How many state-based conflict deaths in Syria will be reported by ACLED for the month of August, 2025?
Here’s what Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai predicts today:
Less than 100: 2%
Between 100 and 250: 8%
Between 250 and 500: 30%
Between 500 and 1,000: 40%
Greater than 1,000: 20%
36–46 minutes read. Alternatively, please see a condensed version here —>
Perplexity response:
{think}
Let me break this down step by step to understand what information I need to gather for this forecasting question.
The question is asking about “state-based conflict deaths” that will be reported by ACLED in Syria for August 2025. The current date is August 28, 2025, so we’re essentially at the end of August 2025.
Key information I need:
1. What is ACLED and what do they track?
2. What constitutes “state-based conflict deaths” in ACLED’s methodology?
3. Current situation in Syria as of August 2025
4. Recent conflict activity and casualties in Syria
5. Any specific data from ACLED about August 2025 if available
6. Historical context of conflict deaths in Syria to understand typical ranges
From the search results, I can see:
1. There’s ongoing conflict in Syria with the interim government facing challenges after Assad’s ouster
2. There are references to Israeli operations in Lebanon (not directly relevant but shows regional instability)
3. Some casualty figures mentioned but not specifically ACLED data for August 2025
4. References to Syrian Network for Human Rights which tracks casualties but this is different from ACLED
The resolution criteria mentions looking at acleddata.com for updates, but the search results don’t contain specific ACLED data for August 2025.
Let me structure my response according to the personalization guidelines:
1. First think step by step about what information is needed
2. Start with 10 citations with summaries
3. Focus on recent data and statistics with dates
4. Look for authoritative sources that would be used for resolution
However, looking at the search results, I don’t have 10 distinct sources, and most don’t directly address ACLED data or Syrian conflict deaths for August 2025 specifically. I need to work with what I have while being clear about limitations.
The search results are quite limited and don’t contain the specific ACLED data needed to answer this question effectively. I should acknowledge this limitation while providing what context I can from the available information.
Looking at this forecasting question about ACLED-reported state-based conflict deaths in Syria for August 2025, I need to gather information about the current conflict situation in Syria, recent casualty data, and any available ACLED reporting methodology or recent data.
## Planning the Information Search
To effectively assess this question, I would need:
– Current ACLED data for Syria in August 2025
– Recent conflict intensity and casualty reports from Syria
– Understanding of what constitutes “state-based conflict deaths” in ACLED’s methodology
– Context about Syria’s current political and military situation following Assad’s ouster
– Historical ACLED data for Syria to understand typical monthly casualty ranges
## Available Citations and Summaries
Unfortunately, the search results provided are quite limited and don’t contain the specific ACLED data needed for this forecast. Here’s what information is available:
**[1] Amnesty International Report on Israel-Lebanon Conflict** (August 25, 2025)
This report focuses on Israeli operations in Lebanon, noting that as of April 15, 2025, at least 71 civilians had been killed in Israeli military operations in Lebanon since the November 2024 ceasefire. While this shows regional instability, it doesn’t directly address Syrian conflict deaths or ACLED data.
**[2] Instagram Post on Syrian Electoral Committee** (August 23, 2025)
Mentions an internal Israeli intelligence database recording around 8,900 fighters killed as of May 2025, but lacks specificity about timeframe, methodology, and whether this aligns with ACLED’s state-based conflict death definitions.
**[3] Sea Guardian Threat Assessment** (August 28, 2025)
Notes that Syria’s interim government faces mounting challenges restoring order after nearly 14 years of civil war following Assad’s ouster. This provides context about ongoing instability but no specific casualty data.
**[4] ADF Magazine on African Terrorism** (August 26, 2025)
Reports that terrorists killed 150,000 across Africa in the past decade, but this is not relevant to Syrian state-based conflict deaths.
**[5] Syrian Network for Human Rights** (August 23, 2025)
Describes SNHR’s methodology for documenting human rights violations in Syria since 2011, but doesn’t provide specific August 2025 data or ACLED figures.
## Key Information Gaps
The search results reveal several critical information gaps for this forecasting question:
**Missing ACLED Data**: The resolution criteria specifically references ACLED as the authoritative source, but no ACLED-specific data for August 2025 is available in these search results.
**Unclear Current Conflict Status**: While we know Syria’s interim government is facing challenges after Assad’s departure, the specific nature and intensity of ongoing state-based conflicts in August 2025 is not detailed.
**Definitional Clarity**: The search results don’t clarify what ACLED categorizes as “state-based conflict deaths” versus other types of casualties, which is crucial for accurate forecasting.
## Recent Context
The limited information suggests that as of late August 2025, Syria remains in a transitional period following the ouster of the Assad regime, with the interim government struggling to establish control after nearly 14 years of civil war[3]. However, without specific ACLED data or detailed reporting on August 2025 conflict incidents, it’s impossible to provide an accurate assessment of where the death toll might fall within the given ranges (Less than 100, Between 100-250, Between 250-500, Between 500-1000, or Greater than 1000).
To properly forecast this question, direct access to ACLED’s database and recent Syria conflict reports would be essential, as the provided search results lack the specific, quantitative data needed for an evidence-based prediction.
Grok response:
Below is a detailed rundown of the news and data most relevant to the question of state-based conflict deaths in Syria for August 2025, as reported or referenced by sources like ACLED. This question falls under a Political Event category, focusing on conflict-related data, so I prioritized recent sources on violence, casualties, and state-based conflicts in Syria. I drew from authoritative sources such as ACLED, UN reports, and news outlets, emphasizing the latest statistics on deaths, including those potentially attributable to state-based actors (e.g., government forces, militias, or insurgent groups aligned with state structures).
To address this effectively, I first considered the need for up-to-date data on conflict deaths from ACLED’s resolution source (https://acleddata.com/2025/03/14/q-a-what-happened-in-the-coastal-region-of-syria-last-week/), which tracks political violence. I focused on recent reports of clashes, massacres, and casualty figures in Syria, particularly from August 2025 onward, as the current date is August 28, 2025. This included cross-referencing UN investigations, news updates, and historical context to capture trends in state-based violence, such as attacks by interim government forces or loyalist remnants. While ACLED’s specific August 2025 data for Syria wasn’t directly available in the sources I accessed, I incorporated the most recent figures from related reports, such as total deaths by early August, to provide context on potential state-based contributions.
Here is a list of 10 citations, selected for their relevance to Syria’s conflict dynamics. I prioritized sources from the past month, including ACLED-related content, UN reports, and news articles, to ensure a variety of perspectives. Each citation includes the title, a brief description, the date of publication, and a three-sentence summary of the relevant content.
1. **Title:** Southern Syria clashes (July 2025–present)
**Description:** A Wikipedia page detailing ongoing violence in southern Syria involving Druze, Bedouin groups, and government forces.
**Date of Publication:** August 27, 2025
**Three-Sentence Summary:** This source reports on clashes starting in July 2025 in Suwayda, involving Syrian transitional government forces and armed groups, which led to civilian deaths and airstrikes by external actors like Israel. It highlights extrajudicial killings and abuses, potentially qualifying as state-based conflict deaths due to government involvement. As of late August, the page notes continued tensions that could contribute to August’s totals, emphasizing the role of state actors in restoring order.
2. **Title:** UN: Syrian factions committed ‘widespread and systematic’ attacks on civilians in coastal violence
**Description:** An AP News article on UN findings regarding violence in Syria’s coastal regions.
**Date of Publication:** Approximately two weeks ago (mid-August 2025, based on context)
**Three-Sentence Summary:** The article details UN investigations into massacres and attacks in March and April 2025, attributing widespread violence to both interim government forces and Assad loyalists, which could include state-based conflict deaths. It reports that these acts involved murder and torture, potentially amounting to war crimes, with implications for ongoing August instability. The source underscores the need for accountability, noting that such violence has persisted into mid-2025, affecting civilian tolls.
3. **Title:** War crimes likely committed in Syria coastal violence, UN says
**Description:** A BBC News article summarizing a UN commission’s assessment of sectarian violence in Syria.
**Date of Publication:** Approximately two weeks ago (mid-August 2025)
**Three-Sentence Summary:** This piece covers UN findings that war crimes were likely committed by former regime fighters and interim government forces during March 2025 clashes, resulting in significant civilian and combatant deaths. It links these events to broader state-based conflicts, including attacks in Alawite areas, which may have carried over into August. The article highlights the potential for ongoing violence, with UN experts calling for investigations into the rising death toll.
4. **Title:** War crimes likely committed by both sides in Syria coastal violence: UN
**Description:** An Al Jazeera article on UN investigators’ conclusions about sectarian attacks in Syria.
**Date of Publication:** August 14, 2025
**Three-Sentence Summary:** The article reports on UN evidence of murder, torture, and other inhumane acts during March 2025 violence, implicating both interim government-aligned forces and loyalist groups in state-based conflicts. It notes that these actions have led to hundreds of deaths, with possible escalation in August due to residual tensions. Experts warn that unchecked violence could inflate conflict death figures, emphasizing the role of state actors in perpetuating instability.
5. **Title:** Eight Months After Assad’s Fall: Nearly 10,000 Killed, Including 1,000 Women and Children
**Description:** A Syrian Observer article documenting overall casualties in Syria post-regime change.
**Date of Publication:** Approximately three weeks ago (August 6, 2025)
**Three-Sentence Summary:** This source provides data from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, reporting 9,889 total deaths by August 6, 2025, with a significant portion linked to state-based violence involving government and militia forces. It breaks down casualties by category, including civilians and combatants, suggesting that ongoing clashes in regions like the coast could push August figures higher. The article highlights the persistence of violence eight months after Assad’s fall, serving as a key indicator of state-based conflict trends.
6. **Title:** Conflict Watchlist
**Description:** An ACLED page identifying global crisis areas, including potential escalations in Syria.
**Date of Publication:** August 16, 2025
**Three-Sentence Summary:** ACLED’s watchlist flags Syria as a high-risk area for evolving conflicts, noting the likelihood of increased violence in 2025 due to post-regime instability and state actor involvement. It references recent data on clashes, which could contribute to state-based death tolls in August. The source emphasizes monitoring for shifts, providing context for forecasters tracking monthly figures.
7. **Title:** 2025 massacres of Syrian Alawites
**Description:** A Wikipedia page on sectarian violence targeting Alawite communities in Syria.
**Date of Publication:** June 30, 2025 (with potential updates)
**Three-Sentence Summary:** This entry documents mass killings from March to April 2025, attributing many deaths to attacks by caretaker government-aligned fighters and civilians, classifying them as state-based conflicts. It reports patterns of targeted violence that resulted in dozens to hundreds of fatalities, with implications for August’s totals if similar incidents persist. The source notes the broader context of the Syrian civil war, urging caution in interpreting casualty data.
8. **Title:** Weekly Data Update (July 15-22, 2025)
**Description:** A Syria Weekly newsletter summarizing violence and deaths in Syria for a specific week in July.
**Date of Publication:** July 24, 2025
**Three-Sentence Summary:** The update records at least 504 deaths between July 15-22, 2025, with the majority linked to hostilities in Suwayda involving state and non-state actors, potentially feeding into August trends. It attributes 96% of deaths to major violence, including state-based clashes, highlighting a surge that could indicate rising instability. This data serves as a benchmark for monitoring monthly fluctuations, such as those in August.
9. **Title:** Casualties of the Syrian civil war
**Description:** A Wikipedia page compiling estimates of deaths in the ongoing Syrian conflict.
**Date of Publication:** January 1, 2025 (with updates through March 2025)
**Three-Sentence Summary:** The page estimates over 656,000 total deaths by March 2025, with state-based conflicts contributing significantly through government and militia actions. It breaks down figures by year, noting 2025 as a period of continued violence that could affect August reports. Recent updates suggest an undercount, emphasizing the need for sources like ACLED for precise state-based tracking.
10. **Title:** War crimes likely committed in Syria’s coastal massacres, UN commission says
**Description:** A Reuters article on UN investigations into violence in Syria’s coastal areas.
**Date of Publication:** August 14, 2025
**Three-Sentence Summary:** This article outlines UN findings that interim government forces and loyalist fighters likely committed war crimes in March 2025, leading to numerous deaths in state-based engagements. It reports on the scale of violence, which may have extended into August, with experts warning of systematic attacks. The source provides critical context for ACLED’s potential August data, focusing on accountability and ongoing risks.
Based on these sources, recent updates indicate a continuation of violence in Syria that could influence ACLED’s reporting for August 2025. For instance, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported 9,889 total deaths as of August 6, 2025, with a substantial portion likely involving state-based actors, such as interim government forces or loyalist remnants, based on UN investigations into coastal and southern clashes. Expert opinions from UN commissions (e.g., from mid-August reports) highlight ongoing war crimes and sectarian attacks, suggesting movement toward higher casualty figures, though exact state-based deaths for August are not yet finalized in the accessed data. While I cannot access real-time ACLED figures directly, historical data from early August shows a baseline of violence that could align with the question’s options, such as “Between 500 and 1000” based on July’s trends, but this is for context only—please consult ACLED’s official updates for the final count.
Extracted resolution criteria links:
[‘https://acleddata.com/2025/03/14/q-a-what-happened-in-the-coastal-region-of-syria-last-week/’]
________________________
Claude Vision analysis response:
I apologize, but I don’t see any image attached to your message. To help you extract relevant data about ACLED conflict deaths in Syria that could inform predictions about August 2025, I would need to see the actual page/image you’re referring to.
Once you provide the image from the ACLED source (https://acleddata.com/2025/03/14/q-a-what-happened-in-the-coastal-region-of-syria-last-week/), I’ll be able to:
1. Extract current state-based conflict death figures for Syria
2. Identify any trends or patterns in the data
3. Note any specific information about recent developments that might affect future conflict levels
4. Look for historical comparisons or baseline figures that could help inform predictions about August 2025
Please share the image so I can provide the data extraction you need.
GPT Multiple Choice JSON response:
Rationale and key evidence
ACLED’s “state-based conflict deaths” category counts fatalities directly attributable to clashes involving state actors (regular forces, security services, or state-aligned militias) — not every violent death in-country. ACLED typically reports monthly totals; the resolution will be whatever ACLED publishes for “Syria — August 2025” under that category. I do not have ACLED’s August release in front of me, so I forecast based on recent patterns from multiple monitors and the qualitative situation on the ground in late summer 2025.
What the recent context implies: independent monitors and UN reporting in mid‑August documented large-scale sectarian and coastal violence earlier in 2025 (March–April), and continuing clashes (e.g., southern/Suwayda fighting in July) produced high weekly death counts in mid‑July (one weekly update cited ~504 deaths in a week). Those indicators point to an elevated baseline of violence into mid‑2025, and ACLED flagged Syria as a high‑risk hotspot in August. However, not all recent killings are necessarily classified as “state‑based” by ACLED (some may be non‑state vs non‑state, or criminal incidents), and ACLED’s methods can diverge from local observers (SOHR, SNHR) in magnitude and classification. Given that, August’s total could easily be in the several hundreds to low thousands, but there is substantial uncertainty.
How I translated that into probabilities
– Base rate and momentum: recent months show multiple high‑fatality incidents and sustained clashes. That makes very low monthly totals (<100) unlikely.
– Classification uncertainty: a meaningful share of reported deaths may be categorized by ACLED as non‑state or civilian rather than state‑based, shifting totals downward compared with some local tallies.
– Time horizon: we are at the end of August (Aug 28), so only a few days remain in the month — this reduces the chance of a late catastrophic spike but does not eliminate it.
– Historical variability: Syrian monthly conflict fatalities have high variance; several months with sustained fighting often push counts into the 500–1000+ range. But ACLED’s narrower “state‑based” filter reduces expected counts relative to total-casualty trackers.
Key assumptions whose failure would materially change this forecast
1) Assumption: Violence intensity in August 2025 remained similar to July / mid‑2025 patterns (no last‑minute large offensive or ceasefire). Probability this assumption fails: 20%. If it fails upward (large offensive), probability mass shifts toward >1000 (and maybe 500–1000); if it fails downward (rapid calm), mass shifts toward 100–500.
2) Assumption: ACLED classifies a substantial share of recent deaths as “state‑based” (rather than non‑state vs non‑state or criminal). Probability this assumption fails: 25%. If ACLED excludes many deaths from the “state‑based” bucket, totals could drop into the 100–500 range.
3) Assumption: ACLED’s reporting cadence and coverage in August is similar to previous months (no major undercounting due to access issues). Probability this assumption fails: 15%. Undercoverage would push the observed count downward relative to real deaths.
Given the elevated but uneven violence, classification uncertainty, and short remaining time in August, I assign most probability to the middle bins (250–1000), with a tilt toward 500–1000 because of recent high‑fatality weeks and ACLED’s watchlist warning. I avoid extreme confidence in >1000 because classification and month‑to‑month variance can keep “state‑based” counts below that threshold, and I keep low probabilities for the bottom bins.
Final probabilities
Less than 100: 2
Between 100 and 250: 8
Between 250 and 500: 30
Between 500 and 1000: 40
Greater than 1000: 20
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 100’: 0.02, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.08, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.3, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.4, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.2}
Gemini Multiple Choice response:
The question asks for the number of state-based conflict deaths reported by ACLED in Syria for August 2025. Given that today’s date is August 28, 2025, the reporting period for August is nearly complete. My forecast relies on recent trends and reported casualties from various credible sources, acknowledging that direct ACLED data for August 2025 is not yet publicly available. The resolution criteria specify ACLED as the authoritative source, so I’m using other reports to infer what ACLED might report based on conflict intensity.
Several sources confirm that Syria continues to experience significant state-based conflict following the ouster of Assad. The Syrian interim government faces ongoing challenges in restoring order after nearly 14 years of civil war. UN investigations from mid-August 2025 have detailed “widespread and systematic” attacks, implicating both interim government forces and Assad loyalists in massacres and other acts that constitute war crimes during March and April 2025. These reports suggest a persistent and severe level of violence attributable to state actors.
Crucially, recent data points to very high casualty figures. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported a total of 9,889 deaths by August 6, 2025, since Assad’s fall. This averages to approximately 1,236 deaths per month across all categories of conflict. While this is a total figure and not exclusively “state-based” or from ACLED, a “significant portion” is linked to state-based violence. Furthermore, a Syria Weekly newsletter reported an astonishing **at least 504 deaths between July 15-22, 2025**, with 96% of these linked to major violence, including state-based clashes. This single weekly figure, already surpassing the “Less than 500” options, serves as a strong indicator of the current high intensity of conflict. Ongoing clashes in southern Syria involving transitional government forces were also reported as continuing into late August 2025. ACLED itself flagged Syria as a “high-risk area for evolving conflicts,” noting the likelihood of increased violence in 2025 due to post-regime instability and state actor involvement.
Based on this evidence, it is highly improbable that the number of state-based conflict deaths for August 2025 would be “Less than 100” or “Between 100 and 250.” The sheer scale of violence indicated by the July weekly figures and the overall monthly average since Assad’s fall makes these categories extremely unlikely. The “Between 250 and 500” category also seems unlikely, as the single weekly report of over 500 deaths in July would mean that August had to experience a dramatic and sustained de-escalation for the entire month to fall within this range, which is not supported by reports of ongoing clashes and persistent instability.
Therefore, the most likely outcomes fall into the “Between 500 and 1000” and “Greater than 1000” categories. If the high intensity observed in late July persisted for even two weeks in August, the total would easily exceed 1000. If the intensity moderated slightly but remained substantial, or if ACLED’s specific methodology for “state-based” deaths results in a slightly lower count than broader conflict reports, the “Between 500 and 1000” range becomes highly plausible. Given the Brier score methodology and my historical tendency for overconfidence, I’ve opted for a distribution that reflects the strong signals of high conflict intensity while acknowledging the inherent uncertainty of relying on proxy data before official ACLED reporting. The high weekly death tolls from July and the average monthly deaths since Assad’s fall
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 100’: 0.26732673267326734, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.26732673267326734, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.26732673267326734, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.066006600660066, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.132013201320132}
________________________
Anthropic response:
This question requires me to forecast ACLED-reported state-based conflict deaths in Syria for August 2025, with today being August 28, 2025. This means August is essentially complete, and ACLED likely has most of the data already collected, though their final report may not be published until after the month ends.
Based on the research, several key factors emerge. First, Syria remains in a highly unstable transitional period following Assad’s ouster, with the interim government struggling to establish control. The UN has documented war crimes and systematic attacks through mid-2025, with significant violence in coastal and southern regions. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported 9,889 total deaths by August 6, 2025, since Assad’s fall, which averages roughly 1,235 deaths per month over 8 months. However, this includes all conflict-related deaths, not just state-based ones, and ACLED uses specific methodology that typically captures a subset of total conflict deaths.
The July 2025 data is particularly informative – the Syria Weekly newsletter documented 504 deaths in just one week (July 15-22), with 96% linked to major violence including state-based clashes in Suwayda. If this pace continued, it would suggest monthly totals potentially exceeding 2,000 deaths. However, conflict intensity varies significantly week-to-week, and not all these deaths would qualify as “state-based” under ACLED’s methodology. State-based conflicts specifically involve government forces or organized armed groups with political aims, excluding criminal violence and some forms of communal violence.
The recent UN investigations highlighting war crimes by both interim government forces and loyalist groups in March-April 2025, with evidence of systematic attacks continuing into August, suggest sustained state-based violence. The southern Syria clashes that began in July 2025 and continued through late August involved Syrian transitional government forces directly, which would clearly count as state-based conflict under ACLED’s definitions.
Given that we’re on August 28th, most of the month’s events have already occurred. ACLED would have already documented most incidents, though their final compilation may take a few more days. The lack of major news about exceptionally high casualty events in August 2025 suggests we’re not in an extreme scenario like “Greater than 1000” deaths, though the ongoing violence patterns indicate we’re unlikely to be in the lowest category either.
Critical assumptions that could alter this forecast:
1. **ACLED’s methodology captures approximately 30-50% of total conflict deaths as “state-based”** (20% chance this is incorrect): If ACLED’s criteria are more restrictive or expansive than estimated, this would significantly shift the numbers. Their focus on organized political violence means many deaths in Syria might not qualify if they’re deemed criminal or communal rather than state-based.
2. **No major unreported massacres or battles occurred in late August** (15% chance this is incorrect): Given the information lag and potential for events in remote areas to be reported late, there could be significant incidents from the last week of August not yet in the available sources. A single major clash could add 100+ deaths.
3. **The violence level in August remained relatively consistent with July patterns** (25% chance this is incorrect): Conflict intensity can vary dramatically month-to-month. If August saw either significant escalation or de-escalation compared to the July baseline, the death toll could differ substantially from projections.
Accounting for these uncertainties and the fact that most of August has already passed without reports of extreme casualty events, the most likely range appears to be “Between 250 and 500” deaths. This aligns with taking roughly 30-40% of the broader conflict death patterns we’re seeing (which would suggest 600-800 total monthly deaths based on early August data) and accounting for ACLED’s specific state-based criteria. The “Between 100 and 250” range is also plausible if August saw relative calm or if ACLED’s criteria exclude more incidents than expected. The “Between 500 and 1000” range remains possible if late-month violence escalated or if more state forces were involved in conflicts than typical.
Less than 100: 8
Between 100 and 250: 27
Between 250 and 500: 42
Between 500 and 1000: 19
Greater than 1000: 4
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 100’: 0.08, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.27, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.42, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.19, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.04}
All predictions:
[{‘Less than 100’: 0.26732673267326734, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.26732673267326734, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.26732673267326734, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.066006600660066, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.132013201320132}, {‘Less than 100’: 0.02, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.08, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.3, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.4, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.2}, {‘Less than 100’: 0.08, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.27, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.42, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.19, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.04}]
Filtered predictions:
[{‘Less than 100’: 0.02, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.08, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.3, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.4, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.2}]
Averaged predictions:
{‘Less than 100’: 0.02, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.08, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.3, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.4, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.2}
Median reasoning:
All Predictions:
[{‘Less than 100’: 0.26732673267326734, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.26732673267326734, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.26732673267326734, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.066006600660066, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.132013201320132}, {‘Less than 100’: 0.02, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.08, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.3, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.4, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.2}, {‘Less than 100’: 0.08, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.27, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.42, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.19, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.04}]
Median Reasoning:
EXTRACTED_PROBABILITIES: [2, 8, 30, 40, 20]
Model’s Answer:
Rationale and key evidence
ACLED’s “state-based conflict deaths” category counts fatalities directly attributable to clashes involving state actors (regular forces, security services, or state-aligned militias) — not every violent death in-country. ACLED typically reports monthly totals; the resolution will be whatever ACLED publishes for “Syria — August 2025” under that category. I do not have ACLED’s August release in front of me, so I forecast based on recent patterns from multiple monitors and the qualitative situation on the ground in late summer 2025.
What the recent context implies: independent monitors and UN reporting in mid‑August documented large-scale sectarian and coastal violence earlier in 2025 (March–April), and continuing clashes (e.g., southern/Suwayda fighting in July) produced high weekly death counts in mid‑July (one weekly update cited ~504 deaths in a week). Those indicators point to an elevated baseline of violence into mid‑2025, and ACLED flagged Syria as a high‑risk hotspot in August. However, not all recent killings are necessarily classified as “state‑based” by ACLED (some may be non‑state vs non‑state, or criminal incidents), and ACLED’s methods can diverge from local observers (SOHR, SNHR) in magnitude and classification. Given that, August’s total could easily be in the several hundreds to low thousands, but there is substantial uncertainty.
How I translated that into probabilities
– Base rate and momentum: recent months show multiple high‑fatality incidents and sustained clashes. That makes very low monthly totals (<100) unlikely.
– Classification uncertainty: a meaningful share of reported deaths may be categorized by ACLED as non‑state or civilian rather than state‑based, shifting totals downward compared with some local tallies.
– Time horizon: we are at the end of August (Aug 28), so only a few days remain in the month — this reduces the chance of a late catastrophic spike but does not eliminate it.
– Historical variability: Syrian monthly conflict fatalities have high variance; several months with sustained fighting often push counts into the 500–1000+ range. But ACLED’s narrower “state‑based” filter reduces expected counts relative to total-casualty trackers.
Key assumptions whose failure would materially change this forecast
1) Assumption: Violence intensity in August 2025 remained similar to July / mid‑2025 patterns (no last‑minute large offensive or ceasefire). Probability this assumption fails: 20%. If it fails upward (large offensive), probability mass shifts toward >1000 (and maybe 500–1000); if it fails downward (rapid calm), mass shifts toward 100–500.
2) Assumption: ACLED classifies a substantial share of recent deaths as “state‑based” (rather than non‑state vs non‑state or criminal). Probability this assumption fails: 25%. If ACLED excludes many deaths from the “state‑based” bucket, totals could drop into the 100–500 range.
3) Assumption: ACLED’s reporting cadence and coverage in August is similar to previous months (no major undercounting due to access issues). Probability this assumption fails: 15%. Undercoverage would push the observed count downward relative to real deaths.
Given the elevated but uneven violence, classification uncertainty, and short remaining time in August, I assign most probability to the middle bins (250–1000), with a tilt toward 500–1000 because of recent high‑fatality weeks and ACLED’s watchlist warning. I avoid extreme confidence in >1000 because classification and month‑to‑month variance can keep “state‑based” counts below that threshold, and I keep low probabilities for the bottom bins.
Final probabilities
Less than 100: 2
Between 100 and 250: 8
Between 250 and 500: 30
Between 500 and 1000: 40
Greater than 1000: 20
=== Forecast Result ===
{
“probability_yes”: null,
“probability_yes_per_category”: {
“Less than 100”: 0.02,
“Between 100 and 250”: 0.08,
“Between 250 and 500”: 0.3,
“Between 500 and 1000”: 0.4,
“Greater than 1000”: 0.2
},
“continuous_cdf”: null
}
=== Reasoning ===
All Predictions:
[{‘Less than 100’: 0.26732673267326734, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.26732673267326734, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.26732673267326734, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.066006600660066, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.132013201320132}, {‘Less than 100’: 0.02, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.08, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.3, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.4, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.2}, {‘Less than 100’: 0.08, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.27, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.42, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.19, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.04}]
Median Reasoning:
EXTRACTED_PROBABILITIES: [2, 8, 30, 40, 20]
Model’s Answer:
Rationale and key evidence
ACLED’s “state-based conflict deaths” category counts fatalities directly attributable to clashes involving state actors (regular forces, security services, or state-aligned militias) — not every violent death in-country. ACLED typically reports monthly totals; the resolution will be whatever ACLED publishes for “Syria — August 2025” under that category. I do not have ACLED’s August release in front of me, so I forecast based on recent patterns from multiple monitors and the qualitative situation on the ground in late summer 2025.
What the recent context implies: independent monitors and UN reporting in mid‑August documented large-scale sectarian and coastal violence earlier in 2025 (March–April), and continuing clashes (e.g., southern/Suwayda fighting in July) produced high weekly death counts in mid‑July (one weekly update cited ~504 deaths in a week). Those indicators point to an elevated baseline of violence into mid‑2025, and ACLED flagged Syria as a high‑risk hotspot in August. However, not all recent killings are necessarily classified as “state‑based” by ACLED (some may be non‑state vs non‑state, or criminal incidents), and ACLED’s methods can diverge from local observers (SOHR, SNHR) in magnitude and classification. Given that, August’s total could easily be in the several hundreds to low thousands, but there is substantial uncertainty.
How I translated that into probabilities
– Base rate and momentum: recent months show multiple high‑fatality incidents and sustained clashes. That makes very low monthly totals (<100) unlikely.
– Classification uncertainty: a meaningful share of reported deaths may be categorized by ACLED as non‑state or civilian rather than state‑based, shifting totals downward compared with some local tallies.
– Time horizon: we are at the end of August (Aug 28), so only a few days remain in the month — this reduces the chance of a late catastrophic spike but does not eliminate it.
– Historical variability: Syrian monthly conflict fatalities have high variance; several months with sustained fighting often push counts into the 500–1000+ range. But ACLED’s narrower “state‑based” filter reduces expected counts relative to total-casualty trackers.
Key assumptions whose failure would materially change this forecast
1) Assumption: Violence intensity in August 2025 remained similar to July / mid‑2025 patterns (no last‑minute large offensive or ceasefire). Probability this assumption fails: 20%. If it fails upward (large offensive), probability mass shifts toward >1000 (and maybe 500–1000); if it fails downward (rapid calm), mass shifts toward 100–500.
2) Assumption: ACLED classifies a substantial share of recent deaths as “state‑based” (rather than non‑state vs non‑state or criminal). Probability this assumption fails: 25%. If ACLED excludes many deaths from the “state‑based” bucket, totals could drop into the 100–500 range.
3) Assumption: ACLED’s reporting cadence and coverage in August is similar to previous months (no major undercounting due to access issues). Probability this assumption fails: 15%. Undercoverage would push the observed count downward relative to real deaths.
Given the elevated but uneven violence, classification uncertainty, and short remaining time in August, I assign most probability to the middle bins (250–1000), with a tilt toward 500–1000 because of recent high‑fatality weeks and ACLED’s watchlist warning. I avoid extreme confidence in >1000 because classification and month‑to‑month variance can keep “state‑based” counts below that threshold, and I keep low probabilities for the bottom bins.
Final probabilities
Less than 100: 2%
Between 100 and 250: 8%
Between 250 and 500: 30%
Between 500 and 1,000: 40%
Greater than 1,000: 20%
Past forecasts by Phil’s and Jeremy ’s bots —>
Below, a forecast of state-based conflict fatalities for Syria in the VIEWS machine forecasting competition, which is an aggregate of the forecasts of twenty competitors. Our botmasters, Phil Godzin and Jeremy Lichtman, are conducting a side experiment with VIEWS.
Source: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/1/who-controls-what-in-syria-in-maps
