Egypt, Qatar, EU, UN) and humanitarian catastrophe could force rapid, pragmatic deals (short-term humanitarian pauses or hostage‑for‑aid swaps) even if a comprehensive settlement isn’t reached.
– Israeli defense officials have sometimes preferred limited hostage deals over prolonged urban combat; that creates an opening for a limited ceasefire tied to hostage releases.
Simple causal model and calibration
– For a formal ceasefire declaration in September we need (at minimum): Hamas willingness (already present), Israel’s acceptance (uncertain), and mediators producing enforceable terms acceptable to Israel and external backers (uncertain). I estimate a modest chance Israel will accept a mediated deal in the remaining weeks and a higher chance of a limited humanitarian pause/hostage swap being stitched together under pressure.
– Using a conservative probabilistic intuition: probability Israel accepts a mediated framework in September ≈ 35%; probability Hamas remains willing and able to deliver concessions/hostage exchanges ≈ 70%; probability mediators can clinch a deal acceptable to Israel within the short timeframe ≈ 40%. Multiplying these rough, partly‑dependent factors gives a baseline ~10% for a negotiated, relatively comprehensive ceasefire. Add a realistic chance (~15%) of a shorter humanitarian pause or limited declared ceasefire tied to hostage exchanges or temporary operational constraints being declared before 1 Oct. Sum ≈ 25%.
Assumptions whose failure would most change the forecast
1) Assumption: Netanyahu (or his cabinet) will not accept a mediated ceasefire in September unless terms are much more favorable to Israel than the August framework. If this assumption fails (i.e., he decides to accept), the ceasefire probability would jump substantially. Probability this assumption is wrong (i.e., that he WILL accept in September): 35% (failure-of-assumption probability 35%).
2) Assumption: Hamas will remain willing to implement the August‑style framework and to exchange hostages on the timetables mediators propose. If Hamas withdraws willingness or is unable to deliver hostages, chances fall. Probability this assumption is wrong (i.e., Hamas becomes unwilling/unable): 30%.
3) Assumption: External mediators (Egypt, Qatar, U.S.) can bridge remaining gaps and provide guarantees/monitoring acceptable to Israel in a short window. Probability this assumption is wrong: 60%.
Sensitivity / alternative timelines
– Chance of a ceasefire declared within ~2 weeks (by ~17 Sept): relatively low — I estimate ~15% (because Israeli offensive momentum and logistics make rapid agreement harder).
– Chance of a ceasefire declared by end of September (the question’s resolution window): higher than the two‑week window but still limited — estimate ~25% (this is my final forecast).
– Chance of a ceasefire within three months (by 1 Dec 2025): noticeably higher — roughly 45% — because mediators and battlefield costs often produce deals over somewhat longer horizons even when they fail in the first few weeks.
Uncertainty and final calibration
– There is substantial uncertainty. My point estimate balances the clear willingness from Hamas and strong mediator activity against the active Israeli offensive and political constraints on Israel. Given the short time left in September and the military escalation that started on 2 Sept, the odds are meaningfully below even. I penalize overconfidence relative to my prior forecasting behavior.
Final answer
Probability: 25%
The extracted probability is: 25%
All predictions: [1, 8, 20, 25]
Filtered predictions: [8, 20]
Median reasoning:
Reasoning and judgment
Summary judgment: the balance of evidence as of 3 Sept 2025 points toward a low but non-trivial chance of a ceasefire being declared at some point in September 2025. Key drivers cut both ways: Hamas has reportedly accepted an August-mediated 60‑day framework (increasing the chance), but Israel has launched a fresh ground operation (2 Sept) and has a planned mid‑September offensive and political incentives that make an Israeli acceptance unlikely in the near term (decreasing the chance). The month left to reach an agreement is short, and military escalation makes talks harder; but intense international pressure and the hostage issue keep a pathway open for a limited or temporary ceasefire negotiated rapidly.
How I weighed evidence
– Military facts (high weight, recent): Israel began a ground operation in Gaza City on 2 Sept and had approved plans for a mid‑September offensive. This materially reduces the chance of a ceasefire in September because operations tend to continue while offensive objectives are pursued. (Strong negative)
– Negotiation facts (high weight, recent): Hamas accepted an August 60‑day ceasefire framework brokered by Egypt/Qatar; Israel has not accepted and has signalled demanding much tougher terms. Hamas acceptance raises the ceiling for a deal but is insufficient without Israeli buy‑in. (Mixed)
– Political incentives (high weight): Netanyahu’s coalition pressure from hard‑liners and public statements about occupying Gaza even if a deal is signed make Israeli acceptance harder. Conversely, domestic protests and international condemnation create pressure to secure hostage releases and humanitarian pauses. (Net negative overall)
– Time window and base rates (medium‑high weight): Only ~27 days remain in September; historically, surprise short deals happen but are rare when large offensives are underway. Short windows favor the status quo. (Negative)
– International diplomacy (medium weight): U.S., Egypt, Qatar and European pressure increases probability of a rapid negotiated pause for hostage deals, but their leverage may be limited. (Slight positive)
Probability profile across the month (my conditional, cumulative reasoning)
– By Sept 10 (very short timeframe, immediately after a new ground operation): low chance — I estimate ~8%. Rapid emergency deals are possible but unlikely while a new operation is underway.
– By Sept 20 (covers the planned mid‑September offensive window): higher but still modest chance — I estimate ~15%. This reflects a possible limited hostage exchange/pause negotiated under intense pressure, or the offensive being paused if it stalls or political costs spike.
– By Sept 30 (end of month): cumulative chance is higher than earlier slices because more negotiation time accumulates — I estimate ~20%. This represents the overall chance of any formal ceasefire declaration occurring sometime in September (temporary or longer), given the mix of Hamas acceptance, diplomatic pressure, but strong Israeli reluctance and active operations.
Key assumptions whose failure would most change the forecast
1) Assumption: Israel’s political leadership (Netanyahu and coalition) will resist agreeing to any ceasefire that implies major concessions (withdrawal/demilitarization) during an offensive.
– Estimated probability this assumption is wrong (i.e., they decide to accept or agree to a deal quickly): 25%.
– If false (i.e., Israel quickly accepts a mediated deal because of domestic/international pressure or battlefield developments), my ceasefire probability would jump substantially (add ~+40–50 points), because Hamas has already signaled acceptance.
2) Assumption: Military operations (including the mid‑September offensive) will continue and escalate sufficiently to impede negotiations during September.
– Estimated probability this assumption is wrong (i.e., operations are paused, bog down, or are scaled back): 30%.
– If false (operations pause or fail quickly), probability of a ceasefire in September would increase (add ~+20–30 points) as bargaining leverage and urgency shift toward a mediated pause.
3) Assumption: Hamas will maintain its acceptance of the August framework and not withdraw or raise new demands.
– Estimated probability this assumption is wrong (i.e., Hamas retracts or hardens demands): 20%.
– If false (Hamas withdraws acceptance), probability of a September ceasefire would fall (subtract ~10–20 points) because negotiators would need to restart talks.
Calibration and uncertainty
– I’ve penalized overconfidence and accounted for the historical fact that sudden ceasefires do sometimes occur even late in escalations, especially around hostage deals. Given the short remaining timeframe and the active offensive, I remain cautious.
– There is substantial tail risk on both sides: a surprise rapid hostage deal could produce a sudden ceasefire (upside), or a rapid military breakthrough could make talks impossible (downside). That uncertainty keeps the probability away from extreme values.
Final integrated probability
Taking all factors into account (recent ground offensive; Hamas acceptance of a framework; Israeli political constraints and plans for a mid‑September offensive; intense international pressure; short time window), my best point estimate for the probability that a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas will be declared at some point during September 2025 is:
Probability: 20%
=== Forecast Result ===
{
“probability_yes”: 0.14,
“probability_yes_per_category”: null,
“continuous_cdf”: null
}
=== Reasoning ===
Reasoning and judgment
Summary judgment: the balance of evidence as of 3 Sept 2025 points toward a low but non-trivial chance of a ceasefire being declared at some point in September 2025. Key drivers cut both ways: Hamas has reportedly accepted an August-mediated 60‑day framework (increasing the chance), but Israel has launched a fresh ground operation (2 Sept) and has a planned mid‑September offensive and political incentives that make an Israeli acceptance unlikely in the near term (decreasing the chance). The month left to reach an agreement is short, and military escalation makes talks harder; but intense international pressure and the hostage issue keep a pathway open for a limited or temporary ceasefire negotiated rapidly.
How I weighed evidence
– Military facts (high weight, recent): Israel began a ground operation in Gaza City on 2 Sept and had approved plans for a mid‑September offensive. This materially reduces the chance of a ceasefire in September because operations tend to continue while offensive objectives are pursued. (Strong negative)
– Negotiation facts (high weight, recent): Hamas accepted an August 60‑day ceasefire framework brokered by Egypt/Qatar; Israel has not accepted and has signalled demanding much tougher terms. Hamas acceptance raises the ceiling for a deal but is insufficient without Israeli buy‑in. (Mixed)
– Political incentives (high weight): Netanyahu’s coalition pressure from hard‑liners and public statements about occupying Gaza even if a deal is signed make Israeli acceptance harder. Conversely, domestic protests and international condemnation create pressure to secure hostage releases and humanitarian pauses. (Net negative overall)
– Time window and base rates (medium‑high weight): Only ~27 days remain in September; historically, surprise short deals happen but are rare when large offensives are underway. Short windows favor the status quo. (Negative)
– International diplomacy (medium weight): U.S., Egypt, Qatar and European pressure increases probability of a rapid negotiated pause for hostage deals, but their leverage may be limited. (Slight positive)
Probability profile across the month (my conditional, cumulative reasoning)
– By Sept 10 (very short timeframe, immediately after a new ground operation): low chance — I estimate ~8%. Rapid emergency deals are possible but unlikely while a new operation is underway.
– By Sept 20 (covers the planned mid‑September offensive window): higher but still modest chance — I estimate ~15%. This reflects a possible limited hostage exchange/pause negotiated under intense pressure, or the offensive being paused if it stalls or political costs spike.
– By Sept 30 (end of month): cumulative chance is higher than earlier slices because more negotiation time accumulates — I estimate ~20%. This represents the overall chance of any formal ceasefire declaration occurring sometime in September (temporary or longer), given the mix of Hamas acceptance, diplomatic pressure, but strong Israeli reluctance and active operations.
Key assumptions whose failure would most change the forecast
1) Assumption: Israel’s political leadership (Netanyahu and coalition) will resist agreeing to any ceasefire that implies major concessions (withdrawal/demilitarization) during an offensive.
– Estimated probability this assumption is wrong (i.e., they decide to accept or agree to a deal quickly): 25%.
– If false (i.e., Israel quickly accepts a mediated deal because of domestic/international pressure or battlefield developments), my ceasefire probability would jump substantially (add ~+40–50 points), because Hamas has already signaled acceptance.
2) Assumption: Military operations (including the mid‑September offensive) will continue and escalate sufficiently to impede negotiations during September.
– Estimated probability this assumption is wrong (i.e., operations are paused, bog down, or are scaled back): 30%.
– If false (operations pause or fail quickly), probability of a ceasefire in September would increase (add ~+20–30 points) as bargaining leverage and urgency shift toward a mediated pause.
3) Assumption: Hamas will maintain its acceptance of the August framework and not withdraw or raise new demands.
– Estimated probability this assumption is wrong (i.e., Hamas retracts or hardens demands): 20%.
– If false (Hamas withdraws acceptance), probability of a September ceasefire would fall (subtract ~10–20 points) because negotiators would need to restart talks.
Calibration and uncertainty
– I’ve penalized overconfidence and accounted for the historical fact that sudden ceasefires do sometimes occur even late in escalations, especially around hostage deals. Given the short remaining timeframe and the active offensive, I remain cautious.
– There is substantial tail risk on both sides: a surprise rapid hostage deal could produce a sudden ceasefire (upside), or a rapid military breakthrough could make talks impossible (downside). That uncertainty keeps the probability away from extreme values.
Final integrated probability
Taking all factors into account (recent ground offensive; Hamas acceptance of a framework; Israeli political constraints and plans for a mid‑September offensive; intense international pressure; short time window), my best point estimate for the probability that a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas will be declared at some point during September 2025 is:
Probability: 20%
Past forecasts by Phil’s and Jeremy ’s bots —>
Source: Centre for Information Resilience, date 8-22-2025
https://www.info-res.org/israel-gaza-war/maps/israel-gaza-conflict-map/
