Question: Will there be a ceasefire declared between Israel and Hamas in the month of May 2025?
Here’s what Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai predicts today:
.
{think}
Okay, let’s tackle this question about whether there will be a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in May 2025. First, I need to go through the provided search results to gather the latest information. The user wants a detailed rundown of the most relevant news, prioritizing recent sources. Let me start by listing out the citations with their titles, descriptions, dates, and summaries.
Looking at the first source from Euronews dated May 13, 2025, Netanyahu is quoted saying Israel will continue the Gaza operation with full force. He insists they won’t stop until Hamas is defeated. Hamas released a US hostage as a goodwill gesture, but Netanyahu warns any ceasefire would be temporary. This seems significant because it’s a direct statement from the Israeli PM indicating a hardline stance.
The second source from PBS also on May 13 echoes Netanyahu’s stance, mentioning the release of the last US hostage, Edan Alexander. It notes that Netanyahu is dismissing the idea of a ceasefire unless Hamas is dismantled. This aligns with the first source, reinforcing the Netanyahu’s position. There’s mention of potential tension between Netanyahu and Trump, who might be pushing for a ceasefire. Hamas’s demands include prisoner exchanges, a lasting ceasefire, and Israeli withdrawal, which Israel is resisting.
The third source from Times of Israel, same date, discusses Israeli negotiators heading to Doha. Netanyahu assured coalition partners that Israel won’t end the war without Hamas’s dismantlement. Hamas is open to a long truce but refuses to disarm permanently. The previous ceasefire in January collapsed when Israel didn’t engage in talks. Arab mediators are struggling because Hamas wants guarantees that Israel won’t resume attacks if hostages are released. This indicates that while there’s mediation, the core issues (Hamas disarmament, Israeli withdrawal) are unresolved.
The fourth source is a PDF from SAJR dated May 8, 2025. It mentions the ceasefire ending in mid-March when Israel resumed airstrikes. At that time, Hamas held 59 hostages, 24 believed to be Israeli. This gives context about the previous ceasefire’s collapse and the number of hostages, but it’s a week older than the other sources. Still, it shows the ongoing back-and-forth.
The fifth source from RFE/RL on May 14 discusses Trump halting US strikes on Yemen’s Houthis. While not directly related to the Israel-Hamas conflict, it shows Trump’s approach to ceasefires, possibly influencing regional dynamics. However, this might be less relevant unless there’s a connection to Gaza talked about elsewhere, which doesn’t seem to be the case here.
Now, considering the question is about a ceasefire in May 2025. The most recent articles are from May 13-14. Netanyahu’s statements are clear: no ceasefire until Hamas is destroyed. Hamas’s conditions (prisoners, ceasefire, withdrawal) are non-negotiable for Israel. Previous attempts at ceasefire collapsed due to unmet conditions. Mediation efforts in Doha are ongoing but face significant hurdles, especially since Netanyahu refuses to accept any end to the war without dismantling Hamas. There’s no indication in the sources that a ceasefire agreement is imminent. Instead, the focus is on Israel’s planned escalation, Hamas’s inflexible demands, and the lack of progress in negotiations. Therefore, based on current information, a ceasefire in May 2025 seems unlikely under the stated conditions from both sides.
### **Key Developments Regarding Israel-Hamas Ceasefire Talks (May 2025)**
Here is a structured analysis of recent developments based on verified sources, focusing on the likelihood of a ceasefire in May 2025.
—
## **Primary Sources and Summaries**
1. **Israeli Military to Continue Gaza Operation “With Full Force”**
– **Source**: Euronews (May 13, 2025)
– Netanyahu stated Israel will escalate its military actions in Gaza “within days” to destroy Hamas, rejecting any permanent ceasefire. Hamas released a U.S. hostage as a “goodwill gesture” but demands prisoner swaps, a lasting truce, and Israeli withdrawal[1].
2. **Netanyahu Rules Out Ending War Until Hamas is Defeated**
– **Source**: PBS NewsHour (May 13, 2025)
– Netanyahu confirmed Israel will not halt operations even if hostages are released. Hamas’s demands include a permanent ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal, which Israel rejects. U.S. President Trump’s push for a peace deal faces resistance due to Netanyahu’s stance[2].
3. **Doha Negotiations Face Major Hurdles**
– **Source**: Times of Israel (May 13, 2025)
– Israeli negotiators traveled to Doha for talks, but Netanyahu insists Hamas must disarm entirely. Hamas refuses to relinquish arms permanently and demands UN-backed guarantees against Israeli retaliation. Previous ceasefires collapsed due to unmet conditions[3].
4. **Context on Hostage Numbers**
– **Source**: SAJR (May 8, 2025)
– When the prior ceasefire ended in March 2023, Hamas held 59 hostages, including 24 Israelis. This highlights the ongoing human toll and the fragility of past truces[4].
5. **Regional Dynamics: U.S. Halts Yemen Bombing**
– **Source**: RFE/RL (May 14, 2025)
– Trump announced a halt to U.S. strikes against Yemen’s Houthi rebels, mediated by Oman. While not directly related to Gaza, it reflects Trump’s approach to conflict resolution, though Netanyahu’s obstinacy suggests similar tactics may not apply here[5].
—
## **Assessment of Ceasefire Prospects**
– **Israeli Position**: Netanyahu’s unyielding stance on destroying Hamas and rejecting temporary ceasefires leaves little room for compromise[1][2].
– **Hamas Demands**: Requires prisoner swaps, a lasting truce, and Israeli withdrawal—conditions Israel deems unacceptable[1][2][3].
– **Mediation Challenges**: Arab states’ inability to broker guarantees (e.g., UN resolutions) and Netanyahu’s refusal to allow Palestinian Authority involvement in Gaza hinder progress[3].
**Conclusion**: Current developments strongly suggest **no ceasefire agreement will be declared in May 2025**. Both sides’ inflexible positions, Israel’s planned escalation, and unresolved core issues (disarmament, withdrawal) indicate prolonged conflict.
—
**Last Updated**: May 14, 2025 | Data Sources: [1][2][3][4][5]
AskNews Deep Usage:
prompt_tokens=20321 completion_tokens=2118 total_tokens=0
AskNews Deep Search Response:
The likelihood of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas being declared by the end of May 2025 remains uncertain, with key sticking points and ongoing negotiations. Below is a summary of developments based on sources from the past 30 days:
1. **Negotiation Deadlines and U.S. Involvement (May 14):**
Israel sent a delegation to Doha (May 13-14) to discuss a temporary ceasefire proposal by U.S. envoy Hady Amr, which includes a 40-day pause in exchange for releasing **half of Hamas’s hostages** (~20-23 people). However, Israel refuses to discuss a permanent ceasefire, while Hamas demands a comprehensive deal involving Israeli withdrawal, prisoner swaps, and reconstruction of Gaza [1][2][3][6][8].
2. **Hamas’s Strategic Concessions:**
Hamas released dual Israeli-American hostage **Aiden Alexander** (May 12) as a goodwill gesture linked to U.S.-mediated talks [3][5][9]. However, this move highlights Hamas’s insistence on leveraging hostages for broader negotiations rather than incremental deals [5][9].
3. **Israeli Government’s Stance:**
Prime Minister Netanyahu insists negotiations continue “under fire” (military operations), signaling limited flexibility. Israel’s delegation has authority only to negotiate the U.S.-backed temporary truce, not a long-term resolution [2][6][8].
4. **Mediation Efforts (Egypt, Qatar, U.S.):**
Egypt and Qatar are pushing for a **70-day pause** (with potential for extension) tied to releasing 10 hostages [11][17][20]. The U.S. is actively coordinating talks, but as of May 14, Hamas still rejects “partial solutions” and demands guarantees for a permanent ceasefire [3][12][13].
5. **Historical Precedents and Stumbling Blocks:**
– A **7-year ceasefire proposal** in April 2025 was rejected by Israel over Hamas’s refusal to disarm and cede security control of Gaza [28][29][31].
– Hamas’s support among Gazans has risen by **12%** since direct U.S. negotiations began, strengthening its resolve to hold out for a comprehensive deal [5][25].
6. **Recent Escalation Risks:**
Israel has threatened to expand military operations if negotiations fail, while Hamas warns of “unprecedented resistance” [4][7][12]. Over **52,760 Palestinians** have died in the conflict since 2023 [15], adding urgency to talks but no clear resolution pathway.
**Critical Dates and Updates:**
– May 14: Israeli delegation remains in Doha but faces skepticism from Hamas leaders [1][3].
– May 13: U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff cited “several options” but no breakthrough [3][11].
– May 12: Hamas released Aiden Alexander but linked further releases to addressing broader demands [9][10].
**Expert Opinions:**
– **Arab media**: Hamas’s direct U.S. talks are a “symbolic victory” but unlikely to yield Israeli concessions [5][12].
– **Reuters**: Progress hinges on Israel accepting Hamas’s governance role in Gaza, which it currently rejects [17][21].
– **Egyptian mediators**: “Gaps remain too wide” for a May agreement, citing distrust over past failed truces [14][15][25].
**Conclusion:**
While negotiations are active, the core demands (permanent ceasefire vs. temporary pause, disarmament, governance of Gaza) remain irreconcilable as of mid-May 2025. Historical precedents (e.g., April’s failed 7-year proposal) and current red lines suggest a ceasefire by May 31 is improbable unless unprecedented compromises occur.
GPT News Summary:
As of May 14, 2025, the situation between Israel and Hamas around the possibility of a ceasefire remains tense and dynamic, marked by recent escalations and ongoing diplomatic efforts:
1. **Ceasefire Talks in Doha**:
– An Israeli delegation is set to travel to Doha, Qatar on May 13, 2025, for indirect ceasefire negotiations with Hamas (Source: military.china.com, May 14, 2025). The negotiations aim for a temporary ceasefire of about 40 days, exchanging it for the release of 20-23 captives, and have been prompted by Hamas’s recent release of Adnan Abu Hasna, an American-Israeli dual citizen.
2. **Military Escalation**:
– Despite the diplomatic movements, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has announced an intensification of military operations in Gaza aimed at defeating Hamas (Source: ici.radio-canada.ca, May 13, 2025). He emphasized that although a temporary truce could be possible to facilitate hostage releases, Israel is prepared to pursue the military campaign to its conclusion (Sources: Business News Tunisia, May 13, 2025; aa.com.tr, May 13, 2025).
3. **Hamas Releases Hostages**:
– On May 12, 2025, Hamas released an Israeli-American soldier as a gesture to break the stalemate in negotiations, although both parties remain at an impasse over the terms of a potential long-term ceasefire (Sources: Mainichi, May 12, 2025; Sankei, May 12, 2025).
4. **US Mediation and Diplomatic Pressure**:
– The US has been actively involved in mediating between the parties, with US President Donald Trump and Middle East envoy Hady Amr playing significant roles in applying diplomatic pressure on both Israel and Hamas (Sources: Kommersant, May 12, 2025; Al Jazeera, May 12, 2025).
5. **Humanitarian Impact and Conflict Dynamics**:
– The ongoing conflict has resulted in severe humanitarian crises in the Gaza Strip, with high levels of malnutrition and civilian casualties reported (Sources: Médecins du Monde and Hamas Ministry of Health via various outlets, May 13, 2025).
The contrasting signals—a push for ceasefire talks in Qatar alongside an intensified military campaign by Israel—highlight the complex and precarious nature of the situation. While diplomatic channels are open, the likelihood of a ceasefire declaration by June 1, 2025, hinges directly on the outcomes of the upcoming negotiations in Doha and any shifts in the military and political stances of both parties.
Extracted resolution criteria links:
[]
get_anthropic_binary_prediction Error: 400 – {“error”: “You have exceeded your credit allowance.”}
get_anthropic_binary_prediction Error: 400 – {“error”: “You have exceeded your credit allowance.”}
get_anthropic_binary_prediction Error: 400 – {“error”: “You have exceeded your credit allowance.”}
get_anthropic_binary_prediction Error: 400 – {“error”: “You have exceeded your credit allowance.”}
get_anthropic_binary_prediction Error: 400 – {“error”: “You have exceeded your credit allowance.”}
GPT Binary response:
Rationale (step-by-step)
1. Definition of the event
• A “ceasefire” is understood (per past resolutions on similar questions) as an officially announced, mutually acknowledged halt in hostilities between Israel and Hamas, even if temporary.
• It must be declared between 00:00 UTC 15 May 2025 and 23:59 UTC 31 May 2025.
2. Time remaining
• 17 calendar days.
• Any agreement must therefore move from draft text to public announcement in < 2½ weeks.
3. Current state of play (all sources 12-14 May 2025)
• Israeli PM Netanyahu: “We will continue the Gaza operation with full force” and rules out ending the war until Hamas is dismantled.
• Hamas: demands permanent ceasefire, Israeli withdrawal, large prisoner release; rejects “partial” deals.
• Talks in Doha exist but delegation’s mandate is limited to a 40-day pause linked to ~20 hostage releases; the two sides remain far apart on core issues (disarmament, withdrawal, Gaza governance).
• Previous March truce collapsed quickly; mistrust is high.
4. Base rate & historical precedent
• During intense Israel-Hamas wars (2008-9, 2012, 2014, 2021, 2023-24) there have been 1-3 humanitarian pauses per 50–70 days of heavy fighting ⇒ order-of-magnitude probability ≈10-15 % per two-week window once mediation is active.
• However, when one side openly insists on outright victory (e.g., 2014 final phase) the rate drops noticeably.
5. Facilitators vs obstacles during the next 17 days
Facilitators (+)
• U.S., Qatar, Egypt pushing; hostages give both leverage and incentive.
• Trump administration reportedly eager for a breakthrough before summer.
• Humanitarian catastrophe raises international cost of continued war.
Obstacles (–)
• Netanyahu’s coalition depends on hard-right partners opposed to any deal that leaves Hamas armed.
• Hamas’s leadership sees growing popular support and resists disarmament or limited pauses.
• “Escalate to win” messaging from Israel signals short-term military rather than diplomatic priority.
• Deep mistrust after March truce failure; any deal would need detailed verification and UN cover—hard to draft, translate, approve, and announce in < 2 weeks.
6. Quantitative estimate
• Start from historical base ≈12 % for a two-week window with active mediation.
• Add +3 % for unusually intense U.S. pressure and fresh Doha channel.
• Subtract –4 % for Netanyahu’s explicit rejection of a ceasefire and coalition constraints.
• Subtract –1 % for very short time left for document drafting, Cabinet and Shura approvals.
• Net ≈10 %.
• Apply ±3 % to reflect uncertainty in whether a short “humanitarian pause” would qualify under resolution wording.
Point estimate after calibration: 13 %.
7. Additional time-horizon check
• By 30 June 2025 (≈1½ months) I would put the chance of a declared ceasefire at ~30 %.
• By 31 Dec 2025, roughly even odds (~55 %).
Consistency check implies 13 % for the remaining 17 days is internally coherent.
8. Overconfidence adjustment
• My past forecasts tend to be 1-2 × too certain on Middle-East ceasefires; bump variance slightly upward rather than shifting mean. Final rounded figure remains 13 %.
Probability: 13%
The extracted probability is: 13%
GPT Binary response:
Reasoning and key considerations
Time window
• The event must occur between 15 May – 31 May 2025, only 17 days.
• Any negotiation that is not already close to the finish line must make very rapid progress, be approved by the Israeli war cabinet + Knesset, accepted by Hamas’s full political-military leadership, and publicly announced. Compressed timelines sharply cut the base chance.
Base rate
• Since Oct 2023 there have been three formal Israel-Hamas ceasefires (Nov 2023, Jan 2024, Mar 2025). Average interval ≈ 4–5 months → baseline ≈ 6-8 % per calendar month.
• May 2025 is only two months after the last pause collapsed, so the base rate for a new ceasefire this soon is at the low end of that range.
Current positions
• Netanyahu (13 May televised address, Euronews / PBS) – “continue with full force,” rejects any permanent ceasefire, promises imminent escalation.
• Hamas (Doha statements) – will not sign a short pause unless it includes a road-map to permanent ceasefire, Israeli withdrawal, large prisoner exchange.
→ The two irreconcilable red lines remain exactly where they were when the March truce fell apart.
Negotiation status
• Indirect Doha talks restarted 13 May. Israeli team’s mandate limited to a 40-day pause tied to release of ~20 hostages. Hamas calls the proposal “insufficient.”
• Mediators (Qatar, Egypt, U.S.) say “gaps remain too wide”; no draft text is circulating that both principals have endorsed. Nothing suggests the deal is in the signature phase.
Israeli domestic constraints
• War-cabinet hawks and far-right partners insist on continuing the campaign until Hamas is “dismantled.”
• Netanyahu’s coalition would likely fracture if he accepted Hamas’s conditions; he therefore has little slack before 31 May.
Potential surprise drivers
• International shock (e.g., mass-casualty strike) or U.S. leverage (aid suspension) could force a halt, but no such move is visible and would still need Hamas buy-in.
• Trump administration exerts pressure but has thus far confined it to shuttle diplomacy; no threat of immediate arms cutoff or UNSC resolution with enforcement.
Calibration and uncertainty
• Previous forecasting drift: personal tendency toward overconfidence → adjust downward.
• Tail risk of a sudden, face-saving “humanitarian truce” for hostage release can’t be ignored (≈ 10 % conditional).
• Add ≈ 5 % for low-probability exogenous shock producing a unilateral but mutually observed ceasefire.
Combined estimate
Base 7 % + active-talks uplift 5 % + shock tail 5 % − overconfidence adjustment 1 % ≈ 16 %.
Short-/long-term checks (internal)
• Ceasefire in next 7 days: ~8 %.
• By 31 Aug 2025: ~40 %.
• By 31 Dec 2025: ~70 %.
Given the above, the likelihood that a ceasefire will actually be declared in May 2025 is low but not negligible.
Probability: 16%
The extracted probability is: 16%
GPT Binary response:
Rationale
1. Time window
• 17 days (15-31 May). Any agreement must be publicly announced during this short period; if nothing changes, status quo is continued fighting.
• Even intensive Middle-East diplomacy usually needs at least a few days to close text, secure cabinet approvals, and issue joint statements—so lead-time matters.
2. Base rate of Israel-Hamas ceasefire declarations since Oct 2023
• Two well-defined truces have been declared in ≈19 months (Nov 2023, Feb-Mar 2025) → rough monthly base rate ≈10 %.
• Half-month base rate ≈5 %. This is our starting point.
3. Current negotiation signal (updates 12-14 May 2025)
• Israeli delegation in Doha under U.S./Qatar/Egypt mediation; proposal on table: 40-day pause for ~20 hostages.
• Netanyahu publicly insists that any pause will be temporary and war resumes until Hamas “dismantled.”
• Hamas leadership says it will not accept another short pause unless it contains “irreversible” steps toward a permanent ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal.
• Key gap: dismantlement vs. continued military capability/governance of Gaza. No bridging formula visible.
• Track-record: similar gaps caused collapse of January-March truce after three weeks.
Net effect: negotiations exist (raises probability vs. pure base rate) but principals’ red lines still clash (caps probability). I add ≈+6 ppt.
4. Domestic incentives
• Israel: hostage-families and White House press for deal, but Netanyahu’s survival depends on far-right partners who threaten government collapse if he accepts anything seen as “victory” for Hamas. He has repeatedly turned down Biden/Trump pressure and accepted only pauses clearly framed as tactical.
• Hamas: severe humanitarian conditions push for aid, yet its bargaining power—and internal legitimacy—derive from refusing to disarm or cede Gaza governance.
Overall bargaining space remains narrow. I subtract ≈-2 ppt.
5. External shocks
• A sudden battlefield disaster (e.g., mass‐casualty Israeli incident or breakthrough raid) could jolt leaders into a pause, but such low-frequency events rarely align with a specific 17-day window. Incremental bump of ≈+1 ppt to capture tail risk.
6. Calibration and overconfidence check
• Superforecasters tend to be 5-10 % too extreme. Adjust slightly toward 50 %.
Computed estimate
Base 5 %
+6 ppt active talks → 11 %
-2 ppt entrenched red lines → 9 %
+1 ppt low-probability shock → 10 %
+5 ppt calibration toward the mean → 15 %
Rounded to nearest whole integer:
Probability: 15%
The extracted probability is: 15%
Gemini Binary response:
Rationale:
The question asks for the probability of a ceasefire being declared between Israel and Hamas in the month of May 2025, specifically between May 15, 2025, and May 31, 2025 (a period of 17 days).
Current Situation (as of May 14, 2025):
1. **Negotiations are Active but Stalled:** An Israeli delegation was in Doha (or set to travel around May 13-14) for indirect talks with Hamas, mediated by the US, Qatar, and Egypt. A specific US-backed proposal for a temporary ceasefire of about 40 days in exchange for the release of some hostages (around 20-23) is reportedly on the table. However, as of May 13, US envoy Steve Witkoff reported “several options” but “no breakthrough.” Egyptian mediators have also stated that “gaps remain too wide” for an agreement.
2. **Israeli Position:** Prime Minister Netanyahu has publicly stated that Israel will intensify its military operations in Gaza “within days” with the aim of dismantling Hamas. He has ruled out a permanent ceasefire that would end the war without achieving this goal. However, he has indicated that a *temporary* truce to facilitate hostage releases could be possible, and the Israeli negotiating team in Doha reportedly has a mandate limited to discussing such a temporary pause.
3. **Hamas Position:** Hamas has demanded a comprehensive deal that includes a permanent ceasefire, Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, significant prisoner exchanges, and guarantees for the reconstruction of Gaza. While Hamas recently released an Israeli-American hostage (Aiden Alexander/Adnan Abu Hasna on May 12), this was reportedly linked to demands for progress on their broader conditions, not an unconditional move towards a simple temporary truce. Hamas appears to be rejecting “partial solutions.”
4. **Recent History:** Previous ceasefire attempts have failed, including one in January 2025 and a more ambitious 7-year ceasefire proposal in April 2025 that Israel rejected due to Hamas’s refusal to disarm.
Key Factors Influencing the Probability:
* **Arguments for a Ceasefire Declaration (likely temporary):**
* Active diplomatic channels with a concrete US-backed proposal being discussed.
* Israel’s negotiating team has a mandate for a temporary truce.
* The recent hostage release by Hamas, indicates some willingness to engage, though with conditions.
* Netanyahu’s acknowledgement that a temporary truce is *possible* for hostage release.
* Significant international pressure and mediation efforts.
* **Arguments Against a Ceasefire Declaration:**
* Netanyahu’s declared intention to escalate military operations imminently.
* Fundamental disagreements on core issues: Israel insists on dismantling Hamas before any permanent end to the war, while Hamas demands a permanent ceasefire and withdrawal as part of any deal.
* Recent reports (May 13-14) from mediators and envoys indicate “no breakthrough” and “gaps [are] too wide.”
* Hamas is reportedly strengthened by increased support and is holding out for a comprehensive deal.
* The short timeframe (17 days) for bridging these significant gaps, especially with an impending military escalation.
* Netanyahu’s domestic political situation, with hardline coalition partners likely opposing concessions.
Probability Assessment:
A *permanent* ceasefire by May 31 is extremely unlikely given the current stated positions. The question revolves around *a* ceasefire, which could include a temporary truce. The primary hope for a “yes” resolution lies in the 40-day pause proposal.
However, the combination of Israel’s planned military escalation, the “no breakthrough” status of talks as of mid-May, Hamas’s insistence on linking hostage releases to broader demands, and the fundamental disagreements on the war’s end-state make even a temporary ceasefire declaration challenging within the next 17 days. The impending escalation is a significant variable; it could either shatter talks or, less likely in the short term, create conditions that push one or both sides toward a pause.
Given the Brier score implications, and the need to avoid overconfidence, a low probability is warranted. The information suggests that while talks are happening, the obstacles are substantial and immediate priorities (like Israel’s planned escalation) point away from an imminent ceasefire. The reports of “no breakthrough” and “gaps too wide” from those involved in mediation are particularly weighty.
Considering these factors, the probability of a ceasefire being declared by May 31, 2025, is low. It’s not impossible, as diplomatic situations can change rapidly, but the current trajectory and stated roadblocks are significant. A probability in the lower teens seems appropriate, acknowledging the active discussions for a temporary pause but weighing heavily the major obstacles.
Probability: 12%
The extracted probability is: 12%
Task failed with error: 400 Client Error: Bad Request for url: https://llm-proxy.metaculus.com/proxy/anthropic/v1/messages/
Traceback (most recent call last):
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 79, in fetch_anthropic_binary_prediction
return await fetch_sync(get_anthropic_binary_prediction, title, perplexity_summary_report, asknews_summary, asknews_deep_research, vision_analysis, today, resolution_date, background, fine_print, resolution_criteria)
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 61, in fetch_sync
return await asyncio.get_event_loop().run_in_executor(
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/concurrent/futures/thread.py”, line 58, in run
result = self.fn(*self.args, **self.kwargs)
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 57, in run_sync
return future.result(timeout=180)
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/concurrent/futures/_base.py”, line 458, in result
return self.__get_result()
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/concurrent/futures/_base.py”, line 403, in __get_result
raise self._exception
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/concurrent/futures/thread.py”, line 58, in run
result = self.fn(*self.args, **self.kwargs)
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/anthropic_service.py”, line 113, in get_anthropic_binary_prediction
response.raise_for_status()
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/.venv/lib/python3.10/site-packages/requests/models.py”, line 1024, in raise_for_status
raise HTTPError(http_error_msg, response=self)
requests.exceptions.HTTPError: 400 Client Error: Bad Request for url: https://llm-proxy.metaculus.com/proxy/anthropic/v1/messages/
Task failed with error: 400 Client Error: Bad Request for url: https://llm-proxy.metaculus.com/proxy/anthropic/v1/messages/
Traceback (most recent call last):
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 79, in fetch_anthropic_binary_prediction
return await fetch_sync(get_anthropic_binary_prediction, title, perplexity_summary_report, asknews_summary, asknews_deep_research, vision_analysis, today, resolution_date, background, fine_print, resolution_criteria)
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 61, in fetch_sync
return await asyncio.get_event_loop().run_in_executor(
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/concurrent/futures/thread.py”, line 58, in run
result = self.fn(*self.args, **self.kwargs)
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 57, in run_sync
return future.result(timeout=180)
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/concurrent/futures/_base.py”, line 458, in result
return self.__get_result()
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/concurrent/futures/_base.py”, line 403, in __get_result
raise self._exception
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/concurrent/futures/thread.py”, line 58, in run
result = self.fn(*self.args, **self.kwargs)
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/anthropic_service.py”, line 113, in get_anthropic_binary_prediction
response.raise_for_status()
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/.venv/lib/python3.10/site-packages/requests/models.py”, line 1024, in raise_for_status
raise HTTPError(http_error_msg, response=self)
requests.exceptions.HTTPError: 400 Client Error: Bad Request for url: https://llm-proxy.metaculus.com/proxy/anthropic/v1/messages/
Task failed with error: 400 Client Error: Bad Request for url: https://llm-proxy.metaculus.com/proxy/anthropic/v1/messages/
Traceback (most recent call last):
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 79, in fetch_anthropic_binary_prediction
return await fetch_sync(get_anthropic_binary_prediction, title, perplexity_summary_report, asknews_summary, asknews_deep_research, vision_analysis, today, resolution_date, background, fine_print, resolution_criteria)
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 61, in fetch_sync
return await asyncio.get_event_loop().run_in_executor(
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/concurrent/futures/thread.py”, line 58, in run
result = self.fn(*self.args, **self.kwargs)
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 57, in run_sync
return future.result(timeout=180)
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/concurrent/futures/_base.py”, line 458, in result
return self.__get_result()
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/concurrent/futures/_base.py”, line 403, in __get_result
raise self._exception
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/concurrent/futures/thread.py”, line 58, in run
result = self.fn(*self.args, **self.kwargs)
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/anthropic_service.py”, line 113, in get_anthropic_binary_prediction
response.raise_for_status()
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/.venv/lib/python3.10/site-packages/requests/models.py”, line 1024, in raise_for_status
raise HTTPError(http_error_msg, response=self)
requests.exceptions.HTTPError: 400 Client Error: Bad Request for url: https://llm-proxy.metaculus.com/proxy/anthropic/v1/messages/
Task failed with error: 400 Client Error: Bad Request for url: https://llm-proxy.metaculus.com/proxy/anthropic/v1/messages/
Traceback (most recent call last):
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 79, in fetch_anthropic_binary_prediction
return await fetch_sync(get_anthropic_binary_prediction, title, perplexity_summary_report, asknews_summary, asknews_deep_research, vision_analysis, today, resolution_date, background, fine_print, resolution_criteria)
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 61, in fetch_sync
return await asyncio.get_event_loop().run_in_executor(
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/concurrent/futures/thread.py”, line 58, in run
result = self.fn(*self.args, **self.kwargs)
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 57, in run_sync
return future.result(timeout=180)
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/concurrent/futures/_base.py”, line 458, in result
return self.__get_result()
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/concurrent/futures/_base.py”, line 403, in __get_result
raise self._exception
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/concurrent/futures/thread.py”, line 58, in run
result = self.fn(*self.args, **self.kwargs)
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/anthropic_service.py”, line 113, in get_anthropic_binary_prediction
response.raise_for_status()
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/.venv/lib/python3.10/site-packages/requests/models.py”, line 1024, in raise_for_status
raise HTTPError(http_error_msg, response=self)
requests.exceptions.HTTPError: 400 Client Error: Bad Request for url: https://llm-proxy.metaculus.com/proxy/anthropic/v1/messages/
Task failed with error: 400 Client Error: Bad Request for url: https://llm-proxy.metaculus.com/proxy/anthropic/v1/messages/
Traceback (most recent call last):
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 79, in fetch_anthropic_binary_prediction
return await fetch_sync(get_anthropic_binary_prediction, title, perplexity_summary_report, asknews_summary, asknews_deep_research, vision_analysis, today, resolution_date, background, fine_print, resolution_criteria)
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 61, in fetch_sync
return await asyncio.get_event_loop().run_in_executor(
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/concurrent/futures/thread.py”, line 58, in run
result = self.fn(*self.args, **self.kwargs)
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 57, in run_sync
return future.result(timeout=180)
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/concurrent/futures/_base.py”, line 458, in result
return self.__get_result()
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/concurrent/futures/_base.py”, line 403, in __get_result
raise self._exception
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/concurrent/futures/thread.py”, line 58, in run
result = self.fn(*self.args, **self.kwargs)
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/anthropic_service.py”, line 113, in get_anthropic_binary_prediction
response.raise_for_status()
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/.venv/lib/python3.10/site-packages/requests/models.py”, line 1024, in raise_for_status
raise HTTPError(http_error_msg, response=self)
requests.exceptions.HTTPError: 400 Client Error: Bad Request for url: https://llm-proxy.metaculus.com/proxy/anthropic/v1/messages/
All predictions: [12, 13, 15, 16]
Filtered predictions: [13, 15]
Median reasoning:
Rationale
1. Time window
• 17 days (15-31 May). Any agreement must be publicly announced during this short period; if nothing changes, status quo is continued fighting.
• Even intensive Middle-East diplomacy usually needs at least a few days to close text, secure cabinet approvals, and issue joint statements—so lead-time matters.
2. Base rate of Israel-Hamas ceasefire declarations since Oct 2023
• Two well-defined truces have been declared in ≈19 months (Nov 2023, Feb-Mar 2025) → rough monthly base rate ≈10 %.
• Half-month base rate ≈5 %. This is our starting point.
3. Current negotiation signal (updates 12-14 May 2025)
• Israeli delegation in Doha under U.S./Qatar/Egypt mediation; proposal on table: 40-day pause for ~20 hostages.
• Netanyahu publicly insists that any pause will be temporary and war resumes until Hamas “dismantled.”
• Hamas leadership says it will not accept another short pause unless it contains “irreversible” steps toward a permanent ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal.
• Key gap: dismantlement vs. continued military capability/governance of Gaza. No bridging formula visible.
• Track-record: similar gaps caused collapse of January-March truce after three weeks.
Net effect: negotiations exist (raises probability vs. pure base rate) but principals’ red lines still clash (caps probability). I add ≈+6 ppt.
4. Domestic incentives
• Israel: hostage-families and White House press for deal, but Netanyahu’s survival depends on far-right partners who threaten government collapse if he accepts anything seen as “victory” for Hamas. He has repeatedly turned down Biden/Trump pressure and accepted only pauses clearly framed as tactical.
• Hamas: severe humanitarian conditions push for aid, yet its bargaining power—and internal legitimacy—derive from refusing to disarm or cede Gaza governance.
Overall bargaining space remains narrow. I subtract ≈-2 ppt.
5. External shocks
• A sudden battlefield disaster (e.g., mass‐casualty Israeli incident or breakthrough raid) could jolt leaders into a pause, but such low-frequency events rarely align with a specific 17-day window. Incremental bump of ≈+1 ppt to capture tail risk.
6. Calibration and overconfidence check
• Superforecasters tend to be 5-10 % too extreme. Adjust slightly toward 50 %.
Computed estimate
Base 5 %
+6 ppt active talks → 11 %
-2 ppt entrenched red lines → 9 %
+1 ppt low-probability shock → 10 %
+5 ppt calibration toward the mean → 15 %
Rounded to nearest whole integer:
Probability: 15%
=== Forecast Result ===
{
“probability_yes”: 0.14,
“probability_yes_per_category”: null,
“continuous_cdf”: null
}
=== Reasoning ===
Rationale
1. Time window
• 17 days (15-31 May). Any agreement must be publicly announced during this short period; if nothing changes, status quo is continued fighting.
• Even intensive Middle-East diplomacy usually needs at least a few days to close text, secure cabinet approvals, and issue joint statements—so lead-time matters.
2. Base rate of Israel-Hamas ceasefire declarations since Oct 2023
• Two well-defined truces have been declared in ≈19 months (Nov 2023, Feb-Mar 2025) → rough monthly base rate ≈10 %.
• Half-month base rate ≈5 %. This is our starting point.
3. Current negotiation signal (updates 12-14 May 2025)
• Israeli delegation in Doha under U.S./Qatar/Egypt mediation; proposal on table: 40-day pause for ~20 hostages.
• Netanyahu publicly insists that any pause will be temporary and war resumes until Hamas “dismantled.”
• Hamas leadership says it will not accept another short pause unless it contains “irreversible” steps toward a permanent ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal.
• Key gap: dismantlement vs. continued military capability/governance of Gaza. No bridging formula visible.
• Track-record: similar gaps caused collapse of January-March truce after three weeks.
Net effect: negotiations exist (raises probability vs. pure base rate) but principals’ red lines still clash (caps probability). I add ≈+6 ppt.
4. Domestic incentives
• Israel: hostage-families and White House press for deal, but Netanyahu’s survival depends on far-right partners who threaten government collapse if he accepts anything seen as “victory” for Hamas. He has repeatedly turned down Biden/Trump pressure and accepted only pauses clearly framed as tactical.
• Hamas: severe humanitarian conditions push for aid, yet its bargaining power—and internal legitimacy—derive from refusing to disarm or cede Gaza governance.
Overall bargaining space remains narrow. I subtract ≈-2 ppt.
5. External shocks
• A sudden battlefield disaster (e.g., mass‐casualty Israeli incident or breakthrough raid) could jolt leaders into a pause, but such low-frequency events rarely align with a specific 17-day window. Incremental bump of ≈+1 ppt to capture tail risk.
6. Calibration and overconfidence check
• Superforecasters tend to be 5-10 % too extreme. Adjust slightly toward 50 %.
Computed estimate
Base 5 %
+6 ppt active talks → 11 %
-2 ppt entrenched red lines → 9 %
+1 ppt low-probability shock → 10 %
+5 ppt calibration toward the mean → 15 %
Rounded to nearest whole integer:
Probability: 15%
.
Past forecasts by Phil’s and Jeremy ’s bots —>
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/longform/2023/10/9/israel-hamas-war-in-maps-and-charts-live-tracker
