Israel/Hamas Ceasefire? Botmaster Phil Godzin’s forecast of Sept. 24, 2025

Will there be a ceasefire declared between Israel and Hamas in the month of September 2025?

Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai bot predicts today: 18%

12–15 minutes read. This is a condensed version of pgodzinai’s results. Full rationale here —>

Gemini Binary response:
Given that today is September 24, 2025, and the resolution date is October 1, 2025. This means the event must occur within the next six days (September 25-30, 2025).

**Recent Diplomatic Setbacks (Mid-September):** Crucially, on September 18, the United States vetoed a UN Security Council resolution calling for an “unconditional and immediate ceasefire”. The US explicitly stated that President Trump “will never accept” a ceasefire that would “leave Hamas in power and allow it to regroup”.

**Ongoing Hostilities and Previous Failures:** Israeli airstrikes continued in September, including one in Qatar targeting Hamas members on September 9, which US officials criticized for not advancing peace efforts. Furthermore, previous ceasefire talks “fell apart last month” (August 2025), and a ceasefire implemented in January 2025 broke down within months.

**Fundamental Disagreements:** The core demands of Israel (preventing Hamas from remaining in power) and Hamas (total Israeli withdrawal and independent Palestinian governance of Gaza) remain fundamentally opposed.

**High Bar for “Declared Ceasefire”:** The question asks for a “ceasefire declared,” implying a formal, public announcement acknowledged by both parties or a credible mediator.

Probability: 4%

Anthropic Binary response:
## Current Situation Analysis
As of September 24, 2025, there has been significant diplomatic activity but **no ceasefire has been formally declared**. The most notable developments include:
1. **Trump’s September 7 Proposal**: President Trump announced Israel had accepted his ceasefire proposal, with Hamas responding positively and expressing readiness for immediate negotiations. However, this has not translated into a formal agreement.
2. **US Veto on September 18**: The United States vetoed a UN Security Council resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire, despite support from 14 other members. The US stated it would never accept a ceasefire leaving Hamas in power.
3. **Recent Military Actions**: Israeli airstrikes on September 9 targeted Hamas leaders in Qatar during negotiations, with experts noting this could derail talks. Ongoing military operations continue with significant casualties.

## Key Obstacles
Several fundamental disagreements remain unresolved:
– **Hamas’s Future Role**: The US and Israel oppose any arrangement leaving Hamas in control of Gaza
– **Israeli Internal Politics**: Netanyahu hasn’t publicly responded to Egyptian-Qatari proposals, with far-right coalition partners opposing deals
– **Trust Deficit**: The January 2025 ceasefire collapsed within weeks, creating skepticism about new agreements

## Time Constraint Analysis
With only 6 days remaining (September 24-30), the window for declaring a ceasefire is extremely narrow.

## Base Rate Considerations
Looking at the pattern throughout 2024-2025:
– Multiple negotiation rounds have failed (October 2024, post-January 2025 breakdown)
– When ceasefires have occurred, they required months of preparation
– The January 2025 ceasefire that did materialize took extensive mediation by Qatar and Egypt

The combination of time constraints, unresolved fundamental disagreements about Hamas’s role, recent military escalations, and the US veto just 6 days ago strongly suggests that while negotiations may be ongoing, they will not culminate in a declared ceasefire before October 1, 2025.

Probability: 8%

GPT Binary response:
Short answer first: There is active diplomacy and a public exchange of proposals in September 2025, but as of today (2025‑09‑24) no formal ceasefire has been declared. Given the very small amount of time left in the month, the mixed signals from the parties, and recent events that both advanced and undermined talks, I judge a low but non‑negligible chance that a ceasefire will be declared before 2025‑09‑30.

Why I give a low probability (key points and weights)
– Time remaining: Only 6–7 calendar days remain. Fast turnarounds do happen, but short time horizons strongly favor the status quo. (High weight)
– Public positions:
– Hamas has publicly signaled willingness to negotiate and responded positively to at least one proposal in early September. (Moderate weight)
– Israel’s government position is inconsistent: some security officials reportedly favor limited deals, but Netanyahu and his coalition include factions opposed to a ceasefire that leaves Hamas any kind of governing role. Reported Israeli strikes during September (including strikes that hit Hamas figures abroad) have also risked derailing trust. (High weight)
– The United States publicly blocked a UN Security Council ceasefire resolution (mid‑September veto), signaling that any ceasefire the U.S. deems unacceptable (e.g., one that leaves Hamas in control without constraints) will not get multilateral backing; nonetheless the U.S. is also reported to be sponsoring its own framework. (High weight)
– Recent events in September are mixed: mediators and one side (Hamas) have sounded open, while military actions and political constraints (Israeli domestic politics; US red lines) have repeatedly undermined prior pauses. (High weight)
– Historical base rate: Israel–Hamas ceasefires often occur as short, negotiated pauses (hostage exchanges/limited pauses) rather than durable settlements. That historical pattern raises the chance of some kind of short, negotiated pause but does not make a last‑minute formal, broad ceasefire likely—especially with internal veto points and last‑minute escalations. (Moderate weight)
– Source reliability & recency: I give most weight to reporting dated September 2025 (statements from Hamas, Israeli government/defense officials, and diplomatic moves in the first three weeks of September). The most important recent signals—public claims that Israel accepted a U.S. (or U.S.-backed) proposal, and Hamas saying it was ready to negotiate—are positive for a deal, but they are unilateral/partial signals that have failed to produce a formal declaration so far. (High weight)

– I’m deliberately conservative because I’ve historically been overconfident; short horizons favor the default (no change). I rate my uncertainty as moderately high: there is plausible upside for a last‑minute deal (public statements, mediator activity) but also multiple strong derailers (military strikes, domestic politics, multilateral fractures).
Final single numeric forecast (event occurs between now and 2025‑09‑30 inclusive)

Probability: 22%

=== Reasoning ===

Summary of current state (as of 24 Sep 2025)
– There are active diplomatic efforts and at least one public U.S.-backed ceasefire proposal that Hamas has publicly said it is willing to discuss. Mediators (Qatar, Egypt, U.S. actors) have been engaged and publicly pressing both sides in September.
– There have also been recent hostile actions in September (Israeli strikes on Hamas-linked figures, a U.S. veto of a UN ceasefire resolution) that both signal diplomatic friction and may reduce international pressure for a quick declared deal.
– Netanyahu has not publicly accepted prior mediator proposals and faces strong domestic political constraints; parts of the Israeli security establishment reportedly favor a limited hostage-release/limited pause approach, but political alignment is unclear.
– Historical pattern (2023–2025): ceasefires between Israel and Hamas have tended to be fragile, negotiated over weeks/months, often tied to phased hostage-release and aid arrangements rather than instant, comprehensive, indefinite cessations. Rapid declarations within a few days of public signaling are possible but uncommon.

Key factors and how they push the probability
– Momentum factors increasing chance: (a) public statements from Hamas indicating willingness to sit down, (b) active mediator pressure and an already-circulating textual framework (U.S./Qatar/Egypt proposals), (c) humanitarian and international legal pressures that raise incentives for a pause. These make a short, conditional ceasefire possible.
– Obstacles reducing chance: (a) narrow remaining time window in September (only 6 days left); (b) Israeli political uncertainty and hard-line domestic opposition to any deal perceived as leaving Hamas intact; (c) recent strikes and the UNSC veto, which indicate diplomatic disagreement and possible retaliation; (d) logistical and trust barriers tied to hostage-release sequencing and verification.

Base-rate and time framing
– Base-rate: Historically, negotiated bilateral ceasefires with hostage exchanges have occurred but usually after several rounds of intensive mediation and concessions. Given the narrow window (remaining days in September) the base-rate for a mutually-declared ceasefire within this last week is much lower than for the next month.
– Timeframes I consider: (A) by Resolution Date (by 01 Oct 2025; i.e., in remaining days of Sep 25–30) — primary question; (B) by end of October 2025; (C) by end of 2025. I give separate probabilities below.

Scenario analysis (stylized)
– Best-case quick scenario (high mediator capacity + political cover for Netanyahu + Hamas discipline): parties agree to a short, limited ceasefire tied to phased hostage releases and aid flows — achievable within days. If that scenario fully materializes, a declared ceasefire in the last week is plausible.
– Middle-case (protracted talks): intense negotiations continue into October; limited or temporary pauses announced after Oct 1.
– Low-case (breakdown/escalation): strikes and political obstacles prevent a deal; talks stall and violence continues.
Key assumptions whose failure would drastically change the forecast
1) Assumption A — Hamas will translate public willingness into a concrete, verifiable acceptance of a specific proposal within days. Probability this assumption fails: 60%. If it fails, a declared ceasefire in the week is unlikely.
2) Assumption B — Israeli political leadership (Netanyahu/security cabinet) will authorize a formal ceasefire/partial pause compatible with mediator terms within days despite internal opposition. Probability this assumption fails: 70%. If it fails, talks may continue but no declared ceasefire will occur in the timeframe.
3) Assumption C — Mediators can prevent military actions that would derail talks (e.g., targeted strikes, retaliations) during the final negotiating days. Probability this assumption fails: 50%. If it fails, momentum collapses quickly.

Putting the pieces together (probability calculus, qualitative + quantitative)
– With both Hamas and Israel ready and mediators successfully managing the last-mile details, the chance of a declared ceasefire in this narrow window would be high (I’d judge ~75–85%). But the joint probability that both political constraints are overcome in the next ~6 days is low because (1) Israeli political consent is uncertain and (2) ongoing military actions can derail talks immediately.
– Weighting scenarios and the above assumption failure rates, and compensating for past overconfidence (I shrink extreme probabilities toward the center), I estimate the probability of a mutual/declared ceasefire between Israel and Hamas before 01 Oct 2025 at 18%. This reflects: some active diplomatic momentum (pulling probability up from single-digits) but strong, immediate obstacles and very limited time (pulling it down).
Additional timeline probabilities (for context)
– By 31 Oct 2025 (one more month for talks to continue, mediators to bridge gaps): I assign ~45% probability of some declared ceasefire/pause (short-term, likely conditional and possibly temporary).
– By 31 Dec 2025: I assign ~65% probability of some declared ceasefire/pause at some point in that interval (reflecting greater time for phased hostage/aid negotiations and mounting international pressure).

Confidence and uncertainty
– My confidence is moderate-to-low. The biggest uncertainties are opaque private negotiations, sudden changes in Israeli domestic politics, and the risk that military actions break negotiations at short notice. I purposely avoided extreme confidence and gave sizable probability mass to both “deal within days” and “no deal, but deal later” outcomes.

Final answer
Probability: 18%