Details on Sudan Updates from Botmaster Phil Godzin of April 30, 2025

How many conflict deaths will there be in Sudan in 2025?

Phil’s pgodzinai is a side competitor with the machine forecasting bots of the VIEWS competition.

Perplexity response:
{think}

Okay, I need to figure out how many conflict deaths there will be in Sudan in 2025, focusing on recent developments within the past few days to update the forecast. The user wants me to consider new information and possible options given, which range from less than 1000 up to more than 12,000.
First, I’ll look at the search results provided. The most recent dates are April 25, 2025, April 27, 2025, April 30, 2025, and May 1, 2025. The latest one is from May 1st, which mentions at least 542 deaths in North Darfur over the past three weeks. That’s a significant number in a short period.
In the first search result [1], dated April 25, the UN Human Rights Chief reports 481 civilian deaths in North Darfur since April 10, with 129 killed between April 20-24. This shows a rapid escalation in deaths. The second result [2] from April 27 mentions mass displacement and civilian deaths in Zamzam camp near Al Fasher, but the specific death count isn’t provided here. The third result [3] is about Sudanese returning home, which might relate to displacement but doesn’t directly contribute to death numbers. The fourth result [4], an opinion piece from April 25, states over 28,700 killed in the war as of November 2024, which is a cumulative figure up to late 2024. The fifth result [5], from May 1, updates the North Darfur death toll to at least 542 in three weeks, which averages about 180 deaths per week.
Putting this together, the conflict is intensifying, especially in North Darfur. The recent data shows a spike in casualties. The April 2025 numbers are particularly alarming, with hundreds killed in short periods. The UN’s reports indicate that actual numbers are likely higher due to underreporting. Considering the current rate and the fact that the conflict is ongoing with the RSF and SAF clashes, the death toll could continue rising. However, there’s no explicit data on projections for the entire year beyond the recent months. The options given go up to more than 12,000. If the current rate continues, say 500 deaths per month, that would be around 6,000 annually, but given the acceleration in recent weeks, it might be higher. The cumulative figure from November 2024 was 28,700, but that’s over a longer period. The recent reports suggest a higher rate now. However, without official projections or data beyond the recent weeks, it’s tricky. The opinion piece [4] mentions the conflict’s roots but doesn’t provide future estimates. The latest UN update [5] only covers three weeks with 542 deaths. Extrapolating that rate (542 over 21 days) would mean about 8,800 deaths per year if sustained, but conflicts often have variable intensity. Considering the humanitarian crisis and continued fighting, the death toll could fall between 5,000 to 8,000, aligning with the ‘Between 5000 and 8000’ option. However, the user’s options include ‘Between 8000 and 12000’ as well. Given the rapid escalation and underreporting noted in [1], the higher end might be possible. The latest figure from [5] is 542 in three weeks, which is about 180 per week. Over 52 weeks, that’s 9,360, but conflicts can fluctuate. The November 2024 number was 28,700, but that’s cumulative since the start, not annual. The recent spike might indicate a worse 2025. Considering all, the most likely bracket is between 5,000 and 8,000, but there’s a risk it could reach higher. The options don’t have a ‘Between 8000-12000’ as a higher tier, so maybe the user’s options go up to 12,000. However, the recent data points to a rate that would hit around 8,000-9,000 if continued, so the ‘Between 8000-12000’ might be possible. But given the ambiguity and the fact that the conflict is ongoing, the answer should probably lean towards the higher end. The sources don’t explicitly state 2025 totals, so it’s a projection based on recent trends. The UN’s statement in [1] mentions the actual number is likely higher, which supports a conservative estimate. Combining all, the answer might be ‘Between 5000-8000’ or ‘8000-12000’. Since the latest three weeks had 542, which is 180 per week, annualizing that is 9,360. If the rate accelerates, it could go higher. The user’s options include up to 12,000. The opinion piece [4] mentions 28,700 cumulative up to November 2024, but that’s not annual. The conflict is ongoing, so 2025’s total could be significant. Given the recent spike and underreporting, the forecast might lean towards the higher brackets. However, without explicit data, it’s safer to go with the data we have. The May 1st report [5] says 542 in three weeks, which is part of April. If that’s a trend, April’s total could be around 712 (assuming 542 from three weeks, maybe a few hundred more in the remaining days). But extrapolating from that isn’t reliable. The answer should probably state that based on recent trends, the death toll is likely to exceed 5,000, possibly reaching 8,000-12,000, but given the options, the best fit is ‘Between 5000 and 8000’ or ‘Between 8000 and 12000’. Considering the recent rate and underreporting, maybe the higher bracket. But the options are provided by the user as possible answers. The user needs to choose from those options. Given the latest data, the answer would be ‘Between 8000 and 12000’ because the recent rate, if continued, would lead to numbers in that range, especially considering underreporting. However, the given data only covers a few weeks, so it’s a forecast. The answer should reflect that recent developments suggest a significant increase, so the higher brackets are more likely. **Recent Developments in Sudan Conflict Deaths (April-May 2025)**
Below is a summary of critical sources providing insight into the escalating conflict in Sudan, particularly focusing on recent civilian casualties and displacement trends.
—
### **Key Citations**
1. **UN Human Rights Office Report (25 April 2025)**
– **Title**: “Sudan: Türk gravely concerned at rising civilian deaths…”
– **Content**: Reports 481 civilian deaths in North Darfur since 10 April, including 129 killed between 20–24 April. Over 210 civilians, including nine medical professionals, died in Zamzam IDP camp (11–13 April). Underreporting is noted due to restricted access.
– **Relevance**: Highlights rapid escalation in fatalities and systemic underreporting. [1]
2. **OCHA Humanitarian Updates (27 April 2025)**
– **Title**: “UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Updates”
– **Content**: Mass displacement and civilian deaths reported in Zamzam camp near Al Fasher. Road access improving, but humanitarian restrictions persist in conflict zones.
– **Relevance**: Emphasizes displacement patterns and challenges in aid delivery, which exacerbate fatalities. [2]
3. **SF Chronicle Article (30 April 2025)**
– **Title**: “Sudanese return to their homeland, hoping for stability…”
– **Content**: Focuses on displacement and returns, with no direct death toll data.
– **Relevance**: Limited relevance to mortality projections; contextualizes displacement pressures. [3]
4. **Pagosa Daily Post Opinion (25 April 2025)**
– **Title**: “OPINION: A Nation Bleeds While The World Watches”
– **Content**: Notes 28,700 conflict deaths as of November 2024, with 12 million displaced and 3.3 million refugees. Outlines historical roots of the SAF-RSF conflict.
– **Relevance**: Provides cumulative death toll up to late 2024, establishing a baseline for 2025 projections. [4]
5. **This Is Beirut Report (1 May 2025)**
– **Title**: “At least 542 killed in Sudan’s North Darfur in past three weeks”
– **Content**: UN Human Rights Chief confirms 542 deaths in North Darfur from mid-April to early May, with civilians facing sexual violence and detention facility deaths.
– **Relevance**: Latest data showing a spike in fatalities in a concentrated period, indicative of accelerating violence. [5]
—
### **Analysis & Projection**
1. **Recent Trends**:
– **Acceleration in Deaths**: The 542 deaths reported in North Darfur over three weeks (mid-April to early May) represent a rate of ~180 deaths per week, suggesting a surge in violence[5].
– **Underreporting**: The UN highlights that actual fatalities are likely higher due to restricted access to conflict zones[1][4].
2. **Cumulative Data**:
– **Pre-2025 Baseline**: 28,700 deaths as of November 2024[4], with displacement worsening in 2025 (12 million displaced)[4].
– **2025 Projections**:
– If the recent weekly rate (~180 deaths) continues, annualized fatalities would reach **~9,360**, aligning with the **”Between 8000 and 12000″** bracket.
– However, conflicts often experience fluctuating intensity. The RSF-SAF clashes, resource disputes, and targeting of IDP camps[1][4] suggest sustained high violence.
3. **Humanitarian & Geopolitical Factors**:
– **Displacement & Access**: Restrictions on aid in El Fasher and Zamzam camps are worsening conditions, indirectly increasing mortality risks[1][2].
– **Sexual Violence & Detention**: Systemic human rights abuses reported, including deaths in detention and during displacement[1][5].
—
### **Conclusion**
Given the intensified violence in North Darfur, underreporting, and displacement crises, **conflict deaths in Sudan in 2025 are likely to exceed 5,000**. The most plausible forecast, considering recent trends, aligns with **”Between 8000 and 12000″**, though uncertainties remain due to variable conflict dynamics and access challenges.
**Final Recommendation**: Prioritize the **”Between 8000 and 12000″** option, supported by accelerating casualties in Q2 2025 and historical underreporting patterns.
AskNews Deep Usage:
prompt_tokens=42053 completion_tokens=4250 total_tokens=0
AskNews Deep Search Response:
**Relevant Citations and Summaries (May 1, 2025 Context):**
1. **[1][2][3][4] UN Reports on North Darfur Violence (May 1, 2025):**
– At least **542 civilians killed in North Darfur** over the previous three weeks, with attacks intensifying in El Fasher and surrounding areas. Recent RSF assaults on displacement camps (e.g., Abu Shouk) resulted in **40+ civilian deaths** in single incidents. The UN calls the violence “limitless” and warns of a worsening humanitarian catastrophe [1][2][3][4].
2. **[5][6][7] Famine and Displacement (May 1, 2025):**
– Famine has spread to regions like Zamzam camp, displacing **400,000+ people**. The UN reports **25 million people** face acute hunger, with **638,000 already in catastrophic famine conditions**. Mortality from malnutrition and disease is rising, compounding conflict deaths [5][6][7].
3. **[8][9][11][23] Cumulative Death Toll Estimates (2023–April 2025):**
– Over **130,000–150,000 conflict-related deaths** since April 2023, per academic studies and UN sources. Direct violence accounts for **26,000–61,000 deaths** in Khartoum alone, but 2025 trends suggest acceleration [10][11][15][23].
4. **[10][15][16][28] Recent Escalation in Darfur (April–May 2025):**
– RSF advances in Darfur, including sieges of El Fasher, have caused **300–400 civilian deaths** in April 2025. The region faces heightened ethnic violence and systematic targeting of displaced populations, with death tolls likely underreported [10][16][28].
5. **[20][25][35] Projections and Warnings (April 2025):**
– The UN warns of “industrial-scale” mortality if violence persists, with **no viable peace process**. Aid shortfalls (only **6.3% of $4.2B needed**) and the rainy season (May–October) will exacerbate famine and disease spread [20][25][35].
—
**Key Updates and Expert Opinions:**
– **Proximate Risk Factors (May 1, 2025):** RSF’s siege of El Fasher, Sudan’s last army-held Darfur city, risks a “bloodbath” [1][4]. Over **4,000 fled violence here in the past week alone** [37].
– **Fatalities Trend:** Civilian deaths in North Darfur rose **15–20% monthly** in early 2025 compared to Q4 2024, per UN data [1–4][19]. If this persists, **2025 deaths could reach 8,000–12,000 in Darfur alone**.
– **Authoritative Data Gaps:** Most UN reports cite cumulative deaths since 2023. The **latest 2025-specific mortality metric** is the **542 deaths in North Darfur over three weeks (April 10–May 1)** [1–4]. Extrapolated nationally, this suggests **5,000–7,000 deaths Q2 2025** before accounting for famine.
—
**Conclusion:**
Based on **May 1, 2025 data**, the conflict is escalating with no near-term resolution. Even conservative extrapolations of recent violence (542 deaths in 3 weeks in one region) suggest **2025 deaths will exceed 12,000**, particularly given famine’s compounding effects. **More than 12,000** is the most probable range, with experts warning of an “industrial-scale” crisis [20][25][35]. Okay, let’s start by analyzing the user’s query and the provided news articles. The user is asking about the number of conflict deaths in Sudan in 2025, with options ranging from less than 1000 to more than 12,000. The background emphasizes new developments in the past few days.
Looking at the search results, all the articles are from April to May 2025, which fits the timeframe. The key points I notice are the recent spikes in violence. For example, the UN reported 542 civilian deaths in North Darfur over three weeks (documents 1-4), and another 12 killed in El Fasher in an April 10 attack (document 37). There’s a mention of a study estimating 150,000 deaths since the conflict began in 2023 (documents 1, 3, 10, 15, 25).
However, the user is specifically interested in 2025. The conflict has been ongoing since April 2023, so the totals from studies might include prior years. The articles from May 1, 2025, highlight recent escalations in El Fasher and Abu Shouk, with daily casualties (documents 1-5). The UN warns of deepening famine and violence, which could exacerbate death tolls (documents 5-7, 25).
Also, there’s conflicting data: some sources report 20,000 deaths (documents 5, 14), while others suggest higher numbers up to 150,000 (documents 10, 15, 25). But these larger figures seem cumulative over the two-year conflict. For 2025 specifically, the daily and weekly reports (like the 542 deaths in three weeks) suggest a high ongoing rate. If that rate continues, projecting over months could lead to numbers in the thousands or higher.
The possible options given go up to more than 12,000. Considering the recent escalation, especially in El Fasher, and the lack of ceasefire, it’s likely the death toll in 2025 will be significant. However, accurate real-time data is scarce due to collapsed infrastructure and limited access for aid organizations (documents 8, 28).
The humanitarian crisis, including famine and displacement, adds indirect deaths not counted in direct conflict fatalities. But the resolution criteria probably focuses on direct casualties. The most recent reports from May 1 indicate continued high fatalities, so the “Between 5000 and 8000” or higher seems plausible. However, the options are in ranges, and given the uncertainty, the safest bet might be the higher brackets due to the sustained violence mentioned in the latest articles.
**Conflict Death Projections for Sudan in 2025**
Based on the latest reports, the conflict in Sudan remains intensely violent, with escalating clashes in Darfur and deteriorating humanitarian conditions. Recent developments and authoritative sources highlight the following:
1. **Immediate Escalation**:
– **542 civilian deaths** were confirmed in North Darfur over the past three weeks (1–30 April 2025) due to attacks by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and Sudanese army on El Fasher and Abu Shouk [1][2][3][4]. The UN warns the actual toll is likely higher.
– Attacks on displacement camps (e.g., Zamzam) have caused **mass displacement (400,000+)** and fatalities, with famine conditions worsening in besieged areas [7][9][11].
2. **Long-Term Trends**:
– Since April 2023, the conflict has caused **~150,000 total deaths**, per estimates from American universities and the International Rescue Committee [1][13][25]. However, **directly attributed 2025 deaths** are not isolated in most reports.
– **Projected Risks**: Intensified fighting in El Fasher (May 1, 2025) and RSF’s push to control Darfur suggest violence will persist, with daily civilian casualties reported [1][37].
3. **Resolution Source Context**:
– The UN and humanitarian agencies cite **extreme challenges in tracking deaths** due to limited access, attacks on healthcare, and collapsed infrastructure [8][23][27]. Recent data gaps suggest underreporting.
– **Daily death rates in April 2025** (e.g., 40+ killed in a single El Fasher assault [1][2][3][4]) indicate a trajectory toward thousands of deaths if violence continues at this pace.
4. **Key Limitations**:
– Overlap between direct combat deaths and indirect fatalities (starvation, disease) complicates accurate tolls. Famine, affecting **25 million people**, exacerbates mortality but may not be counted in conflict-specific criteria [25][26][35].
– No official 2025 projections exist, but historical patterns (e.g., 20,000+ deaths/year [15][25]) and recent escalations suggest **2025 deaths will likely exceed 5,000**.
**Relevant Options Analysis**:
– **Less than 1,000**: Unlikely given recent three-week totals (542+ deaths) and ongoing battles.
– **1,000–3,000 or 3,000–5,000**: Plausible if violence de-escalates, but current trends show intensification.
– **5,000–8,000 or 8,000–12,000**: Most likely range based on sustained clashes, siege tactics, and historical annual rates.
– **>12,000**: Possible if Darfur’s battles worsen or famine-related deaths compound totals.
**Conclusion**: While precise 2025 data is unavailable, the **escalating violence in North Darfur** (May 1, 2025) and **consensus on worsening conditions** strongly indicate **deaths will exceed 5,000**, with higher ranges becoming probable.
GPT News Summary:
As of May 1, 2025, the conflict in Sudan remains dire, with a severe ongoing humanitarian crisis driven by clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Here are the key developments and statistics related to the conflict deaths in Sudan:
1. **Recent Casualty Figures:**
– Over the past three weeks, at least 542 civilians have been killed in North Darfur, as reported by multiple sources including the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk ([Al Jazeera, May 1, 2025](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/5/1/sudan-horror-knows-no-bounds-says-un-as-deaths-in-darfur-rise); [Aksam, May 1, 2025](https://www.aksam.com.tr/dunya/bm-yuksek-komiseri-turk-uc-haftada-sudanda-542-sivil-oldu/haber-1566072)).
– The RSF’s intensifying attacks in El Fasher and Abu Shouk camps resulted in at least 40 additional civilian deaths recently ([SwissInfo, May 1, 2025](https://www.swissinfo.ch/ara/%D9%85%D9%82%D8%AA%D9%84-%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D9%82%D9%84-%D8%B9%D9%86-542-%D9%85%D8%AF%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%B4%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1%D9%81%D9%88%D8%B1-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%A7%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AB%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AB%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%28%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%AF%D8%A9%29/89247005)).
2. **Civilians and Displacement:**
– Since mid-April 2023, the conflict has resulted in tens of thousands of deaths and displaced over 13 million people, setting a record for the worst humanitarian crisis globally ([Al Jazeera, April 30, 2025](https://www.aljazeera.net/news/2025/4/30/165-%d9%82%d8%aa%d9%8a%d9%84%d8%a7-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%af%d8%a7%d8%b1%d9%81%d9%88%d8%b1-%d8%a8%d8%a2%d8%ae%d8%b1-10-%d8%a3%d9%8a%d8%a7%d9%85-%d9%88%d8%ba%d9%88%d8%aa%d9%8a%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b4)).
– The humanitarian situation is exacerbated by the massive displacement, with over 12 million people displaced, including 3.2 million who have sought refuge in neighboring countries ([Libya Akhbar, January 3, 2025](https://www.libyaakhbar.com/world-news/2502877.html)).
3. **Human Rights Concerns:**
– Disturbing reports of extrajudicial executions and other war crimes have emerged, with videos showing civilians executed by armed men in RSF uniforms ([Nouvel Obs, May 1, 2025](https://www.nouvelobs.com/monde/20250501.OBS103418/au-soudan-au-moins-542-civils-tues-au-nord-darfour-depuis-trois-semaines.html)).
– The ongoing conflict has led to severe violations, including attacks on health workers and facilities, and escalating violence against civilians ([OCHA, February 21, 2025](https://www.unocha.org/news/sudan-conflict-whats-really-going)).
4. **Humanitarian Aid and Challenges:**
– The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) has revised its emergency appeal for Sudan, highlighting the worsening crisis and aiming to provide aid to 3 million people across 13 states by the end of 2025 ([ReliefWeb, May 1, 2025](https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-complex-emergency-revised-emergency-appeal-no-mdrsd033-revision-2)).
– Access to aid remains restricted due to continued conflict and logistical challenges.
5. **Forecasted Developments:**
– Analysts predict the humanitarian and conflict situation will continue to deteriorate without decisive action. The deaths and displacement are likely to increase unless the conflict subsides ([AA.com.tr, January 9, 2025](https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/dunya-genelinde-2024e-damgasini-vuran-catismalarin-bir-kisminin-2025te-surmesi-bekleniyor/3445845)).
These updates indicate ongoing instability and increasing violence in Sudan, pointing toward the potential for more conflict-related casualties throughout the rest of 2025. This assessment is crucial for understanding the humanitarian needs and the possible future trajectory of the conflict.
Extracted resolution criteria links:
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Anthropic response:
## Analyzing Sudan Conflict Deaths Forecast for 2025
To make an accurate forecast, I’ll examine recent developments, historical patterns, and factors that could influence conflict deaths in Sudan through 2025.
### Recent Evidence Analysis
The most significant piece of recent evidence is the UN report confirming **542 civilian deaths in North Darfur in just three weeks** (April 10-May 1, 2025). This represents a rate of approximately 180 deaths per week in a single region. Multiple sources confirm this figure, providing high confidence in this data point.
If we extrapolate this rate just for North Darfur:
– 180 deaths/week × 52 weeks = ~9,360 deaths for North Darfur alone in 2025
– This calculation doesn’t account for other conflict zones in Sudan
However, conflicts rarely maintain consistent intensity throughout a year. The recent surge might represent a peak period rather than a sustainable average.
### Historical Context and Trends
The conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) began in April 2023. Recent sources indicate:
1. Cumulative deaths since April 2023 are estimated between 130,000-150,000 (including direct and indirect deaths)
2. The conflict shows signs of intensification rather than resolution, with the siege of El Fasher representing a significant escalation
3. Humanitarian access remains severely restricted, suggesting both underreporting of deaths and increased risk of famine-related mortality
The most reliable recent data indicates:
– Deaths are accelerating in Q2 2025 compared to earlier periods
– Multiple regions beyond North Darfur are experiencing active conflict
– No viable peace process exists as of May 1, 2025
### Uncertainty Factors
Several key uncertainties affect this forecast:
1. **Potential for de-escalation**: There’s little evidence suggesting imminent ceasefire or peace agreements.
2. **Seasonal impacts**: The approaching rainy season (May-October) typically makes conflict operations more difficult but worsens humanitarian conditions.
3. **Data limitations**: Combat deaths are likely underreported due to access restrictions, particularly in active conflict zones.
4. **Definition of “conflict deaths”**: The resolution may include only direct combat casualties or might encompass indirect deaths from displacement, disease, and famine.
### Regional Distribution Analysis
Examining regional patterns:
– North Darfur shows the highest recent casualty rate (542 in three weeks)
– El Fasher remains under siege with daily casualties reported
– Khartoum and other regions continue to experience violence but with less detailed recent reporting
### Forecast Rationale
With 8 months remaining in 2025 (May-December) and evidence of accelerating violence, a conservative projection would be:
– If North Darfur alone maintains even 50% of its recent casualty rate (90 deaths/week), this would add 3,240 more deaths in 2025
– Factoring in deaths from January-April 2025 (likely already >1,500 based on partial reports) plus casualties in other regions
– The minimum plausible outcome exceeds 5,000 deaths for 2025
The continuing siege of El Fasher, deteriorating humanitarian conditions, and absence of peace initiatives all support a forecast toward the higher ranges.
### Probability Distribution Assessment
Considering all factors:
– **Less than 1000**: Extremely unlikely given that recent three-week deaths in one region alone account for over half this number.
– **Between 1000 and 3000**: Highly improbable unless an immediate, effective ceasefire is implemented across all regions.
– **Between 3000 and 5000**: Unlikely given current death rates, but possible with significant de-escalation.
– **Between 5000 and 8000**: Plausible if conflict intensity decreases from current levels.
– **Between 8000 and 12000**: Aligns with extrapolation from recent death rates in North Darfur alone.
– **More than 12000**: Highly plausible if current escalation continues and deaths in other regions are included.
Given the underreporting issues, escalating violence, and 8 months remaining in 2025, the higher ranges represent the most probable outcomes.
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 3
Option_C: 10
Option_D: 25
Option_E: 35
Option_F: 26
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.25, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.35, ‘More than 12000’: 0.26}
________________________
Anthropic response:
## Final Rationale for Sudan Conflict Deaths Forecast 2025
### Recent Data Analysis
The most significant recent data point comes from the UN Human Rights Office, which reported 542 civilian deaths in North Darfur over just a three-week period in April 2025. This represents an alarming rate of approximately 180 deaths per week in a single region. This spike is particularly concerning as it represents an acceleration of violence in an already devastating conflict.
If we were to extrapolate this recent North Darfur death rate (180 deaths/week) across the entire country for the remainder of 2025 (approximately 35 weeks remaining), we would reach about 6,300 additional deaths just from May through December. Adding the deaths that likely occurred in January through April 2025 (possibly 1,500-3,000 based on reports of escalating violence), the total for 2025 could easily reach 8,000-9,300 deaths. This, however, might still be an underestimate given the UN’s explicit statement that actual numbers are likely higher due to restricted access and reporting challenges.
### Historical Context and Conflict Trajectory
The conflict in Sudan began in April 2023, with cumulative death estimates ranging from 20,000 to 150,000 through early 2025, depending on the source and methodology. While these figures represent the entire conflict period, they suggest an annual rate in the thousands to tens of thousands.
Multiple reports indicate the conflict is intensifying rather than abating, particularly in Darfur. The siege of El Fasher, mass displacement (over 400,000 people recently), and systematic attacks on displacement camps suggest the violence will continue or worsen throughout 2025.
### Underreporting Considerations
Several factors point to significant underreporting of conflict deaths:
1. The UN explicitly notes restricted access to conflict zones, limiting accurate casualty counts
2. Collapsed infrastructure in many regions impedes reporting
3. Attacks on healthcare facilities and workers have been documented, reducing medical records
4. Mass displacement complicates tracking of deaths in affected communities
These factors suggest official figures likely represent a lower bound on actual conflict deaths.
### Compounding Factors
The humanitarian situation is catastrophic, with approximately 25 million people facing acute hunger and over 600,000 experiencing famine conditions. This creates additional mortality risks not directly attributed to violence but nonetheless conflict-related. The upcoming rainy season (May-October) is likely to exacerbate these conditions.
### Distribution Analysis
Given the evidence, I can now assess the probability of each outcome bracket:
– **Less than 1,000**: The recent data showing 542 deaths in just three weeks in one region makes this extremely improbable. Probability: 1%
– **Between 1,000 and 3,000**: Given that we’re already seeing hundreds of deaths monthly in North Darfur alone, with 7 months remaining in the year and multiple conflict zones, this range also appears highly unlikely. Probability: 3%
– **Between 3,000 and 5,000**: This would require a significant de-escalation from current death rates, which contradicts all recent reports of intensifying fighting. Probability: 10%
– **Between 5,000 and 8,000**: This range becomes plausible if violence somewhat diminishes from current rates but remains significant. Given historical patterns and current trajectory, this represents a moderate possibility. Probability: 25%
– **Between 8,000 and 12,000**: Extrapolating from the recent death rates in North Darfur across all conflict zones, and considering the escalating nature of the conflict, this range appears most likely. Probability: 36%
– **More than 12,000**: If current death rates continue or intensify further, especially considering the systematic underreporting and famine conditions, this outcome is quite possible. Probability: 25%
### Statistical Validation
As a check on my reasoning, I note that if the current death rate of approximately 180 deaths per week in North Darfur alone continues, and if similar rates occur in other conflict zones (which is plausible given reports), we could see 9,000-10,000 deaths for 2025. The upper ranges become more likely when accounting for underreporting and indirect conflict deaths.
The most recent evidence strongly suggests Sudan’s conflict is experiencing an intensification phase rather than moving toward resolution, making the middle to upper ranges of the possible outcomes most probable.
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 3
Option_C: 10
Option_D: 25
Option_E: 36
Option_F: 25
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.25, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.36, ‘More than 12000’: 0.25}
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Anthropic response:
## Sudan Conflict Death Forecast for 2025
To forecast conflict deaths in Sudan for 2025, I need to carefully analyze current trends, recent data points, and historical patterns, while acknowledging the inherent uncertainty in predicting conflict fatalities.
### Recent Data and Escalation Patterns
The most recent and reliable data points come from early May 2025, with the UN Human Rights Office reporting 542 civilian deaths in North Darfur over just a three-week period (approximately mid-April to early May 2025). This represents an alarming rate of approximately 180 deaths per week in just one region. The conflict involves the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), with intensified fighting particularly in El Fasher and surrounding displacement camps.
This recent death rate is significantly higher than previous periods, suggesting an escalation in violence. If we were to naively extrapolate this regional rate nationally for the remainder of 2025 (approximately 35 weeks remaining), we would project over 6,300 additional deaths just from May-December 2025, not counting deaths from January-April.
### Cumulative and Historical Context
Reports indicate that since the conflict began in April 2023, Sudan has experienced approximately 130,000-150,000 conflict-related deaths. While this figure includes both direct violence and indirect deaths (disease, starvation), it demonstrates the devastating scale of the conflict. The UN has warned of “industrial-scale” mortality if the violence persists, with no viable peace process on the horizon.
The sieges of cities like El Fasher, attacks on displacement camps, and systematic targeting of civilians suggest that violence will continue at high levels through 2025. The humanitarian situation has deteriorated significantly, with 25 million people facing acute hunger and 638,000 already in catastrophic famine conditions, which will likely contribute to indirect conflict deaths.
### Forecast Considerations and Uncertainties
1. **Acceleration vs. Potential De-escalation**: The most recent data shows an acceleration of violence in North Darfur. While conflicts can de-escalate unexpectedly, there are no signs of meaningful peace initiatives or ceasefire agreements that would suggest imminent reduction in violence.
2. **Underreporting**: All sources acknowledge that actual death tolls are likely higher than reported figures due to restricted access to conflict zones, collapsed infrastructure, and systematic underreporting.
3. **Seasonal Factors**: The upcoming rainy season (May-October) typically exacerbates disease spread and complicates humanitarian access, potentially increasing indirect conflict deaths.
4. **Aid Shortfalls**: Only 6.3% of the $4.2 billion needed for humanitarian assistance has been received, suggesting that ameliorative factors will be minimal.
5. **Definition Considerations**: “Conflict deaths” may include both direct violence and indirect deaths from conflict-induced famine and disease, though the exact resolution criteria weren’t provided.
### Regional Analysis
The conflict is particularly severe in Darfur, where ethnic targeting compounds the violence. Recent reports of 300-400 civilian deaths in April 2025 in this region alone suggest that Darfur will continue to be a major contributor to the national death toll. El Fasher, the last army-held city in Darfur, faces a possible “bloodbath” according to UN sources, with 4,000 people fleeing in a single week.
### Forecast Methodology
I’ll use the recent empirical data from North Darfur (542 deaths in three weeks) as my primary reference point, but adjust for:
1. The fact that this represents only one region of Sudan
2. The documented pattern of escalation (15-20% monthly increase in early 2025)
3. Evidence of systematic underreporting
4. The full year timeframe (including January-April 2025)
If the April-May death rate in North Darfur (approximately 180 deaths/week) is representative of just one of Sudan’s conflict-affected regions, and we conservatively estimate that the national weekly death rate is 2-3 times this regional rate, we would project approximately 350-500 deaths weekly nationwide. Over 52 weeks, this would suggest 18,000-26,000 deaths for 2025, though this may include indirect deaths.
Focusing purely on direct conflict violence and accounting for potential fluctuations in intensity, a more conservative estimate would place 2025 deaths in the range of 8,000-12,000, with a significant probability it could exceed 12,000 if current trends continue.
### Final Forecast
Considering the recent escalation, historical patterns, and available data, I forecast the following probabilities:
Less than 1000: 1
Between 1000 and 3000: 3
Between 3000 and 5000: 8
Between 5000 and 8000: 20
Between 8000 and 12000: 32
More than 12000: 36
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.08, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.2, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.32, ‘More than 12000’: 0.36}
________________________
Anthropic response:
## Analyzing Conflict Deaths in Sudan for 2025
To make an accurate forecast on conflict deaths in Sudan for 2025, I’ll analyze recent trends, historical patterns, and the current escalation of violence, focusing particularly on developments from April-May 2025.
### Recent Data Assessment
The most reliable recent indicator comes from UN reports confirming at least 542 civilian deaths in North Darfur alone over just three weeks in April 2025. This represents a rate of approximately 180 deaths per week in a single region. This surge in violence, particularly in El Fasher and displacement camps, suggests a concerning pattern of escalation.
Multiple sources corroborate this acceleration, with consistent reporting across all three research assistants about the intensifying conflict. The UN Human Rights Chief’s statements about systemic underreporting due to access restrictions indicate these figures likely represent minimum estimates.
### Extrapolation Analysis
If we extrapolate the recent North Darfur rate (542 deaths in three weeks) to an annual rate for that region alone, we would expect approximately 9,360 deaths. However, several factors suggest this could be a conservative estimate:
1. **Geographic Scope**: These figures cover only North Darfur, while violence continues across multiple regions of Sudan.
2. **Confirmed Underreporting**: The UN explicitly states that actual figures are higher due to access limitations.
3. **Escalation Trajectory**: The conflict shows signs of intensification rather than de-escalation, with ongoing RSF offensives.
4. **Humanitarian Collapse**: Famine conditions affecting over 25 million people will likely increase indirect conflict mortality.
### Historical Context
The conflict has caused between 130,000-150,000 deaths since its beginning in April 2023, according to academic studies and UN sources. This suggests an average of approximately 65,000-75,000 deaths per year over the first two years. While annual distribution is uneven, this provides a macro perspective on the scale of the crisis.
### Methodological Considerations
There are important limitations to consider:
1. **Resolution Criteria**: The forecast concerns “conflict deaths” which presumably includes direct violence but may exclude some indirect deaths from famine and disease.
2. **Temporal Trends**: The conflict has shown periods of varying intensity, but the April-May 2025 data suggests we’re in a period of acceleration.
3. **Data Reliability**: All sources indicate significant challenges in accurate reporting and likely underestimation of casualties.
### Forward-Looking Assessment
Given that it’s already May 1, 2025, we have four months of data for the year and eight months remaining. The recent escalation, particularly the siege of El Fasher and intensified attacks on displacement camps, suggests the violence will continue at current or higher levels throughout 2025.
Key factors that could influence the death toll include:
– The RSF’s continued offensive in Darfur
– Worsening humanitarian conditions during the upcoming rainy season (May-October)
– The reported funding gap for humanitarian assistance (only 6.3% of needed $4.2B)
– The absence of viable peace negotiations
### Probability Distribution Analysis
Considering these factors, I’ll assess each option:
1. **Less than 1,000**: Extremely unlikely given that we’ve already seen 542 deaths in just three weeks in one region.
2. **Between 1,000 and 3,000**: Highly improbable considering the current rate and escalation.
3. **Between 3,000 and 5,000**: Unlikely given the accelerating violence and multiple conflict zones.
4. **Between 5,000 and 8,000**: Possible but would require significant de-escalation from current trends.
5. **Between 8,000 and 12,000**: Aligned with the current rate if annualized (approximately 9,360 based on recent North Darfur data alone).
6. **More than 12,000**: Highly plausible given underreporting, multiple conflict zones, and the worsening humanitarian situation.
The extrapolation from recent data points toward the higher ranges, particularly “Between 8,000 and 12,000” or “More than 12,000.” However, I must account for potential variance and avoid overconfidence.
### Final Analysis
Considering all evidence, the most likely outcome appears to be either in the 8,000-12,000 range or above 12,000. The current rate in North Darfur alone projects to approximately 9,360 deaths annually, and this doesn’t account for other regions or indirect deaths.
However, to avoid overconfidence, I must acknowledge uncertainty about how the conflict might evolve in the remaining eight months of 2025. The possibility of peace negotiations, international intervention, or other factors could alter the trajectory.
Given the substantial evidence of escalation, the multiple independent sources confirming high recent death rates, and the humanitarian crisis compounding the direct violence, I assess the highest probabilities lie with the upper ranges of the provided options.
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 4
Option_C: 10
Option_D: 20
Option_E: 35
Option_F: 30
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.04, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.2, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.35, ‘More than 12000’: 0.3}
________________________
Anthropic response:
## Analysis of Sudan Conflict Deaths Forecast for 2025
To accurately assess the likelihood of conflict deaths in Sudan for 2025, I’ll analyze the most recent data, established trends, and contextual factors that could influence the death toll between now (May 1, 2025) and the end of 2025.
### Recent Data Points and Escalation
Based on the research assistants’ reports, we have several critical data points:
1. **Current Casualty Rate**: At least 542 civilians were killed in North Darfur alone in just three weeks (approximately mid-April to May 1, 2025). This represents about 180 deaths per week in a single region, which is alarming.
2. **Geographic Concentration**: The violence is particularly intense in El Fasher and surrounding displacement camps, with 40+ civilians killed in single incidents. This suggests a pattern of targeted attacks rather than sporadic violence.
3. **Humanitarian Crisis**: The UN reports 25 million people facing acute hunger, with 638,000 in catastrophic famine conditions. This suggests indirect conflict deaths (from starvation and disease) will compound direct violence.
### Extrapolation Based on Current Trends
If we extrapolate the confirmed rate of 542 deaths over three weeks just in North Darfur:
– This equals approximately 180 deaths per week in one region
– Annualized, this would be about 9,360 deaths (180 × 52 weeks)
– However, this is only counting North Darfur, while the conflict affects multiple regions
The actual national death toll is likely significantly higher when accounting for:
– Other regions experiencing violence (Khartoum, South Darfur, etc.)
– Underreporting due to limited access by humanitarian organizations
– Indirect deaths from conflict-induced famine and disease
### Historical Context and Trajectory
The research indicates that between April 2023 and early 2025, approximately 130,000-150,000 conflict-related deaths have occurred in Sudan. This suggests an average of 5,000-6,000 deaths per month over the approximately 24-month period. However, the recent data suggests the conflict is intensifying rather than abating:
1. The UN notes monthly death increases of 15-20% in early 2025 compared to Q4 2024
2. RSF’s siege of El Fasher (Sudan’s last army-held Darfur city) is escalating
3. No viable peace process exists, and funding for humanitarian aid is severely limited (only 6.3% of the needed $4.2B)
### Remaining Months in 2025
With today being May 1, 2025, we need to forecast deaths for the remaining 8 months of the year. Key factors that will affect this period:
1. **Rainy Season Impact**: The upcoming rainy season (May-October) will likely exacerbate famine and disease spread, potentially increasing indirect conflict deaths.
2. **Continued Fighting**: With no peace process and intensifying regional battles, the violence shows no signs of abating.
3. **Humanitarian Access**: Restricted access to affected populations will continue to limit life-saving interventions.
### Final Assessment
Given the evidence, I can make the following assessments:
1. **Less than 1,000 deaths**: Extremely unlikely given that over 500 deaths occurred in just three weeks in a single region.
2. **Between 1,000 and 3,000 deaths**: Highly unlikely given current death rates, which would exceed this range within 2-3 months if maintained.
3. **Between 3,000 and 5,000 deaths**: Unlikely given the current pace of approximately 180 deaths per week in North Darfur alone, which would amount to over 7,000 deaths in just this region by year-end.
4. **Between 5,000 and 8,000 deaths**: Possible, but would require a significant de-escalation from current trends. The current pace in North Darfur alone would exceed 7,000 deaths by year-end.
5. **Between 8,000 and 12,000 deaths**: Highly plausible based on the current pace in North Darfur (approximately 9,360 annualized) plus deaths in other regions.
6. **More than 12,000 deaths**: Also highly plausible, especially considering the escalating nature of the conflict, famine conditions, and the likelihood that current figures are underreported due to access challenges.
Given the intensification of fighting, the geographical spread of the conflict, and compounding factors like famine and disease, the most likely outcomes are in the upper ranges. However, I must account for uncertainty, including the possibility of a peace agreement, international intervention, or other factors that could reduce the death toll from current trajectories.
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 4
Option_C: 10
Option_D: 25
Option_E: 32
Option_F: 28
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.04, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.25, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.32, ‘More than 12000’: 0.28}
Gemini Multiple Choice response:
Rationale:
1. **Current Situation Assessment (as of May 1, 2025):** The conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) continues with high intensity. Recent reports, consistently cited by all research assistants, highlight a significant escalation, particularly in North Darfur. The UN confirmed at least 542 civilian deaths in North Darfur over the three weeks preceding May 1, 2025. This intense violence includes attacks on cities like El Fasher and displacement camps like Abu Shouk and Zamzam.
2. **Recent Trend Analysis:** The figure of 542 deaths in just three weeks within a single region (North Darfur) translates to approximately 180 deaths per week. Extrapolating this rate is complex, as conflict intensity fluctuates and varies regionally. However, it serves as a stark indicator of the current lethality. If such rates were sustained or replicated elsewhere, the annual national total would be very high. Crucially, multiple sources indicate this violence is *escalating*, not stabilizing or decreasing. The ongoing siege of El Fasher, the last SAF stronghold in Darfur, poses a risk of a major, casualty-intensive battle.
3. **Data Limitations and Underreporting:** Access restrictions, communication blackouts, and attacks on healthcare severely hamper accurate data collection. The UN and aid agencies consistently warn that reported figures are likely minimums, and the true death toll is considerably higher. This factor strongly suggests that projections based solely on confirmed numbers might underestimate the actual scale.
4. **Time Horizon and Cumulative Effect:** The forecast covers the entire calendar year 2025. We are currently on May 1, meaning four months have passed, and eight remain. The high death rate observed in April, if indicative of trends for the coming months, suggests a significant accumulation of fatalities by year-end (December 31, 2025, for resolution on Jan 1, 2026). Even conservative estimates based on recent data point towards totals well above the lower brackets. Historical data (e.g., ACLED estimates for 2023 exceeding 12,000) also suggests high annual tolls are typical for this conflict’s intensity.
5. **Humanitarian Crisis Context:** While the question likely refers to direct conflict deaths, the surrounding humanitarian catastrophe (widespread displacement, looming famine affecting millions) exacerbates conditions, potentially increasing vulnerability to violence and making accurate counting harder. Warnings of “industrial-scale” mortality reflect the combined impact.
6. **Probability Distribution Across Options:**
* **<1000, 1000-3000, 3000-5000:** Extremely unlikely. The confirmed deaths in just three weeks in one region already approach or exceed the lower bounds of these ranges when considering the national scope and the remaining eight months. These low outcomes would require an immediate, sustained, and widespread cessation of hostilities, which appears improbable.
* **5000-8000:** Unlikely. This would imply either a significant de-escalation from current reported rates or that the North Darfur spike was highly localized and temporary, neither of which aligns with current reporting and strategic analyses (e.g., the importance of the El Fasher battle).
* **8000-12000:** Plausible. This range could be reached if violence continues at roughly the currently observed high rates (extrapolated nationally) but without further catastrophic escalation, or with periods of lower intensity balancing out spikes. It represents a scenario of sustained, serious conflict throughout the year.
* **>12000:** Highly Plausible / Most Likely. This outcome is supported by the recent escalation trend, the potential for mass casualties in upcoming battles (El Fasher), the acknowledged underreporting, the duration of the forecast period (entire 2025), and historical precedents from this conflict. The combination of factors makes exceeding 12,000 deaths seem more probable than landing within the 8k-12k bracket.
7. **Confidence and Uncertainty:** While the evidence points towards the higher ranges, significant uncertainty remains regarding the conflict’s trajectory, the accuracy of reporting, and the precise definition used for resolution. Therefore, while ‘>12000’ is assigned the highest probability, a substantial probability (30%) is also assigned to ‘8000-12000’ to reflect this uncertainty and avoid overconfidence in the face of volatile conflict dynamics. The probabilities assigned taper sharply for lower brackets.
Less than 1000: 1
Between 1000 and 3000: 2
Between 3000 and 5000: 5
Between 5000 and 8000: 12
Between 8000 and 12000: 30
More than 12000: 50
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.05, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.3, ‘More than 12000’: 0.5}
GPT Multiple Choice JSON response:
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 5
Option_C: 11
Option_D: 23
Option_E: 32
Option_F: 28
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.11, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.23, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.32, ‘More than 12000’: 0.28}
GPT Multiple Choice JSON response:
Over the first four months of 2025 Sudan has already recorded several thousand conflict‐related fatalities, and every credible monitoring organisation (ACLED, UCDP, UN OHCHR) agrees that reporting from large parts of Darfur, Kordofan and Khartoum is partial at best, implying systematic under-counting. Recent UN figures – 542 civilians killed in North Darfur alone in the three weeks to 1 May – are materially higher than the average weekly tallies seen in late-2024, suggesting a modest upward trend rather than any large step-change. Using ACLED’s 2023–24 data as a base rate (≈12 000 deaths in 2023; ≈11 000 in 2024) and matching it to what we can triangulate so far for 2025 (≈3 600–4 200 deaths through April), the most natural projection places the year-end total around 9 000–10 500 if the current intensity is sustained.
Key sources of uncertainty are:
• Conflict trajectory: there is no peace process in sight, but the SAF-RSF front lines have stabilised and both sides are resource-constrained. This makes a sudden nationwide collapse (pushing deaths far above 12 000) plausible but not the base case.
• Counting method used for resolution: if the question resolves to an ACLED-style dataset (battle-related deaths only), totals stay in the five-figure range; if a broader “excess deaths” approach were adopted, >12 000 would be far more likely. Resolution language in similar competitions almost always refers to battle deaths.
• Seasonality: the May–October rainy season restricts large-scale manoeuvre but also hampers aid, keeping fatalities from famine-driven violence and clashes roughly stable in past years.
Weighting these factors, the modal outcome is “Between 5 000 and 8 000,” but the tail risk of a wider RSF offensive or data-set idiosyncrasies justifies meaningful probability mass above 8 000. A sharp de-escalation leading to <3 000 deaths would require an unexpected cease-fire in the next few weeks, which appears unlikely.
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 6
Option_C: 15
Option_D: 30
Option_E: 28
Option_F: 20
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.06, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.15, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.3, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.28, ‘More than 12000’: 0.2}
GPT Multiple Choice JSON response:
Sudan’s war is entering its third calendar year with no functioning peace talks, a collapsing economy, and worsening sieges in Darfur. Early-2025 violence is measurably higher than late-2024: the UN confirmed 542 civilian deaths in North Darfur alone in the past three weeks, while aid groups report similar spikes around El Fasher, Khartoum State, and Kordofan. ACLED-type sources that typically underpin resolution counts still record only a fraction of true fatalities, but even their conservative tallies show roughly 4 000+ conflict deaths through end-April 2025—already more than one-third of 2024’s full-year figure.
Paths forward:
• De-escalation (≈20 % chance). International pressure or battlefield exhaustion could cut the monthly death rate below 300. That would land the year in the 3 000–8 000 range.
• Status-quo grinding war (≈45 %). Current intensity (500-900 coded deaths per month) persists; famine-related violence rises, but reporting remains patchy. Year-end total ends up roughly 6 000–11 000.
• Major escalation (≈35 %). A decisive RSF push for El Fasher or renewed SAF air campaigns drives a sharp spike (1 200+ coded deaths per month for several months). Even with under-reporting, the recorded toll could top 12 000.
Considering historical under-counting, the central estimate for the dataset likely used in resolution remains in the mid-single-thousands, yet a meaningful tail risk exists on the high side if Darfur collapses further. Very low outcomes (<3 000) require an unlikely rapid cease-fire; extremely high outcomes (>12 000) need both genuine escalation and unusually good reporting capture.
Option_A: 2
Option_B: 8
Option_C: 18
Option_D: 32
Option_E: 26
Option_F: 14
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.08, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.18, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.32, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.26, ‘More than 12000’: 0.14}
All predictions:
[{‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.06, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.15, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.3, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.28, ‘More than 12000’: 0.2}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.04, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.25, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.32, ‘More than 12000’: 0.28}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.08, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.18, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.32, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.26, ‘More than 12000’: 0.14}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.11, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.23, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.32, ‘More than 12000’: 0.28}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.25, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.35, ‘More than 12000’: 0.26}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.04, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.2, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.35, ‘More than 12000’: 0.3}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.08, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.2, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.32, ‘More than 12000’: 0.36}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.25, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.36, ‘More than 12000’: 0.25}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.05, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.3, ‘More than 12000’: 0.5}]
Filtered predictions:
[{‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.08, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.18, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.32, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.26, ‘More than 12000’: 0.14}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.11, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.23, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.32, ‘More than 12000’: 0.28}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.25, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.35, ‘More than 12000’: 0.26}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.04, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.2, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.35, ‘More than 12000’: 0.3}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.08, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.2, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.32, ‘More than 12000’: 0.36}]
Averaged predictions:
{‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.11, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.23, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.32, ‘More than 12000’: 0.28}
Median reasoning:
All Predictions:
[{‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.06, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.15, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.3, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.28, ‘More than 12000’: 0.2}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.04, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.25, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.32, ‘More than 12000’: 0.28}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.08, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.18, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.32, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.26, ‘More than 12000’: 0.14}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.11, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.23, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.32, ‘More than 12000’: 0.28}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.25, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.35, ‘More than 12000’: 0.26}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.04, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.2, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.35, ‘More than 12000’: 0.3}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.08, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.2, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.32, ‘More than 12000’: 0.36}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.25, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.36, ‘More than 12000’: 0.25}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.05, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.3, ‘More than 12000’: 0.5}]
Median Reasoning:
EXTRACTED_PROBABILITIES: [1, 3, 10, 25, 35, 26]
Model’s Answer:
## Analyzing Sudan Conflict Deaths Forecast for 2025
To make an accurate forecast, I’ll examine recent developments, historical patterns, and factors that could influence conflict deaths in Sudan through 2025.
### Recent Evidence Analysis
The most significant piece of recent evidence is the UN report confirming **542 civilian deaths in North Darfur in just three weeks** (April 10-May 1, 2025). This represents a rate of approximately 180 deaths per week in a single region. Multiple sources confirm this figure, providing high confidence in this data point.
If we extrapolate this rate just for North Darfur:
– 180 deaths/week × 52 weeks = ~9,360 deaths for North Darfur alone in 2025
– This calculation doesn’t account for other conflict zones in Sudan
However, conflicts rarely maintain consistent intensity throughout a year. The recent surge might represent a peak period rather than a sustainable average.
### Historical Context and Trends
The conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) began in April 2023. Recent sources indicate:
1. Cumulative deaths since April 2023 are estimated between 130,000-150,000 (including direct and indirect deaths)
2. The conflict shows signs of intensification rather than resolution, with the siege of El Fasher representing a significant escalation
3. Humanitarian access remains severely restricted, suggesting both underreporting of deaths and increased risk of famine-related mortality
The most reliable recent data indicates:
– Deaths are accelerating in Q2 2025 compared to earlier periods
– Multiple regions beyond North Darfur are experiencing active conflict
– No viable peace process exists as of May 1, 2025
### Uncertainty Factors
Several key uncertainties affect this forecast:
1. **Potential for de-escalation**: There’s little evidence suggesting imminent ceasefire or peace agreements.
2. **Seasonal impacts**: The approaching rainy season (May-October) typically makes conflict operations more difficult but worsens humanitarian conditions.
3. **Data limitations**: Combat deaths are likely underreported due to access restrictions, particularly in active conflict zones.
4. **Definition of “conflict deaths”**: The resolution may include only direct combat casualties or might encompass indirect deaths from displacement, disease, and famine.
### Regional Distribution Analysis
Examining regional patterns:
– North Darfur shows the highest recent casualty rate (542 in three weeks)
– El Fasher remains under siege with daily casualties reported
– Khartoum and other regions continue to experience violence but with less detailed recent reporting
### Forecast Rationale
With 8 months remaining in 2025 (May-December) and evidence of accelerating violence, a conservative projection would be:
– If North Darfur alone maintains even 50% of its recent casualty rate (90 deaths/week), this would add 3,240 more deaths in 2025
– Factoring in deaths from January-April 2025 (likely already >1,500 based on partial reports) plus casualties in other regions
– The minimum plausible outcome exceeds 5,000 deaths for 2025
The continuing siege of El Fasher, deteriorating humanitarian conditions, and absence of peace initiatives all support a forecast toward the higher ranges.
### Probability Distribution Assessment
Considering all factors:
– **Less than 1000**: Extremely unlikely given that recent three-week deaths in one region alone account for over half this number.
– **Between 1000 and 3000**: Highly improbable unless an immediate, effective ceasefire is implemented across all regions.
– **Between 3000 and 5000**: Unlikely given current death rates, but possible with significant de-escalation.
– **Between 5000 and 8000**: Plausible if conflict intensity decreases from current levels.
– **Between 8000 and 12000**: Aligns with extrapolation from recent death rates in North Darfur alone.
– **More than 12000**: Highly plausible if current escalation continues and deaths in other regions are included.
Given the underreporting issues, escalating violence, and 8 months remaining in 2025, the higher ranges represent the most probable outcomes.
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 3
Option_C: 10
Option_D: 25
Option_E: 35
Option_F: 26
=== Forecast Result ===
{
“probability_yes”: null,
“probability_yes_per_category”: {
“Less than 1000”: 0.012,
“Between 1000 and 3000”: 0.046,
“Between 3000 and 5000”: 0.11399999999999999,
“Between 5000 and 8000”: 0.24,
“Between 8000 and 12000”: 0.32,
“More than 12000”: 0.26799999999999996
},
“continuous_cdf”: null
}
=== Reasoning ===
All Predictions:
[{‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.06, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.15, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.3, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.28, ‘More than 12000’: 0.2}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.04, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.25, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.32, ‘More than 12000’: 0.28}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.08, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.18, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.32, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.26, ‘More than 12000’: 0.14}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.11, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.23, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.32, ‘More than 12000’: 0.28}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.25, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.35, ‘More than 12000’: 0.26}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.04, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.2, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.35, ‘More than 12000’: 0.3}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.08, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.2, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.32, ‘More than 12000’: 0.36}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.25, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.36, ‘More than 12000’: 0.25}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.05, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.3, ‘More than 12000’: 0.5}]
Median Reasoning:
EXTRACTED_PROBABILITIES: [1, 3, 10, 25, 35, 26]
Model’s Answer:
## Analyzing Sudan Conflict Deaths Forecast for 2025
To make an accurate forecast, I’ll examine recent developments, historical patterns, and factors that could influence conflict deaths in Sudan through 2025.
### Recent Evidence Analysis
The most significant piece of recent evidence is the UN report confirming **542 civilian deaths in North Darfur in just three weeks** (April 10-May 1, 2025). This represents a rate of approximately 180 deaths per week in a single region. Multiple sources confirm this figure, providing high confidence in this data point.
If we extrapolate this rate just for North Darfur:
– 180 deaths/week × 52 weeks = ~9,360 deaths for North Darfur alone in 2025
– This calculation doesn’t account for other conflict zones in Sudan
However, conflicts rarely maintain consistent intensity throughout a year. The recent surge might represent a peak period rather than a sustainable average.
### Historical Context and Trends
The conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) began in April 2023. Recent sources indicate:
1. Cumulative deaths since April 2023 are estimated between 130,000-150,000 (including direct and indirect deaths)
2. The conflict shows signs of intensification rather than resolution, with the siege of El Fasher representing a significant escalation
3. Humanitarian access remains severely restricted, suggesting both underreporting of deaths and increased risk of famine-related mortality
The most reliable recent data indicates:
– Deaths are accelerating in Q2 2025 compared to earlier periods
– Multiple regions beyond North Darfur are experiencing active conflict
– No viable peace process exists as of May 1, 2025
### Uncertainty Factors
Several key uncertainties affect this forecast:
1. **Potential for de-escalation**: There’s little evidence suggesting imminent ceasefire or peace agreements.
2. **Seasonal impacts**: The approaching rainy season (May-October) typically makes conflict operations more difficult but worsens humanitarian conditions.
3. **Data limitations**: Combat deaths are likely underreported due to access restrictions, particularly in active conflict zones.
4. **Definition of “conflict deaths”**: The resolution may include only direct combat casualties or might encompass indirect deaths from displacement, disease, and famine.
### Regional Distribution Analysis
Examining regional patterns:
– North Darfur shows the highest recent casualty rate (542 in three weeks)
– El Fasher remains under siege with daily casualties reported
– Khartoum and other regions continue to experience violence but with less detailed recent reporting
### Forecast Rationale
With 8 months remaining in 2025 (May-December) and evidence of accelerating violence, a conservative projection would be:
– If North Darfur alone maintains even 50% of its recent casualty rate (90 deaths/week), this would add 3,240 more deaths in 2025
– Factoring in deaths from January-April 2025 (likely already >1,500 based on partial reports) plus casualties in other regions
– The minimum plausible outcome exceeds 5,000 deaths for 2025
The continuing siege of El Fasher, deteriorating humanitarian conditions, and absence of peace initiatives all support a forecast toward the higher ranges.
### Probability Distribution Assessment
Considering all factors:
– **Less than 1000**: Extremely unlikely given that recent three-week deaths in one region alone account for over half this number.
– **Between 1000 and 3000**: Highly improbable unless an immediate, effective ceasefire is implemented across all regions.
– **Between 3000 and 5000**: Unlikely given current death rates, but possible with significant de-escalation.
– **Between 5000 and 8000**: Plausible if conflict intensity decreases from current levels.
– **Between 8000 and 12000**: Aligns with extrapolation from recent death rates in North Darfur alone.
– **More than 12000**: Highly plausible if current escalation continues and deaths in other regions are included.
Given the underreporting issues, escalating violence, and 8 months remaining in 2025, the higher ranges represent the most probable outcomes.
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 3
Option_C: 10
Option_D: 25
Option_E: 35
Option_F: 26

Past forecasts by both Phil and Jeremy on Sudan’s conflict fatalities —>

Background on VIEWS: Near the end of 2024, the latest forecasting competition of the Violence and Impacts Early-Warning System (VIEWS) was launched. On Dec. 4, 2024, during a telecon, a group of machine forecasting experts involved in VIEWS observed Jeremy’s demonstration of his Multi-AI Oracle. Although it was too late for Jeremy to sign up as a VIEWS competitor, they urged him to run a side competition for everyone’s benefit. Jeremy chose their Sudan conflict deaths question.

Below, map of control in Sudan’s civil war as of April 15, 2025.

Below, before and after pictures of the devastation of the civil war in Sudan.

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