Sudan updates from Botmaster Phil Godzin of April 23, 2025

How many conflict deaths will there be in Sudan in 2025?

Phil’s pgodzinai, a multi-GenAI bot, is a side competitor with the machine forecasting bots of the VIEWS competition.

Here’s what Phil’s pgodzinai predicts today:
* Less than 1000: 2%
* Between 1000 and 3000: 5%
* Between 3000 and 5000: 8%
* Between 5000 and 8000: 15%
* Between 8000 and 12000: 25%
* More than 12000: 45%

Model’s Answer: # Analysis of Conflict Deaths in Sudan for 2025
## Baseline Context and Recent Developments
The Sudan conflict, which began in April 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has created one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. As we assess likely conflict deaths for 2025, we need to consider both direct combat deaths and indirect deaths from starvation, disease, and lack of healthcare.

Recent data from April 2025 indicates several alarming developments:
1. **Intensifying violence**: Multiple sources confirm over 400 deaths in attacks on Zamzam camp in April 2025, plus another 30+ civilians killed in El Fasher artillery strikes. These are just single incidents in a short timeframe, suggesting a high ongoing death rate.
2. **Humanitarian collapse**: With 25 million facing starvation, 30 million requiring aid, and famine declared in 10 regions, indirect deaths will likely constitute a significant portion of the total mortality.
3. **Scale of displacement**: Reports indicate 12-15 million people displaced (with figures ranging from 8.6 to 13 million depending on the source), including 3.3 million recently from El Fasher alone.

## Historical Precedents and Trends

The previous annual death toll was reported at approximately 150,000 for the 2023-2024 period. This averages to about 12,500 deaths per month across the conflict. While we shouldn’t simply extrapolate this forward, it provides an important benchmark.

The RSF appears to be regrouping in Darfur after losing ground elsewhere, leading to intensified attacks on civilian populations. The siege of El Fasher and systematic targeting of displacement camps indicates the conflict is not abating but potentially escalating in certain regions.

## Time Horizon and Probability Assessment
We’re forecasting for the entire year of 2025, but today’s date is April 23, 2025, meaning we’re already nearly 4 months into the year. We must account for deaths that have already occurred plus projected deaths for the remaining 8+ months.

Given the reported 400+ deaths in Zamzam, 30+ in El Fasher, and 57 in earlier clashes just within recent weeks, direct conflict deaths are likely already in the thousands for 2025. When including indirect deaths from famine (which has been officially declared), disease outbreaks, and healthcare collapse, the cumulative toll is almost certainly higher.

The UN warning of 825,000 children in “hell-like” conditions and famine mortality rates of 1-2 per 10,000 per day in Darfur suggests the indirect death toll could be substantial, potentially exceeding direct combat deaths.

## Variance Factors and Uncertainty
Several factors could alter the trajectory:
1. **International intervention**: Though unlikely given the current geopolitical climate, significant international humanitarian aid could reduce indirect deaths.
2. **Peace negotiations**: No promising developments have been reported, making a sudden resolution improbable.
3. **Seasonal factors**: The rainy season (typically June-September) could impede military operations but might worsen humanitarian conditions and disease spread.
4. **Conflict dynamics**: RSF’s continued offensive operations suggest sustained or increasing violence rather than de-escalation.

## Integrating Various Source Information
The research assistants provide slightly different figures but paint a consistent picture of escalating violence and humanitarian disaster. The first assistant emphasizes recent direct combat deaths (400+ in Zamzam, 30+ in El Fasher), the second provides detailed humanitarian statistics (24.6 million facing acute hunger, famine in 10 areas), and the third offers broader context on international responses and conflict dynamics.

All sources indicate that 2025 is seeing continued high-intensity conflict with significant civilian targeting. The humanitarian crisis is described consistently as catastrophic, with limited aid access.

## Final Forecast Rationale
Given that:
1. We’re already ~4 months into 2025 with multiple documented mass casualty events
2. The baseline from 2023-2024 was ~12,500 deaths per month
3. Famine has been officially declared in multiple regions
4. Healthcare systems have collapsed (80% of hospitals non-functional)
5. There are no indications of de-escalation

It appears highly improbable that conflict deaths would be less than 5,000 for the full year. Even if violence decreased substantially from current levels, the deaths that have already occurred plus the ongoing indirect deaths from famine and disease would likely exceed this threshold.

The upper ranges (8,000-12,000 and more than 12,000) appear most likely given the intensity of recent violence and the scale of the humanitarian disaster. If the previous year saw 150,000 deaths and current reporting suggests similar or increased intensity, it’s reasonable to expect 2025’s total to be in these upper ranges

However, I must account for uncertainty in reporting and potential changes in conflict dynamics. While unlikely, international pressure or exhaustion of combatants could lead to reduced violence in later months.

* Less than 1000: 2%
* Between 1000 and 3000: 5%
* Between 3000 and 5000: 8%
* Between 5000 and 8000: 15%
* Between 8000 and 12000: 25%
* More than 12000: 45%

Details on how Phil’s pgodzinai arrived at the above forecasts –>

Past forecasts by both Phil and Jeremy on Sudan’s conflict fatalities —>

Background on VIEWS: Near the end of 2024, the latest forecasting competition of the Violence and Impacts Early-Warning System (VIEWS) was launched. On Dec. 4, 2024, during a telecon, a group of machine forecasting experts involved in VIEWS observed Jeremy’s demonstration of his Multi-AI Oracle. Although it was too late for Jeremy to sign up as a VIEWS competitor, they urged him to run a side competition for everyone’s benefit. Jeremy chose their Sudan conflict deaths question.

Below, map of control in Sudan’s civil war as of April 15, 2025.

Below, before and after pictures of the devastation of the civil war in Sudan.


Carolyn has checked Sudan’s news sites below to ensure that they are still in operation. However, given the widespread violence in Sudan, any of these could go offline without warning.

https://www.alnilin.com/
https://www.alrakoba.net/
https://www.altaghyeer.info/ar/
https://www.altaghyeer.info/en/
https://www.alttahrer.com/
https://www.alzaeemsd.com/
https://www.assayha.net
https://www.cover-sd.com/
https://kushnews.net/
https://rakobanews.com
https://www.sudanakhbar.com/
https://sudanjem.com/
https://suna-sd.net/en
https://sudantimes.net/
https://www.sudantribune.net/
https://www.sudantribune.com/
https://sudaneseonline.com/
https://www.sudanile.com/
https://sudanow-magazine.net/
https://www.sudaress.com/
https://www.tagpress.net/

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