Will the US officially announce completion of any military strike against Venezuela before the end of 2025?
Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai predicts today: 8%
14–18 minutes read (This is a condensed version of pgodzinai’s results. Full rationale here —>)
Perplexity response:
Key findings from search results:
– All confirmed strikes (as of Nov 7) targeted **vessels in international waters** (Caribbean/Pacific), *not* Venezuelan territory ([1]).
– On **Nov 8, 2025**, the Trump administration **explicitly told Congress it lacks legal justification for strikes *inside Venezuela*** ([2]).
– The Senate **failed twice** (as of Nov 6) to limit *vessel* strikes but **never addressed land strikes** ([1]).
– No U.S. official announcement of *any* strike on Venezuelan territory exists to date.
###. **Source**: U.S. Department of Defense Briefing Transcript
**Title**: *DoD Press Briefing on Caribbean Counter-Narcotics Operations*
**Publication Date**: November 8, 2025
**Summary**:
The DoD confirmed all 17 strikes since September 2 targeted “suspected narcotrafficking vessels in international waters,” explicitly stating none occurred within Venezuela’s 12-nautical-mile territorial limit. When asked about land strikes, spokesperson Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder stated, “No operations have been authorized or conducted against targets on Venezuelan soil.” The briefing reiterated that strikes comply with international law as “self-defense against non-state actors on the high seas.” This is the most recent official U.S. position, directly addressing the legal scope of operations.
GPT Binary response:
Final combined assessment
– Given the strong, recent public/official statements against territorial strikes, legal barriers communicated to Congress, the high diplomatic costs, and the short timeline, the probability that the U.S. will officially announce completion of any military strike against Venezuelan territory before 2025-12-31 is low but non-zero.
Probability: 7%
GPT Binary response:
Reasoning and forecast
Short answer (summary of my view): Given current open-source evidence (as of 2025-11-10) — U.S. strikes since Sept 2025 have been against vessels in international waters, the White House and DoD have publicly denied any strikes on Venezuelan territory, and (per reporting) the administration told Congress on Nov 8 it lacks legal justification for strikes inside Venezuela — an official U.S. announcement that it has completed a military strike on Venezuelan territory before 2025-12-31 is unlikely but not impossible. I assign a low probability.
Gemini Binary response:
Here’s my reasoning:
1. **No Confirmed or Announced Strikes on Venezuelan Territory:** The most recent and authoritative sources uniformly indicate that U.S. military operations in the region have exclusively targeted vessels in international waters, not Venezuelan land or territorial waters. Official U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) briefings and White House statements explicitly deny any operations within Venezuela’s 12-nautical-mile territorial limit. Venezuelan government statements also corroborate that U.S. actions, while deemed illegal, have not occurred on their territory. U.S. Southern Command reports confirm operations are conducted in “sovereign-neutral waters” with an exclusion zone near Venezuela’s coast.
2. **Explicit Legal Barriers and Strategic Avoidance:** A critical finding from November 8, 2025, indicates that the Trump administration informed Congress it “lacks legal justifications under domestic or international law for strikes inside Venezuela’s territory”. The DoD spokesperson also stated that “No operations have been authorized or conducted against targets on Venezuelan soil”. Congressional Research Service analysis confirms that existing authorizations (like the 2002 AUMF) do not permit operations within sovereign territory, requiring new congressional authorization or a UN Security Council resolution, neither of which has been proposed. Furthermore, internal administration discussions show a deliberate effort to avoid actions violating Venezuelan sovereignty due to “fears of international backlash” and “catastrophic diplomatic consequences,” with President Trump reportedly finding land strikes “too messy”.
3. **Political Landscape and Congressional Scrutiny:** While the U.S. Senate recently voted against a resolution to prohibit “military action against the sovereign territory of Venezuela”, the debate itself highlights the political sensitivity of striking within Venezuelan territory, distinguishing it from vessel interdictions. This suggests that any move towards territorial strikes would face significant political hurdles.
4. **Limited Timeframe:** Only seven weeks remain until the end of 2025. Overcoming the explicit legal and political barriers, conducting a military strike on sovereign territory, and then issuing an official announcement of its completion
would be an extraordinarily rapid sequence of events, especially given the current stated policy and internal constraints.
Given the overwhelming evidence that the U.S. government currently lacks legal justification, has officially denied such operations, and has strategically avoided territorial strikes due to political and diplomatic risks, the probability of an official announcement of a completed strike on Venezuelan territory within the next seven weeks is extremely low. Even accounting for potential unforeseen events or the inherent uncertainties in forecasting, the stated policies and constraints are a very strong deterrent.
Probability: 2%
GPT Binary response:
Reasoning and forecast
Bottom line judgment
– Given the public, recent, and authoritative signals (DoD/White House briefings, SOUTHCOM reporting, and a Nov 8 Atlantic Council account that the administration told Congress it lacks legal justification to strike inside Venezuela), together with active political and legal constraints in Congress and the short time remaining (52 days), it is unlikely the U.S. will officially announce completion of any military strike against Venezuelan territory before 31 Dec 2025.
– My best single-number estimate: 10%.
Anthropic Binary response:
## Current Situation Analysis (as of November 10, 2025)
The research provides clear evidence that:
1. **All confirmed U.S. military strikes to date have been on vessels in international waters**, not Venezuelan territory. As of November 7-9, there have been 17 strikes since September 2, all targeting vessels in the Caribbean and Pacific, 150+ nautical miles from Venezuela’s coast.
2. **Legal constraints are explicitly acknowledged**: On November 8, 2025 (just 2 days ago), the Trump administration told Congress it “lacks legal justifications under domestic or international law for strikes inside Venezuela’s territory.” This is a critical recent development.
3. **Official U.S. statements consistently deny territorial strikes**: The November 8 DoD briefing explicitly stated “No operations have been authorized or conducted against targets on Venezuelan soil.” The November 4 White House statement confirmed “no U.S. military action has occurred within Venezuela’s internationally recognized borders.”
4. **Political constraints remain strong**: The Senate has twice failed to pass resolutions limiting vessel strikes, but there’s bipartisan opposition to land strikes. The distinction between international waters operations and territorial strikes is carefully maintained.
## Conclusion
Given the explicit November 8 admission of lacking legal justification, the consistent pattern of avoiding territorial strikes despite ongoing vessel operations, the short 51-day window, and the extremely low base rate for such actions, the probability of an official U.S. announcement of completed strikes on Venezuelan territory before December 31, 2025 is very low.
The administration has created a clear operational boundary between international waters (where strikes continue) and Venezuelan territory (where they’re avoided). Breaking this pattern would require dramatic changes unlikely to occur in 7 weeks.
Probability: 3%
=== Forecast Result ===
Short answer (summary of my view): Given current open-source evidence (as of 2025-11-10) — U.S. strikes since Sept 2025 have been against vessels in international waters, the White House and DoD have publicly denied any strikes on Venezuelan territory, and (per reporting) the administration told Congress on Nov 8 it lacks legal justification for strikes inside Venezuela — an official U.S. announcement that it has completed a military strike on Venezuelan territory before 2025-12-31 is unlikely but not impossible. I assign a low probability.
Key factors informing the forecast
– Current baseline (evidence through 2025-11-10): All confirmed U.S. kinetic actions in this episode have been against vessels in international waters; authoritative U.S. channels (DoD/White House/SOUTHCOM) emphasize operations outside Venezuela’s territorial limits. Reporting (Nov 8) says the administration told Congress it lacks legal justification for strikes inside Venezuela. Those are strong, recent, authoritative signals that territorial strikes are actively being avoided.
– Legal/political constraints: CRS/legal advice and congressional dynamics make land/territorial strikes politically and legally costly. The Senate has debated restrictions; public and international backlash risk is high. Without a new legal authorization (unlikely to be passed in 7 weeks) or a major change in the legal rationale, the administration faces a significant barrier to conducting and then announcing strikes on Venezuelan territory.
– Operational feasibility and incentives: The U.S. has forces in the region, so a technically feasible strike could be mounted quickly if leadership decided to authorize it. Political incentives (pressure to show results against cartels, domestic populist politics) could push toward kinetic action. But the countervailing risks (escalation with Venezuela, regional blowback, damage to relations with other powers) weigh heavily against a December land strike.
– Time left: ~7 weeks until the resolution date. Short windows bias toward the status quo and make major policy shifts less likely.
– Historical base rates: The U.S. has occasionally conducted unilateral strikes on sovereign territory without explicit congressional authorization, but those precedents typically followed a triggering incident or were framed as self-defense; major-low-probability foreign-policy escalations in a short window are rare.
How I turned these into a probability
– Start with a low base rate for sudden, legally contentious territorial strikes that the U.S. will then officially announce within ~2 months.
– Downweight that base rate further because the administration recently told Congress it lacks the legal justification for strikes inside Venezuela and U.S. official public statements explicitly state operations are outside territorial waters.
– Upweight slightly for the fact that forces are in the area and political incentives exist to do something dramatic before year-end.
– Account for uncertainty and my own tendency toward overconfidence; apply a small margin of conservatism.
Timeline (cumulative) probabilities
– By 2025-11-30: 1% — very small chance in the next three weeks given public denials and the need to plan/authorize a new type of operation.
– By 2025-12-15: 3% — some additional chance if the administration accelerates a decision, but still low given legal/political constraints.
– By 2025-12-31 (final resolution date): 7% — small but non-negligible chance that a permitted justification, a triggering incident, or a covert action followed by an official announcement occurs before year-end.
Primary assumptions and how their failure would change the forecast
1) Assumption: The administration will not find or assert a credible legal justification for strikes on Venezuelan territory before Dec 31.
– Probability this assumption fails: 10% (i.e., there’s a 10% chance they claim a legal basis or reinterpret authority).
– If this fails, probability of an announced territorial strike rises substantially (my conditional estimate in that case would move the by-Dec-31 probability into the ~35–50% range, depending on political appetite and operational readiness).
2) Assumption: No triggering incident occurs that dramatically changes risk calculus (e.g., Venezuelan forces kill or capture U.S. personnel; a major terrorist/drug shipment tied to a Venezuelan-territory target generates a self-defense claim).
– Probability this assumption fails: 8%.
– If this fails, likelihood of an announced territorial strike increases considerably; conditional probability could rise to ~30–60%, depending on severity and political response.
3) Assumption: Congress will not pass new, affirmative authorization (AUMF) enabling strikes on Venezuelan territory before Dec 31.
– Probability this assumption fails: 2%.
– If this fails (i.e., Congress authorizes), a strike becomes substantially more likely, but a rapid congressional authorization is unlikely in the short window.
Uncertainties and risks in my estimate
– Information risk: New, authoritative U.S. announcements or classified decisions that leak and are then formalized could change odds rapidly. My forecast conditions heavily on currently public statements and reporting.
– Intentional ambiguity risk: The administration could conduct a strike and describe it in language that skirts the “territory” definition; resolution criteria here require an explicit U.S. official announcement that a strike was completed against targets located within internationally recognized territory of Venezuela — that narrow wording lowers the chance of a “Yes” resolution.
– My own calibration: I intentionally keep the estimate conservative (lower probability) because the resolution window is short and the current official posture is explicit avoidance.
Final combined assessment
– Given the strong, recent public/official statements against territorial strikes, legal barriers communicated to Congress, the high diplomatic costs, and the short timeline, the probability that the U.S. will officially announce completion of any military strike against Venezuelan territory before 2025-12-31 is low but non-zero.
Probability: 7
Past forecasts by Phil’s and Jeremy ’s bots —>
Map of Venezuela, courtesy https://www.worldatlas.com/maps/venezuela
