Details on Sudan Updates from Botmaster Phil Godzin of April 28, 2025

How many conflict deaths will there be in Sudan in 2025?

Phil’s pgodzinai is a side competitor with the machine forecasting bots of the VIEWS competition.

Perplexity response:
{think}
Okay, the user wants to know how many conflict deaths there will be in Sudan in 2025, focusing on recent developments from the past few days. The options given range from less than 1000 to more than 12,000. Let me look through the search results to find the latest data.
First, looking at the dates of the sources. The most recent ones are from April 25, 2025. Source [1] mentions that between April 20-24, at least 129 civilians were killed in El Fasher, Um Kedada, and Abu Shouk. It also states that since April 10, there have been at least 481 confirmed civilian deaths, but notes the actual number is likely higher. Source [3] from April 22 talks about more than 30 people killed in a recent attack, following a multi-day attack that resulted in over 400 deaths according to the UN. Source [2] from April 25 mentions that as of November 2024, 28,700 people had been killed, with over 12 million displaced by April 2025 and 3.3 million refugees in neighboring countries. Source [5], also from April 25, states that 770,000 refugees are in Chad alone, and the conflict has caused 13 million displaced.
Putting this together, the numbers are rising significantly. The latest reports from April 2025 show a sharp increase in casualties, especially with the RSF’s recent offensives. The UN reports from the past week (April 20-24) alone had 129 deaths, and prior weeks (April 10-13) had 210 killed in Zamzam. The total confirmed deaths since April 10 are 481, but actual numbers are higher. The conflict is escalating, with large-scale attacks on IDP camps and cities, leading to mass displacement. Given the intensity of recent attacks and the fact that the conflict is entering its third year with no signs of cessation, the death toll is likely to continue rising.
To project 2025 numbers: considering the scale of violence in recent weeks, if the same rate continues, the annual death toll could be very high. For example, if April alone has over 480 confirmed deaths, but actual deaths are much higher, projecting that over 12 months, even at a lower rate, could exceed 5,000. However, the user wants to emphasize new developments. The recent attacks in April 2025 show a significant spike, suggesting an increased death rate. The RSF’s continued offensives and targeting of IDP camps indicate more violence ahead. Since the options go up to 12,000+, but the options are in brackets, and considering the current rate, maybe between 5,000 and 12,000? But need to check the options again. The options are up to ‘More than 12000’, but the user’s possible options are up to that. However, the data given so far in 2025 shows a high rate. From the sources, the total confirmed deaths since 10 April (two weeks) is 481, but actual higher. If this rate continues, 481 * 26 weeks = around 12,506, but that’s just one reporting period. But considering the conflict is ongoing and intensifying, the death toll could be in the higher brackets. The fact that 28,700 were killed up to November 2024, but with 2025’s current rate, maybe cumulative deaths could exceed prior years. However, the question is about 2025’s total. The answer should focus on recent data to project the 2025 total. Given the April data showing hundreds killed in a few weeks, and the scale of the conflict, it’s plausible that the total for 2025 could be in the higher ranges, especially if the conflict continues unchecked. The UN reports from April 2025 indicate a surge, so the answer would lean towards higher numbers, possibly between 5,000 and 12,000 or more. But need to check the precise numbers. The sources mention that in the past two weeks (April 10-24), at least 481 confirmed deaths, but actual higher. If the same rate continues, 481 / 14 days = ~34 per day. Over 365 days, that would be ~12,410. But this is speculative. However, the question is about the entire year 2025, and the conflict’s intensity might vary. The sources also mention that the conflict is in its third year with increasing violence, suggesting that 2025 could see higher numbers than previous years. The 2024 data had 28,700 deaths up to November, but if 2025 continues at the April rate, it could be similar or higher. However, the options given include up to 12,000+, so considering the recent surge and the ongoing conflict, the answer would point towards higher numbers, possibly between 5,000 and 12,000 or more. But the user’s possible options include ‘Between 8000 and 12000’ and ‘More than 12000’. Given the recent escalation, the answer might lean towards the higher end, but the exact projection is tricky. The key is to highlight the recent data showing a significant increase in deaths, leading to a more pessimistic forecast for 2025. ### Recent Conflict Death Reports in Sudan (April 2025)
1. **Sudan: Türk gravely concerned at rising civilian deaths** (ReliefWeb, 25-Apr-2025)
– **Key Data**: At least 129 civilians killed between 20–24 April in El Fasher, Um Kedada, and Abu Shouk IDP camp. Total confirmed deaths in North Darfur since 10 April: 481 (likely undercounted). Includes 210 killed in Zamzam IDP camp (11–13 April).
– **Context**: RSF’s intensified offensive targets displaced persons, with reports of secondary deaths from starvation and lack of medical care.
2. **A Nation Bleeds While The World Watches** (Pagosa Daily Post, 25-Apr-2025)
– **Key Data**: Over 12 million displaced internally by April 2025; 3.3 million refugees in Chad, South Sudan, and Ethiopia. Total conflict deaths since 2023 estimated at 28,700+ by Nov 2024.
– **Context**: Conflict stems from SAF-RSF power struggles; Darfur’s marginalization and resource disputes (e.g., gold) fuel violence.
3. **Sudan’s RSF kill more than 30 people in latest attack in Darfur** (Euronews, 22-Apr-2025)
– **Key Data**: At least 30 killed in fresh RSF attacks on El Fasher (22–23 April). Follows a multi-day assault that killed over 400 people, per UN.
– **Context**: Zamzam IDP camp (Sudan’s largest) now under RSF control, displacing up to 400,000 and blocking aid access.
4. **Sudan’s Civil War Enters Third Year** (BBN Times, 21-Apr-2025)
– **Key Data**: 13 million displaced overall; 3.3 million refugees. Despite RSF losing Khartoum, they regroup in Darfur.
– **Context**: Prolonged conflict with no ceasefire, raising risks of sustained high casualties.
5. **Chad Camp Overwhelmed by Sudan Refugees** (Times of India, 25-Apr-2025)
– **Key Data**: Chad hosts 770,000 Sudanese refugees, 90% women/children. Total displaced: 13 million.
– **Context**: Mass displacement strains regional resources, exacerbating death risks from malnutrition and disease.
### Trends and Projections
Recent reports indicate **accelerating violence**, with RSF targeting urban centers and IDP camps. The UN confirms **481+ deaths in two weeks** (10–24 April), with Zamzam camp alone accounting for 210 fatalities. Extrapolating this rate (≈34 deaths/day) to 2025 yields ≈12,400 annual deaths—a rough estimate, though underreporting persists.
### Resolution Criteria and Outlook
– **Deteriorating Security**: RSF’s Darfur offensive shows no signs of abating; SAF’s territorial losses shift conflict dynamics.
– **Humanitarian Collapse**: Restrictions on aid and displacement crises (e.g., Zamzam) ensure secondary deaths from malnutrition/illness.
– **Regonal Instability**: Overflow of refugees strains neighbors like Chad, compounding vulnerabilities.
### Option Projections
Given the April 2025 surge and continued escalation, **”Between 8000 and 12000″** or **”More than 12000″** deaths are most plausible. The UN’s April data aligns with a trajectory exceeding 12,000 if violence continues unchecked.
—
*Note: Extrapolations assume sustained conflict intensity and underreporting. Actual totals may exceed projections due to limited access for verification.*
AskNews Deep Search Response:
To assist in forecasting conflict deaths in Sudan for 2025, below are key citations prioritizing recent developments (as of April 28, 2025) and authoritative sources:
**1. [1] Sudan’s renewed horrors** (April 28, 2025)
– **Context**: Intense clashes in Darfur, particularly in El Fasher and Zamzam IDP camp.
– **Casualties**: At least 23 children killed in recent attacks; thousands displaced. UNICEF highlights escalating violence against civilians [1].
– **Expert Opinion**: UNICEF’s Catherine Russel calls for immediate cessation of violence [1].
**2. [4] Clashes in Sudan’s El-Fasher kill 57** (April 27, 2025)
– **Casualties**: 57 civilians killed in El-Fasher shelling; over 400 deaths reported in attacks on displacement camps since April 10 [4].
– **Humanitarian Impact**: ICRC’s Daniel O’Malley warns of systematic sexual violence and restricted aid access [4].
**3. [5] UN report on North Darfur violence** (April 27, 2025)
– **Casualties**: At least 481 civilians killed in North Darfur since April 10, with likely higher totals [5].
– **Displacement**: Hundreds of thousands displaced; food and water shortages worsen [5].
– **UN Statement**: Volker Turk (UN Human Rights Chief) describes the violence as “horrific” and warns of collapsing aid systems [5].
**4. [12] Over 480 civilian deaths in two weeks** (April 25, 2025)
– **Casualties**: 480+ killed in North Darfur in mid-April; ethnically motivated attacks increasing [12].
– **Projections**: UN warns of worsening humanitarian crisis, with 13 million displaced nationwide as of April 2025 [12].
**5. [19] UN warns of ethnic cleansing** (April 25, 2025)
– **Context**: RSF accused of atrocities in Darfur, including sexual violence and forced recruitment.
– **Expert Opinion**: UK Foreign Minister David Lammy states violence may constitute crimes against humanity [19].
**6. [25] WFP’s famine warnings** (April 24, 2025)
– **Humanitarian Data**: 25 million face extreme hunger; famine risks in 10 regions. WFP needs $650 million to assist 7 million [25].
– **Impact**: Famine exacerbates mortality but is not directly counted as conflict deaths.
**7. [30] Escalation in El-Fasher** (April 22, 2025)
– **Casualties**: 30+ killed in RSF artillery attacks; 825,000 children trapped in besieged areas per UNICEF [30].
**8. [41] UN OCHA’s funding appeal** (April 27, 2025)
– **Context**: Only 10% of $4.2 billion humanitarian plan funded.
– **Casualty Trend**: 8,000+ missing (ICRC), 30 million in need of aid [41][47].
**9. [55] RSF atrocities in Darfur** (April 25, 2025)
– **Casualties**: 332,000+ displaced since January; RSF accused of systematic atrocities. Fuel shortages paralyze water access [55].
**10. Historical Context**
– **Prior Data**: US scholars estimated ~130,000 deaths in the conflict by late 2024 [2][36].
**Key Insights**:
– **Trends**: Violence has sharply escalated in April 2025, with projections of 480–500 deaths every two weeks in Darfur alone [12][14]. At this rate, **annual deaths could exceed 12,000**, aligning with the “More than 12000” option.
– **Limitations**: UN and NGOs avoid explicit 2025 projections, but mid-April data suggests a worsening trajectory. RSF’s territorial losses and Sudan Army’s counteroffensives may prolong conflict [3][21].
– **Resolution Source**: UNOCHA and ICRC reports (e.g., [5][55]) are authoritative but lack forward estimates.
Given recent casualty rates, systematic violence, and no ceasefire in sight, current data leans toward **“More than 12000”**, though uncertainty remains high.
GPT News Summary:
Here is a concise summary of recent developments related to the conflict in Sudan that may help assess the trajectory for conflict-related deaths in 2025:
1. **Current Conflict Status**:
– The conflict in Sudan has been ongoing since April 2023, primarily involving battles between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Rapid Support Forces have lost significant ground recently, with the SAF gaining control over the majority of Sudan’s 18 states, including strategic areas in Khartoum. However, RSF still maintains influence in parts of the Darfur region and Kordofan states (AA, April 28, 2025).
2. **Casualties and Displacement**:
– Official reports indicate over 20,000 deaths due to the conflict, but independent studies suggest that the death toll could be as high as 130,000 (Al-Burhan discusses this with Qatari counterparts, April 27, 2025). Recent clashes in El-Fasher alone have killed 57 civilians, and the RSF has used brutal tactics including systematic sexual violence and executions (ICRC, April 27, 2025).
– Displacement figures are staggering, with 14-15 million people displaced. The number of returnees from Egypt has increased by 44% in three weeks, totaling 165,330 individuals recently returning to Sudan (DTM, April 27, 2025).
3. **Humanitarian Impact**:
– Over 30 million people require humanitarian assistance, with widespread food insecurity affecting at least 24.6 million individuals. Of these, 8.5 million face famine-like conditions (Doctors Without Borders, February 3, 2025). Children, in particular, are acutely affected, with significant numbers facing malnutrition (UNICEF, January 17, 2025).
4. **International Response and Peace Efforts**:
– Sudanese leaders, including Prime Minister Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, are engaged in talks with regional leaders like Egypt’s President el-Sisi and Qatar’s Emir, aiming for stability and support, though concrete outcomes of these talks are not yet evident (AA, April 28, 27, 2025).
– International bodies like the African Union and UN continue to call for ceasefires and peace talks, despite RSF’s resistance to negotiations (Sudafax, April 26, 2025). The international community, including the EU and UK, have pledged significant funding for humanitarian aid but face challenges in delivering due to ongoing conflict (The Sudan Report, April 21, 2025).
5. **Outlook**:
– Despite some military advances by SAF, the conflict shows no signs of immediate resolution with continued reports of violence and humanitarian hardships. The ongoing instability portends a high likelihood of significant conflict-related deaths continuing through 2025.
This context suggests a highly volatile situation with ongoing risks of escalation, further complicating humanitarian efforts and likely resulting in continued substantial loss of life.
Extracted resolution criteria links:
[]
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Anthropic response:
# Forecasting Conflict Deaths in Sudan for 2025
## Current Situation Analysis
Sudan’s conflict has entered its third year with alarming intensity. Recent data from April 2025 provides crucial insight into current death rates. Multiple sources confirm at least 481 civilian deaths in North Darfur alone during a two-week period (April 10-24), with UN officials acknowledging these figures are likely undercounted. Specific incidents include 210 killed in Zamzam IDP camp between April 11-13, 129 civilians killed between April 20-24 in El Fasher and surrounding areas, and additional attacks claiming dozens more lives in late April.
The conflict appears to be escalating rather than abating. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have lost ground to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in Khartoum but continue aggressive operations in Darfur. The targeting of civilian populations, particularly in displacement camps, represents a dangerous pattern that could drive higher casualty rates throughout 2025.
## Historical Context and Escalation Patterns
Historical data indicates that by November 2024, approximately 28,700 conflict-related deaths had occurred since the beginning of the conflict in April 2023. While we don’t have precise figures for early 2025, the April 2025 data suggests an intensification rather than reduction in violence.
A simple extrapolation from the confirmed April death rate (approximately 34 deaths per day based on the 481 deaths over two weeks) would suggest around 8,840 deaths for the remaining 260 days of 2025. However, this simple calculation requires several important adjustments:
1. **Underreporting factor**: The UN and multiple sources emphasize that confirmed deaths significantly undercount actual casualties due to access limitations and communication disruptions.
2. **Geographic scope**: The 481 deaths only cover North Darfur, not other conflict zones across Sudan.
3. **Seasonal factors**: Conflict intensity in Sudan often follows seasonal patterns, potentially increasing during dry seasons when mobility is easier.
4. **Conflict trajectory**: The SAF’s territorial gains and RSF’s tactical shifts suggest the conflict is evolving rather than resolving.
## Extrapolation and Projection
If we conservatively estimate that reported deaths capture only 60-70% of actual conflict deaths, and that North Darfur represents roughly 40-50% of nationwide conflict deaths, the actual nationwide death toll for a full year could be significantly higher than a simple extrapolation suggests.
At the current intensity, and accounting for underreporting and geographic scope, we could reasonably expect between 18,000-25,000 conflict deaths for all of 2025. However, several factors might moderate this extreme projection:
1. **Peace initiatives**: International diplomatic efforts, while unsuccessful so far, could potentially yield results during 2025.
2. **Resource exhaustion**: Both military forces may face resource constraints that could temporarily reduce combat intensity.
3. **Civilian displacement**: As more civilians flee conflict zones, the immediate civilian death toll might decrease (though this would increase humanitarian suffering).
Given that we’re already in late April, and the resolution date is January 1, 2026, we’re forecasting for the remaining 8 months of 2025. The current rate suggests that even with some potential moderation, the death toll is likely to exceed 12,000 for the year.
## Risk Factors for Increased Deaths
Several factors could drive the death toll even higher:
1. **Humanitarian collapse**: Only 10% of the $4.2 billion humanitarian plan is currently funded, which could exacerbate secondary deaths from malnutrition and disease.
2. **Ethnic targeting**: Reports indicate ethnically motivated attacks are increasing, which historically correlates with higher civilian casualties.
3. **Restricted aid access**: ICRC and other organizations report severe restrictions on humanitarian access, particularly to besieged areas.
4. **Regional spillover**: The conflict’s regionalization (with 3.3 million refugees in neighboring countries) risks drawing in additional actors.
## Forecast Distribution
Given the current intensity, historical patterns, and time remaining in 2025, my forecast probabilities for conflict deaths in Sudan in 2025 are as follows:
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 3
Option_C: 6
Option_D: 15
Option_E: 25
Option_F: 50
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.06, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.15, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.25, ‘More than 12000’: 0.5}
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Anthropic response:
# Analysis of Conflict Deaths in Sudan for 2025
## Current Situation Assessment
The conflict in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) shows no signs of abating as it enters its third year. Recent reports indicate an intensification of violence, particularly in Darfur. The most striking evidence comes from UN data showing at least 481 confirmed civilian deaths in North Darfur alone since April 10, 2025 – representing approximately 34 deaths per day over a two-week period. This rate is alarming and suggests a significant escalation compared to previous periods.
Multiple sources confirm a deteriorating situation with the RSF launching offensives against civilian targets, including IDP camps. The attack on Zamzam IDP camp resulted in 210 deaths between April 11-13, and more recent attacks in El Fasher caused at least 57 civilian deaths. These numbers are likely undercounts due to limited access for verification.
## Historical Context and Trends
Looking at previous data, estimates indicate approximately 28,700 deaths by November 2024 since the conflict began in April 2023. Independent studies suggest the actual toll could be as high as 130,000 when accounting for indirect deaths. The conflict has caused massive displacement with 12-15 million internally displaced persons and over 3.3 million refugees in neighboring countries.
The current data from April 2025 shows an alarming acceleration in violence. If the observed rate of approximately 34 confirmed deaths per day were to continue for the remainder of 2025, this would result in approximately 8,330 additional deaths for the remaining 245 days of the year. Adding the estimated deaths from January through April would likely push the total well above 10,000 for the year.
## Factors Affecting Future Death Rates
Several factors suggest the death toll may continue at high levels:
1. **Military Dynamics**: While SAF has gained ground in many regions, RSF still maintains influence in Darfur and continues offensive operations, targeting civilians.
2. **Humanitarian Crisis**: The collapse of healthcare infrastructure, food insecurity affecting 24.6 million people, and 8.5 million facing famine-like conditions will contribute to conflict-related deaths.
3. **Limited International Intervention**: Despite diplomatic efforts, no effective ceasefire is in place. Humanitarian aid is severely constrained, with only 10% of the required $4.2 billion funding received.
4. **Targeting of Civilians**: The systematic targeting of civilian populations, particularly in IDP camps, represents a shift toward more deadly tactics.
## Uncertainty Factors
There are some factors that could modify these projections:
1. **Potential Peace Agreement**: While unlikely given current dynamics, a successful peace process could reduce deaths in the latter part of 2025.
2. **Seasonal Variations**: The upcoming rainy season could impact military operations, potentially reducing direct combat deaths but increasing disease-related mortality.
3. **Reporting Limitations**: Current death counts are likely significant undercounts due to limited access to conflict zones and reporting challenges.
## Probability Distribution Analysis
Based on the current death rate of approximately 34 confirmed deaths per day (which is likely an undercount), and considering the 8 months remaining in 2025, we can project the following scenarios:
– If the conflict continues at the current intensity: Death toll likely exceeds 12,000
– If the conflict moderates slightly: Death toll likely between 8,000-12,000
– If significant de-escalation occurs: Death toll might fall to 5,000-8,000
– If major peace agreement is implemented soon: Death toll could be 3,000-5,000
– If immediate cessation of hostilities: Death toll might be 1,000-3,000
– If conflict ends immediately: Death toll less than 1,000 (extremely unlikely)
Given the evidence of intensification rather than de-escalation, the probability mass should be concentrated in the higher brackets. The observed death rate of 481+ deaths in just two weeks (34+ per day) in North Darfur alone suggests that, even with some fluctuation, the annual total will likely exceed 8,000 and quite possibly 12,000.
## Final Probability Assessment
Given the recent escalation in violence, the lack of progress toward peace, ongoing targeting of civilians, and the humanitarian crisis, I assess the probability distribution as follows:
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 3
Option_C: 7
Option_D: 15
Option_E: 28
Option_F: 46
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.15, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.28, ‘More than 12000’: 0.46}
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Anthropic response:
# Forecasting Conflict Deaths in Sudan for 2025
## Analysis of Recent Developments
The recent data from April 2025 shows a significant escalation in the Sudan conflict, particularly in Darfur. According to the UN, at least 481 civilians have been killed in North Darfur alone since April 10, 2025 (just over two weeks). This includes 210 people killed in Zamzam IDP camp between April 11-13 and 129 civilians killed between April 20-24 in El Fasher, Um Kedada, and Abu Shouk IDP camp. Other reports indicate 57 civilians killed in El-Fasher shelling, with over 400 deaths in attacks on displacement camps since April 10.
This represents a rate of approximately 34 deaths per day in just the documented cases from a limited geographical area. Importantly, all sources acknowledge these are confirmed deaths, with actual numbers likely significantly higher due to limited access for verification.
## Historical Context and Trends
The conflict in Sudan began in April 2023 and has intensified over time. By November 2024, approximately 28,700 people had been killed in the conflict. However, some independent studies suggest the death toll could be as high as 130,000 by late 2024, indicating significant underreporting in official figures.
The conflict is now entering its third year with no signs of de-escalation. Recent reports show the RSF has lost ground to the SAF in many areas but continues to hold influence in Darfur and Kordofan states. The targeting of civilian populations, particularly in IDP camps, represents a concerning escalation that suggests death tolls may increase rather than decrease.
## Projection Methodology
To forecast the total conflict deaths for 2025, I’ll analyze the current daily death rate and project it forward, while accounting for uncertainty and potential changes in conflict intensity:
1. **Current observed death rate**: ~34 deaths per day (based on UN-confirmed 481 deaths over ~14 days in North Darfur)
2. **Geographical limitation**: These deaths are primarily from North Darfur, not the entire country
3. **Reporting limitations**: All sources indicate actual deaths are higher than reported
4. **Time remaining in 2025**: As of April 28, 2025, there are approximately 248 days remaining in the year
If the current confirmed death rate from North Darfur alone (34 deaths/day) continued unchanged for the rest of the year, this would yield approximately 8,432 additional deaths by the end of 2025. However, this represents only confirmed deaths from one region, suggesting the nationwide total would be significantly higher.
## Factors That Could Alter the Projection
Several factors could influence the death toll throughout 2025:
1. **Conflict intensity**: The RSF’s recent offensives show an escalation rather than de-escalation, despite territorial losses
2. **Humanitarian crisis**: 13-15 million people displaced, 30 million requiring assistance, and 24.6 million facing food insecurity
3. **Deteriorating humanitarian access**: Aid restrictions continue, exacerbating secondary deaths from malnutrition and disease
4. **International intervention**: Despite diplomatic efforts, no ceasefire appears imminent
5. **Seasonal factors**: Sudan’s rainy season (June-September) typically affects conflict intensity, but also worsens humanitarian conditions
## Final Assessment
Given the data available, I assess that:
1. The current confirmed death rate is approximately 34 deaths per day in North Darfur alone
2. This rate likely underestimates the true death toll due to geographical limitations and reporting challenges
3. If this rate continued unchanged for the remaining 248 days of 2025, it would yield 8,432 more deaths
4. Considering deaths already occurred in the first quarter of 2025 (January-March), plus deaths in other regions, the nationwide total would likely exceed 10,000
5. The conflict shows signs of escalation rather than de-escalation, which may increase the death rate further
The most likely outcome appears to be “More than 12000” deaths, given the current rate of confirmed deaths in just one region, the likelihood of significant underreporting, and the continued escalation of the conflict. The second most likely outcome is “Between 8000 and 12000” deaths, which would require some de-escalation from current levels.
Given the uncertainties involved and the possibility of diplomatic breakthroughs leading to de-escalation, I will assign some probability to lower death toll scenarios, but these appear significantly less likely based on current trends.
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 3
Option_C: 7
Option_D: 12
Option_E: 27
Option_F: 50
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.27, ‘More than 12000’: 0.5}
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Anthropic response:
# Analysis of Conflict Deaths in Sudan for 2025
## Current Situation Assessment
The conflict in Sudan has been ongoing since April 2023, with fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Based on the research provided, we’re seeing a significant escalation in violence during April 2025, particularly in Darfur and specifically around El Fasher and IDP camps like Zamzam.
The most recent data indicates at least 481 confirmed civilian deaths in North Darfur alone in just a two-week period (April 10-24, 2025). This represents a rate of approximately 34 deaths per day in just one region. UN sources acknowledge these figures are likely undercounted due to limited access and reporting capabilities in conflict zones.
## Historical Context and Trends
By November 2024, the conflict had already claimed an estimated 28,700 lives according to official sources, though independent studies suggest the actual toll could be as high as 130,000. This indicates significant underreporting in official figures.
The conflict shows no signs of abating. In fact, recent developments suggest an intensification:
– RSF has lost ground in Khartoum but is regrouping in Darfur
– Attacks on IDP camps have increased (210 killed in Zamzam camp on April 11-13 alone)
– El Fasher is under siege with 57 civilians killed in recent shelling
– The humanitarian situation is deteriorating with 13-15 million displaced people
## Extrapolation of Current Death Rate
If we extrapolate the confirmed death rate from North Darfur (481 deaths in 14 days) across the remaining days of 2025:
– 481 deaths / 14 days ≈ 34.36 deaths per day in North Darfur alone
– There are 248 days remaining in 2025 from April 28
– 34.36 × 248 ≈ 8,521 deaths in North Darfur for the remainder of 2025
However, this only accounts for North Darfur and relies on conservative official counts. The conflict spans multiple regions of Sudan, and recent reporting suggests deaths are being systematically undercounted. Additionally, we need to account for:
1. Deaths that have already occurred in Sudan from January-April 2025
2. Deaths occurring in other regions beyond North Darfur
3. Secondary deaths from starvation and lack of medical care
## Consideration of Mitigating Factors
There are some factors that could potentially reduce the death toll:
– International diplomatic efforts (talks with Qatar, Egypt)
– Humanitarian aid pledges (though currently underfunded at only 10%)
– SAF gaining territory could potentially stabilize some regions
However, these positive factors are currently outweighed by:
– The intensification of violence in April 2025
– Limited international intervention
– Systematic targeting of civilian populations, particularly in IDP camps
– Restricted humanitarian access
– Worsening food insecurity with 25 million facing extreme hunger
## Probability Distribution Analysis
Given the observed death rate in North Darfur alone (34+ deaths/day), and accounting for other regions, past deaths in early 2025, and the humanitarian crisis, we can establish the following:
1. **Less than 1000**: Virtually impossible given the confirmed 481 deaths in just two weeks in one region.
2. **Between 1000 and 3000**: Highly unlikely. We have already seen almost 500 confirmed deaths in just two weeks in North Darfur alone. Extrapolating this rate would exceed 3000 well before year-end, even without counting other regions or the first quarter of 2025.
3. **Between 3000 and 5000**: Unlikely. Even conservative estimates based solely on the verified North Darfur death rate would exceed this range when accounting for the entire country and the full year.
4. **Between 5000 and 8000**: Possible, but would require a significant de-escalation of the conflict in the coming months. Given the current trajectory and recent intensification, this seems optimistic.
5. **Between 8000 and 12000**: Likely scenario if the conflict maintains its current intensity. The extrapolated death toll in North Darfur alone for the remainder of 2025 is approximately 8,500, and this doesn’t account for other regions or the first quarter of 2025.
6. **More than 12000**: Highly probable given the current death rate, the geographic scope of the conflict, and the deteriorating humanitarian situation. If we factor in all regions of Sudan and the full year, there’s a strong case for casualties exceeding 12,000.
Given the accelerating violence, limited international intervention, and the continued humanitarian crisis, I believe the conflict deaths in Sudan for 2025 will most likely exceed 12,000, with a significant probability that they will fall in the 8,000-12,000 range.
Option_A: 0
Option_B: 2
Option_C: 7
Option_D: 19
Option_E: 29
Option_F: 43
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.009900990099009901, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.019801980198019802, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.06930693069306931, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.18811881188118812, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.2871287128712871, ‘More than 12000’: 0.42574257425742573}
________________________
Anthropic response:
# Analysis of Conflict Deaths in Sudan for 2025
## Current Situation Assessment
The conflict in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has entered its third year with significant escalation in recent weeks. Analysis of the most recent data from April 2025 shows an alarming acceleration in civilian casualties, particularly in North Darfur. UN reports confirm at least 481 civilian deaths in North Darfur in just two weeks (April 10-24, 2025), including 210 killed in Zamzam IDP camp and 129 killed between April 20-24 in El Fasher, Um Kedada, and Abu Shouk IDP camp. Additional reports cite 57 civilians killed in recent El-Fasher shelling and at least 30 more killed in fresh RSF attacks on El Fasher (April 22-23).
## Extrapolation of Current Trends
If we extrapolate the documented rate of approximately 34 deaths per day (481 deaths over 14 days) for the remainder of 2025, this would suggest around 12,410 conflict deaths for the full year. However, several factors suggest this is likely an underestimate:
1. **Confirmed Undercounting**: Multiple sources explicitly state that current death counts are underreported due to restricted access, communications blackouts, and challenges in verification.
2. **Escalating Violence**: Reports indicate the RSF is intensifying operations in Darfur while losing ground elsewhere, suggesting potential for increased violence as they attempt to consolidate control of remaining territories.
3. **Deteriorating Humanitarian Conditions**: With 13-15 million displaced people, collapsed healthcare systems, and severe food insecurity (25 million facing extreme hunger with famine risks in 10 regions), indirect conflict-related deaths are likely to increase substantially.
4. **Targeting of Civilian Areas**: The deliberate targeting of IDP camps (like Zamzam, which housed 400,000 people) represents a tactical shift that puts more civilians at direct risk.
## Historical Context
Previous conflicts in Sudan provide important context. The current conflict has reportedly caused over 20,000 official deaths since April 2023, with independent studies suggesting the actual figure could be as high as 130,000 through late 2024. This indicates a potential range of 65,000-130,000 deaths over approximately 21 months (April 2023-December 2024), or roughly 3,100-6,200 deaths per month at peak intensity.
While military dynamics have shifted (with SAF gaining control over most of Sudan’s 18 states), there’s no indication of imminent resolution. The targeting of civilian populations, particularly in Darfur, has intensified rather than diminished.
## Projection Methodology
To forecast the conflict deaths for 2025, I’ll consider:
1. **Recent Intensity**: Documented deaths in April 2025 (481+ in North Darfur alone over two weeks)
2. **Coverage Limitations**: Known undercounting and access restrictions
3. **Conflict Trajectory**: Evidence of escalation rather than de-escalation
4. **Time Horizon**: We’re forecasting for the remaining 8 months of 2025 (as of April 28)
The April 2025 death rate in North Darfur alone (approximately 34 deaths/day or 1,020 deaths/month) would project to 8,160 deaths for the remaining 8 months of 2025. However, this only accounts for documented deaths in one region. When considering:
– Multiple conflict zones across Sudan
– Historical patterns of violence
– Documented undercounting
– Deteriorating humanitarian conditions
– Intensification of targeting civilians
The actual total is likely to be significantly higher.
## Probability Distribution
Given the current trajectory and intensity of conflict, the probability strongly skews toward the higher end of the provided ranges:
1. **Less than 1000** – This outcome appears virtually impossible given that April 2025 alone had 481+ documented deaths in just North Darfur, with known undercounting. Even a dramatic de-escalation would likely still exceed this threshold given what has already occurred in early 2025.
2. **Between 1000 and 3000** – Similarly improbable given current intensity. Even if fighting were to decrease substantially, the April data suggests we’re already on pace to exceed this range.
3. **Between 3000 and 5000** – Possible but unlikely, requiring a significant and sustained reduction in violence from current levels. Given reports of escalation rather than de-escalation, this seems improbable.
4. **Between 5000 and 8000** – This outcome would require some reduction from the current intensity or significant regional containment of the conflict.
5. **Between 8000 and 12000** – Given current trends, this range represents a plausible outcome if there is some moderation in the conflict intensity or if current levels of violence continue mainly in Darfur while decreasing elsewhere.
6. **More than 12000** – The most likely outcome based on current data. The documented April death rate in North Darfur alone projects to over 12,000 when annualized, and considering the known undercounting, multiple conflict zones, and deteriorating conditions, this threshold is likely to be exceeded.
Taking into account the evidence of escalation, historical context, known undercounting, and multiple affected regions, while acknowledging uncertainty about potential political developments that could alter the trajectory, I arrive at the following probability distribution:
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 2
Option_C: 6
Option_D: 14
Option_E: 25
Option_F: 52
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.06, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.14, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.25, ‘More than 12000’: 0.52}
GPT Multiple Choice JSON response:
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 4
Option_C: 9
Option_D: 17
Option_E: 24
Option_F: 45
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.04, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.09, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.17, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.24, ‘More than 12000’: 0.45}
GPT Multiple Choice JSON response:
The key anchor for this forecast is how many conflict-related fatalities the resolution source is likely to tally for calendar-year 2025. The best publicly-available counting efforts (ACLED, UN, Uppsala, etc.) put recorded deaths for the first 19 months of the war (Apr 2023–Nov 2024) at roughly 28 700. That implies an average of ≈1 500 recorded deaths per month during 2024.
Since January 2025 the conflict has not eased—if anything, it has intensified in North Darfur and Kordofan. A UN human-rights note (25 Apr 2025) confirms at least 481 civilian deaths in just two weeks in North Darfur; ACLED typically logs roughly double the UN’s confirmed-civilian counts once military fatalities are added. That implies ≈1 000 – 1 200 recorded conflict deaths country-wide for the first half of April alone, i.e. still around 2 000 per month.
Projecting forward:
• Status-quo/continued intensity (≈2 000 recorded deaths per month) for the remaining eight months would yield ≈16 000 deaths in 2025.
• Partial de-escalation scenario (pressure from Egypt, Qatar-brokered talks, exhaustion of RSF logistics) could drop the remaining-months average to ≈800 per month, finishing 2025 around 8 000.
• A more optimistic cease-fire by mid-year could push the annual total toward ≈5 000.
• A sharp, nationwide collapse of fighting sufficient to bring the annual total below 3 000 would require an early, durable settlement that currently lacks credible diplomatic traction—possible but quite unlikely.
Because the resolution dataset almost certainly relies on recorded fatalities (which systematically undercount true deaths), and because 2024’s recorded total already appears to have exceeded 12 000, the >12 000 bin is again the single most-likely outcome for 2025. Still, meaningful uncertainty remains: a political breakthrough or durable SAF advantage could pull the count into the 8 000–12 000 range; deep de-escalation below 5 000 is conceivable but low-probability; anything under 1 000 is extremely remote.
Accounting for this uncertainty, historical over-confidence, and the nine months still left in 2025, the probability distribution is:
Option_A: 03
Option_B: 06
Option_C: 09
Option_D: 12
Option_E: 26
Option_F: 44
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.03, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.06, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.09, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.26, ‘More than 12000’: 0.44}
GPT Multiple Choice JSON response:
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 4
Option_C: 12
Option_D: 18
Option_E: 32
Option_F: 33
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.04, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.12, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.18, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.32, ‘More than 12000’: 0.33}
Task failed with error: 403 PERMISSION_DENIED. {‘error’: {‘code’: 403, ‘message’: ‘This API method requires billing to be enabled. Please enable billing on project #forecasting-433205 by visiting https://console.developers.google.com/billing/enable?project=forecasting-433205 then retry. If you enabled billing for this project recently, wait a few minutes for the action to propagate to our systems and retry.’, ‘status’: ‘PERMISSION_DENIED’, ‘details’: [{‘@type’: ‘type.googleapis.com/google.rpc.ErrorInfo’, ‘reason’: ‘BILLING_DISABLED’, ‘domain’: ‘googleapis.com’, ‘metadata’: {‘service’: ‘aiplatform.googleapis.com’, ‘containerInfo’: ‘forecasting-433205’, ‘consumer’: ‘projects/forecasting-433205’}}, {‘@type’: ‘type.googleapis.com/google.rpc.LocalizedMessage’, ‘locale’: ‘en-US’, ‘message’: ‘This API method requires billing to be enabled. Please enable billing on project #forecasting-433205 by visiting https://console.developers.google.com/billing/enable?project=forecasting-433205 then retry. If you enabled billing for this project recently, wait a few minutes for the action to propagate to our systems and retry.’}, {‘@type’: ‘type.googleapis.com/google.rpc.Help’, ‘links’: [{‘description’: ‘Google developers console billing’, ‘url’: ‘https://console.developers.google.com/billing/enable?project=forecasting-433205’}]}]}}
Traceback (most recent call last):
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 107, in fetch_gemini_multiple_choice_prediction
return await fetch_sync(get_gemini_multiple_choice_prediction, title, perplexity_summary_report, asknews_summary, asknews_deep_research, vision_analysis, today, resolution_date, background, fine_print, resolution_criteria, options)
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 61, in fetch_sync
return await asyncio.get_event_loop().run_in_executor(
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/concurrent/futures/thread.py”, line 58, in run
result = self.fn(*self.args, **self.kwargs)
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 57, in run_sync
return future.result(timeout=45)
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/concurrent/futures/_base.py”, line 458, in result
return self.__get_result()
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/concurrent/futures/_base.py”, line 403, in __get_result
raise self._exception
File “/opt/hostedtoolcache/Python/3.10.17/x64/lib/python3.10/concurrent/futures/thread.py”, line 58, in run
result = self.fn(*self.args, **self.kwargs)
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/gemini_service_2.py”, line 84, in get_gemini_multiple_choice_prediction
response = client.models.generate_content(
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/.venv/lib/python3.10/site-packages/google/genai/models.py”, line 4672, in generate_content
response = self._generate_content(
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/.venv/lib/python3.10/site-packages/google/genai/models.py”, line 3831, in _generate_content
response_dict = self._api_client.request(
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/.venv/lib/python3.10/site-packages/google/genai/_api_client.py”, line 455, in request
response = self._request(http_request, stream=False)
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/.venv/lib/python3.10/site-packages/google/genai/_api_client.py”, line 385, in _request
errors.APIError.raise_for_response(response)
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/.venv/lib/python3.10/site-packages/google/genai/errors.py”, line 100, in raise_for_response
raise ClientError(status_code, response)
google.genai.errors.ClientError: 403 PERMISSION_DENIED. {‘error’: {‘code’: 403, ‘message’: ‘This API method requires billing to be enabled. Please enable billing on project #forecasting-433205 by visiting https://console.developers.google.com/billing/enable?project=forecasting-433205 then retry. If you enabled billing for this project recently, wait a few minutes for the action to propagate to our systems and retry.’, ‘status’: ‘PERMISSION_DENIED’, ‘details’: [{‘@type’: ‘type.googleapis.com/google.rpc.ErrorInfo’, ‘reason’: ‘BILLING_DISABLED’, ‘domain’: ‘googleapis.com’, ‘metadata’: {‘service’: ‘aiplatform.googleapis.com’, ‘containerInfo’: ‘forecasting-433205’, ‘consumer’: ‘projects/forecasting-433205’}}, {‘@type’: ‘type.googleapis.com/google.rpc.LocalizedMessage’, ‘locale’: ‘en-US’, ‘message’: ‘This API method requires billing to be enabled. Please enable billing on project #forecasting-433205 by visiting https://console.developers.google.com/billing/enable?project=forecasting-433205 then retry. If you enabled billing for this project recently, wait a few minutes for the action to propagate to our systems and retry.’}, {‘@type’: ‘type.googleapis.com/google.rpc.Help’, ‘links’: [{‘description’: ‘Google developers console billing’, ‘url’: ‘https://console.developers.google.com/billing/enable?project=forecasting-433205’}]}]}}
Task failed with error:
Traceback (most recent call last):
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 75, in fetch_gpt_multiple_choice_prediction
return await fetch_sync(get_gpt_multiple_choice_prediction, title, perplexity_summary_report, asknews_summary, asknews_deep_research, vision_analysis, today, resolution_date, background, fine_print, resolution_criteria, options)
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 61, in fetch_sync
return await asyncio.get_event_loop().run_in_executor(
asyncio.exceptions.TimeoutError
All predictions:
[{‘Less than 1000’: 0.009900990099009901, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.019801980198019802, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.06930693069306931, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.18811881188118812, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.2871287128712871, ‘More than 12000’: 0.42574257425742573}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.03, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.06, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.09, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.26, ‘More than 12000’: 0.44}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.04, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.09, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.17, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.24, ‘More than 12000’: 0.45}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.15, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.28, ‘More than 12000’: 0.46}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.06, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.15, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.25, ‘More than 12000’: 0.5}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.27, ‘More than 12000’: 0.5}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.06, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.14, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.25, ‘More than 12000’: 0.52}]
Filtered predictions:
[{‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.04, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.09, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.17, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.24, ‘More than 12000’: 0.45}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.15, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.28, ‘More than 12000’: 0.46}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.06, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.15, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.25, ‘More than 12000’: 0.5}]
Averaged predictions:
{‘Less than 1000’: 0.03, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.06, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.09, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.26, ‘More than 12000’: 0.44}
Median reasoning:
All Predictions:
[{‘Less than 1000’: 0.009900990099009901, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.019801980198019802, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.06930693069306931, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.18811881188118812, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.2871287128712871, ‘More than 12000’: 0.42574257425742573}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.03, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.06, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.09, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.26, ‘More than 12000’: 0.44}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.04, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.09, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.17, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.24, ‘More than 12000’: 0.45}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.15, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.28, ‘More than 12000’: 0.46}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.06, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.15, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.25, ‘More than 12000’: 0.5}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.27, ‘More than 12000’: 0.5}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.06, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.14, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.25, ‘More than 12000’: 0.52}]
Median Reasoning:
EXTRACTED_PROBABILITIES: [1, 3, 7, 15, 28, 46]
Model’s Answer:
# Analysis of Conflict Deaths in Sudan for 2025
## Current Situation Assessment
The conflict in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) shows no signs of abating as it enters its third year. Recent reports indicate an intensification of violence, particularly in Darfur. The most striking evidence comes from UN data showing at least 481 confirmed civilian deaths in North Darfur alone since April 10, 2025 – representing approximately 34 deaths per day over a two-week period. This rate is alarming and suggests a significant escalation compared to previous periods.
Multiple sources confirm a deteriorating situation with the RSF launching offensives against civilian targets, including IDP camps. The attack on Zamzam IDP camp resulted in 210 deaths between April 11-13, and more recent attacks in El Fasher caused at least 57 civilian deaths. These numbers are likely undercounts due to limited access for verification.
## Historical Context and Trends
Looking at previous data, estimates indicate approximately 28,700 deaths by November 2024 since the conflict began in April 2023. Independent studies suggest the actual toll could be as high as 130,000 when accounting for indirect deaths. The conflict has caused massive displacement with 12-15 million internally displaced persons and over 3.3 million refugees in neighboring countries.
The current data from April 2025 shows an alarming acceleration in violence. If the observed rate of approximately 34 confirmed deaths per day were to continue for the remainder of 2025, this would result in approximately 8,330 additional deaths for the remaining 245 days of the year. Adding the estimated deaths from January through April would likely push the total well above 10,000 for the year.
## Factors Affecting Future Death Rates
Several factors suggest the death toll may continue at high levels:
1. **Military Dynamics**: While SAF has gained ground in many regions, RSF still maintains influence in Darfur and continues offensive operations, targeting civilians.
2. **Humanitarian Crisis**: The collapse of healthcare infrastructure, food insecurity affecting 24.6 million people, and 8.5 million facing famine-like conditions will contribute to conflict-related deaths.
3. **Limited International Intervention**: Despite diplomatic efforts, no effective ceasefire is in place. Humanitarian aid is severely constrained, with only 10% of the required $4.2 billion funding received.
4. **Targeting of Civilians**: The systematic targeting of civilian populations, particularly in IDP camps, represents a shift toward more deadly tactics.
## Uncertainty Factors
There are some factors that could modify these projections:
1. **Potential Peace Agreement**: While unlikely given current dynamics, a successful peace process could reduce deaths in the latter part of 2025.
2. **Seasonal Variations**: The upcoming rainy season could impact military operations, potentially reducing direct combat deaths but increasing disease-related mortality.
3. **Reporting Limitations**: Current death counts are likely significant undercounts due to limited access to conflict zones and reporting challenges.
## Probability Distribution Analysis
Based on the current death rate of approximately 34 confirmed deaths per day (which is likely an undercount), and considering the 8 months remaining in 2025, we can project the following scenarios:
– If the conflict continues at the current intensity: Death toll likely exceeds 12,000
– If the conflict moderates slightly: Death toll likely between 8,000-12,000
– If significant de-escalation occurs: Death toll might fall to 5,000-8,000
– If major peace agreement is implemented soon: Death toll could be 3,000-5,000
– If immediate cessation of hostilities: Death toll might be 1,000-3,000
– If conflict ends immediately: Death toll less than 1,000 (extremely unlikely)
Given the evidence of intensification rather than de-escalation, the probability mass should be concentrated in the higher brackets. The observed death rate of 481+ deaths in just two weeks (34+ per day) in North Darfur alone suggests that, even with some fluctuation, the annual total will likely exceed 8,000 and quite possibly 12,000.
## Final Probability Assessment
Given the recent escalation in violence, the lack of progress toward peace, ongoing targeting of civilians, and the humanitarian crisis, I assess the probability distribution as follows:
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 3
Option_C: 7
Option_D: 15
Option_E: 28
Option_F: 46
=== Forecast Result ===
{
“probability_yes”: null,
“probability_yes_per_category”: {
“Less than 1000”: 0.01,
“Between 1000 and 3000”: 0.03333333333333333,
“Between 3000 and 5000”: 0.07333333333333333,
“Between 5000 and 8000”: 0.15666666666666665,
“Between 8000 and 12000”: 0.25666666666666665,
“More than 12000”: 0.47000000000000003
},
“continuous_cdf”: null
}
=== Reasoning ===
All Predictions:
[{‘Less than 1000’: 0.009900990099009901, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.019801980198019802, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.06930693069306931, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.18811881188118812, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.2871287128712871, ‘More than 12000’: 0.42574257425742573}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.03, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.06, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.09, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.26, ‘More than 12000’: 0.44}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.04, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.09, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.17, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.24, ‘More than 12000’: 0.45}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.15, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.28, ‘More than 12000’: 0.46}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.06, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.15, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.25, ‘More than 12000’: 0.5}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.27, ‘More than 12000’: 0.5}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.06, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.14, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.25, ‘More than 12000’: 0.52}]
Median Reasoning:
EXTRACTED_PROBABILITIES: [1, 3, 7, 15, 28, 46]
Model’s Answer:
# Analysis of Conflict Deaths in Sudan for 2025
## Current Situation Assessment
The conflict in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) shows no signs of abating as it enters its third year. Recent reports indicate an intensification of violence, particularly in Darfur. The most striking evidence comes from UN data showing at least 481 confirmed civilian deaths in North Darfur alone since April 10, 2025 – representing approximately 34 deaths per day over a two-week period. This rate is alarming and suggests a significant escalation compared to previous periods.
Multiple sources confirm a deteriorating situation with the RSF launching offensives against civilian targets, including IDP camps. The attack on Zamzam IDP camp resulted in 210 deaths between April 11-13, and more recent attacks in El Fasher caused at least 57 civilian deaths. These numbers are likely undercounts due to limited access for verification.
## Historical Context and Trends
Looking at previous data, estimates indicate approximately 28,700 deaths by November 2024 since the conflict began in April 2023. Independent studies suggest the actual toll could be as high as 130,000 when accounting for indirect deaths. The conflict has caused massive displacement with 12-15 million internally displaced persons and over 3.3 million refugees in neighboring countries.
The current data from April 2025 shows an alarming acceleration in violence. If the observed rate of approximately 34 confirmed deaths per day were to continue for the remainder of 2025, this would result in approximately 8,330 additional deaths for the remaining 245 days of the year. Adding the estimated deaths from January through April would likely push the total well above 10,000 for the year.
## Factors Affecting Future Death Rates
Several factors suggest the death toll may continue at high levels:
1. **Military Dynamics**: While SAF has gained ground in many regions, RSF still maintains influence in Darfur and continues offensive operations, targeting civilians.
2. **Humanitarian Crisis**: The collapse of healthcare infrastructure, food insecurity affecting 24.6 million people, and 8.5 million facing famine-like conditions will contribute to conflict-related deaths.
3. **Limited International Intervention**: Despite diplomatic efforts, no effective ceasefire is in place. Humanitarian aid is severely constrained, with only 10% of the required $4.2 billion funding received.
4. **Targeting of Civilians**: The systematic targeting of civilian populations, particularly in IDP camps, represents a shift toward more deadly tactics.
## Uncertainty Factors
There are some factors that could modify these projections:
1. **Potential Peace Agreement**: While unlikely given current dynamics, a successful peace process could reduce deaths in the latter part of 2025.
2. **Seasonal Variations**: The upcoming rainy season could impact military operations, potentially reducing direct combat deaths but increasing disease-related mortality.
3. **Reporting Limitations**: Current death counts are likely significant undercounts due to limited access to conflict zones and reporting challenges.
## Probability Distribution Analysis
Based on the current death rate of approximately 34 confirmed deaths per day (which is likely an undercount), and considering the 8 months remaining in 2025, we can project the following scenarios:
– If the conflict continues at the current intensity: Death toll likely exceeds 12,000
– If the conflict moderates slightly: Death toll likely between 8,000-12,000
– If significant de-escalation occurs: Death toll might fall to 5,000-8,000
– If major peace agreement is implemented soon: Death toll could be 3,000-5,000
– If immediate cessation of hostilities: Death toll might be 1,000-3,000
– If conflict ends immediately: Death toll less than 1,000 (extremely unlikely)
Given the evidence of intensification rather than de-escalation, the probability mass should be concentrated in the higher brackets. The observed death rate of 481+ deaths in just two weeks (34+ per day) in North Darfur alone suggests that, even with some fluctuation, the annual total will likely exceed 8,000 and quite possibly 12,000.
## Final Probability Assessment
Given the recent escalation in violence, the lack of progress toward peace, ongoing targeting of civilians, and the humanitarian crisis, I assess the probability distribution as follows:
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 3
Option_C: 7
Option_D: 15
Option_E: 28
Option_F: 46

Past forecasts by both Phil and Jeremy on Sudan’s conflict fatalities —>

Background on VIEWS: Near the end of 2024, the latest forecasting competition of the Violence and Impacts Early-Warning System (VIEWS) was launched. On Dec. 4, 2024, during a telecon, a group of machine forecasting experts involved in VIEWS observed Jeremy’s demonstration of his Multi-AI Oracle. Although it was too late for Jeremy to sign up as a VIEWS competitor, they urged him to run a side competition for everyone’s benefit. Jeremy chose their Sudan conflict deaths question.

Below, map of control in Sudan’s civil war as of April 15, 2025.

Below, before and after pictures of the devastation of the civil war in Sudan.

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