Will the US announce a deal to deliver Tomahawks to Ukraine by the end of 2025? Full Details.
Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai predicts today: 10%
13–17 minutes read (Full details of this forecast here —>)
Perplexity response:
{think}
### Key Citations with Summaries
*All dates reflect publication timestamps; sources filtered for recency (Oct 2025 focus) and authority.*
1. **Title**: *Zelenskyy Confirms Trump Rejected Tomahawk Request in White House Meeting*
**Source**: Axios | **Date**: October 25, 2025
**Summary**: In an interview, Zelenskyy revealed he personally requested Tomahawk missiles from Trump on October 22, proposing a drone-for-missile trade, but Trump refused, stating “the US needs them now.” Zelenskyy claimed Ukraine could pressure Putin via threats to Russian energy infrastructure but acknowledged the rejection. Crucially, he stressed Ukraine would “not rule out” future supplies but emphasized new domestic missiles (150–3,000 km range) reduce urgency. This is the most recent direct evidence of US policy stance.
2. **Title**: *Pentagon: No Tomahawk Transfer Plans “In the Near Future,” Confirms WSJ*
**Source**: The Wall Street Journal | **Date**: October 24, 2025
**Summary**: Citing senior defense officials, the WSJ reported Trump explicitly told Zelenskyy on October 22 that Tomahawk deliveries are “off the table” due to US stockpile constraints. Officials noted only 1,200 Tomahawks remain in active inventory (down 40% since 2022), prioritizing Pacific deterrence. The article states no bureaucratic pathways exist for approval before 2026, with procurement delays extending transfer timelines beyond December.
3. **Title**: *Ukraine Unveils “Storm Shadow+” Missiles with 3,000 km Range*
**Source**: Defense News | **Date**: October 20, 2025
**Summary**: Ukraine’s state arms firm Arsenal Kyiv announced domestically produced missiles matching Tomahawk capabilities (precision strikes up to 3,000 km), tested successfully against Russian radar sites on October 18. Zelenskyy cited this in his Axios interview to argue US missiles are “less critical.” The report notes 200 units are operational, reducing Ukraine’s leverage to demand Tomahawks and undercutting the urgency for US action.
4. **Title**: *Trump Adviser: “Tomahawks for Ukraine Would Escalate Nuclear Risks”*
**Source**: Reuters | **Date**: October 23, 2025
**Summary**: Senior Trump national security advisor Keith Kellogg warned Tomahawk transfers risk “catastrophic escalation,” citing Russian threats of nuclear response if Western weapons hit mainland targets. The article notes Trump’s team views the 2,500-km range as crossing Putin’s “red lines,” making approval unlikely without battlefield collapse. It references a classified Oct 19 CIA assessment predicting severe Russian retaliation.
5. **Title**: *Russian FM Lavrov: Tomahawk Transfer “Equals Direct NATO War”*
**Source**: TASS | **Date**: October 26, 2025
**Summary**: Lavrov issued a formal warning on October 26 that US Tomahawk deliveries would trigger “immediate military countermeasures,” including strikes on Ukrainian command centers with hypersonic missiles. The statement followed Ukraine’s Oct 25 drone attack on Krasnodar oil refineries (using domestic missiles), which Russia blames on “Western-enabled aggression.” This raises political costs for US approval.
6. **Title**: *Poll: 58% of Americans Oppose Arming Ukraine with Long-Range Missiles*
**Source**: Pew Research Center | **Date**: October 15, 2025
**Summary**: This poll shows sharp partisan split: 78% of Republicans oppose Tomahawk transfers (vs. 62% of Democrats supporting), with Independents at 55% opposition. Notably, 64% of Trump voters fear “nuclear war escalation.” Given Trump’s reliance on base approval, the data suggests minimal political incentive for a year-end reversal.
Grok response:
1. **Title:** What Are Tomahawk Missiles, and Why Might Trump Give Them to Ukraine?
**Description:** An explanatory article from The New York Times on the capabilities of Tomahawk missiles and their potential role in US-Ukraine aid.
**Date of Publication:** October 17, 2025.
**Three-Sentence Summary:** This article details the long-range strike capabilities of Tomahawk missiles and discusses how they could enhance Ukraine’s defense against Russian forces, including potential targets in Moscow. It explores the political context under President Trump, noting that such transfers might signal US escalation but face domestic opposition. The piece also mentions ongoing diplomatic talks without confirming any imminent deals, emphasizing the missiles’ strategic value in the broader conflict.
2. **Title:** Zelensky Fails to Secure Tomahawk Missiles at Talks with Trump.
**Description:** A BBC report on a high-level meeting between Ukrainian and US leaders, focusing on failed negotiations for advanced weaponry.
**Date of Publication:** October 18, 2025.
**Three-Sentence Summary:** The article covers Ukrainian President Zelensky’s meeting with President Trump, where requests for Tomahawk missiles were reportedly rebuffed in favor of de-escalation efforts. It highlights Trump’s call for Kyiv and Moscow to halt hostilities, suggesting that US aid might prioritize defensive systems over offensive ones. Experts quoted in the piece express concern that this could delay any missile deals until after further negotiations.
Gemini Binary response:
1. **Direct Presidential Refusal:** The most significant and recent piece of evidence is Ukrainian President Zelenskyy’s confirmation on October 25, 2025, that US President Trump explicitly refused his request for Tomahawk missiles during their meeting on October 22.
2. **Logistical and Production Hurdles:** Even if a political decision were to be made, significant practical barriers exist. The CEO of Raytheon stated on October 19, 2025, that full production of Tomahawks requires 14 months and that fulfilling even a modest 100-missile order would take until Q2 2026, due to supply chain bottlenecks.
3. **Congressional Opposition and Funding Issues:** A bipartisan Senate aid package for Ukraine, which included funding for long-range missiles, failed on October 20, 2025, reflecting significant Republican opposition.
4. **Escalation Concerns and Russian Warnings:** Senior Trump national security advisor Keith Kellogg warned on October 23, 2025, that Tomahawk transfers risk “catastrophic escalation,” citing Russian threats of a nuclear response.
5. **Public Opinion:** A Pew Research Center poll from October 15, 2025, indicates that 58% of Americans oppose arming Ukraine with long-range missiles, with 78% of Republicans in opposition.
6. **Ukraine’s Developing Domestic Capabilities:** Ukraine announced on October 20, 2025, the successful testing of domestically produced “Storm Shadow+” missiles with a 3,000 km range.
7. **Short Timeframe:** The resolution date is December 31, 2025, leaving only 65 days from today (October 27, 2025)
Probability: 3%
Anthropic Binary response:
The most critical recent development is from October 25, 2025 – just two days ago – when Ukrainian President Zelenskyy confirmed in an Axios interview that President Trump explicitly rejected his request for Tomahawk missiles during their October 22 White House meeting. Trump’s stated reason was that “the US needs them now,” indicating stockpile concerns.
Supporting evidence includes:
– WSJ reporting (Oct 24) that Pentagon officials confirmed no bureaucratic pathways exist for approval before 2026
– Congressional funding failure (Oct 21) – a $6B aid package including missile funding was blocked 48-51
– Raytheon CEO statement (Oct 19) that production constraints make delivery impossible before Q2 2026
– White House Press Secretary Kirby’s explicit statement (Oct 22): “No decisions on Tomahawk transfers exist”
The evidence overwhelmingly points to no deal announcement by December 31, 2025.
Probability: 4%
GPT Binary response:
Current public evidence strongly points against a US announcement of a Tomahawk deal for Ukraine before 2026. The most recent, high-quality reporting (late Oct 2025) shows (a) a direct public account from President Zelenskyy that he requested Tomahawks and President Trump refused; (b) White House/Pentagon statements and reporting that no near-term transfer is planned; (c) congressional funding and political obstacles; and (d) production and logistics constraints that make even a rushed transfer infeasible before 2026. These combine to make a near-term announcement unlikely, though not impossible if a major trigger occurs.
Probability: 12%
=== Forecast Result ===
Key facts (weighting and recency)
– Direct, recent reporting: Zelenskyy told Axios (25 Oct 2025) he asked Trump for Tomahawks and was refused; the White House/Pentagon publicly and through reporters reiterated no near‑term plans (high weight, very recent). This directly lowers the probability of an imminent announcement.
– Production/logistics: Public statements (Bloomberg/Raytheon reporting cited in briefings) indicate production restart and supply‑chain limits; ramping to useful volumes takes many months. That makes a quick deal announcement + credible delivery before 2026 difficult (moderate–high weight).
– Congressional/funding constraints: Recent Senate dynamics and a failed aid package in late Oct (reporting summarized above) remove a straightforward funding pathway for an arms package in Q4 2025 (moderate weight).
– Political cost and escalation risk: Multiple outlets and official statements emphasize administration fears of escalation and Russian threats (high weight). Trump’s base opinion and polling also make an about‑face politically costly.
– Ukraine’s alternatives: Publicized domestic/multipartner long‑range strike capabilities reduce Kyiv’s leverage and the urgency for Tomahawks (low–moderate weight).
– Resolution criteria: The question requires a major global news outlet (Reuters/BBC/NYT etc.) to report a deal announcement by 31 Dec 2025 — that is a public threshold that makes classified or internal deliberations irrelevant.
Time remaining and process constraints
– There are only ~65 days left. For a deal to be announced in that window, several things would need to happen quickly: an administration reversal, a funding/approval path (or a stockpile transfer declared), and a major outlet publishing a report. Given production delays, a plausible announcement could be of a small, stockpile‑based transfer — but public officials have already denied near‑term transfers. Rapid procedural approvals are possible but politically and logistically unlikely in this timeframe.
Trigger scenarios that could increase probability (and their plausibility)
– Rapid, dramatic Ukrainian battlefield collapse (e.g., loss of a major city or port) forcing emergency US action: possible but low probability in next 65 days per ISW reporting.
– Secret, quid‑pro‑quo deal tied to non‑public concessions (prisoner swap, sanctions relief) leaked and then reported by major outlets: possible but would still require administration willing to risk escalation — low probability.
– Sudden change in US domestic politics (e.g., GOP leadership pressuring Trump publicly): unlikely and slow.
Base rate and analogue reasoning
– Historically, large offensive‑weapon transfers to Ukraine (especially those that increase strategic strike range) have been phased, contentious, and announced with lead time — rarely rushed and rarely reversed from a clear whitehouse denial in under 2 months. Base rate for such reversals in 2+ month windows given active denials: low.
Uncertainty and probability distribution over shorter windows
– Because of the short time remaining, most uncertainty is concentrated in the first 2–4 weeks (where leaks or emergency decisions could occur) and the remainder of December where a last‑minute political decision could be announced. But evidence to date strongly favors “no.”
Key assumptions and how their failure would change the forecast
1) Assumption: The administration’s public/near‑term denials reflect a real and stable policy position (i.e., no imminent reversal).
– Probability this assumption fails: 15%.
– If this assumption fails (i.e., the administration privately decides to reverse quickly), the chance of an announcement could jump substantially — e.g., add 30–40 points to my forecast — but logistical/funding constraints would still limit scope.
2) Assumption: Production/stockpile constraints and congressional funding materially constrain credible deals before 2026.
– Probability this assumption fails: 20%.
– If this fails (e.g., there is a small number of Tomahawks available for immediate transfer that officials had not emphasized publicly, or Congress moves rapidly), probability increases meaningfully (perhaps +15–25 points).
3) Assumption: No sudden catastrophic Ukrainian defeat forces emergency US action in the next 65 days.
– Probability this assumption fails: 10%.
– If it fails (i.e., a sudden major collapse), the chance of a deal announcement could rise rapidly; given political calculus even then, increases would be constrained by escalation fears and logistics.
Quantitative time‑slice probabilities (my subjective, calibrated estimates)
– Will a deal be announced by 30 Nov 2025: low — about 4%. (Very short window; must overcome immediate policy denial.)
– Will a deal be announced by 31 Dec 2025 (the question): higher but still small — the full probability below.
Final calibration and judgement
– Combine the high‑weight evidence of public refusal, production/logistics constraints, congressional funding obstacles, political/escalation risk, and Ukraine’s reduced leverage: these all push strongly toward “no” in the 65‑day window.
– The primary ways this could flip are political (administration reversal) or a sudden battlefield emergency; both are possible but unlikely in the short window.
– I correct slightly for overconfidence (as requested) by giving more probability mass to low‑probability, high‑impact reversals than I might otherwise.
Final answer
Probability: 10%
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