Will there be a ceasefire declared between Israel and Hamas in the month of October 2025?
Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai predicts today:
Probability: 38%
55–70 minutes read Condensed version here —>
Perplexity response:
{think}
Let me analyze this step by step to understand what kind of information is needed for this forecasting question.
The query is asking about whether there will be a ceasefire declared between Israel and Hamas in October 2025. This is a political/military event type question.
Since I’m a research assistant to a superforecaster, I need to:
1. First think step by step about what information is needed
2. Provide 10 citations with title, description, date, and 3-sentence summary
3. Focus on recent developments and statistics with dates
4. Look for authoritative sources
5. Provide context on recent movement toward resolution
Let me analyze the search results first:
From the search results, I can see:
1. There’s discussion of Trump’s 20-point plan to end the war in Gaza
2. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is ongoing with recent developments in September 2025
3. There was UN General Assembly action on September 12, 2025
4. Recent Israeli airstrikes on September 9, 2025
5. Various commentary on ceasefire prospects
The current date is October 1, 2025, so we’re right at the beginning of the month in question.
Let me plan what information is needed:
– Recent ceasefire negotiations and proposals
– Current military situation and escalation/de-escalation trends
– International diplomatic efforts
– Positions of key parties (Israel, Hamas, US, UN, etc.)
– Recent precedents for ceasefires
– Current casualty trends and humanitarian situation
– Any scheduled diplomatic events in October 2025
Now let me extract the key information from the search results to create the 10 citations format requested.
To effectively forecast whether there will be a ceasefire declared between Israel and Hamas in October 2025, I need to analyze recent diplomatic initiatives, military developments, international pressure, negotiation frameworks, party positions, humanitarian conditions, precedent patterns, and scheduled diplomatic events that could influence ceasefire prospects.
## Key Sources and Citations
**1. Trump’s 20-Point Gaza Peace Plan**
– **Source**: Howling Infinite Analysis
– **Date**: September 30, 2025
– **Summary**: Details a comprehensive 20-point plan including immediate ceasefire, hostage exchange within 72 hours, and Hamas amnesty provisions. The plan requires both sides to publicly accept terms for implementation, with Israel withdrawing to agreed lines during ceasefire. If Hamas rejects the plan, Trump has indicated Israel can “finish the job” militarily[1].
**2. Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Status**
– **Source**: Wikipedia
– **Date**: Updated September 2025
– **Summary**: Reports over 60,000 Palestinian deaths in Gaza with nearly half being women and children, and ongoing famine conditions. A Lancet study estimated 64,260 deaths from traumatic injuries by June 2024, projecting to approximately 93,000 by May 2025. The conflict continues with widespread destruction and humanitarian crisis[2].
**3. September 2025 Military Developments**
– **Source**: Wikipedia
– **Date**: September 9-12, 2025
– **Summary**: Israeli airstrikes targeted senior Hamas leaders in Doha on September 9, with conflicting reports on casualties including potential deaths of lower-level operatives. The UN General Assembly adopted the New York Declaration on September 12 by 142-10 vote, endorsing two-state solution steps. The declaration calls for establishing Palestinian government free of Hamas control[2].
**4. Trump’s Ultimatum Statement**
– **Source**: The Peninsula Qatar
– **Date**: September 30, 2025
– **Summary**: Trump issued ultimatum stating if Hamas rejects his peace plan or accepts then counters it, Israel will “finish the job.” This represents a hardline position linking ceasefire acceptance to Hamas compliance. The statement suggests limited patience for negotiation delays or bad-faith acceptance[3].
**5. Critical Analysis of Peace Plan**
– **Source**: Mondoweiss Comments
– **Date**: September 30, 2025
– **Summary**: Critics describe Trump’s plan as “genocide by another name” designed to be rejected by Hamas. Commentary suggests Israel historically reneges on ceasefire agreements as seen with Oslo accords. Analysis indicates the plan excludes Palestinian input and may be structured to justify continued military action[4].
**6. UN Secretary-General Position**
– **Source**: GE2P2 Global Sentinel Report
– **Date**: September 28, 2025
– **Summary**: UN Secretary-General called for permanent ceasefire, immediate hostage release, and full humanitarian access. Referenced ICJ provisional measures requiring implementation of genocide prevention measures in Gaza. Emphasized two-state solution as only viable path to sustainable peace[5].
**7. International Court of Justice Measures**
– **Source**: GE2P2 Global Sentinel Report
– **Date**: September 28, 2025
– **Summary**: ICJ issued legally binding provisional measures regarding genocide prevention in Gaza Strip case. Famine has been declared since measures were issued, with killing intensifying. Court measures require full and immediate implementation but have not been effectively enforced[5].
**8. Hamas War Crime Assessment**
– **Source**: Mondoweiss Comments
– **Date**: September 29, 2025
– **Summary**: Analysis notes Hamas committed war crimes on October 7, 2023, but characterizes Israel’s response as “war crime three orders of magnitude larger.” This framing suggests significant asymmetry in scale of violations. Commentary indicates ongoing debate over proportionality and genocide allegations[4].
**9. Netanyahu UN Response**
– **Source**: New York Times (referenced in Mondoweiss)
– **Date**: September 29, 2025
– **Summary**: Netanyahu delivered defiant speech denouncing Palestine recognition to mostly empty UN Hall. His position appears to reject international pressure for recognition of Palestinian statehood. The empty hall suggests diplomatic isolation but also continued resistance to ceasefire terms requiring Palestinian political concessions[4].
**10. Humanitarian Crisis Escalation**
– **Source**: Wikipedia/GE2P2 reporting
– **Date**: September 2025
– **Summary**: Ongoing famine declared in Gaza with mass population displacement continuing. Over 148,000 Palestinians injured with systematic destruction of Gaza infrastructure. Humanitarian conditions have worsened since ICJ provisional measures, suggesting military operations continue despite international legal pressure[2][5].
## Recent Developments Indicating Movement
The most significant recent development is **Trump’s 20-point peace plan** released around September 30, 2025, which includes specific timelines for ceasefire implementation. However, his accompanying ultimatum that Israel can “finish the job” if Hamas rejects or undermines the plan suggests this may be designed as a final offer rather than opening negotiation.
The **UN General Assembly’s New York Declaration** on September 12, 2025, with 142-nation support provides international backing for ceasefire, but lacks enforcement mechanisms. The **Israeli airstrikes in Doha** on September 9 targeting Hamas leadership indicate continued military pressure rather than de-escalation.
**Critical factors for October 2025**: The humanitarian crisis continues worsening with declared famine conditions, suggesting urgent international pressure for ceasefire. However, Netanyahu’s defiant UN stance and Trump’s ultimatum framework indicate limited flexibility from key parties. The 72-hour hostage release timeline in Trump’s plan could provide rapid ceasefire implementation if accepted, but Hamas response remains unknown as of October 1, 2025.
Grok response:
Below is a detailed rundown of the most relevant news and developments concerning the potential for a ceasefire declaration between Israel and Hamas in October 2025. As a research assistant, my role is to provide context based on recent and historical sources, emphasizing updates, statistics, and expert opinions without producing any forecasts. The question pertains to a political event, so I prioritized a variety of news articles, official statements, and social media sentiment from diverse sources, focusing on the latest available information up to the current date of October 1, 2025.
First, I’ll start with a list of 10 citations, drawing from recent web sources, news articles, and posts on X (formerly Twitter). Each citation includes the title, a brief description, the date of publication, and a three-sentence summary of the relevant content. I prioritized sources from the past month, as they provide the most up-to-date context on ongoing negotiations, proposals, and conflicts. Note that while X posts reflect current sentiment, they are treated as inconclusive and not as definitive evidence.
### List of 10 Citations:
1. **Title**: 2025 Gaza war ceasefire – Wikipedia
**Description**: A Wikipedia page summarizing the history and recent developments of ceasefire efforts in the Gaza conflict.
**Date of Publication**: September 29, 2025
**Three-Sentence Summary**: The page details Israel’s airstrikes on Gaza in March 2025 that broke a previous ceasefire, highlighting ongoing tensions and Hamas’s rejections of proposals. It discusses international efforts, including UN Security Council discussions in October 2023, to broker peace amid accusations of collective punishment. Recent updates note Netanyahu’s declaration of resumed combat, underscoring the fragility of any potential ceasefire in late 2025.
2. **Title**: Updates: Israel kills 59 in Gaza; Hamas reviews Trump’s plan to end war | Israel-Palestine conflict News | Al Jazeera
**Description**: A liveblog covering daily developments in the Israel-Hamas conflict, including responses to ceasefire proposals.
**Date of Publication**: September 30, 2025
**Three-Sentence Summary**: The update reports on Israel’s military actions in Gaza and Hamas’s review of a U.S.-proposed ceasefire plan, with Hamas indicating openness to negotiations. It highlights the human toll, including recent casualties, as a barrier to agreement. Expert opinions from mediators suggest that while talks are progressing, trust issues remain a significant obstacle.
3. **Title**: Israel-Gaza live updates: Aid flotilla alleges Israeli harassment on Gaza approach – ABC News
**Description**: Real-time news coverage of the conflict, including diplomatic efforts and U.S. involvement in ceasefire proposals.
**Date of Publication**: October 1, 2025
**Three-Sentence Summary**: The article mentions U.S. President Donald Trump’s hosting of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and their discussion of a Gaza ceasefire agreement. It notes ongoing military exchanges, with reports of harassment of aid efforts complicating negotiations. Analysts cited in the piece emphasize the need for immediate diplomatic intervention to prevent escalation in October.
4. **Title**: What to know about Trump’s ceasefire plan for Israel and Hamas – NPR
**Description**: An analysis of the U.S.-led ceasefire proposal and its implications for the conflict.
**Date of Publication**: September 30, 2025
**Three-Sentence Summary**: The article outlines the broad terms of Trump’s plan, which includes hostage releases and a potential end to hostilities, but highlights substantial uncertainties in its implementation. It references expert opinions from U.S. and Israeli officials warning that Hamas’s responses could delay progress. Recent updates indicate mixed reactions, with some progress in talks but no formal declaration as of late September.
5. **Title**: Updates: Hamas ‘welcomes’ new ceasefire proposal, Israel pounds Gaza City | Israel-Palestine conflict News | Al Jazeera
**Description**: A news article on Hamas’s response to ceasefire offers amid continued violence.
**Date of Publication**: September 7, 2025 (as per available updates, with recent references)
**Three-Sentence Summary**: The piece reports Hamas welcoming a deal involving hostage exchanges for a ceasefire, while Israel continues airstrikes on Gaza City. It includes statistics on casualties, such as dozens killed in recent weeks, underscoring the urgency of negotiations. Expert analysts from Al Jazeera note that such proposals could lead to short-term pauses but face challenges from entrenched positions.
6. **Title**: What to know about talks on Israel-Hamas ceasefire | AP News
**Description**: A summary of ongoing ceasefire negotiations and their historical context.
**Date of Publication**: August 19, 2025
**Three-Sentence Summary**: The article details Hamas’s acceptance of an Arab-mediated proposal for a ceasefire in the 22-month war, including hostage swaps. It highlights recent data on the conflict, such as over 1,000 casualties reported since mid-2025, as a key factor in talks. Experts quoted express skepticism about long-term success without broader international enforcement.
7. **Title**: July 25, 2025 – Israel-Gaza news | CNN
**Description**: Coverage of ceasefire talks and related escalations in the region.
**Date of Publication**: July 25, 2025
**Three-Sentence Summary**: The news segment discusses the recall of negotiators from ceasefire talks due to Hamas’s response, amid reports of starvation in Gaza. It provides statistics on the humanitarian crisis, including aid blockages affecting thousands. Analysts warn that without a deal, the situation could worsen by October, based on seasonal patterns of escalation.
8. **Title**: Posts on X regarding ceasefire negotiations (e.g., from users discussing Hamas’s letter to Trump)
**Description**: Social media discussions on X about potential ceasefire deals and diplomatic exchanges.
**Date of Publication**: September 22, 2025 (based on aggregated posts)
**Three-Sentence Summary**: Posts reflect sentiment around Hamas allegedly requesting a 60-day ceasefire from Trump in exchange for hostages, with users debating its feasibility. They highlight growing calls for negotiations, though opinions vary on outcomes. As inconclusive social media content, these posts suggest increasing public pressure for a deal but do not confirm official progress.
9. **Title**: Posts on X about Israel-Hamas diplomatic engagement (e.g., from users discussing two-state solutions)
**Description**: X discussions on potential shifts in policy and ceasefire talks.
**Date of Publication**: September 23, 2025
**Three-Sentence Summary**: Posts mention hypothetical negotiations for a two-state solution and discrete operations in Gaza, reflecting optimism among some users. They reference expert-like commentary on the need for Hamas disarmament as part of any ceasefire. These posts indicate mixed sentiment, with some viewing October as a critical window, though they lack verifiable evidence.
10. **Title**: Posts on X about Hamas’s response to ceasefire proposals (e.g., from users analyzing interview threads)
**Description**: Social media threads on X summarizing Hamas officials’ statements on negotiations.
**Date of Publication**: September 22, 2025
**Three-Sentence Summary**: Posts discuss a senior Hamas official’s interview expressing distrust in mediators due to recent attacks, while noting openness to deals. They include references to proposed timelines, such as immediate ceasefires and prisoner exchanges. As user-generated content, these suggest evolving dynamics but should be viewed as speculative.
### Detailed Rundown of Relevant News and Context:
Based on the citations above, recent developments indicate ongoing but fragile negotiations for a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, with several proposals on the table as of early October 2025. Key updates from sources like Al Jazeera and ABC News highlight U.S. President Donald Trump’s involvement in proposing a deal that includes hostage releases and a pause in hostilities, with Hamas reportedly reviewing it positively in late September. For instance, articles from September 30, 2025, mention Hamas’s conditional welcome of new proposals, while Israel’s military actions—such as airstrikes killing dozens in Gaza—have continued, potentially undermining progress; statistics from these sources report over 59 deaths in a single day on September 30, based on Al Jazeera’s updates.
Expert opinions from authoritative sources, such as those cited in NPR and AP News, emphasize the challenges of trust and enforcement, with analysts warning that without verifiable commitments, any ceasefire could collapse quickly. Historical data shows a pattern of seasonal fluctuations in the conflict, with escalations often peaking in the fall due to political calendars, as seen in previous years; for example, ceasefire talks in July and August 2025 were disrupted, per CNN’s coverage. There are no official resolution criteria or authoritative sources like the UN providing current binding values, but the UN Security Council’s past involvement (as noted in Wikipedia) suggests it could play a role if a declaration occurs.
Recent movements toward a potential resolution include Hamas’s alleged communications with Trump and mediators, as referenced in X posts and news articles, indicating some diplomatic momentum. However, ongoing violence and humanitarian issues, such as aid blockages reported in ABC News on October 1, 2025, could influence outcomes. While I cannot access real-time data beyond the provided sources, the context from these varied outlets—spanning mainstream media and social sentiment—underscores the complexity, with no definitive indicators of a ceasefire declaration yet.
Extracted resolution criteria links:
[]
Extracted resolution criteria links:
[]
Gemini Binary response:
## Forecasting the Israel-Hamas Ceasefire in October 2025
As of October 1, 2025, the prospect of a ceasefire being declared between Israel and Hamas in October 2025 is a complex and highly uncertain event. While there are significant diplomatic efforts underway and immense international pressure, deep-seated conflicts, and ongoing military operations present substantial barriers to such a declaration within the short 30-day timeframe.
**Arguments for a Ceasefire Declaration in October:**
1. **Trump’s 20-Point Peace Plan:** A new, comprehensive peace plan, reportedly backed by former U.S. President Donald Trump, is currently on the table. This plan includes provisions for an immediate ceasefire and hostage exchange within 72 hours, potentially offering a concrete framework for de-escalation. Hamas is reportedly “reviewing” this plan and has indicated “openness to negotiations,” suggesting a willingness to engage with the proposal.
2. **Extreme Humanitarian Pressure:** The humanitarian crisis in Gaza continues to worsen, with reported famine conditions and over 60,000 Palestinian deaths, nearly half being women and children. This dire situation is generating immense international pressure for a ceasefire, as evidenced by the UN Secretary-General’s calls and the International Court of Justice’s provisional measures for genocide prevention.
3. **International Diplomatic Engagement:** The UN General Assembly’s adoption of the New York Declaration with broad support (142-10 vote) underscores a strong international desire for a resolution, including steps towards a two-state solution. Such widespread diplomatic calls, even without direct enforcement, can exert pressure on the warring parties.
**Arguments Against a Ceasefire Declaration in October:**
1. **Intense Ongoing Conflict:** Despite diplomatic efforts, military operations remain highly active. Recent reports indicate Israeli airstrikes on September 9, 2025, targeting Hamas leaders, and significant casualties, with 59 deaths reported on September 30, 2025. This suggests a continued pursuit of military objectives rather than an immediate cessation of hostilities.
2. **Israel’s Hardline Stance:** Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s defiance of international pressure, including a speech to a mostly empty UN Hall denouncing Palestinian recognition, indicates a strong unwillingness to make concessions that might be required for a ceasefire. Trump’s plan also includes an ultimatum that if Hamas rejects the terms, Israel can “finish the job,” which could empower Israel to continue military action rather than negotiate.
3. **Hamas’s Distrust and Conditions:** While Hamas has expressed openness to negotiations, there is also reported “distrust in mediators” due to recent attacks. Their acceptance of a comprehensive plan, especially one that calls for a Palestinian government free of Hamas control (as per the UN Declaration), is not guaranteed and could lead to further rejections or counter-proposals.
4. **History of Failed Ceasefires:** Previous ceasefire attempts have collapsed, including one in March 2025 following Israeli airstrikes. Negotiations in July 2025 also saw negotiators recalled due to Hamas’s response, highlighting the fragility and difficulty of reaching a lasting agreement.
5. **Short Timeframe:** Reaching a comprehensive, publicly declared ceasefire agreement between deeply entrenched adversaries with complex demands and security concerns within a single month (October 2025) is an exceptionally challenging diplomatic feat. The existence of a plan does not guarantee rapid acceptance or implementation.
**Conclusion:**
While the emergence of a concrete peace plan backed by a significant international actor (the U.S.) and the overwhelming humanitarian crisis create an impetus for a ceasefire, the momentum for conflict resolution is significantly hampered by the ongoing intensity of military operations, the entrenched positions of both Israel and Hamas, and the history of failed agreements. The “ultimatum” aspect of Trump’s plan also adds a layer of uncertainty, potentially acting more as a justification for continued military action than a genuine pathway to peace if Hamas does not accept it fully. Given these opposing forces, a formal declaration of a ceasefire within the short window of October 2025 remains a low probability event.
Probability: 12%
The extracted probability is: 12%
________________________
Anthropic Binary response:
Looking at this question about whether there will be a ceasefire declared between Israel and Hamas in October 2025, I need to carefully analyze the current situation and recent developments.
## Current Situation Analysis
As of October 1, 2025, we’re at the very beginning of the month in question. The research reveals several critical developments:
**Trump’s 20-Point Peace Plan**: Released around September 30, 2025, this comprehensive proposal includes:
– Immediate ceasefire provisions
– 72-hour timeline for hostage exchanges
– Hamas amnesty provisions
– But critically, an ultimatum: if Hamas rejects or undermines the plan, Israel can “finish the job” militarily
**Recent Military Activity**:
– Israeli airstrikes on September 9 targeting Hamas leaders in Doha
– 59 deaths reported in Gaza on September 30 alone
– Continued military operations despite international pressure
**Diplomatic Positions**:
– Netanyahu delivered a defiant UN speech to a mostly empty hall, rejecting Palestine recognition
– Hamas is reportedly “reviewing” Trump’s plan but has expressed distrust of mediators
– The UN General Assembly passed the New York Declaration (142-10) on September 12, calling for a two-state solution
**Humanitarian Crisis**:
– Over 60,000 Palestinian deaths reported
– Declared famine conditions in Gaza
– Over 148,000 Palestinians injured
– This creates urgent pressure for ceasefire but hasn’t stopped operations so far
## Historical Context and Base Rates
Looking at the historical pattern:
– Previous ceasefires have been fragile and often broken (March 2025 ceasefire was broken by Israeli airstrikes)
– The conflict has been ongoing for 22+ months as of October 2025
– Trust issues between parties are significant, with Hamas expressing distrust due to recent attacks
– Israel has historically shown willingness to continue military operations despite international pressure
## Key Factors for October 2025
**Positive indicators**:
1. Trump’s plan provides a concrete framework with specific timelines
2. Hamas has shown some openness to negotiations (“welcomes” proposals)
3. International pressure is mounting (142 nations supporting UN declaration)
4. Humanitarian crisis creates urgency
**Negative indicators**:
1. Trump’s ultimatum suggests this may be designed to fail
2. Netanyahu’s defiant stance at the UN indicates limited flexibility
3. Ongoing military operations (59 killed on September 30)
4. Critics suggest the plan is “genocide by another name” – designed for rejection
5. Deep trust deficit between parties
6. Historical pattern of failed ceasefires
## Critical Assumptions and Their Failure Probabilities
1. **Assumption: Hamas will reject or counter Trump’s plan** (70% probability this assumption is correct)
– If Hamas unexpectedly accepts the plan fully, ceasefire probability jumps significantly
– The plan seems designed to be rejected, with harsh terms for Hamas
2. **Assumption: Israel maintains current military posture** (65% probability this assumption is correct)
– If international pressure or U.S. leverage forces Israeli restraint, ceasefire becomes more likely
– Netanyahu’s defiant UN stance suggests limited flexibility
3. **Assumption: No major external shock changes dynamics** (80% probability this assumption is correct)
– A major humanitarian disaster, regional escalation, or international intervention could force parties to ceasefire
– October has 30 days remaining for unexpected developments
## Timeline Considerations
For a ceasefire to be declared in October 2025:
– We have 30 days remaining
– Trump’s plan includes a 72-hour implementation timeline if accepted
– But negotiations, if they proceed, typically take weeks or months
– The immediacy of Trump’s ultimatum suggests a binary outcome soon
Comparing different timeframes:
– Probability in next 10 days: ~15% (immediate response to Trump plan)
– Probability in full October: ~22% (my assessment)
– Probability by end of 2025: ~35% (more time for negotiations/pressure)
## Final Assessment
The combination of Trump’s ultimatum structure, Netanyahu’s defiance, ongoing military operations, and the historical pattern of failed agreements suggests a ceasefire declaration in October 2025 is unlikely but not impossible. The humanitarian crisis and international pressure provide some counterweight, and Trump’s plan does offer a concrete pathway if both parties unexpectedly show flexibility.
Given the historical base rate (only 35% of similar prediction questions resolve positively), the entrenched positions of both parties, the “designed to fail” nature of Trump’s proposal, and the continuation of military operations even as negotiations are discussed, I assess a relatively low probability.
The most likely scenario is that Hamas either rejects Trump’s plan or accepts with conditions that Israel/U.S. deem unacceptable, leading to continued conflict through October. However, the severity of the humanitarian crisis and the concrete framework provided by Trump’s plan prevent the probability from being extremely low.
Probability: 22%
The extracted probability is: 22%
GPT Binary response:
Reasoning and key evidence
Current situation (as of 2025-10-01)
– A U.S.-backed ceasefire/peace plan was publicly floated on ~2025-09-30 with an explicit immediate-ceasefire + hostage-exchange timeline; media reported Hamas was “reviewing” or “welcoming” aspects of the proposal while Israel (and Prime Minister Netanyahu) publicly maintained hardline demands and warned of continued military options. Multiple outlets report ongoing Israeli strikes and a worsening humanitarian crisis in Gaza, and the UN/ICJ and many states are pressing urgently for a pause. Negotiations/mediations (Qatar, Egypt, U.S. reportedly involved) are active but trust is low and enforcement mechanisms are weak.
– Time available is short: the event must be a ceasefire declared between 2025-10-01 and 2025-11-01 — essentially a one-month window for a deal, implementation steps, or an announced unilateral/negotiated pause to be declared.
How I translate that into probabilities
– Base-rate and precedent: Israel–Hamas conflicts produce frequent short-term, tactical pauses and occasional negotiated temporary ceasefires (days–weeks), but comprehensive, durable ceasefires are rarer. Given the intense scale of this war and the political incentives on both sides, the base-rate for an announced ceasefire in any given month of high-intensity conflict is meaningful but not high. For a single-month window, short-term/staged pauses are more likely than full political settlements.
– Momentum and shock factors: The presence of a concrete U.S. proposal with an explicit short timeline (hostage exchange + ceasefire) materially raises the near-term probability compared with a no-offer baseline. Conversely, Israeli public rhetoric about “finishing the job,” recent strikes (including attacks on Hamas leadership), and the political costs to either side of perceived capitulation lower the probability.
– Incentives: Hamas has strong incentive to accept a limited ceasefire if it secures hostages and relief; Israel has incentive to secure hostage releases and to demonstrate Hamas weakened — which could be obtained via a conditional, tightly specified pause. International pressure (UN, ICJ, many states) plus acute humanitarian crisis push toward at least a temporary pause.
– Implementation friction and enforcement: Even if both sides tentatively agree, operationalizing a ceasefire (verification, hostage handover sequencing, humanitarian access corridors) often takes days and can unravel. The one-month window reduces the margin for calibration and increases the chance a deal stalls before a formal declaration.
Probability breakdown by short time slices (my best guess)
– Within 1 week (Oct 1–Oct 7): ~20% — negotiations need time to translate a proposal into a formal declaration, and active military operations and mutual distrust make an immediate declared ceasefire less likely.
– Within 2 weeks (by Oct 15): ~35% — enough time for initial bargaining and mediators to secure an interim deal if both sides see leverage/benefit.
– By end of month (by Nov 1): 42% — the cumulative odds by month-end reflect the rising chance that either a temporary ceasefire, a limited hostage-exchange pause, or a mutually announced truce will be declared.
Key assumptions whose failure would most change the forecast
1) Assumption: Hamas is willing to accept a ceasefire linked to a hostage exchange under the proposed terms.
– Probability this assumption is wrong: 45%.
– If false: chance of a ceasefire in October drops sharply (my forecast would fall by ~20–25 percentage points) because Hamas would either refuse the plan publicly or demand materially different conditions, lengthening negotiations.
2) Assumption: The Israeli government will accept and publicly declare a ceasefire if the hostage/verification mechanics are satisfied.
– Probability this assumption is wrong: 40%.
– If false: even if Hamas agrees, Israel could insist on further military goals or refuse to pledge a formal pause, again reducing near-term odds by a similar margin.
3) Assumption: Mediators (U.S./Qatar/Egypt and others) can bridge verification and sequencing friction fast enough to produce a formal, announced cessation within a month.
– Probability this assumption is wrong: 35%.
– If false: agreement could be delayed into November or collapse, reducing the month-window probability by ~10–15 percentage points.
Uncertainty and calibration
– Major uncertainty comes from private negotiations and hostage-sequencing details that are not publicly observable; leaks/petitions can change positions quickly. Because of those unknowns and my tendency to calibrate conservatively, I avoid extreme probabilities.
– I give extra weight to the short time-horizon constraint: it is materially harder to reach and publicly declare a ceasefire within one month than over several months. Temporary tactical pauses are easier and more common than negotiated declarations that both sides will publicly announce and attempt to hold.
Net assessment
– There is active diplomatic momentum (a concrete plan), strong humanitarian and international pressure, and clear incentives for a temporary exchange-linked pause — all of which raise the probability above a pure “no-change” baseline. However, deep mistrust, recent escalation, Israeli leadership’s public posture, and operational/verification frictions in hostage sequencing all substantially reduce the chance of a formal ceasefire declaration within a single month.
Final answer
Probability: 42%
The extracted probability is: 42%
GPT Binary response:
Reasoning and evidence
Summary judgment
– There is active, high-profile diplomacy as of late Sept 2025 (a U.S. “20‑point” plan reportedly available; UN General Assembly resolution; strong international pressure after ICJ provisional measures and a declared famine), and Hamas has signaled conditional openness to mediated proposals. Those raise the chance of a deal.
– Countervailing facts: Israel’s leadership (Netanyahu) has been rhetorically defiant and has continued kinetic operations (including strikes on Hamas leadership abroad), and the U.S./Israeli messaging includes public ultimatums that make a negotiated, mutual ceasefire less likely unless key concessions happen quickly.
– Time is short: the one‑month window (all of October) means only negotiations already well‑advanced or a rapid, mediated exchange (e.g., hostage-for-pause) are likely to produce a declared ceasefire in that window.
– Balancing these, I assign a modestly below‑even chance that a formal ceasefire between Israel and Hamas will be declared in October 2025.
Key factual inputs I weighed
– Diplomatic momentum: public release of a U.S. plan (late Sept 2025) that reportedly ties hostage exchange to an immediate ceasefire — this is the single biggest near‑term enabler of a fast ceasefire.
– Parties’ incentives: Hamas has strong incentive to secure a pause if it yields hostages and relief; Israel’s incentives are mixed — a ceasefire can be politically useful to secure hostages and reduce international pressure, but leadership’s military objectives and rhetoric (and prior reluctance to bind actions to Hamas political demands) reduce willingness to accept anything perceived as empowering Hamas.
– International pressure and law: ICJ provisional measures and widely reported famine raise costs of continued offensive operations, nudging third parties (U.S., Qatar, Egypt, others) to push for a pause.
– Military facts: Ongoing strikes (including high-profile actions in early Sept) show that operations have not paused; these operations lower the baseline probability of an imminent ceasefire absent a specific exchange mechanism.
– Timing: Negotiations that would lead to a credible, declared ceasefire need to progress from “proposal” to mutual acceptance and implementation; with the plan only publicized Sept 30, negotiations would need to move at an accelerated pace in the first two weeks of October to meet the resolution window.
Base‑rate and precedent
– Historically, Israel–Hamas hostilities have seen periodic short, mediated ceasefires (often measured in days–weeks) rather than durable settlements. For large-scale wars with many hostages and high political stakes, negotiated pauses tied to hostage exchanges are a realistic pathway — but they are also fragile.
– Given the high stakes and intense international attention, the base rate for some kind of formal ceasefire or agreed pause in any given month of active negotiations is higher than in calmer periods, but still far from certain.
Scenario decomposition and likelihood drivers
– High‑probability pathway to a ceasefire in October: Hamas accepts a mediated package that includes hostage exchange and humanitarian relief and Israel accepts a time‑limited pause tied to those deliveries; international guarantors (Qatar, Egypt, U.S.) announce terms and a declared ceasefire follows within days. This pathway is plausible because the U.S. plan explicitly offered a rapid exchange mechanism.
– Low‑probability pathway: Israel unilaterally pauses operations without a formal negotiated package (unlikely given current rhetoric and operational tempo).
– Failure pathway: Israel or Hamas publicly reject the terms or condition acceptance on preconditions that cannot be met quickly (e.g., full Hamas dismantling, a large political concession), meaning no declared ceasefire in October.
Uncertainty and signal weighting
– Recent events (late‑Sept plan release) are highly informative in the short run and raise probability relative to a naive baseline, but they are also volatile: leaders may posture publicly while negotiations continue privately. I give greater weight to: (1) whether hostages can be verified and exchanged quickly, and (2) whether Israel’s political leadership publicly accepts a time‑limited pause — both are decisive in the October window.
– Source reliability: mainstream reporting (Al Jazeera, NPR, AP, NYT summaries) and the reported ICJ/UN actions are high‑signal. Social media is low‑signal and used only for corroboration of statements.
Assumptions whose failure would materially change the forecast
1) Assumption: The U.S. plan (or a similar mediated package) is operationalized quickly enough in October (i.e., text accepted, mediators positioned, verification mechanisms agreed). If this fails, a quick ceasefire is unlikely.
– Probability this assumption is incorrect (i.e., package NOT operationalized quickly): 60%.
– Impact if incorrect: lowers the ceasefire probability substantially (moving estimate downward by ~20–30 percentage points).
2) Assumption: Hamas is willing and able to accept terms that include immediate or rapid release of at least a subset of hostages in exchange for a pause.
– Probability this assumption is incorrect (i.e., Hamas refuses or cannot deliver hostages quickly): 50%.
– Impact if incorrect: materially reduces likelihood of a declared ceasefire (by ~15–25 percentage points), because hostage exchange is the most credible trigger mechanism.
3) Assumption: Israeli leadership will accept a time‑limited, verifiable pause tied to hostage exchange despite domestic political constraints and military objectives.
– Probability this assumption is incorrect (i.e., Israel rejects or delays acceptance): 55%.
– Impact if incorrect: similar to assumption 2 — substantial downward effect (15–30 points), since Israeli buy‑in is necessary for a bilateral ceasefire declaration.
Calibration adjustment
– I reduce my raw confidence relative to the point estimate above because historical forecasting performance shows frequent overconfidence; I also account for fast-moving diplomacy that could surprise on either side.
Sensitivity: what would push probability notably higher or lower in the short run
– Higher: rapid, verifiable partial hostage release within the first 10–14 days of October; active third‑party guarantors announcing enforcement/monitoring roles.
– Lower: public rejection by either party of the U.S. plan, a major new military escalation (e.g., large-scale strike or retaliatory action), or collapse of key mediators’ ability to guarantee commitments.
Final numeric judgment (main question)
– My best estimate for “Will there be a ceasefire declared between Israel and Hamas in the month of October 2025?” — i.e., a formal, mutual ceasefire declaration occurring after today (Oct 1) and before Nov 1 — is:
Probability: 42%
The extracted probability is: 42%
GPT Binary response:
Reasoning and judgment
Summary judgment: there is a meaningful but not-favored chance that a ceasefire will be declared in October 2025. Active diplomacy and a concrete U.S. plan released at the end of September raise the odds above a low baseline, but political constraints in Israel, the fragility of trust, continuing military operations (including recent strikes), and the short one-month window make an agreement far from likely.
Key factors I considered
– Momentum toward a deal: A publicly released plan with specific timelines (hostage-exchange framing, immediate pause language) is exactly the kind of focused offer that can produce quick, short-term ceasefires. Reports that Hamas is “reviewing” or conditionally welcoming proposals increases probability materially versus no offer at all.
– Israeli politics and military objectives: Israeli leadership has repeatedly tied ceasefires to concrete Hamas concessions and remains willing to continue operations if they judge objectives unmet. Recent statements by Israeli leaders and high-profile targeted strikes (including cross-border/transnational strikes) indicate willingness to continue pressure rather than accept any vague pause.
– Implementation friction: Ceasefires between asymmetric foes usually require mediators, verification mechanisms, and staged exchanges (hostages for releases, temporary withdrawals). Those mechanisms take time to negotiate and to translate into a formal, public declaration — a nontrivial hurdle in a 31-day window.
– International pressure and humanitarian crisis: Worsening famine/humanitarian conditions and strong international votes/declarations increase reputational and material pressure on Israel (and on mediators) to get a pause in place quickly. That pressure works in favor of a deal sooner rather than later.
– Precedent/base rates: Temporary, tactical ceasefires and hostage-exchange pauses have occurred repeatedly in this conflict’s recent history when there is a mediator and a clear swap architecture; durable comprehensive settlements are far rarer. Because the question is simply whether “a ceasefire is declared” (not whether it will hold long-term), the base-rate for short-term declarations is higher than for lasting peace, but still limited by political willingness.
Timing and probability dynamics
– Short timeline reduces probability materially. Even with a good offer, negotiating verification, sequencing, and public acceptance by hard-line elements on either side can delay or scuttle a declaration.
– If both sides accept (or one accepts and the other’s acceptance is inferred through mediator confirmation), an official declaration could occur very quickly (days). Thus the existence of a concrete plan raises the “speed to deal” chance above baseline.
– Conversely, a single major adverse event in October (e.g., a high-profile strike killing a key leader or a mass-casualty attack) could collapse talks quickly and push the probability toward zero.
Quantitative calibration (how I turned judgment into a number)
– Starting base-rate for a short-term ceasefire declaration in a heavily mediated, high-intensity conflict month: around 25–35% (reflecting frequent tactical pauses historically but also many failed efforts).
– Upward adjustments (+10–15 points) for (a) an explicit, internationally backed plan with clear timelines and hostage-exchange steps and (b) clear humanitarian pressure calling for immediate pauses.
– Downward adjustments (−10–20 points) for (a) Israeli political/military posture and public statements implying continued operations if Hamas doesn’t meet hard terms, (b) ongoing strikes that undermine trust, and (c) the very short one-month window.
– Net of these adjustments yields a mid-to-high thirties probability.
Scenarios I used mentally
– Fast-success scenario (if both mediators and parties rapidly agree to the U.S. plan with clear sequencing): high chance of a formal declaration within days (this is plausible but not the modal scenario).
– Negotiation-but-fails-to-declare scenario (textual agreement but disputes over implementation or public framing): could produce de facto pauses without a formal declaration — this wouldn’t meet the forecast requirement.
– Collapse scenario (talks collapse due to a provocation or political rejection): no declaration in October.
Key assumptions whose failure would greatly alter the forecast
1) Assumption: Hamas (or its effective negotiating leadership) will either accept or put forward a counteroffer that includes a near-term, verifiable pause/hostage sequence within October. Probability this assumption fails: 60%. Rationale: internal factionalism, distrust, or strategic calculation could lead Hamas to delay or reject terms they judge unacceptable; given public statements, conditional openness is plausible but not certain.
2) Assumption: Israeli government/coalition will be willing to publicly declare a ceasefire in October conditional on a hostage exchange and verification that can be implemented quickly. Probability this assumption fails: 50%. Rationale: political pressures and declared military objectives make public acceptance risky for Israeli leadership; they may prefer continued operations unless terms are very favorable.
3) Assumption: No major escalation (e.g., death of a key leader, large-scale cross-border incident) derails talks in October. Probability this assumption fails: 40%. Rationale: recent strikes and the operational tempo make sudden escalations reasonably likely; a major negative event would sharply lower the chance of a declared ceasefire.
Uncertainty and calibration
– I am moderately uncertain; I deliberately avoid extremes. There are real, time-sensitive diplomatic levers active now that make a deal plausible quickly, but they must clear significant domestic and on-the-ground hurdles in a short window.
– Given Brier-score sensitivity, I’m avoiding overprecision and providing a single calibrated probability reflecting the combination of concrete negotiating momentum and significant obstacles.
Other timeframes (brief)
– Chance of a declared ceasefire within one week (from Oct 1): materially lower than the month probability — I estimate roughly half the month probability, reflecting time needed to finalize details.
– Chance by end of November (i.e., additional month beyond October): materially higher than October alone (because more time allows negotiation and mediator pressure). My rough qualitative view is that probability for late-November increases by maybe 15–25 percentage points versus October, all else equal.
Final answer
Probability: 38%
The extracted probability is: 38%
All predictions: [12, 22, 38, 42, 42]
Filtered predictions: [22, 38, 42]
Median reasoning:
Reasoning and judgment
Summary judgment: there is a meaningful but not-favored chance that a ceasefire will be declared in October 2025. Active diplomacy and a concrete U.S. plan released at the end of September raise the odds above a low baseline, but political constraints in Israel, the fragility of trust, continuing military operations (including recent strikes), and the short one-month window make an agreement far from likely.
Key factors I considered
– Momentum toward a deal: A publicly released plan with specific timelines (hostage-exchange framing, immediate pause language) is exactly the kind of focused offer that can produce quick, short-term ceasefires. Reports that Hamas is “reviewing” or conditionally welcoming proposals increases probability materially versus no offer at all.
– Israeli politics and military objectives: Israeli leadership has repeatedly tied ceasefires to concrete Hamas concessions and remains willing to continue operations if they judge objectives unmet. Recent statements by Israeli leaders and high-profile targeted strikes (including cross-border/transnational strikes) indicate willingness to continue pressure rather than accept any vague pause.
– Implementation friction: Ceasefires between asymmetric foes usually require mediators, verification mechanisms, and staged exchanges (hostages for releases, temporary withdrawals). Those mechanisms take time to negotiate and to translate into a formal, public declaration — a nontrivial hurdle in a 31-day window.
– International pressure and humanitarian crisis: Worsening famine/humanitarian conditions and strong international votes/declarations increase reputational and material pressure on Israel (and on mediators) to get a pause in place quickly. That pressure works in favor of a deal sooner rather than later.
– Precedent/base rates: Temporary, tactical ceasefires and hostage-exchange pauses have occurred repeatedly in this conflict’s recent history when there is a mediator and a clear swap architecture; durable comprehensive settlements are far rarer. Because the question is simply whether “a ceasefire is declared” (not whether it will hold long-term), the base-rate for short-term declarations is higher than for lasting peace, but still limited by political willingness.
Timing and probability dynamics
– Short timeline reduces probability materially. Even with a good offer, negotiating verification, sequencing, and public acceptance by hard-line elements on either side can delay or scuttle a declaration.
– If both sides accept (or one accepts and the other’s acceptance is inferred through mediator confirmation), an official declaration could occur very quickly (days). Thus the existence of a concrete plan raises the “speed to deal” chance above baseline.
– Conversely, a single major adverse event in October (e.g., a high-profile strike killing a key leader or a mass-casualty attack) could collapse talks quickly and push the probability toward zero.
Quantitative calibration (how I turned judgment into a number)
– Starting base-rate for a short-term ceasefire declaration in a heavily mediated, high-intensity conflict month: around 25–35% (reflecting frequent tactical pauses historically but also many failed efforts).
– Upward adjustments (+10–15 points) for (a) an explicit, internationally backed plan with clear timelines and hostage-exchange steps and (b) clear humanitarian pressure calling for immediate pauses.
– Downward adjustments (−10–20 points) for (a) Israeli political/military posture and public statements implying continued operations if Hamas doesn’t meet hard terms, (b) ongoing strikes that undermine trust, and (c) the very short one-month window.
– Net of these adjustments yields a mid-to-high thirties probability.
Scenarios I used mentally
– Fast-success scenario (if both mediators and parties rapidly agree to the U.S. plan with clear sequencing): high chance of a formal declaration within days (this is plausible but not the modal scenario).
– Negotiation-but-fails-to-declare scenario (textual agreement but disputes over implementation or public framing): could produce de facto pauses without a formal declaration — this wouldn’t meet the forecast requirement.
– Collapse scenario (talks collapse due to a provocation or political rejection): no declaration in October.
Key assumptions whose failure would greatly alter the forecast
1) Assumption: Hamas (or its effective negotiating leadership) will either accept or put forward a counteroffer that includes a near-term, verifiable pause/hostage sequence within October. Probability this assumption fails: 60%. Rationale: internal factionalism, distrust, or strategic calculation could lead Hamas to delay or reject terms they judge unacceptable; given public statements, conditional openness is plausible but not certain.
2) Assumption: Israeli government/coalition will be willing to publicly declare a ceasefire in October conditional on a hostage exchange and verification that can be implemented quickly. Probability this assumption fails: 50%. Rationale: political pressures and declared military objectives make public acceptance risky for Israeli leadership; they may prefer continued operations unless terms are very favorable.
3) Assumption: No major escalation (e.g., death of a key leader, large-scale cross-border incident) derails talks in October. Probability this assumption fails: 40%. Rationale: recent strikes and the operational tempo make sudden escalations reasonably likely; a major negative event would sharply lower the chance of a declared ceasefire.
Uncertainty and calibration
– I am moderately uncertain; I deliberately avoid extremes. There are real, time-sensitive diplomatic levers active now that make a deal plausible quickly, but they must clear significant domestic and on-the-ground hurdles in a short window.
– Given Brier-score sensitivity, I’m avoiding overprecision and providing a single calibrated probability reflecting the combination of concrete negotiating momentum and significant obstacles.
Other timeframes (brief)
– Chance of a declared ceasefire within one week (from Oct 1): materially lower than the month probability — I estimate roughly half the month probability, reflecting time needed to finalize details.
– Chance by end of November (i.e., additional month beyond October): materially higher than October alone (because more time allows negotiation and mediator pressure). My rough qualitative view is that probability for late-November increases by maybe 15–25 percentage points versus October, all else equal.
Final answer
Probability: 38%
=== Forecast Result ===
{
“probability_yes”: 0.34,
“probability_yes_per_category”: null,
“continuous_cdf”: null
}
=== Reasoning ===
Reasoning and judgment
Summary judgment: there is a meaningful but not-favored chance that a ceasefire will be declared in October 2025. Active diplomacy and a concrete U.S. plan released at the end of September raise the odds above a low baseline, but political constraints in Israel, the fragility of trust, continuing military operations (including recent strikes), and the short one-month window make an agreement far from likely.
Key factors I considered
– Momentum toward a deal: A publicly released plan with specific timelines (hostage-exchange framing, immediate pause language) is exactly the kind of focused offer that can produce quick, short-term ceasefires. Reports that Hamas is “reviewing” or conditionally welcoming proposals increases probability materially versus no offer at all.
– Israeli politics and military objectives: Israeli leadership has repeatedly tied ceasefires to concrete Hamas concessions and remains willing to continue operations if they judge objectives unmet. Recent statements by Israeli leaders and high-profile targeted strikes (including cross-border/transnational strikes) indicate willingness to continue pressure rather than accept any vague pause.
– Implementation friction: Ceasefires between asymmetric foes usually require mediators, verification mechanisms, and staged exchanges (hostages for releases, temporary withdrawals). Those mechanisms take time to negotiate and to translate into a formal, public declaration — a nontrivial hurdle in a 31-day window.
– International pressure and humanitarian crisis: Worsening famine/humanitarian conditions and strong international votes/declarations increase reputational and material pressure on Israel (and on mediators) to get a pause in place quickly. That pressure works in favor of a deal sooner rather than later.
– Precedent/base rates: Temporary, tactical ceasefires and hostage-exchange pauses have occurred repeatedly in this conflict’s recent history when there is a mediator and a clear swap architecture; durable comprehensive settlements are far rarer. Because the question is simply whether “a ceasefire is declared” (not whether it will hold long-term), the base-rate for short-term declarations is higher than for lasting peace, but still limited by political willingness.
Timing and probability dynamics
– Short timeline reduces probability materially. Even with a good offer, negotiating verification, sequencing, and public acceptance by hard-line elements on either side can delay or scuttle a declaration.
– If both sides accept (or one accepts and the other’s acceptance is inferred through mediator confirmation), an official declaration could occur very quickly (days). Thus the existence of a concrete plan raises the “speed to deal” chance above baseline.
– Conversely, a single major adverse event in October (e.g., a high-profile strike killing a key leader or a mass-casualty attack) could collapse talks quickly and push the probability toward zero.
Quantitative calibration (how I turned judgment into a number)
– Starting base-rate for a short-term ceasefire declaration in a heavily mediated, high-intensity conflict month: around 25–35% (reflecting frequent tactical pauses historically but also many failed efforts).
– Upward adjustments (+10–15 points) for (a) an explicit, internationally backed plan with clear timelines and hostage-exchange steps and (b) clear humanitarian pressure calling for immediate pauses.
– Downward adjustments (−10–20 points) for (a) Israeli political/military posture and public statements implying continued operations if Hamas doesn’t meet hard terms, (b) ongoing strikes that undermine trust, and (c) the very short one-month window.
– Net of these adjustments yields a mid-to-high thirties probability.
Scenarios I used mentally
– Fast-success scenario (if both mediators and parties rapidly agree to the U.S. plan with clear sequencing): high chance of a formal declaration within days (this is plausible but not the modal scenario).
– Negotiation-but-fails-to-declare scenario (textual agreement but disputes over implementation or public framing): could produce de facto pauses without a formal declaration — this wouldn’t meet the forecast requirement.
– Collapse scenario (talks collapse due to a provocation or political rejection): no declaration in October.
Key assumptions whose failure would greatly alter the forecast
1) Assumption: Hamas (or its effective negotiating leadership) will either accept or put forward a counteroffer that includes a near-term, verifiable pause/hostage sequence within October. Probability this assumption fails: 60%. Rationale: internal factionalism, distrust, or strategic calculation could lead Hamas to delay or reject terms they judge unacceptable; given public statements, conditional openness is plausible but not certain.
2) Assumption: Israeli government/coalition will be willing to publicly declare a ceasefire in October conditional on a hostage exchange and verification that can be implemented quickly. Probability this assumption fails: 50%. Rationale: political pressures and declared military objectives make public acceptance risky for Israeli leadership; they may prefer continued operations unless terms are very favorable.
3) Assumption: No major escalation (e.g., death of a key leader, large-scale cross-border incident) derails talks in October. Probability this assumption fails: 40%. Rationale: recent strikes and the operational tempo make sudden escalations reasonably likely; a major negative event would sharply lower the chance of a declared ceasefire.
Uncertainty and calibration
– I am moderately uncertain; I deliberately avoid extremes. There are real, time-sensitive diplomatic levers active now that make a deal plausible quickly, but they must clear significant domestic and on-the-ground hurdles in a short window.
– Given Brier-score sensitivity, I’m avoiding overprecision and providing a single calibrated probability reflecting the combination of concrete negotiating momentum and significant obstacles.
Other timeframes (brief)
– Chance of a declared ceasefire within one week (from Oct 1): materially lower than the month probability — I estimate roughly half the month probability, reflecting time needed to finalize details.
– Chance by end of November (i.e., additional month beyond October): materially higher than October alone (because more time allows negotiation and mediator pressure). My rough qualitative view is that probability for late-November increases by maybe 15–25 percentage points versus October, all else equal.
Final answer
Probability: 38%
Past forecasts by Phil’s and Jeremy ’s bots —>
Source: Centre for Information Resilience, date -9-10-2025
https://www.info-res.org/israel-gaza-war/maps/israel-gaza-conflict-map/
