Will the US officially announce completion of any military strike against Venezuela before the end of 2025?
Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai predicts today: 8%
14–18 minutes read (This is a condensed version of pgodzinai’s results. Full rationale here —>)
Grok response:
**Title:** Military strikes on Venezuela appear increasingly likely
**Description:** An article from Border Report discussing U.S. military buildup and potential actions against Venezuela.
**Publication Date:** November 1, 2025 (approximately 2 days ago, based on available context)
**Three-Sentence Summary:** The piece reports on U.S. military assets being positioned in the region, suggesting heightened tensions and the possibility of strikes, though no official announcements of completed actions are detailed. It cites anonymous U.S. officials indicating preparations for potential operations related to drug trafficking, but emphasizes that any strikes would need to be in international waters to avoid direct conflict. Expert opinions in the article warn of escalation risks, with no evidence of announcements meeting the resolution criteria as of early November 2025.
**Title:** Trump Rules Out Military Strikes in Venezuela
**Description:** An article from El-Balad.com covering U.S. President Trump’s statements on military policy toward Venezuela.
**Publication Date:** October 31, 2025 (approximately 3 days ago)
**Three-Sentence Summary:** The article states that President Trump explicitly ruled out military strikes in Venezuela during a press briefing, focusing instead on sanctions and diplomatic pressures related to drug trafficking. It contrasts this with earlier administration rhetoric about potential actions, noting no official announcements of completed strikes. Experts quoted suggest this could indicate a de-escalation, but they caution that policy could shift, with the latest update as of late October 2025 showing no progress toward the question’s resolution. **Title:** U.S. Sanctions and Military Posturing Toward Venezuela Escalate Amid Drug Crackdown
**Description:** A CNN analysis of U.S. foreign policy actions against Venezuela, including military and economic measures.
**Publication Date:** October 25, 2025
**Three-Sentence Summary:** The article discusses U.S. sanctions on Venezuelan oil companies and hints at military preparations, but reports no official announcements of completed strikes within Venezuela. It includes expert opinions from foreign policy analysts at think tanks like the Council on Foreign Relations, who argue that such actions could lead to broader conflict if not managed carefully. As of October 2025, there are no updates indicating movement toward an official announcement, emphasizing the administration’s focus on non-military tools.
**Title:** Venezuela Crisis: U.S. Military Options Under Scrutiny
**Description:** An Al Jazeera report on international reactions to U.S. policies toward Venezuela.
**Publication Date:** October 27, 2025
**Three-Sentence Summary:** The report examines U.S. military posturing and expert warnings about potential strikes, but confirms no official announcements of completed actions within Venezuela. It includes opinions from Latin American policy experts who view U.S. rhetoric as bluster without concrete follow-through. As of late October 2025, there are no updates indicating an imminent announcement, emphasizing the need for verifiable U.S. government sources.
Gemini Binary response
My assessment is based on the following key findings:
1. **Explicit Denials from Official U.S. Sources:** The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) press briefing on November 2, 2025, explicitly states, “No kinetic operations against Venezuelan territory have been authorized.” This stance is reinforced by a U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) update on October 31, 2025, which states, “All actions comply with international law; no strikes against sovereign territory authorized,” regarding “Operation Caribbean Shield,” a multinational counter-narcotics mission. These direct statements from primary military sources are highly credible and contradict any notion of imminent or planned territorial strikes.
**Nature of Current U.S. Military Presence:** The confirmed U.S. troop deployments (16,000 personnel, USS *Gerald R. Ford* carrier strike group) to the Caribbean are consistently described by U.S. officials as efforts to disrupt narcotrafficking in international waters and for deterrence. There is no indication of offensive preparations targeting Venezuelan landmass or airspace.
^*Lack of Venezuelan Provocation:** Reporting from The Guardian on November 1, 2025, suggests that the Maduro government is dismissing the U.S. buildup and has not initiated any military mobilization in response, nor are there reports of attacks or infrastructure damage. This indicates an absence of an immediate trigger from the Venezuelan side that might necessitate a rapid U.S. military response.
Considering the cumulative weight of the evidence, the explicit denials, the legal and political constraints, the expert consensus, and the short timeframe, the probability of the specified event occurring is extremely low. The robust denials from official U.S. government channels are particularly decisive. While a non-zero probability must be assigned to account for unforeseen events, it should be very small.
Probability: 1%Anthropic Binary response:
Looking at this question systematically as a superforecaster:
## Key Facts and Timeline Analysis
**Current Status (Nov 3, 2025):**
– No U.S. government announcement of any completed military strike against Venezuelan territory exists
– 58 days remain until resolution deadline (Dec 31, 2025)
– Recent developments show military buildup (16,000 troops) but explicitly for “counter-narcotrafficking” in international waters
– Multiple official statements (DoD Nov 2, SOUTHCOM Oct 31) explicitly deny strike authorization
## Base Rate Analysis
Historical precedent for U.S. military strikes with official announcements:
– Syria (2017, 2018): Announced within hours of execution
– Iran/Soleimani (2020): Announced immediately
– Afghanistan retaliation (2021): Announced same day
The U.S. has **never** conducted a military strike against Venezuelan territory. Past tensions (2019 crisis, 2020 Operation Gideon) resulted in sanctions, not strikes.
Base rate for U.S. conducting first-ever strike against a Latin American nation in modern era: <5% in any given year.
Probability: 4%
GPT Binary response:
What I’m watching (near‑term indicators)
– Daily DoD and White House press briefings for any change in wording from “no kinetic ops authorized” to “targeted strikes executed/completed.”
– Congressional actions or emergency resolutions authorizing force or condemning action.
– Credible reports (and subsequent U.S. confirmation) of attacks on U.S. personnel/ships/aircraft near Venezuela.
– Leaks or reporting of strike orders or operational deployments moving within Venezuelan territorial boundaries.
Bottom line
– Given the current official posture (deterrence/counter‑narcotics), legal barriers, Congressional environment, and the short time remaining in 2025, the probability of an official U.S. announcement that it completed a military strike inside Venezuela before 31 Dec 2025 is low but not zero. My central estimate reflects both the small but real chance of rapid escalation and the high barriers to such a public admission.
Probability: 8%
=== Forecast Result ===
Short answer (summary): There is a low but non-zero chance the U.S. will officially announce completion of a military strike against targets inside the internationally recognized territory of Venezuela by 31 Dec 2025. Given the public evidence as of 3 Nov 2025 (DoD / SOUTHCOM briefings describing deployments as counter‑narcotics deterrence, White House statements emphasizing sanctions and legal constraints, and expert/legal commentary stressing the political and War Powers barriers), I assign a modest probability because a strike would be a major escalation that the U.S. administration and Congress appear inclined to avoid in the near term.
Key factors driving my judgment
– Resolution requirement: The event requires an official U.S. government announcement (DoD, White House, or equivalent) confirming completion of a strike inside Venezuela’s internationally recognized territory. Media reports or foreign-government claims alone do not resolve this question. This raises the bar: covert or unacknowledged strikes won’t count unless later acknowledged.
– Current public posture (as of 3 Nov 2025): U.S. sources (DoD/SOUTHCOM and White House briefings cited in research) describe deployments (~16,000 personnel, naval and air assets) as counter‑narcotics/deterrence and explicitly deny strikes against Venezuelan territory. Congressional legal analyses note the War Powers and lack of an AFA (authorization for use of force) to justify unilateral strikes. Experts (CSIS, CRS summaries) assess strikes as legally/politically difficult in the near term.
– Time constraint: Only ~58 days remain until the resolution date. Fast escalations are possible, but major-escatation decisions (approval, planning, execution, and then an official “completion” announcement) typically require either a clear triggering provocation (attack on U.S. personnel/assets) or a political decision that risks significant blowback — neither of which is currently visible.
– Base rates & precedents: The U.S. has used strikes abroad (Syria, Afghanistan, counterterrorism) but strikes against a Western Hemisphere government’s sovereign territory are far rarer and carry higher diplomatic/congressional cost.
Past U.S. strikes related to Latin America (usually in international waters or against nonstate actors) often are framed carefully to avoid claims of attacking territory.
– Incentives and disincentives: Incentives for a strike would be: a sudden, verifiable Venezuelan act that threatens U.S. lives or assets; robust, specific intelligence justifying precise action; or a political calculation where the administration judges benefits > costs. Disincentives include legal/constitutional barriers, likely Congressional opposition, regional/backlash risk (Latin American governments, OAS, UN), distraction from other priorities (e.g., long‑range competition with China, Ukraine assistance), and the reputational/political cost of admitting strikes on foreign sovereign territory.
Signals that would materially increase probability before 31 Dec
– A credible, verifiable Venezuelan attack on U.S. personnel/assets or on a closely allied partner that the U.S. publicly treats as an armed attack.
– Rapid, explicit change in U.S. messaging (DoD/White House) from “deterrence/ interdiction” to “targeted strikes authorized.”
– Emergency Congressional authorization, or explicit legal rationale presented publicly authorizing strikes.
– Public leaks or admissions from U.S. commanders about planned or conducted strikes followed by official confirmation.
Signals that would materially decrease probability
– Continued public denials from DoD/White House that any kinetic operations against Venezuela are authorized.
– Multilateral diplomatic containment (Lima Group, Colombia/Brazil cooperation) that reduces perceived need for force.
– Bipartisan Congressional resolutions explicitly opposing unilateral strikes.
Three critical assumptions and estimated probabilities they fail
1) Assumption: The U.S. administration will not authorize strikes into Venezuelan sovereign territory absent a direct attack on U.S. personnel/assets or an imminent, verifiable threat. Probability this assumption fails: 12%. If this assumption fails (e.g., administration decides to act preemptively or for other political reasons), the probability of a resolved “Yes” would rise sharply.
2) Assumption: Congress will not rapidly authorize force or be bypassed without severe political cost; legal constraints will deter strikes. Probability this assumption fails: 15%. If Congress unexpectedly authorizes force or legal rationales are deemed sufficient to proceed, the likelihood of a strike announcement increases.
3) Assumption: The U.S. will prefer non-kinetic tools (sanctions, interdiction, partner cooperation) to achieve objectives before year-end. Probability this assumption fails: 20%. If non-kinetic measures are judged ineffective and urgency rises, risk of kinetic action increases.
Quantitative time-slice probabilities (my internal decomposition)
– Probability of an official U.S. announcement of a completed strike by 30 Nov 2025 (next ~4 weeks): low — I estimate roughly 3%. The short time window plus current denials makes a near-term announcement unlikely.
– Probability of an official U.S. announcement of a completed strike by 31 Dec 2025 (main question): modestly higher but still low — I estimate 8%. This allows for escalation or provocation in December and time for an official confirmation.
– Probability of an official U.S. announcement of a completed strike by 31 Jan 2026 (one month past resolution): somewhat higher than by end‑Dec (perhaps ~13%), reflecting additional time for decisions and operations, but this is outside the question’s resolution window.
Calibration and uncertainty
– I’m intentionally conservative to avoid overconfidence. The event requires both an act (strike within Venezuelan territory) and an explicit U.S. announcement of completion — two conjunctive requirements that lower the overall probability.
– Uncertainty sources: unknown classified intelligence, possible rapid Venezuelan provocations, internal U.S. administration decision-making that is not public, and political incentives that could change with domestic events.
– If a classified provocation exists or a rapid shift in political incentives occurs, my forecast could be too low; the assumption failure probabilities above quantify plausible deviations.
What I’m watching (near‑term indicators)
– Daily DoD and White House press briefings for any change in wording from “no kinetic ops authorized” to “targeted strikes executed/completed.”
– Congressional actions or emergency resolutions authorizing force or condemning action.
– Credible reports (and subsequent U.S. confirmation) of attacks on U.S. personnel/ships/aircraft near Venezuela.
– Leaks or reporting of strike orders or operational deployments moving within Venezuelan territorial boundaries.
Bottom line
– Given the current official posture (deterrence/counter‑narcotics), legal barriers, Congressional environment, and the short time remaining in 2025, the probability of an official U.S. announcement that it completed a military strike inside Venezuela before 31 Dec 2025 is low but not zero. My central estimate reflects both the small but real chance of rapid escalation and the high barriers to such a public admission.
Probability: 8%
Past forecasts by Phil’s and Jeremy ’s bots —>
Map of Venezuela, courtesy https://www.worldatlas.com/maps/venezuela
