How many state-based conflict deaths in Syria will be reported by ACLED for the month of July, 2025?
Here’s what Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai predicts today:
Considering the current intensity, remaining days in July, and the key assumptions outlined above, I assess the probabilities as follows:
Less than 100: 1%
Between 100 and 250: 3%
Between 250 and 500: 8%
Between 500 and 1000: 28%
Greater than 1000: 60%
45–56 minutes read time
Perplexity response:
{think}
Okay, let’s tackle this question about how many state-based conflict deaths ACLED will report in Syria for July 2025. The user provided several search results, so I need to go through them carefully.
First, I see that result [1] from ReliefWeb mentions at least 321 Syrians killed as of July 18, 2025. That’s a significant number. But wait, the user’s question is about July 2025 as a whole, so this 321 is just up to mid-July. There’s still a week or so left in the month, right?
Then looking at result [4], the Daily Sun article from July 21 mentions 1,000 deaths. That’s a lot higher. But the date on that article is July 24, 2025, which seems a bit confusing because the current date given is July 24, 2025. Maybe the article was published on July 21, reporting up to that day. But 1,000 deaths would put the total over 1,000, but the user’s options go up to ‘Greater than 1000’. However, I need to check the sources again.
Result [2] from ACLED’s own site on July 18 discusses Israel’s strikes and the escalation in Suwaida. It mentions hundreds killed in the initial four days of clashes. But that’s part of the 321 figure in [1], perhaps?
Wait, [4] says the UN reports over 128,000 displaced and that calm has returned after violence that killed 1,000. That 1,000 seems much higher than the 321 from [1]. Maybe different time frames? Let me check the dates again.
Result [1] is from July 18, 2025, stating at least 321 killed, including Suwaida. Result [4] is published on July 24, 2025, but the content mentions the UN statement as of July 21, 2025, reporting 1,000 killed and 128,000 displaced. So there’s a discrepancy here. The sources might be referring to different periods or different incidents.
Wait, the user is asking specifically about ACLED’s reported deaths. The Resolution Criteria link points to an ACLED article from March 14, 2025, but that’s probably the methodology source. The actual data for July would come from other sources.
Result [2] is an expert comment from ACLED dated July 18, discussing the escalation and mentioning hundreds killed in the initial four days. But the exact number isn’t specified beyond “hundreds.” Result [4] cites the UN as reporting 1,000 deaths, but it’s unclear if that’s the same as ACLED’s numbers. The user wants ACLED’s figures, so maybe the UN data isn’t the same as ACLED’s.
Looking at result [3], it’s about US strikes in Trump’s first months, but in July 2025, which might not be directly relevant to Syria’s state-based conflict deaths. Result [5] is ACLED’s press and media page, but the content doesn’t seem to include July 2025 Syria death tolls.
So the key sources are [1], [2], and [4]. But there’s a conflict between 321 and 1,000. How to resolve this? Let’s check the dates again. The ReliefWeb article [1] is from July 18, reporting 321 killed as of July 13. Then result [4] from July 24 mentions 1,000 killed, but that might be a cumulative figure or a different area. Wait, [4] mentions south Syria, while [1] is about Suwaida Governorate. Maybe the 1,000 is a broader area including Suwaida and others.
Alternatively, perhaps the 1,000 figure in [4] includes not just Suwaida but other regions as well. The user is asking about Syria in July 2025, so if the total by July 24 is 1,000, but the month isn’t over, maybe the number will keep increasing. However, the options are ‘Greater than 1000’ and others. But according to [4], the UN reports 1,000 killed as of July 21, which would mean that at least 1,000 deaths have occurred. Since the month isn’t over, the final figure could be higher, but the user is asking for the reported number in July 2025. If the UN is already at 1,000 by mid-July, and there’s more days left, it’s possible ACLED might report more than 1,000. However, the user is asking about state-based conflict deaths, which might be a specific category. But the sources don’t differentiate between state-based and other conflict deaths. The 321 in [1] might be state-based, while 1,000 in [4] could include various actors.
Wait, result [2] from ACLED’s own site mentions that Israel’s strikes and clashes in Suwaida led to hundreds killed in the initial four days. Then in [4], the total is 1,000. But the UN figure in [4] might include all conflict-related deaths in south Syria. If ACLED’s count is similar, then the number could be over 1,000. However, the user wants ACLED’s reported numbers, not the UN’s. But in [1], the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) reports 321 as of July 13, but that might be a different monitoring group. ACLED’s own data isn’t explicitly given in the search results except for [2] and [5], which don’t provide a total number.
So, perhaps the most recent data is from [4], which mentions 1,000 deaths as of July 21, but it’s unclear if that’s ACLED’s figure. The user’s background points to ACLED’s own page for updates, but the provided search results don’t include an ACLED page with July data. The March 2025 link is about a different incident. Therefore, relying on the search results given, the only explicit numbers are 321 from SNHR [1] and 1,000 from the UN via Daily Sun [4]. Since the user wants ACLED’s numbers, but the search results don’t provide ACLED’s specific count for July, we might have to infer based on available data.
Alternatively, the ACLED expert comment in [2] mentions hundreds killed in the initial four days of clashes in Suwaida, but that’s part of the 321 figure. However, the 1,000 figure in [4] is more recent (July 21) and includes a larger area. If we consider that, and given that July isn’t over yet, the total could exceed 1,000. But the options include ‘Greater than 1000’, which might be the case if the 1,000 is already met and there’s more time. However, without explicit ACLED data, it’s challenging. The user might need to go with the highest reported figure from reliable sources, which is 1,000, leading to ‘Greater than 1000’ as the answer. But wait, the options have ‘Between 500 and 1000’ and ‘Greater than 1000’. If 1,000 is the number, but the month isn’t over, would it go higher? The user is asking for the number reported by ACLED in July 2025. If ACLED’s data up to July 24 (current date) is aligned with the UN’s 1,000, then ‘Greater than 1000’ would be the case. However, the search results don’t explicitly state ACLED’s numbers, only third-party reports. This is a bit of a dilemma.
Alternatively, maybe the 321 is part of the 1,000 total. If the 1,000 is a broader figure including more days or regions, then ACLED’s count might align closer to that. But without knowing ACLED’s methodology, it’s hard to say. Given the information available, the most recent figure mentioned is 1,000, so the answer might be ‘Greater than 1000’. However, the user’s options include that, so I would lean towards that, but I need to check if there’s any reason to think ACLED’s number would be lower. If the 1,000 is from the UN, which might count differently, ACLED’s number could be different. But since the user wants ACLED’s figure, and the search results don’t have it, but the latest mentions 1,000, maybe that’s the closest we can get. Therefore, the answer would be ‘Greater than 1000’.
**Citations and Key Details**
1. **ReliefWeb: Updated Figures on Suwaida Violence (July 18)**
– Reports 321+ deaths ( includings 6 children, 9 women) as of July 13.
– Documents clashes in Suwaida Governorate involving Druze militias and regime forces[1].
– Source: Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR)[1].
2. **ACLED Expert Comment on Israeli Campaign (July 18)**
– Details Israel’s strikes in Suwaida, Daraa, and Damascus.
– Notes intercommunal violence surge in Suwaida, with “hundreds killed” in initial clashes[2].
– Mentions UN reports of summary executions by regime-linked forces[2].
3. **Daily Sun: South Syria Violence Update (July 24)**
– Reports UN figure of 1,000+ deaths and 128,000 displaced.
– Attributes calm restoration post-violence, with focus on southern Syria[4].
– Mentions July 21 as the cutoff for this data[4].
4. **ACLED Press & Media (July 18)**
– General overview of ACLED methodologies, but no direct Syria July 2025 figures[5].
– Highlights ACLED’s role in tracking political violence globally[5].
5. **AA.com.tr: US Strikes Data (July 22)**
– Primarily discusses U.S. military action in Yemen/Afghanistan; not directly relevant to Syria[3].
—
**Synthesis and Analysis**
Recent reports indicate escalating violence in Syria, particularly in **Suwaida** (_Cluster A_) and **southern regions** (_Cluster B_):
– **Cluster A: Suwaida Governorate (July 13–18)**
– SNHR reports at least 321 deaths, including civilians[1].
– ACLED’s expert analysis confirms “hundreds killed” in early clashes, with regime-linked forces accused of executions[2].
– **Cluster B: South Syria (July 21–24)**
– UN cites 1,000+ deaths and 128,000 displaced, attributed to broader sectarian clashes and regime intervention[4].
**Key Uncertainties**:
1. **ACLED’s Classification**: The term “state-based conflict deaths” may exclude non-state actor clashes (e.g., militia vs. tribes). If ACLED categorizes regime-linked forces as “state actors,” the 1,000+ figure[4] could align.
2. **Temporal Overlap**: July 13–21 data suggests accelerating violence. With 5–7 days remaining in July, totals may exceed 1,000.
**Most Likely Resolution**:
Given the UN’s 1,000+ death toll by July 21[4] and ongoing clashes, ACLED’s July 2025 count for Syria is likely in the **”Greater than 1000″** range. This aligns with the higher end of reported casualties and the unresolved conflict dynamics.
—
*Note: ACLED’s explicit July 2025 Syria data is unavailable in provided sources, but contextual reports suggest exceeding 1,000 deaths.*
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AskNews Deep Usage:
prompt_tokens=19611 completion_tokens=1994 total_tokens=0
AskNews Deep Search Response:
To assess state-based conflict deaths in Syria for July 2025, **the most recent and critical data points focus on sectarian violence in Sweida province** beginning July 13, with key ACLED-relevant updates from authoritative and recent sources (July 9–24, 2025):
### 1. **Sweida Province Conflict Dynamics**
– **Over 1,000 fatalities** reported in Druze-Bedouin clashes in Sweida between July 13–23, per multiple NGOs and media outlets. Ceasefire agreements ([12][19]) were repeatedly violated, leading to sustained high casualties [5][8][16].
– Syrian government forces intervened, suffering casualties and engaging in armed clashes, making this a state-involved conflict [16][21].
### 2. **Key Citations and Statistics**
1. **[5] Le Monde (July 23):** Over 1,000 deaths in Sweida since July 13, per transitional government investigations.
2. **[8] France 24 (July 22):** 1,000+ deaths attributed to sectarian fighting and Israeli airstrikes, displacing 93,000 people.
3. **[11] ReliefWeb (July 21):** 1,120 deaths reported since July 13, with displacement of 92,600 people.
4. **[16] ga.de (July 19):** 940 total fatalities in Sweida by mid-July, including 406 deaths in the province.
### 3. **Ceasefire Impact and Trends**
– A ceasefire announced July 18 ([11][12]) temporarily reduced violence, but clashes resumed before month-end [13][23]. Local sources indicate fatalities continued to accumulate into late July [5][8].
### 4. **Resolution Source Context**
– ACLED’s resolution criteria source (linked) was not directly quoted in results, but NGO and UN data (e.g., Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, Syrian Network for Human Rights) align with ACLED’s methodology for tracking state-linked violence.
### 5. **Limitations and Expert Opinions**
– Discrepancies in fatality counts exist (e.g., [19] cites 321 deaths by July 18, while [5][8] report over 1,000 by July 23), likely due to varying reporting timelines and actor classifications.
– **Most recent consensus (July 23–24)** points to **≥1,000 fatalities** in Sweida alone, with additional state-linked deaths in Damascus and Daraa from Israeli strikes [18][21].
### Conclusion:
Given the escalation in Sweida and recurring state-involved clashes, **ACLED is likely to report between 500–1,000 state-based conflict deaths** for July 2025. However, if Sweida’s casualties are fully attributed to state forces and allied groups (per [5][8][16]), the total could exceed 1,000. **The most defensible range is “Between 500 and 1000″**, considering potential lags in ACLED’s verification process and partial attribution of casualties.
**[Key citations: 5][8][11][16][23]**
GPT News Summary:
Here is a concise and detailed rundown of the most relevant news regarding state-based conflict deaths in Syria as of late July 2025:
1. **Sectarian Violence and Clashes in Coastal Syria**:
– Recent reports indicate that over 1,426 people were killed in sectarian violence in the coastal regions of Latakia and Tartus in March 2025. These incidents have been attributed to a large-scale attack by approximately 200,000 non-government-affiliated armed fighters. The violence was motivated by revenge rather than ideological reasons (Al Jazeera, July 22, 2025; Daily Sabah, July 22, 2025; AA, July 22, 2025).
– The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that between July 13 and now, 1,265 people have been killed in Syria, suggesting ongoing conflict despite a ceasefire (Rojeva Kurd, July 22, 2025).
2. **Ongoing Conflict and Tension in Northern and Western Syria**:
– Despite the ceasefire, hostilities have resumed, particularly with drone bombings reported in the city of Shehba, resulting in civilian casualties (Rojeva Kurd, July 22, 2025).
– Sectarian violence remains a concern, as indicated by a recent attack on a church, killing at least 25 civilians (ReliefWeb, July 7, 2025).
3. **Internal Reports and Government Reactions**:
– A Syrian investigation committee has issued a final report, emphasizing a lack of conclusive evidence but recommending systematic reforms and further investigations into the March violence. The report calls for legal reforms and reparations for victims (Haberler, July 22, 2025).
– The Syrian government has vowed to prevent future violations, suggesting an increased focus on national dialogue and social cohesion (Arab48, July 20, 2025).
4. **Humanitarian Concerns and Responses**:
– Human Rights Watch and international organizations have raised concerns about abuses and the potential for permanent displacement due to ongoing violence (WSLS, July 22, 2025; AA, July 22, 2025).
– The Syrian Arab Red Crescent is actively working on evacuations and providing aid amidst continued violence in southern Sweida province (WSLS, July 22, 2025).
This information underscores a continuation of violence and instability in Syria, with a complex mix of sectarianism, revenge-driven attacks, and government efforts to manage the aftermath of significant past incidents. The data from these reports and monitoring suggest that conflict-related fatalities are expected to continue, impacting the number of deaths that ACLED might report for July 2025.
Extracted resolution criteria links:
[‘https://acleddata.com/2025/03/14/q-a-what-happened-in-the-coastal-region-of-syria-last-week/’]
________________________
Claude Vision analysis response:
The image shows a Cloudflare security check page for acleddata.com, which is verifying that the user is human. This appears to be a standard security verification screen that appears before accessing the website.
There is no actual data about conflict deaths in Syria displayed on this page. The image simply shows a security verification screen with text indicating “Verifying you are human. This may take a few seconds.” and “acleddata.com needs to review the security of your connection before proceeding.”
The image contains no current values, datapoints, trends, or other information that would be useful for predicting future conflict deaths in Syria. It’s merely a security gateway page before accessing the ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project) website, which would presumably contain the relevant data.
To properly forecast state-based conflict deaths in Syria for July 2025, one would need to access the actual ACLED data beyond this security screen.
Adjacent Markets Research:
No relevant and active prediction markets found.
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Anthropic response:
# Analysis of State-Based Conflict Deaths in Syria for July 2025
## Synthesizing the Available Information
Based on the research assistants’ reports, there appears to be significant ongoing violence in Syria during July 2025, particularly focused on the Suwaida (Sweida) region where sectarian violence between Druze militias and regime forces/Bedouin groups has escalated. The information points to a substantial death toll, though there are some discrepancies in the exact figures reported by different sources.
The first research assistant cites a ReliefWeb report indicating at least 321 deaths as of July 13, while also noting a UN figure of over 1,000 deaths by July 21. The second assistant provides more detailed information about Sweida province specifically, with multiple sources citing over 1,000 fatalities between July 13-23. The third assistant mentions 1,265 deaths reported by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights between July 13 and the current date (July 24).
## Key Considerations for ACLED’s Reporting
1. **State-Based Classification**: The question specifically asks about “state-based conflict deaths” that will be reported by ACLED. This is crucial because not all violence in Syria necessarily qualifies as state-based conflict. ACLED typically classifies state-based violence as involving at least one government actor. The information suggests significant government involvement in the current violence, with regime forces participating in the Suwaida clashes.
2. **Timing**: The violence appears to have started around July 13, and today is July 24. This means we have data for approximately 11 days of the month, with 7 days remaining. If the violence continues at similar rates, the total could increase significantly.
3. **Verification and Reporting Delays**: ACLED often has a verification process that may result in some lag between events and their inclusion in official tallies. The final figures for July might not be immediately available at month’s end.
4. **Multiple Conflict Zones**: While Suwaida is the focal point, there are reports of violence in other areas including Damascus and Daraa, which could contribute to the total state-based conflict death count.
## Statistical Analysis and Trend Extrapolation
If we use the most consistent figure of around 1,000 deaths in approximately 10 days (July 13-23), this suggests a rate of about 100 deaths per day. If this rate continued through the end of July, we might expect an additional 700 deaths, bringing the total to around 1,700. However, there are reports of a ceasefire, which, even if partially effective, might reduce the daily death rate for the remainder of the month.
## Critical Assumptions and Their Uncertainties
1. **Classification of Deaths**: I’m assuming ACLED will classify a significant portion of the Suwaida violence as state-based conflict due to regime involvement. If ACLED uses a stricter definition or classifies much of this as communal violence (non-state), the total could be much lower. Probability of this assumption being incorrect: 30%
2. **Continuation of Violence**: I’m assuming the violence will continue at a somewhat reduced rate through the end of July. If a ceasefire holds more effectively than expected, the total could be lower. Conversely, if violence escalates further, the total could be even higher. Probability of this assumption being incorrect: 25%
3. **Reporting Accuracy**: I’m assuming that the current reports from various NGOs and news sources are broadly accurate. If there’s significant over-reporting or double-counting in these preliminary figures, the final ACLED tally could be lower. Probability of this assumption being incorrect: 20%
## Final Assessment
Given the extensive evidence pointing to over 1,000 conflict-related deaths by July 21-23, with state involvement clearly documented, and considering that July isn’t yet over, there is a high probability that ACLED will report more than 1,000 state-based conflict deaths for July 2025. However, the uncertainty around classification and potential effectiveness of ceasefire efforts creates some doubt.
If ACLED classifies a significant portion of these deaths as non-state violence, the final count could fall in the 500-1000 range. There is a smaller but still significant possibility that stricter classification and verification processes could reduce the count further to the 250-500 range.
Given the multiple sources confirming high death tolls with state involvement, it seems highly unlikely that the count would fall below 250.
Less than 100: 2
Between 100 and 250: 5
Between 250 and 500: 15
Between 500 and 1000: 28
Greater than 1000: 50
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 100’: 0.02, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.05, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.15, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.28, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.5}
________________________
Anthropic response:
# Analysis of State-Based Conflict Deaths in Syria (July 2025)
## Current Situation Assessment
Based on the research assistants’ reports, we have multiple sources reporting on conflict deaths in Syria for July 2025, with some variations in the numbers. The most critical information comes from the sectarian violence in Sweida province that began around July 13, 2025. According to multiple sources, this conflict has resulted in a significant number of deaths:
1. Le Monde (July 23) and France 24 (July 22) report over 1,000 deaths in Sweida since July 13.
2. ReliefWeb (July 21) reports 1,120 deaths since July 13, with displacement of 92,600 people.
3. Another source (ga.de, July 19) reports 940 total fatalities in Sweida by mid-July.
The conflict appears to involve state forces, with Syrian government forces intervening and suffering casualties, making this a state-involved conflict relevant to ACLED’s state-based conflict death tracking.
## Timeframe Considerations
Today is July 24, 2025, and we’re predicting the total number ACLED will report for the entire month of July 2025. This means:
1. We already have data for approximately 24 days of the month (July 1-24).
2. There are 7 more days left in July (July 25-31) for additional deaths to occur.
3. ACLED may have some lag in their reporting and verification processes.
## Analysis of State-Based Conflict Deaths
The primary question is how many of these reported deaths will be classified by ACLED as “state-based conflict deaths.” This is a critical distinction as not all violence-related deaths would necessarily count under ACLED’s methodology.
ACLED typically defines state-based violence as organized violence involving at least one state actor (typically government forces). The reports indicate that Syrian government forces have been involved in the Sweida conflict, suggesting many of these deaths would qualify.
However, there are some key considerations:
1. **Attribution uncertainty**: Not all of the 1,000+ deaths reported may be attributed to state-based conflict. Some may be categorized as communal violence or non-state actor violence.
2. **Verification processes**: ACLED has its own verification methodology, which may result in lower confirmed numbers than what media sources report.
3. **Ongoing conflict**: With a week left in July, and ceasefire violations reported, the death toll is likely to continue rising.
## Historical Context and Trends
Syria has experienced varying levels of conflict intensity over the years. While I don’t have specific recent historical ACLED data in the provided information, the current situation appears to represent a significant escalation, particularly in Sweida province.
The reports suggest this is one of the more severe outbreaks of violence in recent times, with sectarian tensions, government intervention, and even Israeli airstrikes contributing to the death toll.
## Key Assumptions and Their Probabilities
1. **ACLED’s attribution rate**: I assume that 60-80% of the reported deaths will be classified as state-based conflict deaths by ACLED. There’s a 30% chance this assumption is wrong, which would significantly alter the forecast if ACLED uses a much narrower definition for state-based deaths.
2. **Continuation of violence**: I assume that violence will continue at a moderate pace for the remaining days of July, adding perhaps 100-200 more deaths to the total. There’s a 40% chance this assumption is wrong – either violence could escalate dramatically or a sustainable ceasefire could take hold.
3. **Reporting accuracy**: I assume the current reports of 1,000+ deaths are reasonably accurate. There’s a 25% chance this assumption is wrong, with actual numbers being significantly higher or lower due to reporting biases or limitations.
## Final Assessment
Given that multiple sources report over 1,000 deaths by July 21-23, and considering that:
– Some portion of these will be classified as state-based
– Additional deaths will likely occur in the remaining days of July
– The conflict involves government forces
I believe the most likely outcome is that ACLED will report more than 1,000 state-based conflict deaths in Syria for July 2025. However, there is significant uncertainty, particularly regarding ACLED’s specific attribution methodology and verification processes.
The second most likely outcome is between 500-1,000 deaths, which would occur if ACLED attributes a smaller portion of the reported deaths to state-based conflict, or if their verification process results in lower confirmed numbers.
The options below 500 deaths seem highly unlikely given the current reporting, unless ACLED’s methodology differs dramatically from what we anticipate.
Less than 100: 1
Between 100 and 250: 3
Between 250 and 500: 12
Between 500 and 1000: 29
Greater than 1000: 55
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 100’: 0.01, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.03, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.12, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.29, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.55}
________________________
Anthropic response:
# Analysis of State-Based Conflict Deaths in Syria for July 2025
## Current Situation Assessment
Based on the research assistants’ reports, there is an ongoing serious conflict in Syria as of July 2025, with particular intensity in Suwaida (also spelled Sweida) province. This conflict appears to involve multiple parties, including Syrian government forces, Druze militias, Bedouin groups, and possibly other actors. The conflict escalated significantly starting around July 13, 2025.
Multiple sources provide casualty estimates, with varying figures:
– The Syrian Network for Human Rights reported at least 321 deaths as of July 13
– One research assistant cites reports of 940 fatalities in Sweida by mid-July
– Several sources, including Le Monde (July 23) and France 24 (July 22), report over 1,000 deaths
– ReliefWeb (July 21) cites 1,120 deaths since July 13
– Another research assistant mentions 1,265 deaths reported by SOHR between July 13 and July 22
A ceasefire was reportedly announced around July 18, but reports indicate it was violated and violence continued.
## ACLED Classification Considerations
The question specifically asks about “state-based conflict deaths” as reported by ACLED. This is a critical distinction, as not all deaths in the conflict may be classified as “state-based” by ACLED’s methodology.
ACLED defines state-based violence as involving at least one government actor. While the research indicates that Syrian government forces are involved in the conflict, it’s unclear what proportion of the total deaths would be classified as “state-based” versus other categories like “communal violence” (which ACLED tracks separately).
The reports suggest the conflict involves both state forces and inter-communal violence between Druze and Bedouin groups. Some of the deaths may be categorized differently depending on ACLED’s assessment of which actors were directly involved.
## Time Period Analysis
Today is July 24, 2025, and we’re predicting the total for the month of July 2025. This means:
1. We have data up to approximately July 22-23 from various sources
2. There are 7-8 days remaining in the month
3. The conflict appears to be ongoing despite ceasefire attempts
## Key Uncertainties
1. **ACLED’s Classification Methodology**: What portion of the reported deaths will ACLED classify as “state-based” rather than communal or other categories? If the majority of deaths are from Druze-Bedouin fighting without direct state involvement, ACLED might report a lower number than the total conflict deaths.
– Probability of significant difference between total deaths and state-based deaths: 65%
2. **Continuation of Violence**: Will the violence continue at the same intensity for the remainder of July, increase, or decrease?
– Probability of continued high-intensity violence: 70%
– Probability of significant de-escalation: 30%
3. **Reporting Delays**: ACLED data typically involves some delay in collection and verification. Will all July events be captured in their July report?
– Probability of significant reporting delays affecting the July total: 45%
## Statistical Projections
The most recent reliable figures suggest:
– 1,000+ deaths over approximately 10 days (July 13-23)
– This averages to roughly 100 deaths per day during this intense period
– If this rate continued for the remaining 7-8 days of July, it would add 700-800 more deaths
However, considering:
– The ceasefire attempt suggests some desire to reduce violence
– Conflict intensity often fluctuates rather than maintaining peak levels
– Not all deaths may be classified as “state-based”
## Forecast Rationale
Looking at the multiple sources of information, it appears that by July 22-23, the total conflict deaths were already over 1,000. However, the key question is how many of these ACLED will classify as “state-based.”
If we assume that approximately 60-80% of the deaths involved state actors (given Syrian government involvement), and considering the reported 1,000+ deaths by July 22-23, plus additional deaths likely to occur in the remaining days of July, the most probable outcome is that ACLED will report more than 1,000 state-based conflict deaths for July 2025.
However, if ACLED classifies a significant portion of the Druze-Bedouin violence as communal rather than state-based, the number could fall into the 500-1,000 range.
Given the magnitude of the reported violence, the involvement of government forces, and the ongoing nature of the conflict, it is extremely unlikely that the state-based conflict deaths would be less than 250 for the month.
## Final Probability Assessment
Weighing all factors, including classification uncertainties and the remaining days in the month:
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 3
Option_C: 8
Option_D: 28
Option_E: 60
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 100’: 0.01, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.03, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.08, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.28, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.6}
Gemini Multiple Choice response:
The forecast for state-based conflict deaths in Syria during July 2025 by ACLED hinges on synthesizing recent, high-impact casualty reports and accounting for ACLED’s specific methodology and potential reporting lags. The available information strongly indicates a significant escalation of violence, primarily centered around the Suwaida/Sweida Governorate and broader southern Syria.
Multiple independent sources report substantial death tolls for the period between July 13 and July 23, 2025. ReliefWeb, citing the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), reported at least 321 deaths as of July 13. More critically, by July 21-23, several outlets including Le Monde, France 24, and ReliefWeb, citing various NGOs and the UN, indicated that fatalities in Sweida and surrounding areas had surpassed 1,000, with specific figures like 1,120 and 1,265 being mentioned. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) also reported 1,265 people killed between July 13 and July 22 [RA3]. These figures represent cumulative deaths over approximately two to three weeks of July.
The key factor for this forecast is whether these reported deaths qualify as “state-based conflict deaths” under ACLED’s classification. The provided context explicitly mentions the involvement of Syrian government forces and “regime-linked groups” in the clashes. This direct or indirect participation by state actors makes it highly probable that a substantial portion of these fatalities will be categorized as state-based conflict deaths by ACLED.
Considering that the current date is July 24, 2025, the vast majority of July’s events have already transpired. The reported death tolls, which are already well over 1,000 by the third week of the month, suggest that the final reported figure for the entire month will likely remain high. While there is a possibility that ACLED’s verification process or specific attribution rules might result in a slightly lower number than preliminary NGO or media tallies, it is unlikely to drastically reduce the figure to below 500, given the consistent reporting of large-scale fatalities across multiple credible sources.
The primary uncertainty lies in whether ACLED’s final count will be precisely 1,000 (which would fall into the “Between 500 and 1000” category) or truly “Greater than 1000.” The fact that several sources already specify numbers like 1,120 or 1,265 strongly points towards the total exceeding 1,000. Therefore, the “Greater than 1000” category is the most probable outcome.
**Assumptions and their implications:**
1. **Assumption: A significant majority of the reported 1,000+ deaths in Sweida/south Syria will be classified by ACLED as “state-based conflict deaths.”**
* **Probability of failure:** Low. Reports consistently mention government or regime-linked forces’ involvement, aligning with ACLED’s definition of state-based conflict. If a large portion were reclassified as non-state violence, the forecast would be significantly altered, pushing numbers lower.
2. **Assumption: ACLED’s final verified count for July 2025 will broadly align with the magnitude of fatalities reported by other major humanitarian and media organizations for the same period.**
* **Probability of failure:** Moderate. ACLED’s methodology can lead to variations compared to other trackers due to stricter verification, temporal lags, or specific event definitions. If ACLED’s data proves to be significantly more conservative, the final number could fall just below 1,000, shifting the outcome to the “Between 500 and 1000” category.
Given the current information, the most robust forecast points towards the higher end of the spectrum.
Less than 100: 0
Between 100 and 250: 0
Between 250 and 500: 1
Between 500 and 1000: 15
Greater than 1000: 84
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 100’: 0.00980392156862745, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.00980392156862745, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.00980392156862745, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.14705882352941177, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.8235294117647058}
All predictions:
[{‘Less than 100’: 0.02, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.05, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.15, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.28, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.5}, {‘Less than 100’: 0.01, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.03, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.12, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.29, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.55}, {‘Less than 100’: 0.01, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.03, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.08, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.28, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.6}, {‘Less than 100’: 0.00980392156862745, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.00980392156862745, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.00980392156862745, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.14705882352941177, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.8235294117647058}]
Filtered predictions:
[{‘Less than 100’: 0.01, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.03, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.12, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.29, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.55}, {‘Less than 100’: 0.01, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.03, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.08, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.28, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.6}]
Averaged predictions:
{‘Less than 100’: 0.02, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.05, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.15, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.28, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.5}
Median reasoning:
All Predictions:
[{‘Less than 100’: 0.02, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.05, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.15, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.28, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.5}, {‘Less than 100’: 0.01, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.03, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.12, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.29, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.55}, {‘Less than 100’: 0.01, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.03, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.08, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.28, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.6}, {‘Less than 100’: 0.00980392156862745, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.00980392156862745, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.00980392156862745, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.14705882352941177, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.8235294117647058}]
Median Reasoning:
EXTRACTED_PROBABILITIES: [1, 3, 8, 28, 60]
Model’s Answer:
# Analysis of State-Based Conflict Deaths in Syria for July 2025
## Current Situation Assessment
Based on the research assistants’ reports, there is an ongoing serious conflict in Syria as of July 2025, with particular intensity in Suwaida (also spelled Sweida) province. This conflict appears to involve multiple parties, including Syrian government forces, Druze militias, Bedouin groups, and possibly other actors. The conflict escalated significantly starting around July 13, 2025.
Multiple sources provide casualty estimates, with varying figures:
– The Syrian Network for Human Rights reported at least 321 deaths as of July 13
– One research assistant cites reports of 940 fatalities in Sweida by mid-July
– Several sources, including Le Monde (July 23) and France 24 (July 22), report over 1,000 deaths
– ReliefWeb (July 21) cites 1,120 deaths since July 13
– Another research assistant mentions 1,265 deaths reported by SOHR between July 13 and July 22
A ceasefire was reportedly announced around July 18, but reports indicate it was violated and violence continued.
## ACLED Classification Considerations
The question specifically asks about “state-based conflict deaths” as reported by ACLED. This is a critical distinction, as not all deaths in the conflict may be classified as “state-based” by ACLED’s methodology.
ACLED defines state-based violence as involving at least one government actor. While the research indicates that Syrian government forces are involved in the conflict, it’s unclear what proportion of the total deaths would be classified as “state-based” versus other categories like “communal violence” (which ACLED tracks separately).
The reports suggest the conflict involves both state forces and inter-communal violence between Druze and Bedouin groups. Some of the deaths may be categorized differently depending on ACLED’s assessment of which actors were directly involved.
## Time Period Analysis
Today is July 24, 2025, and we’re predicting the total for the month of July 2025. This means:
1. We have data up to approximately July 22-23 from various sources
2. There are 7-8 days remaining in the month
3. The conflict appears to be ongoing despite ceasefire attempts
## Key Uncertainties
1. **ACLED’s Classification Methodology**: What portion of the reported deaths will ACLED classify as “state-based” rather than communal or other categories? If the majority of deaths are from Druze-Bedouin fighting without direct state involvement, ACLED might report a lower number than the total conflict deaths.
– Probability of significant difference between total deaths and state-based deaths: 65%
2. **Continuation of Violence**: Will the violence continue at the same intensity for the remainder of July, increase, or decrease?
– Probability of continued high-intensity violence: 70%
– Probability of significant de-escalation: 30%
3. **Reporting Delays**: ACLED data typically involves some delay in collection and verification. Will all July events be captured in their July report?
– Probability of significant reporting delays affecting the July total: 45%
## Statistical Projections
The most recent reliable figures suggest:
– 1,000+ deaths over approximately 10 days (July 13-23)
– This averages to roughly 100 deaths per day during this intense period
– If this rate continued for the remaining 7-8 days of July, it would add 700-800 more deaths
However, considering:
– The ceasefire attempt suggests some desire to reduce violence
– Conflict intensity often fluctuates rather than maintaining peak levels
– Not all deaths may be classified as “state-based”
## Forecast Rationale
Looking at the multiple sources of information, it appears that by July 22-23, the total conflict deaths were already over 1,000. However, the key question is how many of these ACLED will classify as “state-based.”
If we assume that approximately 60-80% of the deaths involved state actors (given Syrian government involvement), and considering the reported 1,000+ deaths by July 22-23, plus additional deaths likely to occur in the remaining days of July, the most probable outcome is that ACLED will report more than 1,000 state-based conflict deaths for July 2025.
However, if ACLED classifies a significant portion of the Druze-Bedouin violence as communal rather than state-based, the number could fall into the 500-1,000 range.
Given the magnitude of the reported violence, the involvement of government forces, and the ongoing nature of the conflict, it is extremely unlikely that the state-based conflict deaths would be less than 250 for the month.
## Final Probability Assessment
Weighing all factors, including classification uncertainties and the remaining days in the month:
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 3
Option_C: 8
Option_D: 28
Option_E: 60
=== Forecast Result ===
{
“probability_yes”: null,
“probability_yes_per_category”: {
“Less than 100”: 0.01,
“Between 100 and 250”: 0.03,
“Between 250 and 500”: 0.1,
“Between 500 and 1000”: 0.28500000000000003,
“Greater than 1000”: 0.575
},
“continuous_cdf”: null
}
=== Reasoning ===
All Predictions:
[{‘Less than 100’: 0.02, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.05, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.15, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.28, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.5}, {‘Less than 100’: 0.01, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.03, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.12, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.29, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.55}, {‘Less than 100’: 0.01, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.03, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.08, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.28, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.6}, {‘Less than 100’: 0.00980392156862745, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.00980392156862745, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.00980392156862745, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.14705882352941177, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.8235294117647058}]
Median Reasoning:
EXTRACTED_PROBABILITIES: [1, 3, 8, 28, 60]
Model’s Answer:
# Analysis of State-Based Conflict Deaths in Syria for July 2025
## Current Situation Assessment
Based on the research assistants’ reports, there is an ongoing serious conflict in Syria as of July 2025, with particular intensity in Suwaida (also spelled Sweida) province. This conflict appears to involve multiple parties, including Syrian government forces, Druze militias, Bedouin groups, and possibly other actors. The conflict escalated significantly starting around July 13, 2025.
Multiple sources provide casualty estimates, with varying figures:
– The Syrian Network for Human Rights reported at least 321 deaths as of July 13
– One research assistant cites reports of 940 fatalities in Sweida by mid-July
– Several sources, including Le Monde (July 23) and France 24 (July 22), report over 1,000 deaths
– ReliefWeb (July 21) cites 1,120 deaths since July 13
– Another research assistant mentions 1,265 deaths reported by SOHR between July 13 and July 22
A ceasefire was reportedly announced around July 18, but reports indicate it was violated and violence continued.
## ACLED Classification Considerations
The question specifically asks about “state-based conflict deaths” as reported by ACLED. This is a critical distinction, as not all deaths in the conflict may be classified as “state-based” by ACLED’s methodology.
ACLED defines state-based violence as involving at least one government actor. While the research indicates that Syrian government forces are involved in the conflict, it’s unclear what proportion of the total deaths would be classified as “state-based” versus other categories like “communal violence” (which ACLED tracks separately).
The reports suggest the conflict involves both state forces and inter-communal violence between Druze and Bedouin groups. Some of the deaths may be categorized differently depending on ACLED’s assessment of which actors were directly involved.
## Time Period Analysis
Today is July 24, 2025, and we’re predicting the total for the month of July 2025. This means:
1. We have data up to approximately July 22-23 from various sources
2. There are 7-8 days remaining in the month
3. The conflict appears to be ongoing despite ceasefire attempts
## Key Uncertainties
1. **ACLED’s Classification Methodology**: What portion of the reported deaths will ACLED classify as “state-based” rather than communal or other categories? If the majority of deaths are from Druze-Bedouin fighting without direct state involvement, ACLED might report a lower number than the total conflict deaths.
– Probability of significant difference between total deaths and state-based deaths: 65%
2. **Continuation of Violence**: Will the violence continue at the same intensity for the remainder of July, increase, or decrease?
– Probability of continued high-intensity violence: 70%
– Probability of significant de-escalation: 30%
3. **Reporting Delays**: ACLED data typically involves some delay in collection and verification. Will all July events be captured in their July report?
– Probability of significant reporting delays affecting the July total: 45%
## Statistical Projections
The most recent reliable figures suggest:
– 1,000+ deaths over approximately 10 days (July 13-23)
– This averages to roughly 100 deaths per day during this intense period
– If this rate continued for the remaining 7-8 days of July, it would add 700-800 more deaths
However, considering:
– The ceasefire attempt suggests some desire to reduce violence
– Conflict intensity often fluctuates rather than maintaining peak levels
– Not all deaths may be classified as “state-based”
## Forecast Rationale
Looking at the multiple sources of information, it appears that by July 22-23, the total conflict deaths were already over 1,000. However, the key question is how many of these ACLED will classify as “state-based.”
If we assume that approximately 60-80% of the deaths involved state actors (given Syrian government involvement), and considering the reported 1,000+ deaths by July 22-23, plus additional deaths likely to occur in the remaining days of July, the most probable outcome is that ACLED will report more than 1,000 state-based conflict deaths for July 2025.
However, if ACLED classifies a significant portion of the Druze-Bedouin violence as communal rather than state-based, the number could fall into the 500-1,000 range.
Given the magnitude of the reported violence, the involvement of government forces, and the ongoing nature of the conflict, it is extremely unlikely that the state-based conflict deaths would be less than 250 for the month.
## Final Probability Assessment
Weighing all factors, including classification uncertainties and the remaining days in the month:Less than 100: 1%
Between 100 and 250: 3%
Between 250 and 500: 8%
Between 500 and 1000: 28%
Greater than 1000: 60%
Past forecasts by Phil’s and Jeremy ’s bots —>
Below, a forecast of state-based conflict fatalities for Syria in the VIEWS machine forecasting competition, which is an aggregate of the forecasts of twenty competitors. Our botmasters, Phil Godzin and Jeremy Lichtman, are conducting a side experiment with VIEWS.
