India/Pakistan military clashes? Botmaster Phil Godzin’s forecast, May 26, 2025

Will ACLED report any conflict fatalities by India against Pakistan or vice versa between May 13 and the end of May?

Phil’s pgodzinai bot predicts a probability of 60%. Below, a summary of how it arrived at this result.

Perplexity response:
{think}

Okay, let’s tackle this question step by step. The user wants to know if ACLED will report any conflict fatalities between India and Pakistan from May 13 to May 31, 2025. The background mentions recent tensions starting in April 2025 after the Pahalgam attack, followed by skirmishes along the Line of Control.

First, I need to check the provided search results for mentions of ACLED’s reporting on India-Pakistan conflict fatalities in the specified period. The search results go up to May 22, 2025. Let’s go through each source:

1. **Result [1]**: ACLED’s analysis search page mentions an infographic on Manipur state from 2023-2025 but doesn’t directly address Indo-Pak conflicts. However, it notes escalated tensions between India and Pakistan as of the publish date (May 22, 2025). This could imply ongoing monitoring.

2. **Result [2]**: India Today article from May 21, 2025, states that India retaliated against Pakistan in 2025 after the Pahalgam attack, destroying terror camps. But it doesn’t specify fatalities between May 13-31. The user’s background mentions April events leading to skirmishes starting April 24-25, so this article might be referencing earlier actions.

3. **Result [3]**: The Telegraph article from May 22, 2025, discusses global conflict trends, including Ukraine and Myanmar, but not directly India-Pakistan. However, it quotes Ms. Raleigh from ACLED discussing conflict metrics, which shows ACLED’s active analysis but not specific to the query’s dates.

4. **Result [4]**: Instagram post from Al Jazeera on May 22, 2025, mentions ACLED reporting on increased violence in the occupied West Bank, not related to India-Pakistan.

5. **Result [5]**: India Today article from May 20, 2025, details Gaza conflict stats using ACLED data, which is unrelated but shows ACLED’s methodology for incorporating government health ministry data when access is limited. This could be relevant if similar methods are applied to India-Pakistan, but the article doesn’t mention that region.

Now, cross-referencing the dates: The user’s period is May 13-31, 2025. The latest article mentioning ACLED in the context of India-Pakistan is [2] from May 21, which references actions taken in 2025 after the Pahalgam attack but doesn’t specify fatalities in May. The background indicates skirmishes started in late April, so if these continued into May, ACLED might report them. However, the search results don’t provide explicit data on May 13-31 fatalities between India and Pakistan. ACLED’s reports are typically updated in real-time, (Carolyn‘s note: Not true. ACLED takes time to evaluate sources. In my experience, this can take days to weeks.) but the provided sources don’t include data from the specified period.

Since the latest mention of ACLED regarding India-Pakistan is from May 21 and discusses earlier actions, but no explicit fatalities in the specified window are reported in the provided results, the answer would be that there’s no direct evidence from the given sources. However, considering ACLED’s methodology from [5] where they integrate government health data when access is limited, if such access issues exist in Kashmir, they might report fatalities. But without specific data in the provided sources, the answer leans towards no reported fatalities in the specified period by ACLED based on the given information.

### Key Citations and Summaries
**1. ACLED’s Infographic on India’s Manipur State (2023-2025)** [1]
*Date*: May 22, 2025
*Summary*: Discusses political violence in Manipur but does not directly address India-Pakistan tensions. Mentions escalated tensions between India and Pakistan as of late May 2025, indicating ongoing monitoring.

**2. India’s Military Retaliation Against Pakistan (2025)** [2]
*Date*: May 21, 2025
*Summary*: Notes India’s military response to the April 2022 Pahalgam terror attack, including destruction of terror camps. No mention of fatalities during May 13–31, 2025.

**3. Global Conflict Trends (2020–2024)** [3]
*Date*: May 22, 2025
*Summary*: Highlights ACLED’s methodology for assessing conflict severity, emphasizing factors like civilian impact and group fragmentation. No direct reference to India-Pakistan clashes in May 2025.

**4. ACLED’s Reporting on West Bank Violence** [4]
*Date*: May 22, 2025
*Summary*: Focuses on increased violence in the occupied West Bank. Serves as a proxy for ACLED’s real-time conflict tracking but unrelated to India-Pakistan.

**5. Gaza Conflict Fatalities (2023–2025)** [5]
*Date*: May 20, 2025
*Summary*: Details ACLED’s integration of Palestinian Ministry of Health data to account for fatalities in Gaza. Demonstrates ACLED’s reliance on official sources when access is limited, a method likely applied elsewhere, including Kashmir.
—
### Analysis
ACLED’s reporting on India-Pakistan conflicts during May 13–31, 2025, is not explicitly documented in the provided sources. While tensions escalated in April 2025 following the Pahalgam attack and subsequent Line of Control skirmishes [2], the latest references to ACLED’s work up to May 22, 2025, focus on other regions (e.g., Manipur, West Bank, Gaza) [1][4][5].

**Factors to Consider**:
– **Methodology**: ACLED integrates government health data when access is restricted, as seen in Gaza [5]. If similar limitations exist in Kashmir, fatalities might still be reported.
– **Recent Context**: The May 21, 2025, article [2] references India’s military actions against Pakistan but does not specify fatalities in the queried timeframe.
– **Global Trends**: ACLED’s conflict severity metrics emphasize fragmentation and civilian impact [3], which may influence how potential India-Pakistan fatalities are categorized and reported.

**Conclusion**: Based on available data up to May 22, 2025, there is no direct evidence of ACLED reporting fatalities between India and Pakistan during May 13–31, 2025. However, ongoing tensions and ACLED’s active monitoring suggest future updates could address this period. For definitive resolution, direct access to ACLED’s May 2025 datasets would be required.

AskNews Deep Search Response:
**1. Conflict Fatality Incident (May 25, 2025):**
– **Citation [1][2][4][5][6][8][9]:** Multiple sources confirm Indian border forces killed a Pakistani man near Banaskantha, Gujarat, on May 23–24 after he crossed the Line of Control (LoC). Indian authorities stated the individual ignored warnings, leading to a fatal shooting. This is within the forecast window (May 13–31) and meets ACLED’s criteria for kinetic violence.

**2. Ceasefire Context:**
– A ceasefire was declared on May 10, 2025, ending a major four-day conflict that caused ~70 fatalities [12][14][23][29][32]. However, both sides retained troops near the LoC, and sporadic skirmishes persisted. The May 25 shooting highlights ongoing low-level tensions despite the truce.

**3. Recent Escalation Dynamics:**
– India’s Operation Sindoor (May 7–10) targeted Pakistani positions but concluded before the forecast window [13][16][22][30]. Post-ceasefire troop withdrawals were agreed to conclude by May 31 [12][14], but the May 25 incident occurred during this drawdown phase.

**4. No Additional Confirmed Fatalites (May 13–26):**
– Aside from the May 25 shooting, no fatalities were reported between May 13 and the current date (May 26). Pakistani officials accused India of shelling civilian areas earlier in May but provided no evidence of casualties during the forecast period. Indian officials denied these claims [3][24][27][28].

**5. Expert Opinions & Risks:**
– Analysts note the LoC remains volatile, with both sides maintaining readiness for retaliation [6][18][20]. Indian Prime Minister Modi reiterated that future attacks would be met with “firm responses” [23][30]. Pakistan’s military similarly warned of “decisive retaliation” [28][30].

**Conclusion:**
ACLED is likely to report **at least one conflict fatality** (the May 25 incident) between India and Pakistan within the specified window. While broader hostilities de-escalated after May 10, localized kinetic clashes like this shooting meet the resolution criteria. No evidence of additional fatalities exists as of May 26, but the situation remains fluid.

GPT News Summary:
Based on the recent news articles, tensions between India and Pakistan have flared significantly following an attack in Pahalgam, Indian-administered Kashmir, on April 22, 2025, which resulted in 26 fatalities. Since then, both countries have engaged in various military actions and diplomatic disputes.

1. **Operation Sindoor and Subsequent Retaliation**: India launched “Operation Sindoor,” hitting strategic sites in Pakistan with missile and drone strikes from May 7 to May 10, targeting terror infrastructure. Pakistan retaliated with missile and artillery attacks, escalating the situation ([Sambad English] (https://sambadenglish.com), May 25, 2025).

2. **Ceasefire and Tension**: A ceasefire was reportedly agreed upon after four days of intense military exchanges resulting in over 70 deaths ([Dostor] (https://www.dostor.org), May 24, 2025). However, skirmishes and military engagements have persisted along the Line of Control (LoC).

3. **Current Military Actions**: There is a report of Indian troops shooting a Pakistani man at the border on May 24, 2025, illustrating ongoing border tensions ([Tribune Pakistan] (https://tribune.com.pk), May 24, 2025). Additionally, Indian forces have accused Pakistan of shelling border villages, reportedly causing over 20 civilian casualties ([NDTV] (https://www.ndtv.com), May 24, 2025).

4. **Political Rhetoric and International Involvement**: Both nations are engaged in a war of diplomatic narratives. India emphasizes its anti-terrorism stance globally, while Pakistan actively counters India’s narrative. The international community, including figures like the US President, has called for dialogue to prevent further escalation ([Tribune Pakistan](https://tribune.com.pk), May 25, 2025).

5. **Recent Developments**: According to a defense analyst, satellite images show significant damage at Pakistan’s Nur Khan Airbase from India’s strikes, demonstrating the extent of the military engagements ([Sambad English](https://sambadenglish.com), May 25, 2025).

The ongoing military engagements, despite diplomatic efforts, suggest a fragile peace that could potentially break, leading to further conflict and possibly more fatalities before May 31, 2025. The recent fatal incident of a Pakistani national near the border could serve as a precursor to more serious exchanges, raising the likelihood that ACLED might report conflict fatalities in the specified period. GPT Binary response:
Rationale

1. Resolution requirement
• At least one ACLED-coded event with ≥1 fatality whose actors are on the India-Pakistan dyad and whose event date is 13–31 May 2025 (inclusive).
• ACLED’s weekly updates mean all events through late May should appear in the data release that the resolver checks by 15 June.

2. Evidence to date (26 May)
a) Public-source scan finds no confirmed cross-border fatality in the window up to 22 May.
b) Multiple independent news items (Indian, Pakistani and international wires) report that in the early hours of 24 May a Pakistani national was shot dead by India’s Border Security Force near the India-Pakistan International Border in Banaskantha (Gujarat). The BSF statement claims the individual crossed the fence and ignored warnings.
– ACLED routinely codes comparable “intruder shot” incidents (e.g., BSF shootings of Pakistanis in Punjab 2020-23) as:
Actor1 = Indian BSF | Actor2 = “Pakistan ‑ unidentified armed group/individual”, sub-event = “Attack”, with 1 fatality.
c) No other fatal incidents are documented for 13-26 May, but the LoC remains tense; low-level cease-fire violations and militant infiltration attempts are common and historically generate one or two lethal incidents per month during flare-ups.
d) Six days remain in the window, leaving some extra chance of a further fatality.

3. Likelihood assessment
Base rate (peaceful LoC months, 19-day stretch) ≈ 5-10 %.
Current elevated tension (post-Pahalgam attack + Operation Sindoor) roughly quadruples that risk ⇒ ~30 %.
Highly specific report of one qualifying fatality raises the probability substantially, though:
• P(event occurred & meets ACLED dyad coding) ≈ 70 %.
• P(ACLED will capture it before 15 Jun) given it occurred ≈ 85 %.
Combined ≈ 0.70 × 0.85 ≈ 0.60.
Add ~5 % for possible additional incidents before 31 May; subtract ~5 % for chance the shooting is coded as India-only violence against a civilian (thus disqualifying).
Calibrated forecast → 60 % that at least one qualifying fatality will appear in ACLED’s dataset for 13–31 May 2025.

Probability: 60%
The extracted probability is: 60%
All predictions: [42, 60, 95]
Filtered predictions: [60]

=== Reasoning ===
Rationale

1. Resolution requirement
• At least one ACLED-coded event with ≥1 fatality whose actors are on the India-Pakistan dyad and whose event date is 13–31 May 2025 (inclusive).
• ACLED’s weekly updates mean all events through late May should appear in the data release that the resolver checks by 15 June.

2. Evidence to date (26 May)
a) Public-source scan finds no confirmed cross-border fatality in the window up to 22 May.
b) Multiple independent news items (Indian, Pakistani and international wires) report that in the early hours of 24 May a Pakistani national was shot dead by India’s Border Security Force near the India-Pakistan International Border in Banaskantha (Gujarat). The BSF statement claims the individual crossed the fence and ignored warnings.
– ACLED routinely codes comparable “intruder shot” incidents (e.g., BSF shootings of Pakistanis in Punjab 2020-23) as:
Actor1 = Indian BSF | Actor2 = “Pakistan ‑ unidentified armed group/individual”, sub-event = “Attack”, with 1 fatality.
c) No other fatal incidents are documented for 13-26 May, but the LoC remains tense; low-level cease-fire violations and militant infiltration attempts are common and historically generate one or two lethal incidents per month during flare-ups.
d) Six days remain in the window, leaving some extra chance of a further fatality.

3. Likelihood assessment
Base rate (peaceful LoC months, 19-day stretch) ≈ 5-10 %.
Current elevated tension (post-Pahalgam attack + Operation Sindoor) roughly quadruples that risk ⇒ ~30 %.
Highly specific report of one qualifying fatality raises the probability substantially, though:
• P(event occurred & meets ACLED dyad coding) ≈ 70 %.
• P(ACLED will capture it before 15 Jun) given it occurred ≈ 85 %.
Combined ≈ 0.70 × 0.85 ≈ 0.60.

Add ~5 % for possible additional incidents before 31 May; subtract ~5 % for chance the shooting is coded as India-only violence against a civilian (thus disqualifying).

Calibrated forecast → 60 % that at least one qualifying fatality will appear in ACLED’s dataset for 13–31 May 2025.

Probability: 60%