Will there be a ceasefire declared between Israel and Hamas in the month of September 2025?
Here’s what Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai predicts today:
Probability: 22%
52–66 minutes read Condensed version here —>
Perplexity response:
{think}
Let me understand this query. The user is asking about a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in September 2025. The current date is September 17, 2025, so we’re in the middle of the month already.
This is a political event type question about a ceasefire. I need to plan what kind of information would be relevant:
1. Current status of negotiations between Israel and Hamas
2. Any recent ceasefire proposals or agreements
3. Timeline of events in September 2025
4. Positions of key stakeholders (Israel, Hamas, mediators)
5. Recent military operations and their impact on negotiations
6. International diplomatic efforts
Let me analyze the search results:
1. From search result [1]: There was a 60-day ceasefire plan presented by Egyptian and Qatari mediators on 17 August that was accepted by Hamas, but Netanyahu hasn’t responded publicly. On 7 September, Trump stated that Israel had accepted his new proposal for a ceasefire and Hamas must accept it as well.
2. From search result [2]: This appears to be from September 14, 2025, and mentions ongoing tensions and military operations in Gaza.
3. From search result [3]: Mentions September 2025 developments including Israeli airstrikes on Hamas leaders in Doha on 9 September 2025.
4. From search result [4]: Discusses ongoing military operations and families of hostages begging Netanyahu to halt operations.
5. Search results [5] and [6] seem less directly relevant to the Hamas-Israel ceasefire question.
Since this is for a superforecaster, I need to start with my reasoning and then provide 10 citations with summaries. Let me plan this out:
First, I need to think step by step about what information would be relevant for forecasting whether there will be a ceasefire in September 2025.
Types of information needed:
1. Current ceasefire negotiations status
2. Recent military developments
3. Positions of key parties (Israel, Hamas)
4. International mediation efforts
5. Timeline of recent events
6. Obstacles to ceasefire
7. Any deadlines or pressure points
I’ll investigate international mediation efforts and potential obstacles. Multiple diplomatic channels are active, including Egyptian, Qatari, and Trump’s proposals. The key challenge appears to be getting both parties to agree simultaneously. Military operations continue, which complicates negotiations. Hostage situations and ongoing tensions create significant barriers to a quick resolution.
The timeline shows multiple diplomatic and military developments in September 2025. Trump’s proposal on September 7th and Israeli airstrikes on September 9th suggest ongoing complexity. The lack of a unified response from both parties indicates significant challenges to reaching a ceasefire.
To effectively assess the likelihood of a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in September 2025, I need to examine several key factors: the current status of ongoing negotiations, recent military developments, positions of the key parties, international mediation efforts, and any specific deadlines or pressure points that could drive resolution within the remaining days of September.
**Available Citations and Analysis:**
**Citation 1: 2025 Gaza City offensive – Wikipedia**
*Date: Current (accessed September 2025)*
*Summary: A 60-day ceasefire plan was presented by Egyptian and Qatari mediators on August 17, 2025, which Hamas accepted, but Netanyahu has not responded publicly to the proposal. His far-right political allies have pressured him to reject it. On September 7, 2025, President Trump stated that Israel had accepted his new ceasefire proposal and that Hamas must also accept it, though the terms remain unclear.*
**Citation 2: The Sentinel – GE2P2 Global (Period ending September 14, 2025)**
*Date: September 14, 2025*
*Summary: As of September 5, 2025, 361 Palestinians have died due to malnutrition, including 130 children, with famine conditions (IPC Phase 5) persisting. The document references ongoing humanitarian crisis and mentions that nearly 1 million Palestinians remain displaced in Gaza City amid continued Israeli military operations.*
**Citation 3: Israeli-Palestinian conflict – Wikipedia**
*Date: September 2025 updates*
*Summary: On September 9, 2025, Israeli airstrikes targeted senior Hamas leaders in Doha, with differing reports on the outcome. The ongoing war since October 2023 has resulted in large-scale casualties, widespread destruction, mass displacement, and what international experts describe as genocidal actions by Israel.*
**Citation 4: NBC Right Now – Israeli military begins ground offensive in Gaza City**
*Date: Recent (September 2025)*
*Summary: Families of hostages gathered outside Netanyahu’s residence overnight, begging him to stop the Gaza offensive, with one mother stating “Netanyahu gave the order to bomb my child.” Secretary of State Rubio suggested there might still be time for negotiation, stating “At some point, this has to end… we hope it can happen through a negotiation, but time is running out.”*
**Citation 5: Crisis Group – Golan Heights and South/West Syria**
*Date: 2025*
*Summary: Following regional ceasefire arrangements, Netanyahu announced Syrian forces had retreated to Damascus, indicating Israel’s involvement in multiple regional conflicts simultaneously, which could complicate Gaza ceasefire negotiations.*
**Citation 6: Julius Baer Insights**
*Date: June 25, 2025*
*Summary: References a ceasefire between Israel and Iran that appears to be holding as of June 2025, with global markets showing relief, though this pertains to the Iran conflict rather than Hamas.*
## Current Ceasefire Negotiation Status
As of mid-September 2025, there are **competing ceasefire proposals** on the table. The most significant development occurred on **September 7, 2025**, when President Trump announced that Israel had accepted his new ceasefire proposal and called on Hamas to accept it as well[1]. However, the specific terms of Trump’s proposal remain undisclosed, creating uncertainty about its viability.
Prior to this, Egyptian and Qatari mediators had presented a **60-day ceasefire plan on August 17, 2025**, which Hamas accepted but to which Netanyahu has not provided a public response[1]. This earlier proposal faces significant domestic political pressure, as Netanyahu’s far-right coalition partners have heavily pressured him to reject any ceasefire arrangement.
## Recent Military Developments
The military situation has escalated significantly in September 2025, which could either pressure parties toward a ceasefire or make negotiations more difficult. On **September 9, 2025**, Israel conducted airstrikes targeting senior Hamas leaders in Doha[3], representing a significant escalation that extended the conflict beyond Gaza’s borders.
The ongoing **2025 Gaza City offensive** continues as part of what Israel frames as Operation Gideon’s Chariots[1]. This military pressure has created desperate humanitarian conditions, with nearly 1 million Palestinians remaining displaced in Gaza City and 361 Palestinians having died from malnutrition as of September 5, 2025[2].
## Key Stakeholder Positions
**Israel’s position** appears internally divided. While Trump claims Israel has accepted his ceasefire proposal[1], domestic pressure from Netanyahu’s far-right allies continues to oppose any deal. Significantly, on August 31, 2025, Israeli security cabinet officials unanimously argued for “a limited hostage release deal” and stated that military takeover of Gaza City would not bring victory over Hamas[1].
**Hamas has indicated flexibility**, stating it “is ready to immediately sit at the negotiating table to discuss the release of all prisoners in exchange for a clear declaration to end the war, a total withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and creation of a committee of independent Palestinians to run the Gaza Strip”[1].
## Pressure Points and Timeline Factors
The **humanitarian crisis** is creating increasing pressure for resolution. Families of hostages are actively pressuring Netanyahu, with one mother stating he “gave the order to bomb my child”[4]. Secretary of State Rubio acknowledged the urgency, stating “time is running out” for a negotiated solution[4].
The **remaining two weeks of September 2025** present a critical window, as the competing proposals from Egyptian/Qatari mediators and Trump’s administration create potential momentum, while the deteriorating humanitarian situation and domestic Israeli pressure regarding hostages add urgency to reach an agreement.
However, the **September 9 Doha strikes**[3] and ongoing military operations suggest that military dynamics could still derail diplomatic progress, making the timing of any September ceasefire announcement highly uncertain despite the apparent readiness of mediators and stated positions of the parties.
Grok response:
Below is a detailed rundown of the most relevant news and context for the question: “Will there be a ceasefire declared between Israel and Hamas in the month of September 2025?” As your research assistant, my role is to provide factual context based on recent sources, emphasizing updates, expert opinions, and data where available. I will not produce any forecasts or predictions; instead, I’ll focus on summarizing the latest information to help the superforecaster evaluate the situation.
First, I’ll start with a list of 10 citations drawn from recent web results, news articles, and social media posts (specifically from X, treated as indicative of public sentiment rather than conclusive evidence). I’ve prioritized sources from September 2025, as they are the most recent. Note that I have fewer than 10 unique, highly relevant sources from the available results, so I’ve included all pertinent ones and noted any overlaps or less direct relevance. Each entry includes the title, a brief description, the date of publication, and a three-sentence summary of the relevant content.
### List of 10 Citations:
1. **Title**: 2025 Gaza war ceasefire – Wikipedia
**Description**: A Wikipedia page summarizing the ongoing ceasefire negotiations in the Gaza conflict, including historical context and recent developments.
**Date of Publication**: September 5, 2025.
**Three-Sentence Summary**: This page details the complexities of ceasefire talks, noting Egypt’s opposition to Israeli occupation of the Philadelphi corridor as a barrier to agreements and referencing the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty. It highlights how Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s reluctance has stalled progress, with reports from August 2025 indicating no desire for a deal. The content emphasizes that continued military operations in Gaza City could derail negotiations, providing a broad overview of the diplomatic challenges as of early September.
2. **Title**: Updates: Hamas ‘welcomes’ new ceasefire proposal, Israel pounds Gaza City | Israel-Palestine conflict News | Al Jazeera
**Description**: A liveblog from Al Jazeera covering the latest on ceasefire proposals and ongoing violence in Gaza.
**Date of Publication**: September 7, 2025.
**Three-Sentence Summary**: The article reports Hamas expressing openness to a ceasefire deal involving the release of Israeli captives in exchange for a halt in hostilities. It notes concurrent Israeli military actions in Gaza City, which could undermine talks. This update reflects mixed signals in the negotiations, with mediators involved but no immediate resolution confirmed.
3. **Title**: Gaza: Israel rejects ‘spin’ after Hamas says ready for comprehensive deal – BBC News
**Description**: A BBC article on Israel’s response to Hamas’s statements regarding ceasefire proposals.
**Date of Publication**: September 4, 2025.
**Three-Sentence Summary**: The piece quotes Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu dismissing Hamas’s proposals as lacking novelty and insisting on terms set by Israel for any ceasefire. It highlights the ongoing stalemate, with Hamas pushing for a full withdrawal from Gaza and aid access. Expert opinions from unnamed negotiators suggest that such rejections could prolong the conflict into mid-September.
4. **Title**: Israel launches airstrikes against top Hamas members in Qatar for Gaza ceasefire talks | The Guardian
**Description**: A Guardian report on Israeli military actions targeting Hamas leadership amid ceasefire discussions.
**Date of Publication**: September 10, 2025.
**Three-Sentence Summary**: The article describes an Israeli airstrike in Qatar that killed several Hamas members, which Hamas claims disrupted leadership but did not eliminate it entirely. It includes U.S. statements criticizing the strike as counterproductive to peace efforts. Analysts warn that such escalations could harden positions and delay any ceasefire declaration in September.
5. **Title**: Israel Removes Hamas Leaders via Surgical Strike in Doha, Qatar – The Daily Declaration
**Description**: An opinion piece analyzing the implications of Israel’s military strike on Hamas in Qatar for ceasefire negotiations.
**Date of Publication**: Approximately September 10, 2025 (noted as 1 week ago from current date).
**Three-Sentence Summary**: This article justifies the strike as a national security measure but acknowledges its potential to violate international norms and complicate diplomacy. It discusses the broader context of the conflict, including self-defense claims by Israel. Experts cited suggest that such actions make a September ceasefire less likely by escalating tensions.
6. **Title**: UN General Assembly Endorses New York Declaration on Two-State Solution between Israel and Palestine | HUMAN WRONGS WATCH
**Description**: A report on a UN General Assembly resolution related to the Israel-Palestine conflict, including implications for ceasefire efforts.
**Date of Publication**: September 14, 2025.
**Three-Sentence Summary**: The declaration endorses a two-state solution and was met with applause, potentially paving the way for broader peace talks. It indirectly references ceasefire negotiations by calling for de-escalation, though it does not directly address Hamas-Israel dynamics. UN experts view this as a positive step but emphasize that without immediate action from both sides, it may not lead to a September ceasefire.
7. **Title**: Posts found on X regarding ceasefire sentiments
**Description**: A collection of public posts on X expressing views on ceasefire proposals, drawn from user discussions.
**Date of Publication**: Various dates in September 2025 (e.g., September 4, 6, 7, 10, 16, and 17).
**Three-Sentence Summary**: These posts reflect a mix of optimism from some users about Hamas agreeing to terms like hostage releases and a five-year ceasefire, contrasted with skepticism about Israel’s willingness to comply. Sentiment indicates frustration with ongoing violence and diplomatic hurdles, with one post from September 17 suggesting a potential pause in hostilities. However, as social media content, these are inconclusive and represent public opinion rather than verified events.
8. **Title**: Hamas Statement via posts found on X
**Description**: User-shared content on X summarizing Hamas’s official statements on ceasefire proposals.
**Date of Publication**: September 7, 2025 (based on prominent posts).
**Three-Sentence Summary**: Posts highlight Hamas welcoming U.S.-mediated ideas for a ceasefire, including full withdrawal from Gaza and prisoner exchanges. They note Hamas’s commitment to prior agreements, such as one from August 18. This sentiment underscores ongoing diplomatic efforts but is not verifiable as official policy.
9. **Title**: General updates on ceasefire from posts found on X
**Description**: Aggregated X posts discussing the broader context of Israel-Hamas negotiations.
**Date of Publication**: September 16, 2025.
**Three-Sentence Summary**: Discussions include claims of Hamas agreeing to disarmament and a ceasefire, juxtaposed with criticisms of Israeli leadership for blocking deals. Some posts express doubt about peace prospects due to recent military actions. These reflect polarized public views but lack authoritative confirmation.
10. **Title**: Recent X discussions on conflict resolution
**Description**: Posts on X capturing evolving sentiments around the Israel-Palestine conflict in September.
**Date of Publication**: September 17, 2025.
**Three-Sentence Summary**: Users reference a possible “pause” in hostilities, linking it to broader calls for peace, though tied to unrelated contexts like other conflicts. They highlight frustration with stalled talks and the need for international intervention. As with other X content, this is indicative of online discourse rather than factual evidence.
### Detailed Rundown of Relevant News and Context
Based on the citations above, the context for a potential ceasefire declaration between Israel and Hamas in September 2025 shows significant activity but persistent obstacles. Recent updates from early to mid-September 2025 indicate movement toward negotiations, with Hamas repeatedly expressing openness to proposals involving hostage releases, full withdrawal from Gaza, and aid access (e.g., as reported in Al Jazeera on September 7 and BBC on September 4). However, Israeli actions, such as airstrikes on Hamas leaders in Qatar (The Guardian, September 10) and rejections of Hamas’s terms (BBC, September 4), have complicated these efforts. The UN General Assembly’s endorsement of a two-state solution on September 14 (HUMAN WRONGS WATCH) represents a broader diplomatic push, with experts from the UN and mediators warning that escalations could “have disastrous repercussions” for talks, as noted in Wikipedia sources.
Key recent developments include:
– **Hamas’s stance**: Multiple sources (e.g., Al Jazeera and X posts) show Hamas welcoming U.S.-mediated ideas as recently as September 7, suggesting a willingness to engage. This aligns with statements indicating commitment to prior frameworks, though no formal agreement has been confirmed.
– **Israeli position**: Prime Minister Netanyahu’s insistence on specific terms (BBC, September 4) and military operations (e.g., the September 10 airstrike) have been highlighted by experts as potential deal-breakers. The Guardian article includes U.S. officials stating that such actions “do not advance goals,” indicating expert skepticism from authoritative sources like the U.S. State Department.
– **Broader context**: The UN declaration on September 14 could indirectly support ceasefire efforts by promoting de-escalation, but it does not provide specific data on ceasefire probabilities. No recent polling data or approval ratings directly tied to this question were available in the sources, though public sentiment on X reflects growing frustration and calls for resolution.
– **Indicators of movement**: There are no authoritative metrics like polling aggregates for this specific event, but the frequency of proposals and responses in early September (e.g., Hamas’s August 18 commitment referenced in X posts) suggests active dialogue. However, airstrikes and rejections indicate setbacks, with experts (e.g., in The Guardian) emphasizing that these could delay any declaration.
– **Data and statistics**: No quantifiable data, such as the number of negotiation sessions or agreement rates, was available from authoritative sources like the UN or U.S. mediators. Historical context from Wikipedia notes ongoing complications since August 2025, but without real-time access to resolution criteria (e.g., official UN or U.S. State Department pages), I can only report that as of September 17, 2025, no ceasefire has been declared based on the reviewed sources.
This information draws from a variety of sources, including news outlets for factual reporting and X for sentiment, ensuring a balanced view. For authoritative resolution, refer to official channels like the UN or U.S. State Department if available. This context highlights the fluid nature of the situation without implying outcomes.
Extracted resolution criteria links:
[]
Extracted resolution criteria links:
[]
Gemini Binary response:
## Probability of a Ceasefire Declared Between Israel and Hamas in September 2025
As of September 17, 2025, the likelihood of a ceasefire being declared between Israel and Hamas within the remaining 13 days of the month appears low, despite significant international and domestic pressure for de-escalation. While multiple diplomatic efforts are underway, key obstacles, particularly from the Israeli side, and ongoing military escalations make an imminent declaration unlikely.
**Key Factors Influencing the Forecast:**
1. **Stalled Negotiations and Competing Proposals:**
* An Egyptian and Qatari-mediated 60-day ceasefire plan, presented on August 17, 2025, was accepted by Hamas, but Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has not responded publicly to it, facing pressure from his far-right political allies to reject such a deal.
* On September 7, 2025, President Trump announced that Israel had accepted his new ceasefire proposal and called for Hamas to accept it. However, the specific terms of this proposal remain unclear, and Hamas’s acceptance is still pending. Hamas has, however, expressed openness to U.S.-mediated ideas for a ceasefire [SocialMediaResearch 8].
* As recently as September 4, 2025, Netanyahu publicly dismissed Hamas’s proposals, insisting on Israel’s own terms for any ceasefire, indicating a continued divergence in positions [SocialMediaResearch 3].
2. **Ongoing Military Operations and Escalation:**
* The 2025 Gaza City offensive is continuing, with significant military operations still underway. The Israeli military’s actions include recent airstrikes on senior Hamas leaders in Doha on September 9, 2025 [3, SocialMediaResearch 4, 5]. Such escalations tend to harden positions and undermine trust, making diplomatic breakthroughs more challenging [SocialMediaResearch 4, 5].
* The ongoing conflict contributes to a dire humanitarian crisis, with nearly 1 million Palestinians displaced and hundreds dying from malnutrition as of early September.
3. **Pressure for a Ceasefire:**
* Hamas has consistently indicated a willingness to engage in ceasefire talks, welcoming new proposals and expressing readiness to negotiate prisoner releases in exchange for an end to the war and Israeli withdrawal from Gaza [1, SocialMediaResearch 2, 8].
* Intense pressure is mounting on the Israeli government from various fronts, including families of hostages begging Netanyahu to halt operations. U.S. Secretary of State Rubio noted that “time is running out” for a negotiated solution, underscoring international urgency.
* The UN General Assembly endorsed a two-state solution on September 14, calling for de-escalation, which adds to the international diplomatic pressure [SocialMediaResearch 6].
**Assumptions and Potential Impact on Forecast:**
1. **Netanyahu’s Political Will:** The primary assumption is that Netanyahu’s political survival and dependence on his far-right coalition will continue to outweigh the pressure for a ceasefire declaration within this short timeframe. If Netanyahu were to suddenly prioritize a deal, perhaps due to overwhelming domestic or international pressure, it would significantly increase the probability. The likelihood of this happening quickly is currently low.
2. **Impact of Military Escalations:** It is assumed that the recent Israeli airstrikes on Hamas leadership in Doha will likely complicate rather than accelerate a ceasefire declaration in the immediate term. If these strikes are instead a precursor to a tactical shift or if they weaken Hamas to the point where a rapid agreement becomes more feasible, the probability would be higher.
3. **Feasibility of Rapid Agreement:** It is assumed that crafting and formally declaring a comprehensive ceasefire agreement within 13 days is challenging, especially given the current lack of a publicly accepted framework by both parties. If a simpler, temporary “pause” were to be declared and categorized as a “ceasefire” for the resolution criteria, the probability might be slightly higher.
**Conclusion:**
While there is strong external and internal pressure on both sides to reach an agreement, and Hamas has shown a willingness to engage, the current posture of the Israeli government, marked by a lack of public commitment to specific proposals, internal political resistance, and ongoing military operations, suggests that a declared ceasefire in September 2025 is unlikely within the remaining days. The events of early September, particularly the Doha airstrikes, have created additional hurdles that are difficult to overcome in such a short window.
Probability: 7%
The extracted probability is: 7%
________________________
Anthropic Binary response:
Let me carefully analyze this question about whether there will be a ceasefire declared between Israel and Hamas in September 2025, with only 13 days remaining in the month (September 18-30).
## Current Situation Assessment
As of September 17, 2025, there is significant diplomatic activity but no ceasefire has been declared yet. The key developments include:
1. **Competing Proposals**: There are two main ceasefire proposals on the table:
– Egyptian/Qatari 60-day ceasefire plan from August 17 (accepted by Hamas, no public response from Netanyahu)
– Trump’s proposal from September 7 (Israel allegedly accepted, Hamas urged to accept)
2. **Recent Escalations**: The September 9 Israeli airstrikes on Hamas leaders in Doha represent a significant escalation that has complicated negotiations.
3. **Stakeholder Positions**:
– Hamas has indicated readiness to negotiate with clear conditions
– Israel appears internally divided, with security officials favoring a deal but Netanyahu facing pressure from far-right coalition partners
– U.S. officials (Rubio) indicate “time is running out” for negotiations
## Key Factors Affecting Probability
### Positive Indicators:
– Multiple active mediation channels (Egypt, Qatar, U.S.)
– Hamas’s stated willingness to negotiate
– Israeli security establishment’s support for a limited deal
– Extreme humanitarian crisis creating pressure
– UN General Assembly endorsement of two-state solution (September 14)
### Negative Indicators:
– September 9 airstrikes disrupting negotiations
– Netanyahu’s non-response to Egyptian/Qatari proposal
– Far-right coalition pressure against any ceasefire
– Israel’s rejection of Hamas terms as “spin” (September 4)
– Ongoing military operations in Gaza City
– History of failed ceasefire attempts
## Timeline Analysis
With only 13 days remaining in September, the window is extremely narrow. Ceasefire negotiations typically require:
– Agreement on specific terms
– Internal approvals from both sides
– Coordination with mediators
– Public announcement
The September 9 airstrikes occurred just 8 days ago, likely setting back negotiations significantly. Historical precedent shows that after major escalations, it typically takes weeks to months to rebuild diplomatic momentum.
## Critical Assumptions and Their Failure Probabilities
1. **Assumption: The September 9 airstrikes haven’t completely derailed negotiations**
– Failure probability: 60%
– If failed: Would reduce ceasefire probability to near zero
2. **Assumption: Netanyahu can overcome far-right coalition pressure**
– Failure probability: 70%
– If failed: Would prevent Israeli acceptance of any deal
3. **Assumption: Trump’s proposal represents genuine progress rather than political posturing**
– Failure probability: 50%
– If failed: Would mean no real advancement beyond August stalemate
## Base Rate Considerations
Historically, Israel-Hamas ceasefires:
– Often take months of negotiation after major escalations
– Require alignment of multiple stakeholders
– Have a low success rate when domestic political opposition is strong
– Rarely materialize within two weeks of major military strikes on leadership
The fact that only about 35% of forecasting questions resolve positively suggests being cautious about predicting positive outcomes, especially for complex geopolitical events with tight timeframes.
## Mathematical Analysis
If we consider the probability of a ceasefire being equally likely on any given day if it were to happen:
– 13 days remaining in September
– Even if negotiations were progressing well (which evidence suggests they aren’t), the probability of announcement in any specific 13-day window would be low
– The September 9 strikes likely created at least a 2-3 week setback in negotiations
Given:
– The narrow 13-day window
– Recent military escalation
– Lack of unified positions
– Historical precedent of lengthy negotiations
– Multiple failed attempts already in 2025
## Final Assessment
The combination of the extremely short timeframe (13 days), the recent September 9 airstrikes that disrupted negotiations, Netanyahu’s domestic political constraints, and the lack of any concrete signs of imminent agreement all point to a very low probability of a ceasefire being declared by September 30, 2025.
While diplomatic activity continues and humanitarian pressure is mounting, these factors are unlikely to overcome the substantial obstacles in such a short timeframe. The September 9 strikes in particular represent a major setback that typically requires weeks to months to recover from diplomatically.
Probability: 8%
The extracted probability is: 8%
GPT Binary response:
Reasoning and evidence (step‑by‑step)
1) What counts as a “ceasefire” here and timing constraints
– I treat the question as asking whether a publicly announced ceasefire (temporary pause, humanitarian pause, or longer cessation of hostilities) between Israel and Hamas will be declared at any point after today (2025‑09‑17) and before the resolution date (2025‑10‑01). That leaves ~13 days for a declaration. Short time windows strongly favor the status quo unless negotiations are already at a late stage.
2) Key recent developments and what they imply for probability
– Mediators’ proposals exist: Egyptian/Qatari mediators presented a 60‑day plan (Hamas accepted on/after 17 Aug) and there have been U.S.‑mediated proposals in early September that Hamas publicly welcomed. These show bargaining positions and active diplomacy that could yield an agreement if political obstacles are resolved. (Sources: mediator proposals reported Aug–Sep 2025.)
– Confounding escalations: Israel carried out strikes in early September (including strikes on Hamas figures in Doha reported around 9 Sept) and continues offensive operations in Gaza City. Such military escalations tend to harden positions and can derail talks. (Sources: multiple Sep 2025 reports.)
– Domestic Israeli politics: Netanyahu faces strong pressure from far‑right coalition partners who have opposed major concessions; reports indicate internal divisions and public statements that complicate a quick Israeli acceptance of salient ceasefire terms. That raises the bar for a near‑term deal. (Sources: reporting on Israeli political dynamics Sep 2025.)
– Humanitarian and international pressure: Severe civilian suffering and UN/other international calls for de‑escalation create strong incentives for an agreement or at least a humanitarian pause. This pushes toward some form of ceasefire, especially if mediators can present face‑saving terms. (Sources: humanitarian reports and UN actions mid‑Sep 2025.)
3) Base‑rate and timeline effects
– Base rate: In high‑intensity conflicts, negotiated ceasefires are not uncommon, but they typically require time and iterative bargaining. The combination of active diplomacy plus intense military action creates two opposing forces: diplomacy raising the chance, escalation reducing it.
– Time left (13 days): this is short. If negotiations were weeks from final agreement already, a declaration is plausible; if they were still at early/mid negotiation stages, the chance is low. Public reports in early–mid September show proposals on the table but also fresh escalations — indicating negotiations are active but fragile, not clearly in finalization.
4) Net assessment of drivers
– Factors raising probability: Hamas has expressed willingness to engage/accept proposals; mediators (Egypt, Qatar, the U.S.) are actively pushing; intense humanitarian pressure and international diplomatic pressure.
– Factors lowering probability: Israeli domestic political constraints, recent Israeli strikes (including cross‑border operations), lack of public, verifiable Israeli agreement to the mediators’ terms, and the short remaining timeframe.
5) Uncertainty and distributional judgment
– A plausible near‑term outcome that would count as “yes” is a short humanitarian pause or limited hostage‑for‑release truce rather than a broad, durable settlement. That outcome is more likely than a comprehensive long‑term ceasefire in the next two weeks.
– I assign substantial uncertainty: this is not near‑certain but not extremely unlikely either. Small signals (an Israeli cabinet statement, mediator announcement) could flip probability quickly.
6) Key assumptions whose failure would change the forecast (and the chance those assumptions are wrong)
– Assumption A: Israel’s leadership is willing to publicly accept at least a limited ceasefire or temporary pause within two weeks. Probability this assumption is incorrect (i.e., Israel refuses or stalls): 60%. If Israel refuses, the probability of a ceasefire in September falls sharply.
– Assumption B: Hamas’s public acceptance of mediator terms is both genuine and stable (Hamas follows through on acceptance rather than using it as bargaining). Probability this assumption is incorrect: 25%. If Hamas backtracks it reduces the chance modestly (but Hamas has repeatedly signaled willingness).
– Assumption C: International mediators (Egypt/Qatar/US) can craft and present a face‑saving package rapidly and obtain buy‑in from both sides despite recent escalations. Probability this assumption is incorrect: 55%. If mediators cannot bridge domestic political constraints in Israel within two weeks, a deal is unlikely.
7) Weighting of evidence sources and recency
– I place greatest weight on (a) direct reporting of concrete diplomatic moves (mediator proposals and public acceptance statements), (b) official/close‑to‑official statements by the parties, and (c) signs of military escalation that could block deals. Recent (first half of Sep 2025) reporting shows active diplomacy plus countervailing escalations, so I treat the situation as “active but fragile.”
8) Final probabilistic synthesis
– Balancing active negotiations and heavy international pressure against strong Israeli domestic constraints, recent escalatory strikes, and the very short deadline, I lean toward a below‑even chance that a ceasefire will be declared before October 1, 2025.
– I tilt slightly upward relative to a very low number because (a) Hamas appears willing to agree to mediator plans, (b) mediators are active and motivated by the humanitarian situation, and (c) limited/temporary pauses are easier to arrange and therefore appreciably more likely than a comprehensive settlement.
Final answer
Probability: 30%
The extracted probability is: 30%
GPT Binary response:
Reasoning and forecast rationale
Summary judgment and headline probability
– There is active diplomatic momentum (multiple mediation tracks; Hamas has publicly signaled willingness to accept ceasefire proposals), but also strong, recent military escalations (notably Israeli strikes including against Hamas figures in Doha) and clear domestic political obstacles inside Israel. With only two weeks left in September and no formal deal announced as of today, the balance favors no declared ceasefire this month, but not overwhelmingly so. My best estimate: a modest chance a ceasefire will be declared before Oct 1, 2025.
Key facts and how they move the probability
– Mediator activity and prior acceptances (raise probability): An Egyptian–Qatari 60‑day ceasefire plan from mid‑August was reportedly accepted by Hamas; U.S./other mediation has continued into September. These create a realistic pathway to a deal on timelines of weeks if principal actors agree.
– Conflicting public claims and opacity (lower confidence): On Sept 7 a U.S. political actor publicly said Israel had accepted a ceasefire proposal but the terms were not disclosed; opacity increases the chance that claimed “acceptance” may be contingent or partial rather than a final cabinet-level commitment.
– Recent escalations (reduce probability): Israeli strikes in early September beyond Gaza (reported strikes on Hamas figures in Doha) and continuing intense operations inside Gaza increase mistrust and can scuttle or delay negotiations—especially given hardline domestic political pressure on Israel’s leadership.
– Humanitarian and hostage pressures (raise probability): Severe humanitarian deterioration and intense public pressure from hostage families are strong incentives to reach a pause/ceasefire quickly; these are significant tailwinds toward some kind of formal halt.
– Time remaining (strongly reduces probability): With only 14 days left in the month, even active negotiations face logistic, ratification, and implementation hurdles; short time windows favor “no” unless negotiators were already on the brink of a signed, announced deal.
Base rates and precedent
– Historical base rate for negotiated, formal ceasefires in high-intensity asymmetric wars with hostages is mixed: partial humanitarian pauses or short-term prisoner-exchange truce declarations happen somewhat often, but comprehensive, enforceable ceasefires tend to take longer and often fail to appear within brief windows once fighting is intense. Given this conflict’s complexity and cross-border escalations, the base rate over two weeks for a formal ceasefire is low-to-moderate.
Quantitative thinking (how I combined factors)
– Start with a cautious base of ~35% chance for a ceasefire in a short window when mediation is active but fighting is intense (reflecting prior calibration that many such diplomatic windows fail).
– Upward adjustments: Hamas’s stated willingness and active mediators (+10 percentage points).
– Downward adjustments: recent cross-border strikes and continuing offensive operations, plus domestic Israeli political constraints and opacity over acceptance (−17 points).
– Time remaining and logistic frictions (−5 points).
– Net: ~35 + 10 − 17 − 5 = 23%. I adjust upward slightly for the strong humanitarian and hostage pressure (local actors often accept short-term deals when public pressure spikes), rounding to 28% to reflect uncertainty and a modest probability that negotiators will announce at least a temporary ceasefire/pause this month.
Alternative time-horizon probabilities (for perspective)
– Chance of a declared ceasefire within 7 days (by Sept 24): ~10% — unlikely because final approvals and implementation details usually take several days.
– Chance by the end of September (by Oct 1): 28% (my main forecast).
– Chance by end of October (by Oct 31): ~55% — more time greatly increases the odds that mediators will secure a deal or that operational pressures produce a formal pause.
Main assumptions whose failure would most change the forecast
1) Assumption: Israel’s leadership (Netanyahu + security cabinet) will either accept a mediated deal or allow a limited/temporary ceasefire to be declared. Probability this assumption is false: 60%. If this fails (i.e., leadership rejects or demands additional terms), probability of a September ceasefire falls to single digits.
2) Assumption: Hamas remains unified and willing to accept an exchange/cessation package that mediators can present quickly. Probability this assumption is false: 25%. If internal Hamas divisions or demands harden, probability falls substantially.
3) Assumption: Mediators (Egypt/Qatar/U.S./others) can bridge final technical/verification/logistics issues quickly (hostage list, withdrawal sequencing, monitoring). Probability this assumption is false: 40%. If this fails, expect negotiated agreement delays into October or later.
Confidence and calibration
– I’m moderately uncertain because public signals are mixed and much rests on private commitments and rapidly changing battlefield events. I deliberately avoided extreme probabilities and applied historical base rates plus concrete, recent events (mediation offers, public statements, and strikes) to arrive at the estimate.
Final answer
Probability: 28%
The extracted probability is: 28%
GPT Binary response:
Reasoning and analysis
Short answer I’m aiming toward: a low-to-moderate probability that a ceasefire will be declared between Israel and Hamas in the remainder of September 2025 (the window Sept 18–30). Below I lay out the evidence, the key drivers, a simple probabilistic decomposition, the crucial assumptions whose failure would change the forecast the most, and the reasoning-adjusted final probability.
Current situation (what matters, as of 17 Sept 2025)
– Multiple mediation tracks are active (Egypt/Qatar 60‑day plan from 17 Aug that Hamas accepted; a U.S. (Trump) proposal that the U.S. says Israel accepted on 7 Sept). Hamas publicly has signaled willingness to negotiate on hostage exchanges tied to a halt of hostilities. Mediators and international bodies are pressing for de-escalation.
– Significant obstacles: Netanyahu’s domestic coalition (far-right partners) is hostile to a ceasefire that looks like a “withdrawal” or signals strategic concession; Israeli military operations continued into September, and there was a notable strike on Hamas figures in Doha (9–10 Sept), which both escalates the conflict and signals unresolved Israeli security priorities.
– Humanitarian pressure is acute (malnutrition/famine conditions and mass displacement), which raises international and domestic incentives to pause fighting and facilitates mediator leverage.
– Time remaining is short: 13 days to Oct 1. That compresses negotiation time and reduces probability relative to a longer horizon.
Key factors that push probability up or down
– Push-up factors: Hamas stated willingness; existence of concrete mediator proposals already (Egypt/Qatar), public U.S. claim Israel agreed to a U.S. proposal (which, if accurate, strongly raises chances); intense humanitarian pressure and hostage-family lobbying.
– Push-down factors: Israeli domestic political constraints and likely need for a public Israeli government statement; recent cross-border strike (Doha) that could harden Hamas and/or undermine mediators; uncertainty about whether Israeli “acceptance” is formal and politically sustainable; risk of last-minute derailment (new military operations, targeted killings, or political backlash in Israel).
Base-rate and historical analogs
– Short-term ceasefires in Israel–Gaza conflicts do occur, often for hostage exchanges or humanitarian pauses, but they require synchronous acceptance by both sides and are frequently fragile. When the remaining window is only 1–2 weeks, the historical base rate for new, formal ceasefires being declared in that short interval is modest. Past deals that happened quickly usually had clear, convergent pressures and a strong mediator with credible enforcement or guarantees.
Probabilistic decomposition (intuitive, transparent)
I view a ceasefire declaration in this window as requiring three things to happen in sequence (not exhaustive, but useful for tractable probability math):
1) Hamas acceptance of an explicit set of terms (likely: already high). I estimate P(Hamas accepts terms that are on the table) ≈ 75%.
2) Israel (the government) formally accepts and publicly declares a ceasefire under those terms (harder given coalition politics and recent strikes). I estimate P(Israel accepts and announces within the window | Hamas accepts) ≈ 38%.
3) No major derailment between now and declaration (e.g., a new, large strike, breakdown in mediator channel, or a political reversal in Israel) that prevents the announcement. I estimate P(no major derailment during negotiation window) ≈ 65%.
Multiply these (as a rough conditional model): 0.75 * 0.38 * 0.65 ≈ 0.185 → ~18.5%.
I then adjust this baseline upward slightly because:
– There is an actively stated tranche of proposals and a public U.S. claim Israel accepted one (if true that increases odds materially).
– Humanitarian and hostage pressures can force faster outcomes than usual.
So I move the estimate up from ~18.5% to a final judged probability near the low‑to‑mid 20s.
Crucial assumptions whose failure would most change the forecast
1) Assumption: The U.S. statement that “Israel accepted” a U.S. proposal reflects a durable Israeli political decision and not a provisional or tactically framed comment.
– Probability this assumption is wrong: 45% (i.e., fairly plausible that the statement overstates Israel’s commitment).
– If this assumption fails, the probability of a September declaration drops substantially (roughly halves), because Israeli public agreement is the main gating factor.
2) Assumption: Hamas remains unified and will not be split by hardliners rejecting a mediated deal.
– Probability this assumption is wrong: 20%.
– If wrong, odds drop substantially (there would be no single Hamas sign-off), perhaps to near zero for a credible two‑side ceasefire in this short window.
3) Assumption: No major military escalation or targeted killing occurs that materially hardens positions before a deal is announced.
– Probability this assumption is wrong: 35%.
– If wrong, odds fall significantly because escalations have historically derailed talks.
Uncertainty, calibration, and qualitative modifiers
– I’m intentionally conservative because (a) resolution markets penalize overconfidence, and (b) short windows favor the status quo. There is meaningful uncertainty in the intelligence/claims (e.g., whether Israel has truly accepted a U.S. proposal), and a few events (one targeted strike, a ministerial resignation, a public refusal) could flip the outcome quickly.
– If asked about a longer horizon (e.g., by end of October or by end of 2025), probabilities would be substantially higher: by end of October I’d move into the 40–55% range conditioned on continued international pressure and possible incremental bargaining. But that is outside the current resolution window.
Final subjective probability (after the above reasoning)
Probability: 22%
The extracted probability is: 22%
All predictions: [7, 8, 22, 28, 30]
Filtered predictions: [8, 22, 28]
Median reasoning:
Reasoning and analysis
Short answer I’m aiming toward: a low-to-moderate probability that a ceasefire will be declared between Israel and Hamas in the remainder of September 2025 (the window Sept 18–30). Below I lay out the evidence, the key drivers, a simple probabilistic decomposition, the crucial assumptions whose failure would change the forecast the most, and the reasoning-adjusted final probability.
Current situation (what matters, as of 17 Sept 2025)
– Multiple mediation tracks are active (Egypt/Qatar 60‑day plan from 17 Aug that Hamas accepted; a U.S. (Trump) proposal that the U.S. says Israel accepted on 7 Sept). Hamas publicly has signaled willingness to negotiate on hostage exchanges tied to a halt of hostilities. Mediators and international bodies are pressing for de-escalation.
– Significant obstacles: Netanyahu’s domestic coalition (far-right partners) is hostile to a ceasefire that looks like a “withdrawal” or signals strategic concession; Israeli military operations continued into September, and there was a notable strike on Hamas figures in Doha (9–10 Sept), which both escalates the conflict and signals unresolved Israeli security priorities.
– Humanitarian pressure is acute (malnutrition/famine conditions and mass displacement), which raises international and domestic incentives to pause fighting and facilitates mediator leverage.
– Time remaining is short: 13 days to Oct 1. That compresses negotiation time and reduces probability relative to a longer horizon.
Key factors that push probability up or down
– Push-up factors: Hamas stated willingness; existence of concrete mediator proposals already (Egypt/Qatar), public U.S. claim Israel agreed to a U.S. proposal (which, if accurate, strongly raises chances); intense humanitarian pressure and hostage-family lobbying.
– Push-down factors: Israeli domestic political constraints and likely need for a public Israeli government statement; recent cross-border strike (Doha) that could harden Hamas and/or undermine mediators; uncertainty about whether Israeli “acceptance” is formal and politically sustainable; risk of last-minute derailment (new military operations, targeted killings, or political backlash in Israel).
Base-rate and historical analogs
– Short-term ceasefires in Israel–Gaza conflicts do occur, often for hostage exchanges or humanitarian pauses, but they require synchronous acceptance by both sides and are frequently fragile. When the remaining window is only 1–2 weeks, the historical base rate for new, formal ceasefires being declared in that short interval is modest. Past deals that happened quickly usually had clear, convergent pressures and a strong mediator with credible enforcement or guarantees.
Probabilistic decomposition (intuitive, transparent)
I view a ceasefire declaration in this window as requiring three things to happen in sequence (not exhaustive, but useful for tractable probability math):
1) Hamas acceptance of an explicit set of terms (likely: already high). I estimate P(Hamas accepts terms that are on the table) ≈ 75%.
2) Israel (the government) formally accepts and publicly declares a ceasefire under those terms (harder given coalition politics and recent strikes). I estimate P(Israel accepts and announces within the window | Hamas accepts) ≈ 38%.
3) No major derailment between now and declaration (e.g., a new, large strike, breakdown in mediator channel, or a political reversal in Israel) that prevents the announcement. I estimate P(no major derailment during negotiation window) ≈ 65%.
Multiply these (as a rough conditional model): 0.75 * 0.38 * 0.65 ≈ 0.185 → ~18.5%.
I then adjust this baseline upward slightly because:
– There is an actively stated tranche of proposals and a public U.S. claim Israel accepted one (if true that increases odds materially).
– Humanitarian and hostage pressures can force faster outcomes than usual.
So I move the estimate up from ~18.5% to a final judged probability near the low‑to‑mid 20s.
Crucial assumptions whose failure would most change the forecast
1) Assumption: The U.S. statement that “Israel accepted” a U.S. proposal reflects a durable Israeli political decision and not a provisional or tactically framed comment.
– Probability this assumption is wrong: 45% (i.e., fairly plausible that the statement overstates Israel’s commitment).
– If this assumption fails, the probability of a September declaration drops substantially (roughly halves), because Israeli public agreement is the main gating factor.
2) Assumption: Hamas remains unified and will not be split by hardliners rejecting a mediated deal.
– Probability this assumption is wrong: 20%.
– If wrong, odds drop substantially (there would be no single Hamas sign-off), perhaps to near zero for a credible two‑side ceasefire in this short window.
3) Assumption: No major military escalation or targeted killing occurs that materially hardens positions before a deal is announced.
– Probability this assumption is wrong: 35%.
– If wrong, odds fall significantly because escalations have historically derailed talks.
Uncertainty, calibration, and qualitative modifiers
– I’m intentionally conservative because (a) resolution markets penalize overconfidence, and (b) short windows favor the status quo. There is meaningful uncertainty in the intelligence/claims (e.g., whether Israel has truly accepted a U.S. proposal), and a few events (one targeted strike, a ministerial resignation, a public refusal) could flip the outcome quickly.
– If asked about a longer horizon (e.g., by end of October or by end of 2025), probabilities would be substantially higher: by end of October I’d move into the 40–55% range conditioned on continued international pressure and possible incremental bargaining. But that is outside the current resolution window.
Final subjective probability (after the above reasoning)
Probability: 22%
=== Forecast Result ===
{
“probability_yes”: 0.19333333333333333,
“probability_yes_per_category”: null,
“continuous_cdf”: null
}
=== Reasoning ===
Reasoning and analysis
Short answer I’m aiming toward: a low-to-moderate probability that a ceasefire will be declared between Israel and Hamas in the remainder of September 2025 (the window Sept 18–30). Below I lay out the evidence, the key drivers, a simple probabilistic decomposition, the crucial assumptions whose failure would change the forecast the most, and the reasoning-adjusted final probability.
Current situation (what matters, as of 17 Sept 2025)
– Multiple mediation tracks are active (Egypt/Qatar 60‑day plan from 17 Aug that Hamas accepted; a U.S. (Trump) proposal that the U.S. says Israel accepted on 7 Sept). Hamas publicly has signaled willingness to negotiate on hostage exchanges tied to a halt of hostilities. Mediators and international bodies are pressing for de-escalation.
– Significant obstacles: Netanyahu’s domestic coalition (far-right partners) is hostile to a ceasefire that looks like a “withdrawal” or signals strategic concession; Israeli military operations continued into September, and there was a notable strike on Hamas figures in Doha (9–10 Sept), which both escalates the conflict and signals unresolved Israeli security priorities.
– Humanitarian pressure is acute (malnutrition/famine conditions and mass displacement), which raises international and domestic incentives to pause fighting and facilitates mediator leverage.
– Time remaining is short: 13 days to Oct 1. That compresses negotiation time and reduces probability relative to a longer horizon.
Key factors that push probability up or down
– Push-up factors: Hamas stated willingness; existence of concrete mediator proposals already (Egypt/Qatar), public U.S. claim Israel agreed to a U.S. proposal (which, if accurate, strongly raises chances); intense humanitarian pressure and hostage-family lobbying.
– Push-down factors: Israeli domestic political constraints and likely need for a public Israeli government statement; recent cross-border strike (Doha) that could harden Hamas and/or undermine mediators; uncertainty about whether Israeli “acceptance” is formal and politically sustainable; risk of last-minute derailment (new military operations, targeted killings, or political backlash in Israel).
Base-rate and historical analogs
– Short-term ceasefires in Israel–Gaza conflicts do occur, often for hostage exchanges or humanitarian pauses, but they require synchronous acceptance by both sides and are frequently fragile. When the remaining window is only 1–2 weeks, the historical base rate for new, formal ceasefires being declared in that short interval is modest. Past deals that happened quickly usually had clear, convergent pressures and a strong mediator with credible enforcement or guarantees.
Probabilistic decomposition (intuitive, transparent)
I view a ceasefire declaration in this window as requiring three things to happen in sequence (not exhaustive, but useful for tractable probability math):
1) Hamas acceptance of an explicit set of terms (likely: already high). I estimate P(Hamas accepts terms that are on the table) ≈ 75%.
2) Israel (the government) formally accepts and publicly declares a ceasefire under those terms (harder given coalition politics and recent strikes). I estimate P(Israel accepts and announces within the window | Hamas accepts) ≈ 38%.
3) No major derailment between now and declaration (e.g., a new, large strike, breakdown in mediator channel, or a political reversal in Israel) that prevents the announcement. I estimate P(no major derailment during negotiation window) ≈ 65%.
Multiply these (as a rough conditional model): 0.75 * 0.38 * 0.65 ≈ 0.185 → ~18.5%.
I then adjust this baseline upward slightly because:
– There is an actively stated tranche of proposals and a public U.S. claim Israel accepted one (if true that increases odds materially).
– Humanitarian and hostage pressures can force faster outcomes than usual.
So I move the estimate up from ~18.5% to a final judged probability near the low‑to‑mid 20s.
Crucial assumptions whose failure would most change the forecast
1) Assumption: The U.S. statement that “Israel accepted” a U.S. proposal reflects a durable Israeli political decision and not a provisional or tactically framed comment.
– Probability this assumption is wrong: 45% (i.e., fairly plausible that the statement overstates Israel’s commitment).
– If this assumption fails, the probability of a September declaration drops substantially (roughly halves), because Israeli public agreement is the main gating factor.
2) Assumption: Hamas remains unified and will not be split by hardliners rejecting a mediated deal.
– Probability this assumption is wrong: 20%.
– If wrong, odds drop substantially (there would be no single Hamas sign-off), perhaps to near zero for a credible two‑side ceasefire in this short window.
3) Assumption: No major military escalation or targeted killing occurs that materially hardens positions before a deal is announced.
– Probability this assumption is wrong: 35%.
– If wrong, odds fall significantly because escalations have historically derailed talks.
Uncertainty, calibration, and qualitative modifiers
– I’m intentionally conservative because (a) resolution markets penalize overconfidence, and (b) short windows favor the status quo. There is meaningful uncertainty in the intelligence/claims (e.g., whether Israel has truly accepted a U.S. proposal), and a few events (one targeted strike, a ministerial resignation, a public refusal) could flip the outcome quickly.
– If asked about a longer horizon (e.g., by end of October or by end of 2025), probabilities would be substantially higher: by end of October I’d move into the 40–55% range conditioned on continued international pressure and possible incremental bargaining. But that is outside the current resolution window.
Final subjective probability (after the above reasoning)
Probability: 22%
Past forecasts by Phil’s and Jeremy ’s bots —>
Source: Centre for Information Resilience, date -9-10-2025
https://www.info-res.org/israel-gaza-war/maps/israel-gaza-conflict-map/
