Israel/Hamas Ceasefire? Botmaster Phil Godzin’s forecast details, Sept. 24, 2025

Will there be a ceasefire declared between Israel and Hamas in the month of September 2025?

Here’s what Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai predicts today:

Probability: 18% 46–59 minutes read Condensed version here —>

Perplexity response:
{think}

The user is asking me to forecast whether there will be a ceasefire declared between Israel and Hamas in September 2025. Since the current date is September 24, 2025, we are currently in the month being asked about. Let me look through the search results to see what information is available.
From the search results:
1. Wikipedia article about 2025 Gaza City offensive – mentions ceasefire negotiations and Trump’s statement on Sept 7 about Israel accepting his ceasefire proposal, with Hamas responding positively.
2. The Sentinel document mentions the UN Security Council’s 10,000th meeting where they failed to adopt a resolution calling for immediate ceasefire in Gaza.
3. PEN report mentions a ceasefire that commenced on January 19, 2025, but Israel blocked humanitarian aid again on March 2, 2025.
4. Jewish Insider mentions ceasefire talks falling apart “last month” and Syrian-Israeli discussions happening now.
5. Crisis Group mentions ceasefire deals between Hamas and Israel in their timeline.
6. UN General Assembly document mentions calling for ceasefire.
7. Financial Express mentions US vetoing ceasefire proposal on September 18.
8. David Weinberg’s site doesn’t seem to have relevant current info.
Let me plan what information I need:
1. Current status of ceasefire negotiations
2. Recent developments in September 2025
3. Key stakeholder positions
4. Timeline of recent events
5. Expert opinions and authoritative sources

Let me start with the 10 citations as requested by the personalization instructions. Looking at this question about a potential ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in September 2025, I need to examine recent diplomatic developments, negotiation progress, and positions of key stakeholders. This is a political event requiring analysis of current negotiations, recent statements, and international diplomatic efforts.

## Key Citations and Sources
1. **2025 Gaza City offensive – Wikipedia** (August-September 2025): Documents that on September 7, 2025, President Trump stated Israel had accepted his ceasefire proposal and Hamas responded positively, saying it was “ready to immediately sit at the negotiating table.” A 60-day ceasefire plan from Egyptian and Qatari mediators was accepted by Hamas on August 17 but Netanyahu had not responded publicly. Israeli defense officials argued against military takeover of Gaza City on August 31.
2. **The Sentinel – Period ending 21 September 2025** (September 21, 2025): Reports that the UN Security Council failed to adopt a resolution calling for immediate ceasefire in Gaza in its 10,000th meeting. The US vetoed the resolution despite 14 members voting in favor, with the US representative stating Trump would never accept a ceasefire that leaves Hamas in power. The resolution would have demanded immediate, unconditional permanent ceasefire and hostage release.
3. **PEN Report “All That Is Lost”** (September 10, 2025): Details that a ceasefire commenced on January 19, 2025, but Israel blocked humanitarian aid again on March 2, 2025, and cut electricity on March 10. As of September 10, 2025, nearly 65,000 Palestinians have been killed and over 163,000 wounded. The report indicates the previous ceasefire broke down within months.
4. **Jewish Insider Congress Archives** (Recent): Reports ceasefire talks between Israel and Hamas “fell apart last month” and mentions ongoing Syrian-Israeli security discussions. Syrian Foreign Minister was on Capitol Hill lobbying for sanctions repeal, with Syrian President stating Syria and Israel could reach security agreement “within days.”
5. **Crisis Group Tehran Flashpoint** (August 2025): Documents E3 foreign ministers’ August 8 letter warning Iran about nuclear negotiations, stating they are “prepared to trigger the snapback mechanism” if no diplomatic solution by end of August 2025. Iran’s vice president dismissed US demands while stating readiness for negotiations “under equal conditions.”
6. **UN General Assembly Press Release** (Recent): References calls for “full and immediate implementation of the International Court of Justice measures, a permanent ceasefire, the release of all hostages.”
7. **Financial Express Bangladesh** (September 18, 2025): Reports that on September 18, the United States vetoed a UN Security Council proposal supported by 14 members for “unconditional and immediate ceasefire.”
8. **UN Commission Report** (September 16, 2025): UN Commission found that “Israel has committed genocide against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip,” adding significant legal and diplomatic pressure for ceasefire.
9. **Trump Administration Position** (September 2025): Multiple sources indicate President Trump has presented his own ceasefire proposal, with both Israel reportedly accepting and Hamas expressing willingness to negotiate, though specific terms remain unclear.
10. **Israeli Security Cabinet Position** (August 31, 2025): All Israeli defense officials argued in favor of “a limited hostage release deal” rather than continued military operations, suggesting internal pressure for ceasefire within Israeli security establishment.
## Current Ceasefire Status and Recent Developments
The evidence suggests significant diplomatic activity around ceasefire negotiations throughout September 2025, but **no ceasefire has been formally declared yet**. On September 7, President Trump announced that Israel had accepted his ceasefire proposal and called on Hamas to do the same[1]. Hamas responded positively, stating it was “ready to immediately sit at the negotiating table to discuss the release of all prisoners in exchange for a clear declaration to end the war, a total withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, and creation of a committee of independent Palestinians to run the Gaza Strip”[1].
However, major obstacles remain. The United States vetoed a UN Security Council ceasefire resolution on September 18, 2025, despite support from 14 other members[2][7]. The US representative stated that President Trump “will never accept” a ceasefire that would “leave Hamas in power and allow it to regroup”[2].
## Key Stakeholder Positions
**Israeli Position**: Netanyahu has not responded publicly to the Egyptian-Qatari ceasefire proposal from August 17, while his far-right political allies have pressured him to reject it[1]. However, Israeli defense officials unanimously argued for a “limited hostage release deal” on August 31, indicating internal pressure for negotiated settlement[1].
**Hamas Position**: Hamas accepted the 60-day Egyptian-Qatari ceasefire plan and expressed readiness for immediate negotiations following Trump’s September 7 statement[1].
**US Position**: The Trump administration appears to be pursuing its own ceasefire framework while rejecting proposals that would leave Hamas in control of Gaza[2]. The US vetoed the most recent UN ceasefire resolution on September 18[2][7].
## International Pressure and Legal Developments
The UN Commission’s September 16, 2025 finding that “Israel has committed genocide against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip” adds significant international legal pressure[2]. The ongoing humanitarian crisis, with nearly 65,000 Palestinians killed as of September 10, continues to drive international calls for immediate ceasefire[3].
With only 6 days remaining in September 2025, while negotiations appear active and both parties have expressed some willingness to engage with Trump’s proposal, the fundamental disagreements over Hamas’s role and the US veto of the UN resolution suggest a formal ceasefire declaration before month’s end remains uncertain. The window is rapidly closing for September implementation.
Grok response:
Below is a detailed rundown of the most relevant news and context for the question: “Will there be a ceasefire declared between Israel and Hamas in the month of September 2025?” As a research assistant, my role is to provide objective information from recent and authoritative sources without producing any forecasts. I have drawn from a variety of up-to-date web pages, news articles, and social media posts (where sentiment is noted but not treated as conclusive evidence) to compile this overview. The focus is on recent developments in negotiations, airstrikes, proposals, and expert opinions, prioritizing sources from September 2025. Key themes include ongoing U.S.-backed ceasefire proposals, recent escalations, and statements from mediators like Qatar, but no definitive resolution has been confirmed as of the latest available information on September 24, 2025.
To begin, here is a list of 10 citations, including their title, a brief description, date of publication, and a three-sentence summary of the relevant content. I prioritized the most recent sources, such as those from September 2025, and included a mix of news outlets, encyclopedic entries, and social media sentiment for broader context. Where possible, I incorporated details on negotiations, attacks, and expert views.
### List of 10 Citations:
1. **Title:** Israel-Hamas War – Ceasefire and hostage exchange (January–March 2025)
**Description:** An encyclopedic overview from Britannica on ceasefire negotiations and outcomes earlier in 2025.
**Date of Publication:** March 2, 2025.
**Three-Sentence Summary:** This source details a ceasefire agreement announced in January 2025 that included a hostage exchange, following months of mediation by Qatar and Egypt, but notes that subsequent talks in October 2024 collapsed. It highlights U.S. President Joe Biden’s efforts in May 2024 and a near-deal in July 2024, emphasizing the challenges in sustaining peace amid ongoing hostilities. While focused on earlier 2025 events, it provides historical context for current September negotiations, showing a pattern of temporary pauses that have not led to lasting resolutions.
2. **Title:** Gaza war
**Description:** A Wikipedia page summarizing the ongoing conflict, including recent military actions and ceasefire attempts.
**Date of Publication:** September 24, 2025 (last updated).
**Three-Sentence Summary:** The page outlines the escalation of the Gaza war, including a second ceasefire in January 2025 that ended abruptly with an Israeli attack in March, leading to a humanitarian crisis with famine confirmed by August 2025. It discusses Israel’s military campaigns, such as the Rafah offensive and strikes in Gaza City, and notes the failure of previous pauses in fighting. This context underscores the volatility in September 2025, with no new ceasefire confirmed but ongoing talks amid rising casualties.
3. **Title:** Israel-Hamas war | Breaking News & Live Updates
**Description:** A live news hub from the Associated Press providing real-time developments on the conflict.
**Date of Publication:** September 23, 2025.
**Three-Sentence Summary:** This hub reports on the latest escalations, including airstrikes and diplomatic efforts, with a focus on U.S.-backed proposals for a ceasefire in early September. It mentions the humanitarian impact, such as the rising death toll, and quotes international mediators urging both sides to negotiate. The updates indicate no breakthrough as of late September, with experts warning that continued military actions could derail any potential agreement.
4. **Title:** Israel launches airstrikes against top Hamas members in Qatar for Gaza ceasefire talks
**Description:** An article from The Guardian on Israeli military actions targeting Hamas leaders amid ceasefire discussions.
**Date of Publication:** September 9, 2025.
**Three-Sentence Summary:** The article describes an Israeli airstrike in Qatar that killed several Hamas members but missed senior leaders, potentially complicating U.S.-backed ceasefire negotiations. It includes U.S. officials’ criticism, stating the strike does not advance peace efforts, and highlights Hamas’s response that it would not deter talks. This event represents a recent setback in September, with experts from the U.S. State Department emphasizing the need for de-escalation to achieve any deal.
5. **Title:** Sept. 8: Qatar PM urges Hamas to accept latest US-backed ceasefire deal
**Description:** A live blog from The Times of Israel covering diplomatic pressures and military updates in the conflict.
**Date of Publication:** September 8, 2025.
**Three-Sentence Summary:** The blog reports Qatar’s prime minister urging Hamas to accept a new U.S.-backed ceasefire proposal that includes hostage releases and a pause in fighting, amid ongoing Israeli operations in Gaza. It details attacks outside Gaza City and statements from Israeli officials on the consequences of terrorism, reflecting heightened tensions. Expert opinions from mediators suggest a narrow window for agreement in September, but the blog notes no immediate acceptance from Hamas.
6. **Title:** Updates: Hamas ‘welcomes’ new ceasefire proposal
**Description:** A news update from Al Jazeera on Hamas’s response to ceasefire proposals and ongoing violence.
**Date of Publication:** September 7, 2025.
**Three-Sentence Summary:** The update states that Hamas has expressed openness to a ceasefire deal involving the release of all Israeli captives in exchange for a halt in Gaza operations, as proposed by the U.S. and mediators. It reports on simultaneous Israeli airstrikes in Gaza City, resulting in at least 17 deaths, which could undermine negotiations. Analysts from Al Jazeera cite this as a potential step toward resolution but warn that historical patterns of escalation make September outcomes uncertain.
7. **Title:** Israel-Gaza war timeline: From Hamas’ surprise attack in 2023 to Trump’s ceasefire proposal in 2025
**Description:** A timeline article from The Indian Express tracing the conflict’s history and recent proposals.
**Date of Publication:** July 2, 2025 (with updates noted through September).
**Three-Sentence Summary:** The timeline covers the escalation from October 2023 to a U.S.-proposed ceasefire in 2025, attributed to former President Trump’s influence, emphasizing the role of international mediation. It highlights repeated negotiation failures, such as the November 2023 pause, and notes increasing calls for a September deal amid humanitarian crises. Expert opinions from U.N. officials stress the urgency, pointing to data on civilian casualties as a key factor in potential resolutions.
8. **Title:** Posts found on X regarding recent ceasefire discussions
**Description:** Social media sentiment from various users on X (formerly Twitter) about ceasefire negotiations and attacks.
**Date of Publication:** September 10–23, 2025 (aggregated from multiple posts).
**Three-Sentence Summary:** These posts reflect mixed sentiment, with some users noting Hamas’s reported willingness to a deal and others criticizing escalations like airstrikes as obstacles. They include references to U.S. officials clarifying timelines for negotiations, suggesting a short window in September. As social media content, this is inconclusive but indicates public and expert frustration, with no verified outcomes.
9. **Title:** Live updates on the Israel-Palestine conflict
**Description:** Coverage from Middle East Eye on the war’s toll and diplomatic efforts.
**Date of Publication:** September 11, 2025.
**Three-Sentence Summary:** The updates report a Gaza death toll rising to 64,605 as of September 2025, with U.S. Vice President criticizing recent Israeli actions while noting potential “silver linings” in ongoing talks. It mentions U.K. MPs urging pressure on Israel for a ceasefire, reflecting international expert opinions on the humanitarian crisis. This source highlights the urgency of September negotiations but notes no confirmed agreement amid continued strikes.
10. **Title:** Israel War Room posts on ceasefire timelines
**Description:** Social media commentary from accounts focused on the conflict, discussing negotiation windows.
**Date of Publication:** September 16, 2025.
**Three-Sentence Summary:** These posts discuss U.S. officials stating that Hamas’s operational capacity is diminishing, creating a “short window” for a deal in September. They reference potential consequences of ongoing strikes, with experts warning of escalation risks. As user-generated content, this is not definitive but captures sentiment around expert predictions of a possible resolution if talks advance quickly.
### Rundown of Relevant Context:
Based on the citations above, recent developments in September 2025 show a mix of diplomatic progress and military escalations that could influence ceasefire prospects. Key updates include U.S.-backed proposals urged by Qatar and other mediators, with Hamas expressing openness as early as September 7, but Israeli airstrikes on September 9–10 targeting Hamas leaders have introduced significant setbacks, potentially derailing talks. For instance, sources like The Guardian and Al Jazeera highlight expert opinions from U.S. and U.N. officials, who emphasize the narrow window for agreement amid rising casualties—such as the Gaza death toll reaching 64,605 by September 11, per Middle East Eye—warning that continued violence could exacerbate the humanitarian crisis.
Historical data from earlier in 2025, such as the January ceasefire breakdown noted in Britannica and Wikipedia, underscores a pattern of temporary pauses followed by renewed conflict, with no clear indicators of a lasting resolution this month. While there are no specific statistics on approval ratings or polls for this event, sentiment from posts found on X suggests growing international pressure for a deal, though this is inconclusive. Overall, authoritative sources like AP News and The Times of Israel indicate movement toward potential negotiations but stress uncertainties, with no confirmed ceasefire as of September 24, 2025. This context provides a balanced view for informed forecasting, drawing from diverse perspectives without drawing conclusions.
Extracted resolution criteria links:
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Extracted resolution criteria links:
[]
GPT Binary response:
Gemini Binary response:
**Reasoning Rationale:**
To forecast whether a ceasefire will be declared between Israel and Hamas in September 2025, I have carefully evaluated the provided research, focusing on developments from September 2025, given that today is September 24, 2025, and the resolution date is October 1, 2025. This means the event must occur within the next six days (September 25-30, 2025).
1. **Short Timeframe:** The most significant factor influencing this forecast is the extremely limited time remaining in September. Reaching a formal ceasefire agreement between deeply entrenched parties like Israel and Hamas, and then publicly declaring it, typically requires extensive and often protracted negotiations. A six-day window presents a formidable challenge for such a complex diplomatic achievement.
2. **Recent Diplomatic Activity (Early September):** On September 7, President Trump stated that Israel had accepted his ceasefire proposal, and Hamas responded positively, expressing readiness to negotiate terms that included an end to the war, total Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, and an independent Palestinian committee to run Gaza. This initial signal of willingness to engage from both sides provided a degree of optimism. Qatar’s Prime Minister also urged Hamas to accept a US-backed deal on September 8.
3. **Recent Diplomatic Setbacks (Mid-September):** Crucially, on September 18, the United States vetoed a UN Security Council resolution calling for an “unconditional and immediate ceasefire”. The US explicitly stated that President Trump “will never accept” a ceasefire that would “leave Hamas in power and allow it to regroup”. This veto, occurring after the initial positive developments, strongly indicates that the US will only support a ceasefire under very specific conditions that address Hamas’s future role. These conditions are likely a major point of contention for Hamas and make a general, broadly accepted ceasefire declaration more difficult to achieve in the short term.
4. **Ongoing Hostilities and Previous Failures:** Israeli airstrikes continued in September, including one in Qatar targeting Hamas members on September 9, which US officials criticized for not advancing peace efforts. Furthermore, previous ceasefire talks “fell apart last month” (August 2025), and a ceasefire implemented in January 2025 broke down within months. This historical pattern underscores the fragility of such agreements and the persistent challenges in sustaining peace, making both sides potentially more cautious.
5. **Fundamental Disagreements:** The core demands of Israel (preventing Hamas from remaining in power) and Hamas (total Israeli withdrawal and independent Palestinian governance of Gaza) remain fundamentally opposed. Bridging these significant gaps to achieve a public declaration within six days, especially with the US’s firm stance, is a high bar. While Israeli defense officials reportedly argued for a “limited hostage release deal” on August 31, suggesting internal pressure for de-escalation, this does not equate to a comprehensive ceasefire declaration.
6. **High Bar for “Declared Ceasefire”:** The question asks for a “ceasefire declared,” implying a formal, public announcement acknowledged by both parties or a credible mediator. This is a higher threshold than ongoing negotiations or a temporary, unconfirmed pause in fighting.
**Assumptions and their potential impact:**
1. **Assumption:** The US position articulated in the September 18 veto is a firm and unyielding obstacle to a general ceasefire declaration within September.
* **Probability of failure/incorrectness (10%):** While the statement was strong, diplomatic positions can evolve rapidly, especially under intense pressure. A specific aspect of Trump’s deal might allow for a declaration that the US can interpret as meeting its conditions, or a very limited humanitarian ceasefire could be declared. If this assumption were significantly incorrect, the probability of a declaration would increase.
2. **Assumption:** The existing gaps between Israel’s and Hamas’s core demands are too wide to bridge within 6 days, precluding a formal declaration.
* **Probability of failure/incorrectness (15%):** A last-minute breakthrough, fueled by extreme international pressure, a significant concession from one side, or an unforeseen change in circumstances, is always a possibility in such volatile conflicts. If this assumption were incorrect, the probability would be higher.
Considering the confluence of a very short remaining timeframe, the recent hardening of the US position (as evidenced by the UN veto), persistent hostilities, and deep-seated disagreements between the parties, the probability of a formal ceasefire declaration occurring within the next six days remains low. While intense diplomatic efforts are undoubtedly ongoing, the barriers to a public announcement by September 30 are substantial.
Probability: 4%
The extracted probability is: 4%
________________________
Anthropic Binary response:
Looking at the available evidence about a potential Israel-Hamas ceasefire in September 2025, I need to analyze the current diplomatic situation with only 6 days remaining in the month.
## Current Situation Analysis
As of September 24, 2025, there has been significant diplomatic activity but **no ceasefire has been formally declared**. The most notable developments include:
1. **Trump’s September 7 Proposal**: President Trump announced Israel had accepted his ceasefire proposal, with Hamas responding positively and expressing readiness for immediate negotiations. However, this has not translated into a formal agreement.
2. **US Veto on September 18**: The United States vetoed a UN Security Council resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire, despite support from 14 other members. The US stated it would never accept a ceasefire leaving Hamas in power.
3. **Recent Military Actions**: Israeli airstrikes on September 9 targeted Hamas leaders in Qatar during negotiations, with experts noting this could derail talks. Ongoing military operations continue with significant casualties.
## Key Obstacles
Several fundamental disagreements remain unresolved:
– **Hamas’s Future Role**: The US and Israel oppose any arrangement leaving Hamas in control of Gaza
– **Israeli Internal Politics**: Netanyahu hasn’t publicly responded to Egyptian-Qatari proposals, with far-right coalition partners opposing deals
– **Trust Deficit**: The January 2025 ceasefire collapsed within weeks, creating skepticism about new agreements
## Time Constraint Analysis
With only 6 days remaining (September 24-30), the window for declaring a ceasefire is extremely narrow. Historical precedent shows that ceasefire negotiations typically require:
– Extended diplomatic shuttling between parties
– Resolution of technical details (prisoner exchanges, withdrawal timelines)
– Internal political consensus building
– Implementation mechanisms
## Critical Assumptions to Question
1. **Assumption: Trump’s proposal represents genuine progress (30% chance of being incorrect)**
– Despite positive rhetoric on September 7, no concrete steps have followed in 17 days
– The US veto on September 18 suggests fundamental disagreements persist
2. **Assumption: Hamas’s stated readiness translates to actual agreement (40% chance of being incorrect)**
– Hamas has conditions including total Israeli withdrawal and independent Palestinian control
– These conditions appear incompatible with US/Israeli positions
3. **Assumption: The current negotiation momentum will continue (35% chance of being incorrect)**
– The September 9 airstrikes and ongoing military operations suggest negotiations may already be stalled
– No public diplomatic meetings have been reported since mid-September
## Base Rate Considerations
Looking at the pattern throughout 2024-2025:
– Multiple negotiation rounds have failed (October 2024, post-January 2025 breakdown)
– When ceasefires have occurred, they required months of preparation
– The January 2025 ceasefire that did materialize took extensive mediation by Qatar and Egypt
## Probability Assessment for Different Timeframes
– **Remaining 6 days of September**: Very low probability given time constraints and unresolved issues
– **By October 31, 2025**: Moderate probability (~25%) if current diplomatic efforts continue
– **By December 31, 2025**: Higher probability (~40%) allowing time for negotiation cycles
Given the extremely short timeframe, the fundamental disagreements evident from the September 18 US veto, the lack of concrete progress since Trump’s September 7 announcement, and the historical pattern of protracted negotiations, the probability of a formal ceasefire declaration in the remaining 6 days of September 2025 is very low.
The combination of time constraints, unresolved fundamental disagreements about Hamas’s role, recent military escalations, and the US veto just 6 days ago strongly suggests that while negotiations may be ongoing, they will not culminate in a declared ceasefire before October 1, 2025.
Probability: 8%
The extracted probability is: 8%
GPT Binary response:
Reasoning and judgment
Summary of current state (as of 24 Sep 2025)
– There are active diplomatic efforts and at least one public U.S.-backed ceasefire proposal that Hamas has publicly said it is willing to discuss. Mediators (Qatar, Egypt, U.S. actors) have been engaged and publicly pressing both sides in September.
– There have also been recent hostile actions in September (Israeli strikes on Hamas-linked figures, a U.S. veto of a UN ceasefire resolution) that both signal diplomatic friction and may reduce international pressure for a quick declared deal.
– Netanyahu has not publicly accepted prior mediator proposals and faces strong domestic political constraints; parts of the Israeli security establishment reportedly favor a limited hostage-release/limited pause approach, but political alignment is unclear.
– Historical pattern (2023–2025): ceasefires between Israel and Hamas have tended to be fragile, negotiated over weeks/months, often tied to phased hostage-release and aid arrangements rather than instant, comprehensive, indefinite cessations. Rapid declarations within a few days of public signaling are possible but uncommon.
Key factors and how they push the probability
– Momentum factors increasing chance: (a) public statements from Hamas indicating willingness to sit down, (b) active mediator pressure and an already-circulating textual framework (U.S./Qatar/Egypt proposals), (c) humanitarian and international legal pressures that raise incentives for a pause. These make a short, conditional ceasefire possible.
– Obstacles reducing chance: (a) narrow remaining time window in September (only 6 days left); (b) Israeli political uncertainty and hard-line domestic opposition to any deal perceived as leaving Hamas intact; (c) recent strikes and the UNSC veto, which indicate diplomatic disagreement and possible retaliation; (d) logistical and trust barriers tied to hostage-release sequencing and verification.
Base-rate and time framing
– Base-rate: Historically, negotiated bilateral ceasefires with hostage exchanges have occurred but usually after several rounds of intensive mediation and concessions. Given the narrow window (remaining days in September) the base-rate for a mutually-declared ceasefire within this last week is much lower than for the next month.
– Timeframes I consider: (A) by Resolution Date (by 01 Oct 2025; i.e., in remaining days of Sep 25–30) — primary question; (B) by end of October 2025; (C) by end of 2025. I give separate probabilities below.
Scenario analysis (stylized)
– Best-case quick scenario (high mediator capacity + political cover for Netanyahu + Hamas discipline): parties agree to a short, limited ceasefire tied to phased hostage releases and aid flows — achievable within days. If that scenario fully materializes, a declared ceasefire in the last week is plausible.
– Middle-case (protracted talks): intense negotiations continue into October; limited or temporary pauses announced after Oct 1.
– Low-case (breakdown/escalation): strikes and political obstacles prevent a deal; talks stall and violence continues.
Key assumptions whose failure would drastically change the forecast
1) Assumption A — Hamas will translate public willingness into a concrete, verifiable acceptance of a specific proposal within days. Probability this assumption fails: 60%. If it fails, a declared ceasefire in the week is unlikely.
2) Assumption B — Israeli political leadership (Netanyahu/security cabinet) will authorize a formal ceasefire/partial pause compatible with mediator terms within days despite internal opposition. Probability this assumption fails: 70%. If it fails, talks may continue but no declared ceasefire will occur in the timeframe.
3) Assumption C — Mediators can prevent military actions that would derail talks (e.g., targeted strikes, retaliations) during the final negotiating days. Probability this assumption fails: 50%. If it fails, momentum collapses quickly.
Putting the pieces together (probability calculus, qualitative + quantitative)
– With both Hamas and Israel ready and mediators successfully managing the last-mile details, the chance of a declared ceasefire in this narrow window would be high (I’d judge ~75–85%). But the joint probability that both political constraints are overcome in the next ~6 days is low because (1) Israeli political consent is uncertain and (2) ongoing military actions can derail talks immediately.
– Weighting scenarios and the above assumption failure rates, and compensating for past overconfidence (I shrink extreme probabilities toward the center), I estimate the probability of a mutual/declared ceasefire between Israel and Hamas before 01 Oct 2025 at 18%. This reflects: some active diplomatic momentum (pulling probability up from single-digits) but strong, immediate obstacles and very limited time (pulling it down).
Additional timeline probabilities (for context)
– By 31 Oct 2025 (one more month for talks to continue, mediators to bridge gaps): I assign ~45% probability of some declared ceasefire/pause (short-term, likely conditional and possibly temporary).
– By 31 Dec 2025: I assign ~65% probability of some declared ceasefire/pause at some point in that interval (reflecting greater time for phased hostage/aid negotiations and mounting international pressure).
Confidence and uncertainty
– My confidence is moderate-to-low. The biggest uncertainties are opaque private negotiations, sudden changes in Israeli domestic politics, and the risk that military actions break negotiations at short notice. I purposely avoided extreme confidence and gave sizable probability mass to both “deal within days” and “no deal, but deal later” outcomes.
Final answer
Probability: 18%
The extracted probability is: 18%
GPT Binary response:
Reasoning and evidence summary
Short answer first: There is active diplomacy and a public exchange of proposals in September 2025, but as of today (2025‑09‑24) no formal ceasefire has been declared. Given the very small amount of time left in the month, the mixed signals from the parties, and recent events that both advanced and undermined talks, I judge a low but non‑negligible chance that a ceasefire will be declared before 2025‑09‑30.
Why I give a low probability (key points and weights)
– Time remaining: Only 6–7 calendar days remain. Fast turnarounds do happen, but short time horizons strongly favor the status quo. (High weight)
– Public positions:
– Hamas has publicly signaled willingness to negotiate and responded positively to at least one proposal in early September. (Moderate weight)
– Israel’s government position is inconsistent: some security officials reportedly favor limited deals, but Netanyahu and his coalition include factions opposed to a ceasefire that leaves Hamas any kind of governing role. Reported Israeli strikes during September (including strikes that hit Hamas figures abroad) have also risked derailing trust. (High weight)
– The United States publicly blocked a UN Security Council ceasefire resolution (mid‑September veto), signaling that any ceasefire the U.S. deems unacceptable (e.g., one that leaves Hamas in control without constraints) will not get multilateral backing; nonetheless the U.S. is also reported to be sponsoring its own framework. (High weight)
– Recent events in September are mixed: mediators and one side (Hamas) have sounded open, while military actions and political constraints (Israeli domestic politics; US red lines) have repeatedly undermined prior pauses. (High weight)
– Historical base rate: Israel–Hamas ceasefires often occur as short, negotiated pauses (hostage exchanges/limited pauses) rather than durable settlements. That historical pattern raises the chance of some kind of short, negotiated pause but does not make a last‑minute formal, broad ceasefire likely—especially with internal veto points and last‑minute escalations. (Moderate weight)
– Source reliability & recency: I give most weight to reporting dated September 2025 (statements from Hamas, Israeli government/defense officials, and diplomatic moves in the first three weeks of September). The most important recent signals—public claims that Israel accepted a U.S. (or U.S.-backed) proposal, and Hamas saying it was ready to negotiate—are positive for a deal, but they are unilateral/partial signals that have failed to produce a formal declaration so far. (High weight)
Scenario decomposition (rough, qualitative)
– Fast negotiated deal scenario (ceasefire declared in last week of Sept): requires both sides (and key backers) to accept common text and rapid implementation (possibly tied to hostage releases). This is feasible but needs coordination and a pause in damaging strikes during final talks. Probability: small.
– Limited humanitarian pause/hostage‑exchange scenario: a short, time‑limited pause to allow exchanges or aid could be concluded quickly if both sides accept narrower terms. This is more likely than a broad permanent ceasefire but still not guaranteed. Probability: modest.
– Talks collapse/no deal scenario: continued strikes, political opposition within Israel, or last‑minute breakdowns make no ceasefire before end‑of‑September the default. Probability: highest.
Three assumptions that most affect the forecast (and chance each assumption fails)
1) Assumption: Israel’s leadership will accept a mediated ceasefire framework in late September if the text meets stated security/hostage conditions. Probability this assumption fails: 65%. Rationale: Netanyahu’s coalition includes hardliners; public acceptance has been ambiguous; previous offers were left unanswered. If this assumption fails, a deal is unlikely this week.
2) Assumption: Hamas will not be derailed by military setbacks or internal pressure and will keep its publicly stated openness to negotiate. Probability this assumption fails: 40%. Rationale: Hamas has shown willingness in public statements, but battlefield shocks or political splits could change that.
3) Assumption: Mediators (Egypt, Qatar, US or others) can finalize details and secure implementation arrangements in under a week. Probability this assumption fails: 50%. Rationale: terms and verification (withdrawal, force posture, hostage sequencing) are complex; international disagreements (e.g., US veto at the UNSC) complicate multilateral acceptance.
Combined intuition: Because at least one of these failure modes is likely, the chance of a formal ceasefire declaration in the next few days is substantially below 50%. But the presence of active diplomacy and public willingness from one or both sides keeps the probability above a very small number.
Probability for adjacent timeframes (for context)
– By 2025‑10‑31 (end of October): my estimate rises because mediators would have more time to bridge gaps — approx. 40% chance of a declared ceasefire (time allows more negotiation, pressure, and possible interim pauses).
– By 2025‑12‑31 (end of 2025): chance increases further as pressure, legal/diplomatic moves, and battlefield dynamics accumulate — roughly 60% chance a ceasefire of some sort is declared before year’s end (this includes short‑term deals as well as broader pauses).
Calibration / uncertainty
– I’m deliberately conservative because I’ve historically been overconfident; short horizons favor the default (no change). I rate my uncertainty as moderately high: there is plausible upside for a last‑minute deal (public statements, mediator activity) but also multiple strong derailers (military strikes, domestic politics, multilateral fractures).
Final single numeric forecast (event occurs between now and 2025‑09‑30 inclusive)
Probability: 22%
The extracted probability is: 22%
All predictions: [4, 8, 18, 22]
Filtered predictions: [8, 18]
Median reasoning:
Reasoning and judgment
Summary of current state (as of 24 Sep 2025)
– There are active diplomatic efforts and at least one public U.S.-backed ceasefire proposal that Hamas has publicly said it is willing to discuss. Mediators (Qatar, Egypt, U.S. actors) have been engaged and publicly pressing both sides in September.
– There have also been recent hostile actions in September (Israeli strikes on Hamas-linked figures, a U.S. veto of a UN ceasefire resolution) that both signal diplomatic friction and may reduce international pressure for a quick declared deal.
– Netanyahu has not publicly accepted prior mediator proposals and faces strong domestic political constraints; parts of the Israeli security establishment reportedly favor a limited hostage-release/limited pause approach, but political alignment is unclear.
– Historical pattern (2023–2025): ceasefires between Israel and Hamas have tended to be fragile, negotiated over weeks/months, often tied to phased hostage-release and aid arrangements rather than instant, comprehensive, indefinite cessations. Rapid declarations within a few days of public signaling are possible but uncommon.
Key factors and how they push the probability
– Momentum factors increasing chance: (a) public statements from Hamas indicating willingness to sit down, (b) active mediator pressure and an already-circulating textual framework (U.S./Qatar/Egypt proposals), (c) humanitarian and international legal pressures that raise incentives for a pause. These make a short, conditional ceasefire possible.
– Obstacles reducing chance: (a) narrow remaining time window in September (only 6 days left); (b) Israeli political uncertainty and hard-line domestic opposition to any deal perceived as leaving Hamas intact; (c) recent strikes and the UNSC veto, which indicate diplomatic disagreement and possible retaliation; (d) logistical and trust barriers tied to hostage-release sequencing and verification.
Base-rate and time framing
– Base-rate: Historically, negotiated bilateral ceasefires with hostage exchanges have occurred but usually after several rounds of intensive mediation and concessions. Given the narrow window (remaining days in September) the base-rate for a mutually-declared ceasefire within this last week is much lower than for the next month.
– Timeframes I consider: (A) by Resolution Date (by 01 Oct 2025; i.e., in remaining days of Sep 25–30) — primary question; (B) by end of October 2025; (C) by end of 2025. I give separate probabilities below.
Scenario analysis (stylized)
– Best-case quick scenario (high mediator capacity + political cover for Netanyahu + Hamas discipline): parties agree to a short, limited ceasefire tied to phased hostage releases and aid flows — achievable within days. If that scenario fully materializes, a declared ceasefire in the last week is plausible.
– Middle-case (protracted talks): intense negotiations continue into October; limited or temporary pauses announced after Oct 1.
– Low-case (breakdown/escalation): strikes and political obstacles prevent a deal; talks stall and violence continues.
Key assumptions whose failure would drastically change the forecast
1) Assumption A — Hamas will translate public willingness into a concrete, verifiable acceptance of a specific proposal within days. Probability this assumption fails: 60%. If it fails, a declared ceasefire in the week is unlikely.
2) Assumption B — Israeli political leadership (Netanyahu/security cabinet) will authorize a formal ceasefire/partial pause compatible with mediator terms within days despite internal opposition. Probability this assumption fails: 70%. If it fails, talks may continue but no declared ceasefire will occur in the timeframe.
3) Assumption C — Mediators can prevent military actions that would derail talks (e.g., targeted strikes, retaliations) during the final negotiating days. Probability this assumption fails: 50%. If it fails, momentum collapses quickly.
Putting the pieces together (probability calculus, qualitative + quantitative)
– With both Hamas and Israel ready and mediators successfully managing the last-mile details, the chance of a declared ceasefire in this narrow window would be high (I’d judge ~75–85%). But the joint probability that both political constraints are overcome in the next ~6 days is low because (1) Israeli political consent is uncertain and (2) ongoing military actions can derail talks immediately.
– Weighting scenarios and the above assumption failure rates, and compensating for past overconfidence (I shrink extreme probabilities toward the center), I estimate the probability of a mutual/declared ceasefire between Israel and Hamas before 01 Oct 2025 at 18%. This reflects: some active diplomatic momentum (pulling probability up from single-digits) but strong, immediate obstacles and very limited time (pulling it down).
Additional timeline probabilities (for context)
– By 31 Oct 2025 (one more month for talks to continue, mediators to bridge gaps): I assign ~45% probability of some declared ceasefire/pause (short-term, likely conditional and possibly temporary).
– By 31 Dec 2025: I assign ~65% probability of some declared ceasefire/pause at some point in that interval (reflecting greater time for phased hostage/aid negotiations and mounting international pressure).
Confidence and uncertainty
– My confidence is moderate-to-low. The biggest uncertainties are opaque private negotiations, sudden changes in Israeli domestic politics, and the risk that military actions break negotiations at short notice. I purposely avoided extreme confidence and gave sizable probability mass to both “deal within days” and “no deal, but deal later” outcomes.
Final answer
Probability: 18%
=== Forecast Result ===
{
“probability_yes”: 0.13,
“probability_yes_per_category”: null,
“continuous_cdf”: null
}
=== Reasoning ===
Reasoning and judgment
Summary of current state (as of 24 Sep 2025)
– There are active diplomatic efforts and at least one public U.S.-backed ceasefire proposal that Hamas has publicly said it is willing to discuss. Mediators (Qatar, Egypt, U.S. actors) have been engaged and publicly pressing both sides in September.
– There have also been recent hostile actions in September (Israeli strikes on Hamas-linked figures, a U.S. veto of a UN ceasefire resolution) that both signal diplomatic friction and may reduce international pressure for a quick declared deal.
– Netanyahu has not publicly accepted prior mediator proposals and faces strong domestic political constraints; parts of the Israeli security establishment reportedly favor a limited hostage-release/limited pause approach, but political alignment is unclear.
– Historical pattern (2023–2025): ceasefires between Israel and Hamas have tended to be fragile, negotiated over weeks/months, often tied to phased hostage-release and aid arrangements rather than instant, comprehensive, indefinite cessations. Rapid declarations within a few days of public signaling are possible but uncommon.
Key factors and how they push the probability
– Momentum factors increasing chance: (a) public statements from Hamas indicating willingness to sit down, (b) active mediator pressure and an already-circulating textual framework (U.S./Qatar/Egypt proposals), (c) humanitarian and international legal pressures that raise incentives for a pause. These make a short, conditional ceasefire possible.
– Obstacles reducing chance: (a) narrow remaining time window in September (only 6 days left); (b) Israeli political uncertainty and hard-line domestic opposition to any deal perceived as leaving Hamas intact; (c) recent strikes and the UNSC veto, which indicate diplomatic disagreement and possible retaliation; (d) logistical and trust barriers tied to hostage-release sequencing and verification.
Base-rate and time framing
– Base-rate: Historically, negotiated bilateral ceasefires with hostage exchanges have occurred but usually after several rounds of intensive mediation and concessions. Given the narrow window (remaining days in September) the base-rate for a mutually-declared ceasefire within this last week is much lower than for the next month.
– Timeframes I consider: (A) by Resolution Date (by 01 Oct 2025; i.e., in remaining days of Sep 25–30) — primary question; (B) by end of October 2025; (C) by end of 2025. I give separate probabilities below.
Scenario analysis (stylized)
– Best-case quick scenario (high mediator capacity + political cover for Netanyahu + Hamas discipline): parties agree to a short, limited ceasefire tied to phased hostage releases and aid flows — achievable within days. If that scenario fully materializes, a declared ceasefire in the last week is plausible.
– Middle-case (protracted talks): intense negotiations continue into October; limited or temporary pauses announced after Oct 1.
– Low-case (breakdown/escalation): strikes and political obstacles prevent a deal; talks stall and violence continues.
Key assumptions whose failure would drastically change the forecast
1) Assumption A — Hamas will translate public willingness into a concrete, verifiable acceptance of a specific proposal within days. Probability this assumption fails: 60%. If it fails, a declared ceasefire in the week is unlikely.
2) Assumption B — Israeli political leadership (Netanyahu/security cabinet) will authorize a formal ceasefire/partial pause compatible with mediator terms within days despite internal opposition. Probability this assumption fails: 70%. If it fails, talks may continue but no declared ceasefire will occur in the timeframe.
3) Assumption C — Mediators can prevent military actions that would derail talks (e.g., targeted strikes, retaliations) during the final negotiating days. Probability this assumption fails: 50%. If it fails, momentum collapses quickly.

Putting the pieces together (probability calculus, qualitative + quantitative)
– With both Hamas and Israel ready and mediators successfully managing the last-mile details, the chance of a declared ceasefire in this narrow window would be high (I’d judge ~75–85%). But the joint probability that both political constraints are overcome in the next ~6 days is low because (1) Israeli political consent is uncertain and (2) ongoing military actions can derail talks immediately.
– Weighting scenarios and the above assumption failure rates, and compensating for past overconfidence (I shrink extreme probabilities toward the center), I estimate the probability of a mutual/declared ceasefire between Israel and Hamas before 01 Oct 2025 at 18%. This reflects: some active diplomatic momentum (pulling probability up from single-digits) but strong, immediate obstacles and very limited time (pulling it down).

Additional timeline probabilities (for context)
– By 31 Oct 2025 (one more month for talks to continue, mediators to bridge gaps): I assign ~45% probability of some declared ceasefire/pause (short-term, likely conditional and possibly temporary).
– By 31 Dec 2025: I assign ~65% probability of some declared ceasefire/pause at some point in that interval (reflecting greater time for phased hostage/aid negotiations and mounting international pressure).

Confidence and uncertainty
– My confidence is moderate-to-low. The biggest uncertainties are opaque private negotiations, sudden changes in Israeli domestic politics, and the risk that military actions break negotiations at short notice. I purposely avoided extreme confidence and gave sizable probability mass to both “deal within days” and “no deal, but deal later” outcomes.

Final answer
Probability: 18%