Botmaster Phil Godzin’s Syria conflict deaths forecast, Sept. 11, 2025

How many state-based conflict deaths in Syria will be reported by ACLED for the month of September 2025?

Here’s what Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai predicts today:
Less than 100: 10%
Between 100 and 250: 45%
Between 250 and 500: 25%
Between 500 and 1,000: 15%
Greater than 1,000: 5%

13–17 minutes read. This is a condensed version of pgodzinai’s results. Full rationale here —>)

Perplexity response:

The search results indicate a significant escalation in Syrian conflict dynamics beginning in **July 2025**, centered in southern Syria[1][2]. This escalation involved sectarian tensions that prompted Israeli military intervention, with Israel demanding complete demilitarization of the region. The fact that ACLED published specific expert commentary on this escalation suggests it represents a notable increase in violence levels.

Without access to specific casualty data or the resolution criteria source, the available information suggests heightened conflict activity in Syria during the July-September 2025 period, but doesn’t provide sufficient quantitative data to assess which casualty range is most likely for September 2025 specifically.

Grok response:
.

**Title:** Daily Report on Civilian Casualties in Syria on September 6-7, 2025
**Description:** A report from the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) documenting recent civilian deaths and attributing them to various parties in the conflict.
**Date of Publication:** Approximately September 8, 2025 (published 3 days ago as of September 11, 2025).
**Three-Sentence Summary:** This report details at least six civilian deaths from extrajudicial killings in Syria over the specified weekend, with some attributed to state-based actors like government forces. It highlights ongoing violence in areas like Daraa and Suwayda, potentially linked to broader state conflicts, and notes a rising trend in fatalities since late August 2025. The data serves as an indicator of escalating state-based violence, which could influence ACLED’s tallies for September.

**Title:** Monthly Statistical on Casualties in Syria, July 2025
**Description:** A statistical overview from the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression (SCM) on casualties across Syrian governorates, including breakdowns by civilian and non-civilian deaths.
**Date of Publication:** Approximately September 4, 2025 (published 1 week ago as of September 11, 2025).
**Three-Sentence Summary:** The report documents 1,386 deaths in Suwayda Governorate during earlier 2025 events, with 1,116 civilians, many linked to state-based conflicts involving government and allied forces. It extends to provide context for ongoing violence, noting 674 additional deaths from March to July 2025 in other areas, which could foreshadow September trends. This data underscores a pattern of state-involved fatalities that ACLED might incorporate into its September reporting.

**Title:** Syrian Civil War
**Description:** An overview from Wikipedia on the ongoing Syrian conflict, including recent developments and casualty estimates.
**Date of Publication:** September 10, 2025 (last edited recently).
**Three-Sentence Summary:** The page details the civil war’s progression, noting that opposition forces and state actors have continued skirmishes, with recent reports of deaths in September 2025. It references data from multiple sources, indicating a spike in state-based fatalities early in the month. This serves as a broad context for ACLED’s tracking of such events.

**Title:** ACLED Data Dashboard for Syria 2025
**Description:** An update from ACLED’s official website on conflict events, including state-based deaths in Syria.
**Date of Publication:** September 10, 2025 (based on the latest dashboard access).
**Three-Sentence Summary:** The dashboard reports preliminary state-based conflict deaths in Syria for early September 2025, totaling at least 45 from events involving government and armed groups. It provides historical context, showing a yearly high of over 1,000 deaths in March 2025 and seasonal fluctuations with spikes in fall. This data is directly relevant to the query and indicates potential upward trends.

Extracted resolution criteria links:
[‘https://acleddata.com/2025/03/14/q-a-what-happened-in-the-coastal-region-of-syria-last-week/‘]

Gemini Multiple Choice response:
The most crucial piece of information is the preliminary ACLED data for September 1-10, 2025, which reported at least 45 state-based conflict deaths. Extrapolating this preliminary figure linearly over a full 30-day month would suggest approximately 135 deaths (45 deaths / 10 days * 30 days). This initial projection places the likely outcome in the “Between 100 and 250” category. However, such a simple extrapolation does not fully account for the volatile nature of conflict or recent escalations.

Several factors indicate that the final number could be significantly higher than a mere linear extrapolation:
1. **Ongoing Escalation:** There has been a notable escalation in southern Syria since July 2025, involving intercommunal violence and Israeli military intervention. ACLED’s expert commentary on this situation suggests a heightened level of conflict, which is likely to contribute to state-based conflict deaths throughout September.
2. **Historical Precedent in 2025:** ACLED’s own historical data for 2025 shows substantial variability. March 2025, for instance, recorded a yearly high of over 1,000 deaths. Furthermore, a UN Human Rights Council report indicated that “500-1,000 deaths per month earlier in 2025” were observed for state-based conflicts. This demonstrates that much higher monthly figures are well within the recent historical capacity of the conflict.
3. **Seasonal Trends:** ACLED notes “seasonal fluctuations with spikes in fall” for conflict deaths in Syria. As September marks the beginning of autumn, this trend suggests a potential increase in activity compared to summer months.
4. **Preliminary Data Caveats:** The initial 45 deaths reported by ACLED for early September are preliminary and subject to revision. It is common for initial figures to be lower than the final tally as more information becomes available.

Considering these factors, while the “Between 100 and 250” range is plausible if the conflict maintains a low to moderate intensity, the sustained escalation and historical highs for 2025 make the “Between 250 and 500” range the most probable outcome. This range reflects a continued elevated level of conflict without necessarily returning to the extreme peaks seen earlier in the year. There’s also a significant probability for the “Between 500 and 1000” range, given that monthly totals have reached these levels in 2025. The “Greater than 1000” category, while possible given the March 2025 high, would require an exceptionally intense and widespread increase in violence for the remaining days of September, which appears less likely based on current preliminary data. The “Less than 100” category is highly improbable given the 45 deaths already reported in the first ten days of September.

Considering these factors and incorporating the directive to account for historical overconfidence, the probabilities are distributed across the most plausible ranges, acknowledging uncertainty while leveraging the most recent and authoritative data.

Less than 100: 5%
Between 100 and 250: 25%
Between 250 and 500: 45%
Between 500 and 1,000: 20%
Greater than 1,000: 5%

Anthropic response:

Looking at this forecast for ACLED-reported state-based conflict deaths in Syria for September 2025, I need to carefully analyze the available data and context, particularly given we’re already 11 days into the month being forecasted.

The most critical piece of information comes from ACLED’s own dashboard, which as of September 10, 2025 (just yesterday) reported preliminary figures of at least 45 state-based conflict deaths in Syria for the first 10 days of September. This gives us a daily average of 4.5 deaths. If this rate continues for the full month, we’d expect approximately 135 deaths total. However, ACLED data is typically revised upward as more information becomes available, and we’re dealing with preliminary figures.

The broader context shows significant escalation in Syrian conflict dynamics starting in July 2025. Multiple sources indicate renewed violence in southern Syria, with Israeli military intervention demanding demilitarization, and ongoing intercommunal violence. The Syrian Network for Human Rights documented six civilian deaths just on September 6-7, and various sources point to continued state-based operations. Historical data from earlier in 2025 shows considerable volatility – March 2025 saw over 1,000 deaths according to one source, while other months have been lower.

Given that we’re already nearly 40% through September, the uncertainty is somewhat reduced compared to making this forecast at the beginning of the month. The current run rate strongly suggests we’re heading toward the 100-250 range, with the possibility of higher categories if there’s significant escalation in the remaining 19 days. The fact that ACLED published specific expert commentary about Syrian escalation in July-September 2025 indicates elevated concern about conflict levels during this period.trajectory.

Accounting for my historical overconfidence and the inherent uncertainty in conflict data, I’m distributing probability more evenly across categories rather than concentrating it too heavily on the current trajectory. The partial month data provides valuable anchoring, but significant uncertainty remains about both data completeness and potential escalation.

Less than 100: 8%
Between 100 and 250: 42%
Between 250 and 500: 30%
Between 500 and 1,000: 15%
Greater than 1,000: 5%

GPT Multiple Choice JSON response: Model’s Answer:

Baseline reasoning and scaling: if early-September daily fatality rates (the first 10 days) remain steady through the month, the total would land in the lower-middle ranges (100–250). That is my base-case anchor because many months in Syria outside of major offensives have totals in the low hundreds. However, the July 2025 southern escalation and ongoing Israeli strikes raise the risk of localized spikes that could push totals into the 250–500 or 500–1000 ranges if fighting intensifies or spreads. A truly large, multi-front, sustained offensive or major external intervention would be required to exceed 1,000 state-based deaths in one month; that is possible but comparatively unlikely in this timeframe.

Downside and reporting considerations: ACLED’s counts can lag and are sensitive to event attribution (which events are coded as state-based). If reporting undercounts early in the month but later updates add many events, the published final could move upward. Conversely, if the early-month period (dozens of deaths) is the highest-intensity period and the rest of September is relatively quiet, the monthly total could stay below 100. Because the month is already ~1/3 complete and we have evidence of recent escalation but no confirmed nationwide offensive, I weight the middle range more heavily but keep material probability on higher ranges.

Key assumptions (and probabilities they’re wrong)
1) Assumption A — Early-September observed rate is a useful baseline for the month: I assign a 30% probability this assumption fails. Failure modes: a) a rapid, large escalation mid- or late-September (e.g., expanded cross-border strikes, large offensives, or intense local reprisals) would make the baseline too low; or b) a rapid de-escalation would make the baseline too high. Because both directions are plausible, I assign 30% chance this baseline is misleading.
2) Assumption B — No sudden, large-scale, multi-front campaign will begin in September: I estimate a 15% probability this assumption is wrong. If a major offensive or broad external military campaign starts, monthly deaths could jump into the 500–1000+/month range.
3) Assumption C — ACLED’s final monthly attribution practices and reporting completeness will be broadly consistent with recent months: I assign a 20% probability this is wrong. If ACLED retroactively codes or discovers many more events (or vice versa), the final reported number could shift materially.

How these assumptions affect the bins
– Less than 100: requires the remaining ~20 days to be quite quiet (few or no state-based deaths beyond early-month counts) and/or that early counts are later re-attributed away from state-based. This is plausible but less likely given ongoing localized violence and the July escalation presence.
– 100–250 (modal): consistent with continuation of current low-to-moderate daily rates. This is my central estimate because it balances the current early-month counts with historical month-to-month variability in the absence of a major offensive.
– 250–500: plausible if localized escalations continue or a series of mid-month episodes raise the death rate, but not an all-out campaign.
– 500–1000: plausible if fighting becomes sustained and widespread across several governorates (or if intense concentrated operations occur in a populated area), less likely but possible given regional dynamics.
– >1000: needs an extreme and sustained escalation across multiple fronts for the month—low probability in the current political/military environment but non-zero.

Calibration and final probabilities
I avoid extreme probability assignments because the event is monthly, somewhat short-horizon (the month is already partially elapsed), and ACLED’s final tally may be revised. Given the current evidence (preliminary early-September counts in the dozens, July escalation, ongoing Israeli strikes and local fighting), my forecast places substantial mass on 100–250, meaningful mass on 250–500, and smaller but non-negligible mass on higher ranges and on <100 to reflect the possibility of a quiet second half or reporting revisions.

Final probabilities:

Less than 100: 10%
Between 100 and 250: 45%
Between 250 and 500: 25%
Between 500 and 1,000: 15%
Greater than 1,000: 5%