Botmaster Phil Godzin’s Sudan conflict deaths forecast details, May 23, 2025

How many state-based conflict deaths will be reported by ACLED in 2025?

Full details from what Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai predicts today:
Less than 1000: 2%
Between 1000 and 3000: 5%
Between 3000 and 5000: 12%
Between 5000 and 8000: 28%
Between 8000 and 12000: 40%
More than 12000: 13%

Perplexity response:
{think}
Alright, let’s tackle this query step by step. The user is asking how many state-based conflict deaths ACLED will report in Sudan in 2025, with specific options. First, I need to check the provided search results for any mention of ACLED data or statistics related to Sudan in 2025.
Looking through the sources:
1. The first source from May 16, 2025, compares crime in South Africa to conflict zones, mentioning ACLED data from 2017 and Oxfam’s 2024 stats for Afghanistan and Syria. No direct info on Sudan here.
2. The second source from May 23, 2025, discusses Ethiopia, focusing on humanitarian updates, education, and health initiatives. Mentions Sudan in the context of datasets but not state-based conflict deaths in 2025.
3. The third source from May 17, 2025, is about Sudan datasets related to hazards, floods, diseases, and conflict. It’s a planning tool but doesn’t specify 2025 numbers.
4. The fourth source, a PDF from May 20, 2025, references ACLED in discussing conflict hotspots in 2023, including Sudan. However, it’s about food crises and past data (2023), not projections for 2025.
5. The fifth source from May 22, 2025, lists Sudan humanitarian datasets but doesn’t provide specific death numbers.
None of the provided search results have current ACLED data for Sudan in 2025. The latest Sudan-related info is from 2023 in the PDF. Since the available data doesn’t include 2025 figures, I can’t directly cite any numbers. The user’s provided links to ACLED’s Sudan pages aren’t accessible here, so I can’t pull the latest stats from there either.
Therefore, based on the given sources, there’s no specific information to determine the exact number of state-based conflict deaths in Sudan for 2025. The answer would need to rely on historical trends, but without recent data, it’s speculative. The options provided suggest a range, but without updated ACLED reports, the answer can’t be definitively determined from the provided search results. **Relevant Sources and Summaries**
1. **”South Africa’s Crime Outpaces Certain Global Conflict Zones” (May 16, 2025)**
Discusses ACLED and Oxfam data comparing South Africa’s crime rates to conflict zones like Gaza, Syria, and Afghanistan. Mentions ACLED’s 2017 data for Afghanistan (14,000 deaths) and Oxfam’s 2024 figures for Syria (96.5 daily deaths) and Afghanistan (23.8 daily deaths). No direct Sudan data, but highlights ACLED’s methodology for conflict tracking[1].
2. **”Ethiopia Updates | ReliefWeb” (May 23, 2025)**
Focused on Ethiopia’s humanitarian crises, including conflict-related fatalities in Amhara and Oromia regions. Mentions Sudan’s datasets in the context of humanitarian response but lacks specific 2025 death tolls[2].
3. **”Ocha Sudan Humanitarian Datasets” (May 17, 2025)**
Provides Sudan datasets for hazards, disease outbreaks, and conflicts. Designed for planning but does not include 2025 death counts[3].
4. **”FSIN Joint Analysis for Better Decisions” (PDF, May 20, 2025)**
Mentions ACLED in analyzing 2023 conflict hotspots, including Sudan and Gaza. States that food crises escalated in conflict zones but provides no 2025 projections[4].
5. **”Crisis Response Datasets | HDX – Sudan” (May 22, 2025)**
Lists 418 Sudan-specific datasets but does not specify state-based conflict deaths for 2025[5].
—
**Analysis**
The provided sources lack explicit data on **state-based conflict deaths in Sudan for 2025**. ACLED’s conflict monitoring in 2023–2024 focused on countries like Gaza, Syria, and Afghanistan, with Sudan mentioned only in general humanitarian contexts (e.g., datasets). For example:
– The PDF references ACLED’s analysis of 2023 conflicts but does not extend to 2025[4].
– Sudan datasets (e.g., OCHA’s May 17 update) focus on risk assessments rather than death tolls[3].
**Key Gaps**
1. **No 2025 Projections**: No source cites ACLED’s 2025 estimates for Sudan.
2. **Historical Context**: ACLED’s past reports (e.g., 2017, 2023) track conflicts but lack Sudan-specific trends.
3. **Regional Comparisons**: The May 16 article highlights Oxfam’s 2024 data for Syria (23.8 daily deaths) and Afghanistan (20 per 100,000), but Sudan’s data remains unspecified[1][4].
**Resolution Context**
Given the absence of explicit 2025 data, resolution relies on extrapolating trends. However, without direct ACLED statistics or recent Sudan-specific reports, selecting an option requires inferring from:
– **Option ranges** (e.g., “Between 8000 and 12000”) necessitate awareness of Sudan’s conflict intensity.
– **Regional Conflict Rates**: For example, Syria’s 2024 rate (~96.5 deaths/day) would equate to ~35,200 annually[1], but Sudan’s context differs.
**Conclusion**
The provided sources do not contain sufficient data to select a precise answer. For a definitive resolution, direct consultation with ACLED’s Sudan-specific reports (linked in the query’s background) would be required.
AskNews Deep Usage:
prompt_tokens=24275 completion_tokens=1390 total_tokens=0
AskNews Deep Search Response:
The most recent available data for Sudan’s conflict as of May 2025 highlights an escalating crisis but does not yet provide definitive ACLED-reported state-based conflict death totals for 2025. Key contextual updates include:
1. **Persistent High Casualties**: ACLED has documented record violence in Sudan since 2023, with the October–December 2024 quarter alone seeing over 700 violent events targeting civilians, a 78% increase compared to early 2024 [17][15]. By January 2025, attacks on hospitals and markets caused 120+ deaths in single incidents [23].
2. **Humanitarian Collapse**: Over 25 million Sudanese (half the population) face acute hunger, and 17 million children lack education, worsening conflict-driven vulnerabilities [37]. These conditions correlate with higher civilian mortality.
3. **ACLED’s 2025 Forecast**: While no specific Sudan figure is published, ACLED globally projects a 20% rise in organized violence by 2025 [1][6]. In Sudan, fragmentation of armed groups (e.g., RSF vs. SAF) and ethnic targeting [22][23] suggest fatalities could align with recent trends (e.g., ~18,000 deaths reported from April 2023–May 2025 in earlier data) [2][9].
4. **Current 2025 Data Gaps**: The latest ACLED update cited (May 23, 2025) focuses on global trends but does not specify Sudan’s 2025 totals [1][6]. ReliefWeb and UN reports through May 2025 emphasize extreme violence but lack aggregated death counts [2][4][5].
**Critical Uncertainty**: ACLED’s 2025 Sudan page ([Conflict Watchlist 2025](https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2025/sudan/)) is not directly accessed here, but contextual reports suggest fatalities are likely to fall in the **”Between 5000 and 8000″** range due to sustained high-intensity conflict, though escalation risks (e.g., famine, disease) might push numbers higher. Earlier 2024 data (e.g., 153,000 global conflict deaths [1]) and Sudan’s outsized share of fatalities support this estimate.
**Limitations**: Inconsistent aid access and underreporting in conflict zones mean actual deaths may exceed official counts. Final resolution should defer to ACLED’s forthcoming 2025 data.
GPT News Summary:
Here’s a detailed rundown of the most relevant information from the recent sources concerning the ongoing conflict in Sudan, which may aid in forecasting the number of state-based conflict deaths in 2025 as reported by ACLED:
1. **Escalating Violence and Instability in Sudan**: The ongoing conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has resulted in significant violence and instability across Sudan, particularly in Khartoum, North Darfur, and the states of Kordofan and Darfur (Swissinfo – May 22, 2025). Recent reports indicate that the SAF captured various strategic locations in Khartoum (ReliefWeb – March 8, 2025).
2. **Conflict Impact on Civilians**: The humanitarian situation in Sudan is dire, with over 13 million displaced people and atrocious acts committed against civilians, including mass rapes and abductions (AllAfrica – May 21, 2025). The RSF is accused of attacking medical facilities and targeting aid workers. There have been 481 civilian deaths reported in North Darfur since April 10, 2025 (AllAfrica – May 21, 2025).
3. **Destruction of Infrastructure**: The conflict has severely affected public infrastructure, including healthcare facilities. There have been 603 attacks on Sudan’s healthcare system from April 2023 to the end of April 2025, resulting in significant damage to health facilities and the deaths of healthcare workers (ReliefWeb – May 22, 2025).
4. **Health Crisis Exacerbated by Conflict**: The ongoing airstrikes and the resultant power and water shortages have exacerbated health crises, including severe cholera outbreaks. In Khartoum, over 2,300 cholera cases were reported over the past three weeks, with 51 associated deaths (Swissinfo – May 22, 2025).
5. **ACLED and Conflict Deaths Data**: The SAF and RSF conflict has reported at least 11,292 attacks and 32,973 deaths since its onset in April 2023. The data indicate that half of these deaths have occurred in Khartoum and North Darfur (Al Jazeera – April 14, 2025).
6. **Global Context and Implications**: The global conflict landscape is at its most violent since World War II, as per the Global Peace Index and ACLED data. The global death toll from conflicts has seen a significant rise, with the Middle East, Africa, and Asia experiencing elevated death tolls (NZ Herald – May 22, 2025; The Telegraph – May 22, 2025).
Given these conditions, high levels of violence and instability, coupled with humanitarian crises, are likely to continue affecting the civilian population throughout 2025. This ongoing turmoil may continue to result in a significant number of state-based conflict deaths, which ACLED will record by the end of the year.
Extracted resolution criteria links:
[]
Gemini Multiple Choice response:
The conflict in Sudan, primarily between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has been characterized by escalating violence and a dire humanitarian crisis. Recent data from various sources provides a basis for forecasting state-based conflict deaths in 2025 as reported by ACLED.
Several key pieces of information guide this forecast:
1. **High Casualty Rates:** One research assistant indicates that the SAF and RSF conflict has resulted in at least 32,973 deaths since its onset in April 2023, as reported by Al Jazeera on April 14, 2025. [Al Jazeera – April 14, 2025] This figure, spread over approximately 24 months, translates to an average annual rate of roughly 16,486 deaths. Another research assistant cites ~18,000 deaths from April 2023 to May 2025 (25 months), yielding an average of ~8,640 deaths per year. The Al Jazeera figure is more recent and significantly higher, suggesting a more comprehensive or updated count of conflict-related fatalities. Given the instruction to prioritize real-time and recent sources, the 32,973 death count is heavily weighted.
2. **Escalating Violence:** Reports highlight record violence in Sudan since 2023, with a 78% increase in violent events targeting civilians in late 2024 compared to early 2024. Specific incidents in early 2025, such as over 120 deaths in single attacks on hospitals and markets by January 2025, and 481 civilian deaths in North Darfur since April 10, 2025 [AllAfrica – May 21, 2025], indicate a sustained high intensity of conflict.
3. **Humanitarian Crisis:** The severe humanitarian situation, with over 25 million Sudanese facing acute hunger and widespread displacement, suggests that conditions conducive to high mortality from conflict will persist or worsen throughout 2025. The destruction of infrastructure and exacerbation of health crises further contribute to high mortality risks.
4. **ACLED Projections:** ACLED itself globally projects a 20% rise in organized violence by 2025. While not Sudan-specific, this global trend combined with Sudan’s significant contribution to global conflict deaths suggests that a decrease in fatalities is unlikely.
Based on the annualized rate derived from the more recent and higher death count (approximately 16,500 deaths per year from April 2023 to April 2025), and considering the escalating nature of the conflict and the ongoing humanitarian crisis, the most probable outcome for 2025 is that the number of state-based conflict deaths reported by ACLED will remain very high. While there’s always uncertainty in forecasting, especially concerning the precise definition and reporting lag of “state-based conflict deaths” by ACLED, the overarching trend points to continued severe violence. Therefore, the “More than 12000” category is assigned the highest probability, reflecting the current baseline and escalating trends. The “Between 8000 and 12000” category accounts for potential fluctuations or slight differences in reporting methodologies. The lower categories are deemed highly unlikely given the current and historical context of the conflict.
Less than 1000: 0
Between 1000 and 3000: 0
Between 3000 and 5000: 1
Between 5000 and 8000: 8
Between 8000 and 12000: 25
More than 12000: 66
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.00980392156862745, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.00980392156862745, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.00980392156862745, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.0784313725490196, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.24509803921568626, ‘More than 12000’: 0.6470588235294118}
GPT Multiple Choice JSON response:
Less than 1000: 1
Between 1000 and 3000: 2
Between 3000 and 5000: 5
Between 5000 and 8000: 12
Between 8000 and 12000: 25
More than 12000: 55
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.05, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.25, ‘More than 12000’: 0.55}
GPT Multiple Choice JSON response:
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 6
Option_C: 15
Option_D: 26
Option_E: 30
Option_F: 22
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.06, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.15, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.26, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.3, ‘More than 12000’: 0.22}
GPT Multiple Choice JSON response:
Less than 1000: 1
Between 1000 and 3000: 3
Between 3000 and 5000: 10
Between 5000 and 8000: 21
Between 8000 and 12000: 32
More than 12000: 33
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.21, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.32, ‘More than 12000’: 0.33}
________________________
Anthropic response:
## Probability Distribution
Given these factors, here is my forecast for state-based conflict deaths reported by ACLED in Sudan for 2025:
1. **Less than 1000**: (2%) – This scenario would require an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire maintained throughout the rest of 2025. Given that fighting has already occurred through May 2025 and the parties’ commitment to military solutions, this outcome is extremely unlikely.
2. **Between 1000 and 3000**: (8%) – This would require a significant de-escalation and partial ceasefire within the next 1-2 months. While possible, the current trajectory and statements from both sides make this unlikely.
3. **Between 3000 and 5000**: (15%) – This represents a scenario where conflict continues but at a significantly reduced intensity compared to 2024. Possible if informal de-escalation occurs or if one side makes decisive gains, leading to less active fighting.
4. **Between 5000 and 8000**: (35%) – This aligns with a moderate continuation of current conflict patterns, possibly with some fluctuation in intensity but no fundamental change in the dynamics. Given recent trends, this appears to be the most likely outcome.
5. **Between 8000 and 12000**: (30%) – This scenario involves continued high-intensity conflict similar to late 2024, possibly with new offensives in Darfur or renewed fighting in Khartoum. The ongoing militarization and foreign support make this quite plausible.
6. **More than 12000**: (10%) – This would require a significant escalation above current levels, perhaps involving new actors or the conflict spreading to previously stable regions. While not the most likely outcome, the risk of fragmentation and total war rhetoric make this a real possibility.
Option_A: 2
Option_B: 8
Option_C: 15
Option_D: 35
Option_E: 30
Option_F: 10
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.020000000000000004, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.08000000000000002, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.15000000000000002, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.35000000000000003, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.30000000000000004, ‘More than 12000’: 0.0999999999999998}
________________________
Anthropic response:
.
### Prediction Model
Based on the monthly average of reported deaths and the current conflict dynamics, I can project the likely range for ACLED-reported state-based conflict deaths in Sudan for 2025:
1. **Average Monthly Rate**: The 30,813 deaths over 20 months (April 2023-December 2024) gives an average of approximately 1,540 deaths per month.
2. **2025 Patterns**: The first few months of 2025 have seen continued high-intensity conflict, with the SAF recapturing territory but the RSF continuing attacks in various regions. The weekly data suggests conflict levels similar to or slightly lower than late 2024.
3. **Forecasting Scenarios**:
– **Low Estimate**: If the conflict gradually de-escalates (due to SAF gains or international pressure), deaths might average 1,000-1,200 per month (6,000-7,200 for 2025).
– **Baseline Estimate**: If current patterns continue with similar intensity, deaths would average 1,500-1,700 per month (9,000-10,200 for 2025).
– **High Estimate**: If the conflict intensifies or expands to new regions, deaths could average 1,800-2,000+ per month (10,800-12,000+ for 2025).
Given the ongoing high intensity of the conflict, recent territorial shifts, and the SAF’s current offensive, the most likely scenario falls between the baseline and high estimates, with ACLED-reported state-based conflict deaths for 2025 most likely to be between 8,000 and 12,000.
## Final Probability Distribution
Based on the comprehensive analysis, here is my forecast for how many state-based conflict deaths will be reported by ACLED in Sudan in 2025:
Less than 1000: 2
Between 1000 and 3000: 5
Between 3000 and 5000: 12
Between 5000 and 8000: 28
Between 8000 and 12000: 40
More than 12000: 13
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.12, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.28, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.4, ‘More than 12000’: 0.13}
________________________
Anthropic response:
This escalation at the end of 2024 and beginning of 2025 suggests that the conflict is intensifying rather than abating, which could lead to higher casualty rates in 2025 than previously observed.
### Final Assessment and Distribution of Probabilities
Given all the available information, I believe the most likely scenario is that ACLED will report between 5,000 and 8,000 state-based conflict deaths in Sudan for 2025. This reflects:
1. The established monthly rate of approximately 1,500-2,000 reported deaths
2. The continued high intensity of the conflict in early 2025
3. The severe underreporting of deaths (ACLED figures capturing only about 10-20% of actual deaths)
4. The continued territorial offensives by both sides
5. The increasing targeting of civilians
However, there are several factors that could push the figure higher:
– Further escalation in El Fasher and other contested areas
– New major offensives by either side
– Increased targeting of civilian populations
– Improved reporting mechanisms capturing more deaths
Conversely, factors that could lead to lower reported deaths include:
– Potential ceasefire agreements (though currently unlikely)
– Exhaustion of fighting forces
– Displacement reducing civilian presence in conflict zones
– Further deterioration in reporting capabilities
Therefore, my probability distribution for the question “How many state-based conflict deaths will be reported by ACLED in Sudan in 2025?” is:
Less than 1000: 2%
Between 1000 and 3000: 12%
Between 3000 and 5000: 25%
Between 5000 and 8000: 38%
Between 8000 and 12000: 18%
More than 12000: 5%
Option_A: 2
Option_B: 12
Option_C: 25
Option_D: 38
Option_E: 18
Option_F: 5
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.12, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.25, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.38, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.18, ‘More than 12000’: 0.05}
________________________
Anthropic response:
Assuming the January-March 2025 period saw approximately 2,160 additional deaths (32,973 – 30,813), this suggests a rate of about 720 deaths per month in early 2025 – a decrease from the late 2024 peak but still substantial.
For the remaining months of 2025 (April-December), several scenarios must be considered:
– **Intensification Scenario**: If the conflict escalates again, particularly in Darfur or if new offensives are launched, monthly deaths could return to 1,000-1,500.
– **Status Quo Scenario**: If current patterns continue with localized fighting and continued but reduced intensity, monthly deaths might remain at 600-800.
– **De-escalation Scenario**: If peace initiatives gain traction or if one side makes decisive gains, monthly deaths could drop to 300-500.
The most likely scenario based on recent developments is a continuation of the status quo with periodic intensification, suggesting an average of 700-900 deaths per month for the remainder of 2025.
## Forecast Analysis
Given the available data and trends, I’ll now estimate the total state-based conflict deaths that ACLED will likely report for Sudan in 2025:
1. January-March 2025: Approximately 2,160 deaths (based on comparison of totals)
2. April-December 2025 (Status Quo with Periodic Intensification): 7,200 deaths (800/month × 9 months)
This gives an estimated total of approximately 9,360 state-based conflict deaths to be reported by ACLED for Sudan in 2025.
Key uncertainties that could shift this estimate:
1. Whether the SAF can consolidate its gains in Khartoum and expand control to other areas
2. The situation in Darfur, particularly around El Fasher
3. Whether new diplomatic initiatives emerge that might reduce fighting
4. Changes in foreign support to either side
5. The humanitarian crisis and its impact on the conflict
6. Seasonal factors (e.g., rainy season typically reduces fighting)
Given these considerations and the historical underestimation of conflict deaths in ACLED data (which only captures reported deaths), the range of 5,000-8,000 deaths appears most likely, with some possibility of higher numbers if the conflict intensifies again.
## Probability Distribution
Considering all factors, here is my probability distribution for the number of state-based conflict deaths that will be reported by ACLED in Sudan in 2025:
Less than 1000: 5%
Between 1000 and 3000: 10%
Between 3000 and 5000: 20%
Between 5000 and 8000: 40%
Between 8000 and 12000: 20%
More than 12000: 5%
Option_A: 5
Option_B: 10
Option_C: 20
Option_D: 40
Option_E: 20
Option_F: 5
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.05, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.1, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.2, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.4, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.2, ‘More than 12000’: 0.05}
All predictions:
[{‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.06, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.15, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.26, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.3, ‘More than 12000’: 0.22}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.21, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.32, ‘More than 12000’: 0.33}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.020000000000000004, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.08000000000000002, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.15000000000000002, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.35000000000000003, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.30000000000000004, ‘More than 12000’: 0.0999999999999998}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.12, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.25, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.38, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.18, ‘More than 12000’: 0.05}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.12, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.28, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.4, ‘More than 12000’: 0.13}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.05, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.1, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.2, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.4, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.2, ‘More than 12000’: 0.05}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.05, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.25, ‘More than 12000’: 0.55}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.00980392156862745, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.00980392156862745, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.00980392156862745, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.0784313725490196, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.24509803921568626, ‘More than 12000’: 0.6470588235294118}]
Filtered predictions:
[{‘Less than 1000’: 0.020000000000000004, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.08000000000000002, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.15000000000000002, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.35000000000000003, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.30000000000000004, ‘More than 12000’: 0.0999999999999998}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.12, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.25, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.38, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.18, ‘More than 12000’: 0.05}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.12, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.28, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.4, ‘More than 12000’: 0.13}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.05, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.1, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.2, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.4, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.2, ‘More than 12000’: 0.05}]
Averaged predictions:
{‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.21, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.32, ‘More than 12000’: 0.33}
Median reasoning:
All Predictions:
[{‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.06, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.15, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.26, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.3, ‘More than 12000’: 0.22}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.21, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.32, ‘More than 12000’: 0.33}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.020000000000000004, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.08000000000000002, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.15000000000000002, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.35000000000000003, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.30000000000000004, ‘More than 12000’: 0.0999999999999998}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.12, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.25, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.38, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.18, ‘More than 12000’: 0.05}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.12, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.28, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.4, ‘More than 12000’: 0.13}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.05, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.1, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.2, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.4, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.2, ‘More than 12000’: 0.05}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.05, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.25, ‘More than 12000’: 0.55}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.00980392156862745, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.00980392156862745, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.00980392156862745, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.0784313725490196, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.24509803921568626, ‘More than 12000’: 0.6470588235294118}]
Median Reasoning:
EXTRACTED_PROBABILITIES: [2, 5, 12, 28, 40, 13]
Model’s Answer:
.
### Prediction Model
Based on the monthly average of reported deaths and the current conflict dynamics, I can project the likely range for ACLED-reported state-based conflict deaths in Sudan for 2025:
1. **Average Monthly Rate**: The 30,813 deaths over 20 months (April 2023-December 2024) gives an average of approximately 1,540 deaths per month.
2. **2025 Patterns**: The first few months of 2025 have seen continued high-intensity conflict, with the SAF recapturing territory but the RSF continuing attacks in various regions. The weekly data suggests conflict levels similar to or slightly lower than late 2024.
3. **Forecasting Scenarios**:
– **Low Estimate**: If the conflict gradually de-escalates (due to SAF gains or international pressure), deaths might average 1,000-1,200 per month (6,000-7,200 for 2025).
– **Baseline Estimate**: If current patterns continue with similar intensity, deaths would average 1,500-1,700 per month (9,000-10,200 for 2025).
– **High Estimate**: If the conflict intensifies or expands to new regions, deaths could average 1,800-2,000+ per month (10,800-12,000+ for 2025).
Given the ongoing high intensity of the conflict, recent territorial shifts, and the SAF’s current offensive, the most likely scenario falls between the baseline and high estimates, with ACLED-reported state-based conflict deaths for 2025 most likely to be between 8,000 and 12,000.
## Final Probability Distribution
Based on the comprehensive analysis, here is my forecast for how many state-based conflict deaths will be reported by ACLED in Sudan in 2025:
Less than 1000: 2
Between 1000 and 3000: 5
Between 3000 and 5000: 12
Between 5000 and 8000: 28
Between 8000 and 12000: 40
More than 12000: 13
=== Forecast Result ===
{
“probability_yes”: null,
“probability_yes_per_category”: {
“Less than 1000”: 0.027500000000000004,
“Between 1000 and 3000”: 0.0875,
“Between 3000 and 5000”: 0.18,
“Between 5000 and 8000”: 0.35250000000000004,
“Between 8000 and 12000”: 0.27,
“More than 12000”: 0.08249999999999995
},
“continuous_cdf”: null
}
=== Reasoning ===
All Predictions:
[{‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.06, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.15, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.26, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.3, ‘More than 12000’: 0.22}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.21, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.32, ‘More than 12000’: 0.33}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.020000000000000004, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.08000000000000002, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.15000000000000002, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.35000000000000003, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.30000000000000004, ‘More than 12000’: 0.0999999999999998}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.12, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.25, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.38, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.18, ‘More than 12000’: 0.05}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.12, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.28, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.4, ‘More than 12000’: 0.13}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.05, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.1, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.2, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.4, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.2, ‘More than 12000’: 0.05}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.05, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.25, ‘More than 12000’: 0.55}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.00980392156862745, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.00980392156862745, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.00980392156862745, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.0784313725490196, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.24509803921568626, ‘More than 12000’: 0.6470588235294118}]
Median Reasoning:
EXTRACTED_PROBABILITIES: [2, 5, 12, 28, 40, 13]
Model’s Answer:
.
### Prediction Model
Based on the monthly average of reported deaths and the current conflict dynamics, I can project the likely range for ACLED-reported state-based conflict deaths in Sudan for 2025:
1. **Average Monthly Rate**: The 30,813 deaths over 20 months (April 2023-December 2024) gives an average of approximately 1,540 deaths per month.
2. **2025 Patterns**: The first few months of 2025 have seen continued high-intensity conflict, with the SAF recapturing territory but the RSF continuing attacks in various regions. The weekly data suggests conflict levels similar to or slightly lower than late 2024.
3. **Forecasting Scenarios**:
– **Low Estimate**: If the conflict gradually de-escalates (due to SAF gains or international pressure), deaths might average 1,000-1,200 per month (6,000-7,200 for 2025).
– **Baseline Estimate**: If current patterns continue with similar intensity, deaths would average 1,500-1,700 per month (9,000-10,200 for 2025).
– **High Estimate**: If the conflict intensifies or expands to new regions, deaths could average 1,800-2,000+ per month (10,800-12,000+ for 2025).
Given the ongoing high intensity of the conflict, recent territorial shifts, and the SAF’s current offensive, the most likely scenario falls between the baseline and high estimates, with ACLED-reported state-based conflict deaths for 2025 most likely to be between 8,000 and 12,000.
## Final Probability Distribution
Based on the comprehensive analysis, here is my forecast for how many state-based conflict deaths will be reported by ACLED in Sudan in 2025:

Less than 1000: 2%
Between 1000 and 3000: 5%
Between 3000 and 5000: 12%
Between 5000 and 8000: 28%
Between 8000 and 12000: 40%
More than 12000: 13%

Past forecasts by Phil’s and Jeremy ’s bots —>

Below, a forecast of state-based conflict fatalities for Sudan in the VIEWS machine forecasting competition, which is an aggregate of the forecasts of twenty competitors. Our botmasters, Phil Godzin and Jeremy Lichtman, are conducting a side experiment with VIEWS.