How many state-based conflict deaths in Sudan will be reported by ACLED in 2025?
Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai predicts today:
Less than 1,000: 0%
Between 1,000 and 3,000: 0%
Between 3,000 and 5,000: 0%
Between 5,000 and 8,000: 0%
Between 8,000 and 12,000: 67%
More than 12,000: 33%
11–14 minutes read (Full version of pgodzinai here —>)
Perplexity response:
[1] **ACLED Regional Overview Africa: November 2025** (Published: November 10, 2025)
This monthly report documents RSF attacks following their capture of El Fasher and Bara in Sudan, with specific mention of state-based conflict patterns. It records 1,842 state-based conflict fatalities in Sudan during October 2025 alone, representing a 37% increase from September. The report notes intensified SAF-RSF battles around remaining government strongholds before the fall of El Fasher on October 27-28.
[2] **El Fasher Massacre Documentation** (Published: November 5, 2025)
Wikipedia’s entry details the RSF’s capture of El Fasher (Darfur’s last SAF stronghold) on October 27-28, 2025, with an estimated 2,500+ civilians killed during subsequent “combing operations.” While many civilian deaths would be classified as one-sided violence, ACLED separately documents 847 combatant deaths during the battle for the city between October 1-27, which qualifies as state-based conflict. Approximately 260,000 civilians remained trapped in the city during the siege.
[3] **Telegraph: “Sudanese Militia Commits Fresh Atrocities”** (Published: November 8, 2025)
This report details RSF operations across multiple regions following the El Fasher capture, including eastern Sudan. It references ACLED data showing 1,200 state-based conflict deaths recorded between October 1-31, 2025, primarily from SAF-RSF engagements. The article notes these figures represent only verified incidents, with many remote areas inaccessible to monitors.
Grok response:
1. **Title:** Civil War in Sudan | Global Conflict Tracker
**Description:** A CFR overview of the ongoing power struggle in Sudan, including estimates of casualties and humanitarian impact.
**Date of Publication:** 2025-11-06
**3-Sentence Summary:** This report from the Council on Foreign Relations details the third year of Sudan’s civil war, noting that death toll estimates from state-based conflicts have surpassed 9,000 for 2025 based on preliminary ACLED data, with a significant increase in incidents involving the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces. It highlights expert warnings from CFR analysts about potential escalation due to regional alliances, predicting that without intervention, deaths could approach or exceed 12,000 by year-end. The analysis also references historical volatility, comparing it to 2024’s 6,000 deaths, and emphasizes the need for updated ACLED monitoring.
2. **Title:** Sudan War: A Simple Guide to What Is Happening
**Description:** A BBC news article providing an overview of the conflict, including key events and casualty figures.
**Date of Publication:** 2025-11-13
**3-Sentence Summary:** The BBC article outlines the escalation of violence in Sudan since 2023, reporting that ACLED data shows over 9,500 state-based conflict deaths in 2025 so far, with a sharp rise in the last quarter due to urban battles in Khartoum. It includes expert opinions from UN officials who warn of an R0-like spread of violence, potentially leading to totals between 8,000 and 12,000 if unchecked. The piece also notes seasonal patterns, with deaths peaking in November, and compares this to lower figures in early 2025.
3. **Title:** ACLED Conflict Watchlist 2025: Sudan
**Description:** ACLED’s official watchlist page providing real-time data on state-based violence in Sudan.
**Date of Publication:** 2025-11-01 (latest update as accessed today)
**3-Sentence Summary:** This ACLED resource tracks 2025 state-based conflict deaths in Sudan at around 9,500 as of November, with detailed breakdowns showing spikes in October due to inter-factional fighting. It offers expert analysis from ACLED researchers on the volatility of conflict zones, indicating that without de-escalation, the final count could surpass 12,000. The page includes historical comparisons, noting that 2024 ended with 6,000 deaths and highlighting seasonal patterns with higher incidents in the latter half of the year.
4. **Title:** World Bank Sudan Crisis Brief: Economic and Humanitarian Impacts in 2025
**Description:** A World Bank brief on the economic fallout of the conflict, including indirect mortality estimates.
**Date of Publication:** 2025-11-02
**3-Sentence Summary:** The brief cites ACLED figures of approximately 9,000 state-based deaths in Sudan for 2025, with World Bank economists predicting sustained high levels due to economic instability. It includes expert opinions on how resource scarcity is fueling violence, potentially resulting in over 12,000 deaths by year-end. The document offers historical data, showing cyclical patterns with peaks in Q4, compared to 2024’s lower baseline.
Extracted resolution criteria links:
[‘https://acleddata.com/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/‘, ‘https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2025/sudan/‘
Claude Vision analysis response:
## Current Data (as of November 14, 2025):
**Year-to-date fatalities in 2025**: The page shows **9,872 reported fatalities** so far in 2025 (through approximately mid-November).
## Historical Context:
**2024 Data**:
– Total reported fatalities in 2024: **24,850**
– This represents a significant escalation from previous years
**Conflict Trends**:
The bar chart shows a dramatic escalation pattern:
– 2023 saw a major spike in fatalities compared to earlier years
– 2024 continued this high level of violence with approximately 24,850 deaths
– 2025 (partial year through mid-November) has already recorded 9,872 deaths
## Current Conflict Intensity:
Based on the visual data, Sudan is experiencing high-intensity conflict with:
– Rapidly increasing fatality rates based on the steep upward trajectory of the blue line
– Widespread geographic distribution of violent events
– No indication of de-escalation in the most recent data shown
The fatality trend line suggests the conflict has intensified significantly and continues on an upward trajectory as of the most recent data points displayed.
Anthropic response:
The most authoritative source is the ACLED dashboard screenshot, which shows 9,872 reported fatalities as of November 14, 2025. This represents actual ACLED data through mid-November, giving us approximately 10.5 months of data. The social media research corroborates this with reports of “approximately 9,500” deaths as of November, though the exact dashboard figure of 9,872 should take precedence.
For projection purposes, the current monthly average is approximately 940 deaths (9,872 divided by 10.5 months). With 1.5 months remaining, a simple linear projection would add about 1,410 deaths, bringing the total to approximately 11,282. However, several factors complicate this projection:
Accounting for data verification lags, the acceleration pattern visible in recent months, ongoing major military operations, but also the possibility of seasonal moderation in December and the limited time remaining, I believe the most likely outcome is the total remaining between 8,000 and 12,000, with meaningful probability of exceeding 12,000 given current trends.
Less than 1,000: 0%
Between 1,000 and 3,000: 0%
Between 3,000 and 5,000: 0%
Between 5,000 and 8,000: 0%
Between 8,000 and 12,000: 67%
More than 12,000: 33%
GPT Multiple Choice JSON response:
ACLED is the resolution-source and their dashboard and monthly reports are the authoritative data stream for this question. As of the most recent ACLED snapshots and regional summaries available on/around 2025-11-14, ACLED’s verified year‑to‑date (YTD) count of state‑based conflict fatalities in Sudan is roughly 9.8–9.9 thousand. ACLED’s methodology distinguishes “state‑based” fatalities (battles between a state and an organized armed actor) from one‑sided violence against civilians; the dashboard and monthlies explicitly report the state‑based totals separately from violence‑against‑civilians totals. The dashboard trajectory shows a steep uptick beginning mid‑year and a very large October contribution (the fall of El Fasher and related battles), which explains why the YTD total is already high with only ~1.5 months left in the year.
Projecting to 2025‑12‑31 from the current date (2025‑11‑14) requires estimating likely additional fatalities in the remaining ~47 days. Using simple extrapolation: with ~9.87k YTD through ~10.5 months, the average rate over the year so far is ≈940 state‑based fatalities/month. If that average continues for the remaining ~1.5 months we would see roughly +1.4k more fatalities → a year‑end total near ≈11.3k. That arithmetic places the most likely final bin squarely in “Between 8,000 and 12,000.” The October spike demonstrates that short, large surges are possible, but surges big enough in late November–December to push the total above 12k require a sustained rate materially above the October level (or another October‑scale single event), which is plausible but less likely than continuation of current trends.
Final judgment
Base arithmetic projection (carry current average forward) → ~11.3k; qualitative assessment of volatility → still most likely in 8k–12k, but with a credible (but smaller) chance of exceeding 12k if another big wave of fighting is recorded before year‑end.
Less than 1,000: 0%
Between 1,000 and 3,000: 0%
Between 3,000 and 5,000: 0%
Between 5,000 and 8,000: 0%
Between 8,000 and 12,000: 85%
More than 12,000: 15%
Model’s Answer:
Looking at the available data, I need to carefully analyze ACLED’s reported state-based conflict deaths in Sudan for 2025, with only about 6.5 weeks remaining in the year.
The most authoritative source is the ACLED dashboard screenshot, which shows 9,872 reported fatalities as of November 14, 2025. This represents actual ACLED data through mid-November, giving us approximately 10.5 months of data. The social media research corroborates this with reports of “approximately 9,500” deaths as of November, though the exact dashboard figure of 9,872 should take precedence.
For projection purposes, the current monthly average is approximately 940 deaths (9,872 divided by 10.5 months). With 1.5 months remaining, a simple linear projection would add about 1,410 deaths, bringing the total to approximately 11,282. However, several factors complicate this projection:
First, the trend analysis shows an accelerating pattern rather than a linear one. The dashboard’s line chart displays a steep upward trajectory in recent months, with no signs of plateauing. The research indicates October alone contributed significantly to the total, with reports of major battles around El Fasher resulting in substantial casualties. This acceleration pattern suggests the final weeks could see higher-than-average death rates.
Second, seasonal patterns matter. Historical ACLED data shows conflict intensity typically remains high through November before potentially moderating in December-January. We’re currently in the peak conflict season, which could maintain elevated death rates through much of the remaining period.
Third, the conflict dynamics appear to be worsening. Multiple sources cite the fall of El Fasher (Darfur’s last government stronghold) in late October as a major escalation, with ongoing “combing operations” and expanded RSF control potentially sustaining high casualty rates. The displacement of 445,000 people in 2025 alone indicates sustained, widespread violence.
Critical assumptions that could affect my forecast:
1. **Data completeness assumption (25% chance of significant incompleteness)**: The 9,872 figure assumes ACLED has captured and verified most deaths through mid-November. However, ACLED typically has a verification lag, and remote areas may be underreported. If significant unreported deaths exist from recent weeks, the actual total could be substantially higher.
2. **Trend continuation assumption (30% chance of major deviation)**: I’m assuming the conflict intensity will remain relatively stable or slightly decrease through December. However, a major escalation (like battles for remaining government strongholds) could dramatically increase deaths, while a ceasefire or seasonal lull could significantly reduce them.
3. **Methodological consistency assumption (15% chance of classification changes)**: I’m assuming ACLED maintains consistent classification of state-based versus other violence. Any retrospective reclassification or inclusion of previously unverified incidents could alter the final count.
Accounting for data verification lags, the acceleration pattern visible in recent months, ongoing major military operations, but also the possibility of seasonal moderation in December and the limited time remaining, I believe the most likely outcome is the total remaining between 8,000 and 12,000, with meaningful probability of exceeding 12,000 given current trends.
Less than 1,000: 0%
Between 1,000 and 3,000: 0%
Between 3,000 and 5,000: 0%
Between 5,000 and 8,000: 0%
Between 8,000 and 12,000: 67%
More than 12,000: 33%
Past forecasts by Phil’s and Jeremy ’s bots —>
Below, a forecast of state-based conflict fatalities for Sudan in the VIEWS machine forecasting competition, which is an aggregate of the forecasts of twenty competitors. Our botmasters, Phil Godzin and Jeremy Lichtman, are conducting a side experiment with VIEWS.
Below: Source: https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2025/9/30/war-in-sudan-humanitarian-fighting-control-developments-september-2025
