How many conflict deaths will there be in Sudan in 2025?
Phil’s pgodzinai is a side competitor with the machine forecasting bots of the VIEWS competition.
Here’s what Phil’s pgodzinai predicts:
* Less than 1000: 2%
* Between 1000 and 3000: 5%
* Between 3000 and 5000: 8%
* Between 5000 and 8000: 18%
* Between 8000 and 12000: 25%
* More than 12000: 42%
Details on what pgodzinai says about how it created the above forecasts:
Perplexity response:
First, I need to look through the provided search results to find the most recent data. The latest dates here are April 22, 2025, from sources [4] and [5]. Let’s start by summarizing each relevant search result with their dates and key points.
From [1], dated April 16, 2025, we know that 13 million people have been displaced, and as many as 150,000 people are dead. That’s a significant number, but that’s up to April 16. Then [2], also April 15, mentions the same 150,000 death toll. So that’s a baseline.
Looking at [3], ReliefWeb’s report from April 15, 2025, talks about 4.2 million displaced in 2025 alone. While displacement numbers are important, they don’t directly translate to deaths. However, it indicates ongoing conflict which could lead to more deaths.
Now, the more recent sources: [4] from April 22 reports that RSF killed over 30 people in a recent attack in Darfur, following a multi-day attack that killed over 400. The UN’s humanitarian office mentioned that. This happened just a few days ago. Also, [5] from April 15 notes 300 deaths in displacement camps near El-Fasher as RSF launches an assault. Wait, but [5] is dated April 15, same as [2] and [3], but [4] is from April 22, which is more recent. However, [5] also mentions 300 deaths in the past few days, but since the current date is April 22, 2025, maybe the user is asking for data up to today.
The key here is the recent attacks. The April 22 attack [4] resulted in over 30 deaths, and the previous attack mentioned in [4] killed over 400. So in the last week or so, around 430 deaths. But these are just specific instances. However, the UN’s report in [4] refers to the 400+ deaths in a multi-day attack, which is part of the broader conflict.
Looking at the death tolls mentioned: [1], [2], and [5] all mention up to 150,000 deceased. That’s a cumulative figure over the conflict, which started in 2023. Now, the question is about 2025 specifically. However, none of the sources directly provide the 2025 death toll. The ReliefWeb [3] talks about displacement in 2025, not deaths. The other sources report cumulative deaths since the start of the conflict.
Wait, this is a problem. The user is asking about deaths in 2025, but the search results don’t explicitly break down the death toll by year. The 150,000 figure is cumulative since the conflict began in 2023. So, to answer the question about 2025, we need to estimate based on current trends and recent data.
The recent attacks in April 2025 show that the conflict is still intense. The RSF has killed over 400 in a multi-day attack, and 30 more recently. If this level of violence continues, the daily death toll could be extrapolated. However, without explicit monthly or yearly breakdowns, it’s challenging.
But the user wants to emphasize new developments in the past few days. The latest attacks in April 2025 indicate a high but fluctuating death toll. The 400+ in one attack and 30 in another suggest that large-scale events can cause significant spikes. However, consistent daily violence would add up.
Considering that the conflict has already caused 150,000 deaths over two years, extrapolating for 2025 would require knowing the monthly rate. If 150,000 over 24 months is about 6,250 per month, but that’s a rough estimate. However, the current situation in 2025, especially with the recent attacks, might indicate that the death toll is not decreasing.
But since the sources don’t provide a 2025-specific death toll, we have to infer. The recent attacks suggest that the conflict is still deadly. The UN’s report in [4] mentions that the RSF has lost some territories but is regrouping in Darfur. Continued fighting there could lead to more deaths.
The options given are ranges. Assuming that in the first few months of 2025, the death toll is around 400-500 (from the recent attacks), but that’s just a part of the year. If similar attacks happen monthly, the total could reach towards the higher end. However, without more data, it’s speculative.
Alternatively, looking at the options, the user wants to know which bracket 2025’s total will fall into. The 150,000 is cumulative, so 2025’s total would be a portion of that. But since the conflict started in 2023, 2025 is the third year. If 150,000 over two years averages 75,000 per year, then 2025 might not reach that. But the actual distribution might not be linear.
However, given that the recent attacks are causing hundreds of deaths in short periods, and the conflict shows no signs of slowing (as per [2] and [4]), it’s possible that 2025 could see a significant number. If the conflict continues at the same intensity as in early 2025, with major attacks causing hundreds of deaths, the annual total could be in the higher ranges.
But without explicit data, this is uncertain. The sources mention 150,000 total, but not the 2025 portion. The Danish Refugee Council in [3] forecasts 4.2 million displaced in 2025, which might correlate with increased deaths, but displacement doesn’t directly equal deaths.
Considering the options, the higher end (more than 12000) seems plausible if the current rate continues. For example, if there are multiple attacks like the 400+ deaths per month, but that’s a lot. Alternatively, if the conflict’s death rate is around 1000 per month, that would be 12,000 annually. However, the recent attacks suggest higher concentration in certain periods.
In conclusion, based on recent attacks causing hundreds of deaths in a week, and the conflict continuing intensely, the 2025 death toll could reach the higher end. But given the uncertainty and lack of explicit 2025 figures, the answer should highlight the recent spikes and the ongoing intensity, leading to a forecast that leans towards the higher options, possibly “More than 12000” if the current rate persists.
### Key Sources and Summaries
1. **Sudan’s Rival Government (CFR, 16 Apr 2025)**
– Reports 13 million displaced and “as many as 150,000 people dead” in total since the conflict began in 2023.
– Notes RSF military setbacks but regrouping in Darfur[1].
2. **Two Years of War (KGOU, 15 Apr 2025)**
– Confirms 150,000+ cumulative deaths and highlights the humanitarian crisis worsening in 2025[2].
3. **Displacement Forecast (ReliefWeb, 15 Apr 2025)**
– Danish Refugee Council warns of 4.2 million new displacements in 2025, exacerbating conditions for conflict-related deaths[3].
4. **RSF Attacks in Darfur (EURONews, 22 Apr 2025)**
– RSF killed >30 in el-Fasher on 20 Apr 2025, following a multi-day attack that killed >400 and displaced 400,000 from Zamzam camp[4].
5. **Darfur Assault (OPB, 15 Apr 2025)**
– RSF assault on displacement camps near el-Fasher caused 300+ deaths in mid-April 2025[5].
—
### Critical Analysis
– **Recent Death Spikes**: The latest attacks in Darfur (April 20-22, 2025) highlight **acute intensification** – 400+ deaths in one multi-day offensive and 30+ in a follow-up assault[4][5].
– **Conflict Escalation**: RSF’s focus on seizing el-Fasher (last major army-held city in Darfur) suggests **prolonged and deadly clashes** in 2025[4].
– **Humanitarian Collapse**: Displacement of 400,000 from Zamzam camp and continued shelling of civilian areas indicate **deteriorating security conditions**, raising risks of further mass casualties[4][5].
—
### Forecast Rationale
– **Extreme Volatility**: High-impact events like the 400+ death attacks suggest **sporadic but catastrophic spikes** rather than a steady death rate.
– **Baseline Estimate**: Assuming similar escalation as April 2025, annual totals could exceed **12,000+ deaths**, particularly if major offensives continue in Darfur.
– **Resolution Criteria**: The absence of reliable granular data on 2025-specific deaths makes precise forecasting challenging, but recent trends point to the conflict maintaining **high-intensity dynamics**[1][4][5].
**Most Plausible Option**: **”More than 12000″** (aligning with the severity of recent attacks and the conflict’s entrenched nature)[4][5].
AskNews Deep Search Response:
Here is a structured assessment of relevant information for forecasting conflict deaths in Sudan during 2025, with citations to the most recent authoritative sources:
**Key Recent Developments (April 15–22, 2025):**
1. **Escalation in Darfur:**
– RSF launched new attacks on **El Fasher** (North Darfur’s last army-held city), killing **30+ civilians** (April 21–22) [1][2][10]. This follows a **multi-day assault** on April 13–14 that killed **400+ people** at Zamzam and Abu Shouk displacement camps and displaced **400,000–450,000** [13][22][23].
– RSF now controls most of Darfur and aims to establish a parallel government, risking prolonged conflict akin to Libya’s civil war [1][2][34].
2. **Humanitarian Crisis:**
– **Food insecurity, displacement, and aid blockades** are worsening mortality risks. North Darfur faces famine conditions, with 825,000 children trapped in “hell” [36][40]. The UN warns of catastrophic malnutrition and disease spread due to severed supply chains [13][23].
– **Direct conflict deaths** in 2023–2024 totaled ~24,000 (UN estimate), but activists claim the true figure is far higher [2][24].
3. **Military Strategies:**
– RSF is regrouping in Darfur after losing ground in Khartoum, prioritizing territorial control [2][35].
– Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) continue to resist but lack capacity to protect civilians; both sides use heavy artillery in urban areas [28][31].
**Critical Data Points:**
– **Recent Death Toll:** At least **47 civilians killed** in RSF shelling of El Fasher (April 22) [28]. Cumulative deaths in Zamzam camp attacks (April) exceed **800** [1][10].
– **Displacement:** ~13 million displaced nationwide since 2023, with **400,000–450,000** newly displaced in North Darfur in April 2025 alone [20][23][40].
– **UN Projections:** OCHA warns of “explosive” mortality risks from famine/disease if hostilities persist [9][13][23]. No official 2025 death forecasts exist, but **UNICEF reports 15 million Sudanese children in urgent need** (April 18) [25].
**Expert Opinions:**
– **UN Humanitarian Coordinator Clementine Nkweta-Salami:** “The scale of violations [in Darfur] is unacceptable… civilians are deliberately targeted” [15][38].
– **INSO (NGO):** Documents **200+ attacks on aid workers** in 2025 (as of April 20), severely hampering mortality tracking [19].
– **Tom Fletcher (UN):** “Both sides promised aid access, but systemic obstruction continues” [32][38].
**Limitations:**
– No ACLED or official mortality data for April 2025 exists in public reports.
– **Underreporting** is severe due to attacks on journalists/aid workers and RSF-controlled areas being inaccessible [10][28].
**Implications for Forecasting:**
Recent trends (400+ deaths/week in Darfur hotspots) suggest **2025 deaths will exceed 12,000** if fighting continues at current intensity. However, fatalities could fall into the **5,000–12,000 range** if humanitarian corridors open or peace talks progress. Given RSF’s stated goal of capturing El Fasher and no diplomatic breakthroughs reported, **”More than 12,000″** is the most plausible 2025 estimate based on escalation patterns [1][34][40].
Citations: [1][2][10][13][15][19][20][23][25][28][34][38][40]
GPT News Summary:
As of April 22, 2025, the conflict in Sudan between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has resulted in severe humanitarian and civilian impacts. Notable recent developments include:
1. **Death and Displacement Statistics**:
– Over 20,000 deaths and 15 million people displaced or refugees as stated by the UN (April 22, 2025).
– More specifically, in Khartoum province, at least 61,000 deaths have been reported since the war began, 26,000 attributed to direct violence (April 20, 2025).
2. **Recent Attacks and Casualties**:
– The RSF bombed El Fasher, resulting in at least 33 deaths and several injuries, with extensive shelling marking the intensity of the conflict (April 21, 2025).
3. **Humanitarian Crisis**:
– The UN reports more than 30 million people in need of aid, with 13 million displaced internally or seeking refuge in other countries (April 22, 2025).
– 15 million children require humanitarian aid, with widespread malnutrition and disease due to the ongoing conflict (April 18, 2025).
4. **Food Insecurity**:
– Doctors Without Borders highlighted that half the population, 24.6 million people, are severely food insecure (February 3, 2025).
5. **International Efforts and Challenges**:
– The international community continues working on peace initiatives but faces significant challenges. The proposals for a transitional civilian government aim to manage the crisis but achieving consensus remains difficult (April 22, 2025).
6. **Future Projections and Risks**:
– Analysts predict that if the conflict persists, it may lead to the partition of Sudan, further destabilizing the region (April 16, 2025).
– Humanitarian experts have warned that the situation is unlikely to improve without significant intervention, and the ongoing war risks escalation and deeper humanitarian crises (January 3 and January 9, 2025).
The situation remains dire, with tensions high and little progress toward a ceasefire or a peaceful resolution, suggesting significant potential for continued and possibly escalated violence through the rest of 2025.
Extracted resolution criteria links:
[]
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Anthropic response:
# Sudan Conflict Deaths in 2025: Forecast Rationale
## Current Situation Assessment
The Sudan conflict, which began in April 2023, has escalated significantly into 2025. According to the most recent information from April 2025, the cumulative death toll from the conflict stands at approximately 150,000 since 2023. This represents a devastating humanitarian crisis that continues to worsen.
Recent developments are particularly concerning. In April 2025 alone, there have been several major attacks:
– A multi-day RSF assault that killed over 400 people
– A follow-up attack killing at least 30 more
– Reports of 300+ deaths in displacement camps near El-Fasher
– At least 47 civilians killed in RSF shelling in El-Fasher on April 22
These attacks demonstrate that the conflict is not only continuing but potentially intensifying, particularly in Darfur where the RSF is regrouping after losing ground in Khartoum.
## Forecasting Methodology
To forecast conflict deaths for the remainder of 2025, I’ll analyze:
1. **Current intensity**: Recent events suggest extremely high-impact episodes with hundreds of deaths in short periods
2. **Time remaining**: We have over 8 months left in 2025 (from April 22 to December 31)
3. **Conflict trajectory**: The RSF’s focus on seizing El-Fasher indicates continued high-intensity fighting
4. **Humanitarian conditions**: Severe food insecurity, displacement, and aid blockades are worsening mortality risks
## Recent Death Rate Analysis
The data from April 2025 shows several hundred deaths in just a week or two. If we conservatively estimate 400-500 deaths in recent weeks, and project similar patterns throughout the year (acknowledging conflict intensity can fluctuate), we would expect:
– ~400-500 deaths per 2 weeks = ~800-1,000 deaths per month
– With 8+ months remaining in 2025, this suggests ~6,400-8,000+ additional deaths
– Adding the already-occurred deaths from January-April 2025 (which would be several thousand based on similar rates)
## Additional Mortality Factors
Several factors point to potentially higher mortality:
1. **Humanitarian collapse**: 13 million displaced, with 400,000-450,000 newly displaced in North Darfur in April 2025 alone
2. **Food insecurity**: Half the population (24.6 million people) are severely food insecure
3. **Disease risk**: UN warnings of “explosive” mortality risks from disease outbreaks
4. **Limited aid access**: 200+ attacks on aid workers in 2025 (as of April 20)
These indirect conflict effects will likely contribute significantly to the overall death toll beyond direct combat casualties.
## Comparison to Historical Patterns
The UN has estimated ~24,000 direct conflict deaths for 2023-2024 combined (though activists claim this is understated). This suggests an average of ~12,000 direct conflict deaths per year. Given the recent escalation in Darfur and the lack of any evident peace progress, 2025 is unlikely to see a reduction from this baseline.
## Uncertainty Factors
Key uncertainties include:
– Possible peace negotiations (though none appear imminent)
– International intervention (limited progress so far)
– Seasonal factors affecting conflict intensity
– Severe underreporting of deaths in inaccessible RSF-controlled areas
## Forecast Conclusion
Based on the recent intensity of attacks, the humanitarian crisis, and the apparent trajectory of the conflict, the death toll for 2025 is most likely to exceed 12,000. The April 2025 data alone shows hundreds of deaths in short periods, with no signs of de-escalation. Furthermore, indirect conflict deaths will compound this figure.
The conflict appears to be entering a new phase of intensification rather than resolution, particularly in Darfur. With most of the year still ahead, and without any significant diplomatic breakthroughs reported, the most plausible scenario is that 2025 will see a death toll similar to or higher than previous years, which places it in the highest category of the available options.
Option_A: 2
Option_B: 5
Option_C: 7
Option_D: 12
Option_E: 24
Option_F: 50
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.24, ‘More than 12000’: 0.5}
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Anthropic response:
# Sudan Conflict Deaths Forecast for 2025
## Current Situation Analysis
The conflict in Sudan between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) that began in April 2023 continues to devastate the country. Recent developments in April 2025 indicate the conflict is intensifying rather than abating:
1. **Recent Death Patterns (April 2025):**
– Significant incidents include the RSF’s multi-day offensive that killed 400+ people in Zamzam displacement camp
– Additional RSF attacks in El Fasher killed 30+ civilians in just the last few days
– Reports indicate at least 47 civilians killed in RSF shelling of El Fasher on April 22
– April casualties in Darfur alone appear to approach 800+ deaths
2. **Conflict Trajectory:**
– The RSF is regrouping in Darfur after losing ground in Khartoum
– Strategic focus on capturing El Fasher (North Darfur’s last army-held city)
– Both sides continue using heavy artillery in populated areas
– Conflict shows signs of morphing into a Libya-style prolonged civil war with parallel governance structures
## Estimating 2025 Death Toll
To forecast the total 2025 death toll (with 8 months remaining), I need to consider:
### Baseline Data and Extrapolation
– UN estimated 24,000 direct conflict deaths over the first two years (2023-2024)
– However, recent pace appears accelerated based on April 2025 data
– The 800+ deaths reported in Darfur in April alone suggests a significant escalation
– If this new intensity persists, even conservatively, the monthly death toll could exceed 1,000-1,500
### Aggravating Factors
– Humanitarian crisis worsening: 15 million children in urgent need
– Famine conditions in North Darfur affecting 825,000 children
– Food insecurity affecting half the population (24.6 million)
– Blockages to humanitarian aid continue (200+ attacks on aid workers in 2025 already)
– Recent displacement of 400,000-450,000 people from camps creates new vulnerabilities
### Mitigating Factors
– International pressure for peace continues
– Potential for humanitarian corridors or limited ceasefires
– SAF resistance in certain areas may contain RSF territorial expansion
## Time Horizon Analysis
With the resolution date of January 1, 2026, we have approximately 8 months remaining in 2025 after today’s date (April 22, 2025). This timeframe is sufficient for:
1. Several major offensives like those seen in April 2025
2. Significant deterioration of humanitarian conditions
3. Potential for diplomatic breakthroughs (though evidence suggests low probability)
## Range Probability Assessment
Given the recent intensity of ~800 deaths in April 2025 in Darfur alone (representing just one region of the conflict), and 8 months remaining in the year, the death toll will likely exceed 5,000 at minimum.
The questions become:
1. Will the current intensity (800+ deaths/month in just Darfur) continue?
2. How many unreported deaths are occurring in other regions?
3. Will indirect deaths from starvation/disease be counted?
Given the current trajectory and RSF’s offensive operations, the conflict appears to be escalating rather than de-escalating. The targeting of displacement camps shows a willingness to attack vulnerable civilian populations.
If the April 2025 patterns continue (800+ deaths/month in just one region), we could easily see over 8,000 deaths by year-end. If intensity increases further or expands geographically, 12,000+ becomes likely.
## Final Probability Distribution
Based on the analysis of current conditions, recent developments, historical patterns, and time remaining in 2025:
Option_A: 2
Option_B: 5
Option_C: 10
Option_D: 23
Option_E: 28
Option_F: 32
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.23, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.28, ‘More than 12000’: 0.32}
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Anthropic response:
# Analysis of Conflict Deaths in Sudan for 2025
## Current Situation Assessment
The conflict in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has been ongoing since April 2023, with devastating humanitarian consequences. According to recent reports, the cumulative death toll since the conflict began is significant, with UN estimates suggesting over 20,000 direct conflict deaths, while some local sources put the figure as high as 150,000 when including indirect deaths from disease, starvation, and lack of medical care.
Most critically, recent developments show a marked escalation in violence, particularly in Darfur. In April 2025 alone, RSF attacks on displacement camps near El Fasher resulted in 400+ deaths in a multi-day attack around mid-April, followed by another 30+ deaths in a subsequent attack on April 20-22. This suggests that even in a short timeframe of just one month, the conflict has already caused hundreds of documented deaths.
## Pattern of Violence and Acceleration
The pattern of violence is showing signs of intensification rather than abatement. Several factors support this assessment:
1. **Territorial Focus**: The RSF is regrouping in Darfur after losing ground in Khartoum, signaling a geographical shift in violence rather than a reduction.
2. **Strategic Objectives**: RSF is attempting to establish a parallel government, with a focus on capturing El Fasher, the last major army-held city in Darfur, suggesting prolonged and intense fighting ahead.
3. **Urban Warfare**: Both sides continue to use heavy artillery in populated areas, leading to high civilian casualties.
4. **Humanitarian Crisis**: Severe food insecurity, with half the population (24.6 million people) severely food insecure, combined with blockades of humanitarian aid, suggests indirect conflict deaths will increase significantly.
## Estimating 2025 Deaths
To forecast the death toll for the remainder of 2025, I need to consider:
1. **Recent Death Rate**: The April 2025 attacks in Darfur resulted in at least 430 documented deaths in a very short period. This suggests a high-intensity conflict with the potential for thousands of deaths per month if similar patterns continue.
2. **Time Remaining**: As of April 22, 2025, approximately 8 months remain in the year. If the current intensity continues or escalates, the death toll for these 8 months could easily reach the higher ranges of the options provided.
3. **Underreporting Factors**: Both research assistants highlight severe underreporting due to attacks on journalists, limited access to RSF-controlled areas, and communications blackouts. This suggests actual death tolls are likely higher than reported figures.
4. **Indirect Deaths**: The severe humanitarian crisis, with 15 million children requiring aid and widespread malnutrition, will contribute significantly to conflict-related deaths beyond direct violence.
## Estimating Probabilities
If the violence seen in April 2025 is representative of the rest of the year, with 400+ deaths in a single multi-day attack, and additional smaller attacks causing dozens more, the monthly death toll could easily exceed 1,000-1,500 deaths per month. Over 8 months, this would accumulate to 8,000-12,000+ deaths.
However, I must also account for:
1. **Potential Peace Initiatives**: While no significant breakthrough has been reported, international pressure could potentially lead to ceasefires or reductions in violence.
2. **Conflict Dynamics**: The intensity could fluctuate, with periods of lower violence interspersed with high-casualty events.
3. **Seasonal Factors**: Weather conditions and seasonal patterns might affect military operations and humanitarian conditions.
Given the documented intensity in April 2025, the entrenched positions of both sides, the strategic focus on capturing El Fasher, and the severe humanitarian crisis, the most likely outcome appears to be in the higher ranges. The “More than 12,000” category seems particularly probable given the current trajectory, but I need to distribute probability across multiple outcomes to account for uncertainty.
## Final Probability Distribution
Considering all factors and accounting for uncertainty:
Option_A: 2
Option_B: 5
Option_C: 8
Option_D: 18
Option_E: 25
Option_F: 42
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.08, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.18, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.25, ‘More than 12000’: 0.42}
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Anthropic response:
# Analysis of Sudan Conflict Deaths Forecast for 2025
## Current Situation Assessment
Examining the recent developments in Sudan through April 2025, I’m seeing a severe, deteriorating conflict with accelerating casualty rates. The most recent reports from late April 2025 document intensive fighting in Darfur, particularly around El Fasher, which has become a critical battleground. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have conducted major attacks resulting in hundreds of civilian deaths within just days – over 400 killed in a multi-day assault on displacement camps, followed by another attack killing 30+ civilians (April 20-22, 2025).
These recent casualty figures are especially concerning because they represent just one region and a short timeframe. The conflict has multiple active fronts, with the RSF regrouping in Darfur after losing ground in Khartoum, suggesting the fighting will continue throughout 2025.
## Historical Context and Trajectory
The Sudan conflict has caused approximately 150,000 deaths since it began in 2023, according to multiple sources. While we don’t have a precise breakdown by year, we can observe the conflict’s evolution from initial outbreaks to the current high-intensity battles. The recent surge in violence (400+ deaths in a single offensive) demonstrates that the conflict is not abating but potentially intensifying.
If we consider that this conflict has averaged approximately 75,000 deaths per year over its first two years, and recent evidence suggests similar or increasing intensity, we should expect 2025’s death toll to reach well into the thousands.
## Forecasting Methodology
To forecast the remainder of 2025, I’m analyzing:
1. **Recent documented death rates**: The 400+ deaths from one multi-day attack plus 30+ deaths days later in El Fasher suggests weekly death tolls potentially exceeding 400-500 in active conflict zones.
2. **Geographic spread**: Fighting continues across multiple regions, with RSF controlling most of Darfur and aiming to establish a parallel government.
3. **Secondary mortality factors**: Severe humanitarian conditions (13 million displaced, 4.2 million new displacements projected for 2025, widespread famine conditions, and collapsed healthcare) will contribute significantly to the conflict death toll.
4. **Conflict trajectory**: The RSF’s offensive to capture El Fasher (the last army-held city in Darfur) indicates an escalation rather than de-escalation.
## Time Horizon Considerations
With the resolution date of January 1, 2026, we need to forecast deaths for the full calendar year 2025. As of April 22, 2025, we’ve already seen one quarter of the year with significant casualties. Assuming the current death rate continues or escalates for the remaining three quarters, we’re looking at a minimum of several thousand conflict-related deaths for 2025.
## Range Probability Assessment
Given the trajectory and intensity of the conflict, the evidence strongly points toward the upper ranges of the provided options:
– **Less than 1000**: This outcome appears virtually impossible given documented deaths already approaching or exceeding this number in just April 2025 alone.
– **Between 1000-3000**: Also highly improbable given recent death rates (400+ in a single multi-day attack), unless an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire were implemented, which no evidence suggests.
– **Between 3000-5000**: While possible if conflict intensity decreases significantly, recent escalation patterns make this unlikely.
– **Between 5000-8000**: This represents a moderate conflict intensity scenario for the remainder of 2025, but still appears too optimistic given current trends.
– **Between 8000-12000**: This aligns with the continuation of current death rates, accounting for both direct violence and the secondary effects of humanitarian collapse.
– **More than 12000**: Given the high-intensity fighting reported through April 2025, the extensive humanitarian crisis, and trajectory of escalation, this outcome appears most probable. If weekly death tolls regularly exceed 400-500 in active conflict zones, annual deaths could easily surpass 12,000.
Considering the documented escalation, established patterns of violence, and absence of meaningful peace initiatives, I forecast the following probabilities:
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 3
Option_C: 6
Option_D: 12
Option_E: 25
Option_F: 53
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.06, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.25, ‘More than 12000’: 0.53}
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Anthropic response:
# Sudan Conflict Deaths Forecast Analysis for 2025
## Current Situation Assessment
Based on the most recent information from April 2025, the conflict in Sudan remains at critical intensity levels, particularly in Darfur. All three research assistants highlight consistent evidence of ongoing high-impact violence with several key observations:
1. **Recent Death Spikes**: There’s consensus that April 2025 has seen severe escalation in violence, with multiple reports of:
– 400+ deaths in a multi-day RSF attack on displacement camps
– 30+ civilians killed in El Fasher attacks around April 20-22
– 300+ deaths reported near displacement camps in mid-April
2. **Cumulative Context**: While the total death toll since the conflict began in 2023 is estimated around 150,000, with direct conflict deaths at roughly 24,000 (per UN), it’s critical to note these are likely underestimates due to:
– Severe restrictions on humanitarian access
– Deliberate targeting of aid workers (200+ attacks in 2025 alone)
– RSF control over large territories preventing accurate casualty reporting
3. **Intensity Indicators**: The pattern of violence suggests sustained or increasing lethality in 2025:
– RSF’s strategic focus on capturing El Fasher (last major army-held city in Darfur)
– Use of heavy artillery in civilian areas
– Forced displacement of 400,000+ in North Darfur in April 2025 alone
## Extrapolating to Full-Year 2025
To forecast total conflict deaths for 2025, I need to account for both direct conflict fatalities and indirect deaths from conflict-related causes such as disease, starvation, and lack of medical care. The resolution date is January 1, 2026, meaning we need to forecast for the remainder of 2025 (approximately 8 months) from our current position in April.
### Pattern Analysis
1. **Monthly Rate Estimation**: The April 2025 data suggests a concentrated death toll of 700-800+ in specific attacks within a two-week period. If this represents typical intensity, even assuming some decline, the monthly direct death rate could reasonably range from 1,000-1,500.
2. **Indirect Deaths**: With 15 million children requiring humanitarian aid, 24.6 million people severely food insecure, and the UN warning of “explosive” mortality risks from famine/disease, indirect deaths could easily match or exceed direct conflict deaths.
3. **Geographical Spread**: While Darfur is currently the hotspot, the conflict remains active in multiple regions, including Khartoum province where significant casualties have been reported.
### Forecast Constraints
Several factors limit precision in this forecast:
1. **Data Limitations**: No ACLED or official mortality data for April 2025 exists in public reports, and significant underreporting is acknowledged.
2. **Conflict Dynamics**: Both warring parties are engaged in strategic repositioning, with RSF regrouping in Darfur after losing ground in Khartoum, suggesting continued fighting rather than de-escalation.
3. **Humanitarian Access**: Systematic obstruction of aid continues despite promises of access, exacerbating indirect deaths.
4. **Political Trajectory**: No significant peace talks or diplomatic breakthroughs are reported, indicating limited prospects for conflict reduction in 2025.
## Probabilistic Forecast Analysis
Given the evidence, I need to consider various scenarios for the remaining 8 months of 2025:
1. **Low-Intensity Scenario** (<3,000 total deaths): This would require an immediate, dramatic de-escalation and cease-fire. Given recent intensification and strategic objectives of both sides, this appears highly unlikely.
2. **Moderate-Intensity Scenario** (3,000-8,000 deaths): This would require significant reduction in current hostility levels and improved humanitarian access. While possible if international pressure succeeds, recent trends show no evidence of such progress.
3. **High-Intensity Scenario** (8,000-12,000 deaths): This aligns with a slightly moderated continuation of current violence levels, averaging approximately 1,000 deaths per month (both direct and indirect).
4. **Severe-Intensity Scenario** (>12,000 deaths): This reflects either continuation of current intensity or further escalation, particularly if the humanitarian situation deteriorates further as displacement increases.
Based on the April 2025 death rate indicators and the complex humanitarian crisis, the evidence strongly suggests the conflict will maintain high lethality through 2025. However, I must account for uncertainty and potential (though unlikely) diplomatic breakthroughs.
## Final Probability Assessment
Considering:
– Recent death tolls of 400+ in single multi-day attacks
– Continued offensive operations by RSF targeting civilian areas
– Catastrophic humanitarian conditions affecting millions
– Limited international intervention effectiveness
– Historical conflict persistence in Sudan
– But also acknowledging uncertainties in reporting and potential for change
My forecast distribution for Sudan conflict deaths in 2025 is:
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 3
Option_C: 7
Option_D: 14
Option_E: 30
Option_F: 45
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.14, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.3, ‘More than 12000’: 0.45}
Gemini Multiple Choice response:
**Rationale for Forecast:**
The conflict in Sudan, ongoing since April 2023, has created a devastating humanitarian crisis. Estimating conflict deaths for the entirety of 2025 requires analyzing recent trends, conflict dynamics, and acknowledging significant data limitations.
1. **Recent Escalation (April 2025):** Multiple sources confirm a significant intensification of fighting in April 2025, particularly around El Fasher in North Darfur. Reports indicate attacks resulting in hundreds of deaths within short periods (e.g., over 400 in one multi-day offensive near Zamzam camp, followed by dozens more in subsequent attacks on El Fasher itself). This recent spike suggests the conflict remains highly lethal and potentially escalating in key strategic areas. El Fasher is the last major city in Darfur not under RSF control, making it a focal point for intense and likely prolonged fighting.
2. **Cumulative vs. 2025 Deaths:** Sources cite widely varying cumulative death tolls since 2023 (from UN figures around 20,000-24,000 direct conflict deaths to broader estimates including indirect deaths reaching 150,000). Crucially, no source provides a reliable count specifically for January 1, 2025, to the present. However, the April 2025 events alone likely account for over 500 deaths in just one region over a couple of weeks.
3. **Conflict Trajectory and Humanitarian Crisis:** Both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) appear entrenched, with the RSF consolidating control in Darfur and aiming to capture El Fasher. Peace talks have yielded no lasting results. Compounding this is a catastrophic humanitarian situation, with millions displaced, widespread aid blockades, and looming famine, particularly in Darfur. While the question likely focuses on direct conflict deaths, the overall crisis context suggests conditions conducive to sustained violence and high mortality.
4. **Extrapolation and Uncertainty:** Extrapolating from the recent spike in April is necessary but carries uncertainty. If the intensity seen in El Fasher persists or spreads, an annual death toll exceeding 12,000 is highly plausible (e.g., averaging over 1,000 direct deaths per month). Even a slightly lower average intensity throughout the year, punctuated by major battles, would likely place the total in the higher brackets (8,000-12,000 or >12,000). The lowest brackets (<5000) seem highly improbable barring an unexpected, significant, and sustained de-escalation in the remaining eight months of 2025, for which there is currently little evidence. Data underreporting is a major issue, meaning actual figures could be higher than reported.
5. **Probability Distribution:** Given the recent escalation, the strategic importance of ongoing battles (like El Fasher), the lack of peace prospects, and the dire humanitarian backdrop, the probability distribution leans heavily towards the higher death count ranges. The “More than 12,000” bracket appears most likely, reflecting the potential for continued large-scale violence. However, acknowledging the inherent uncertainty in forecasting conflict casualties over eight months and potential fluctuations in intensity, significant probability is also assigned to the “8,000 to 12,000” range. Lower ranges receive minimal probability.
**Final Probability Forecast:**
Less than 1000: 1
Between 1000 and 3000: 2
Between 3000 and 5000: 5
Between 5000 and 8000: 12
Between 8000 and 12000: 25
More than 12000: 55
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.05, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.25, ‘More than 12000’: 0.55}
GPT Multiple Choice JSON response:
Option_A: 03
Option_B: 09
Option_C: 19
Option_D: 29
Option_E: 26
Option_F: 14
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.03, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.09, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.19, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.29, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.26, ‘More than 12000’: 0.14}
GPT Multiple Choice JSON response:
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 4
Option_C: 10
Option_D: 25
Option_E: 35
Option_F: 25
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.04, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.25, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.35, ‘More than 12000’: 0.25}
GPT Multiple Choice JSON response:
The publicly‑available datasets most likely to be used for resolution (ACLED, UCDP GED, or similar) have historically logged far fewer Sudan conflict deaths than headline UN or media tallies. For example, ACLED recorded ≈12 000 fatalities in 2023 and ≈9 000 in 2024, even while UN statements cited “over 100 000” cumulative deaths. Because the question asks specifically about 2025 conflict deaths and will be resolved on 1 Jan 2026—well before the slower‑updating epidemiological or excess‑mortality studies are finished—the figure that matters is the near‑real‑time conflict‑event count, not the higher eventual humanitarian estimates.
Key recent signals (mid‑April 2025):
• Large RSF offensives around El‑Fasher produced 400‑plus deaths in a few days, and sporadic shelling continues (≈500–600 fatalities logged by ACLED‑like monitors so far in April).
• Fighting elsewhere (Khartoum / Kordofan) has tapered somewhat after SAF regained limited ground.
• Diplomatic traction remains weak; neither side shows signs of large‑scale collapse or externally‑enforced ceasefire.
Taken together, January–21 April 2025 appears to have generated roughly 2 000–2 500 catalogued fatalities. Extrapolating under three stylised scenarios for the remaining 8 ⅓ months:
1. De‑escalation (15 %): ceasefire talks gain traction; monthly average ≈250 deaths → year‑end ≈4 000–4 500.
2. Status quo (45 %): continued, uneven fighting; monthly average ≈600 deaths → year‑end ≈7 000–8 000.
3. Escalation (40 %): Darfur campaign intensifies and Khartoum front re‑ignites; monthly average ≈1 000 deaths → year‑end ≥12 000.
Weighting these outcomes and adjusting for reporting uncertainty (under‑count risk and timing of data ingestions), the central tendency lands in the 5 000–8 000 bracket, but with substantial right‑tail risk if April’s Darfur dynamics persist or widen.
Option_A: 01
Option_B: 05
Option_C: 15
Option_D: 35
Option_E: 26
Option_F: 18
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.15, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.35, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.26, ‘More than 12000’: 0.18}
All predictions:
[{‘Less than 1000’: 0.03, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.09, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.19, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.29, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.26, ‘More than 12000’: 0.14}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.23, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.28, ‘More than 12000’: 0.32}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.15, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.35, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.26, ‘More than 12000’: 0.18}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.04, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.25, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.35, ‘More than 12000’: 0.25}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.08, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.18, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.25, ‘More than 12000’: 0.42}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.14, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.3, ‘More than 12000’: 0.45}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.24, ‘More than 12000’: 0.5}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.06, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.25, ‘More than 12000’: 0.53}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.05, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.25, ‘More than 12000’: 0.55}]
Filtered predictions:
[{‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.15, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.35, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.26, ‘More than 12000’: 0.18}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.04, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.25, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.35, ‘More than 12000’: 0.25}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.08, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.18, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.25, ‘More than 12000’: 0.42}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.14, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.3, ‘More than 12000’: 0.45}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.24, ‘More than 12000’: 0.5}]
Averaged predictions:
{‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.04, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.25, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.35, ‘More than 12000’: 0.25}
Median reasoning:
All Predictions:
[{‘Less than 1000’: 0.03, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.09, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.19, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.29, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.26, ‘More than 12000’: 0.14}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.23, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.28, ‘More than 12000’: 0.32}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.15, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.35, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.26, ‘More than 12000’: 0.18}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.04, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.25, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.35, ‘More than 12000’: 0.25}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.08, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.18, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.25, ‘More than 12000’: 0.42}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.14, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.3, ‘More than 12000’: 0.45}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.24, ‘More than 12000’: 0.5}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.06, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.25, ‘More than 12000’: 0.53}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.05, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.25, ‘More than 12000’: 0.55}]
Median Reasoning:
EXTRACTED_PROBABILITIES: [2, 5, 8, 18, 25, 42]
Model’s Answer:
# Analysis of Conflict Deaths in Sudan for 2025
## Current Situation Assessment
The conflict in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has been ongoing since April 2023, with devastating humanitarian consequences. According to recent reports, the cumulative death toll since the conflict began is significant, with UN estimates suggesting over 20,000 direct conflict deaths, while some local sources put the figure as high as 150,000 when including indirect deaths from disease, starvation, and lack of medical care.
Most critically, recent developments show a marked escalation in violence, particularly in Darfur. In April 2025 alone, RSF attacks on displacement camps near El Fasher resulted in 400+ deaths in a multi-day attack around mid-April, followed by another 30+ deaths in a subsequent attack on April 20-22. This suggests that even in a short timeframe of just one month, the conflict has already caused hundreds of documented deaths.
## Pattern of Violence and Acceleration
The pattern of violence is showing signs of intensification rather than abatement. Several factors support this assessment:
1. **Territorial Focus**: The RSF is regrouping in Darfur after losing ground in Khartoum, signaling a geographical shift in violence rather than a reduction.
2. **Strategic Objectives**: RSF is attempting to establish a parallel government, with a focus on capturing El Fasher, the last major army-held city in Darfur, suggesting prolonged and intense fighting ahead.
3. **Urban Warfare**: Both sides continue to use heavy artillery in populated areas, leading to high civilian casualties.
4. **Humanitarian Crisis**: Severe food insecurity, with half the population (24.6 million people) severely food insecure, combined with blockades of humanitarian aid, suggests indirect conflict deaths will increase significantly.
## Estimating 2025 Deaths
To forecast the death toll for the remainder of 2025, I need to consider:
1. **Recent Death Rate**: The April 2025 attacks in Darfur resulted in at least 430 documented deaths in a very short period. This suggests a high-intensity conflict with the potential for thousands of deaths per month if similar patterns continue.
2. **Time Remaining**: As of April 22, 2025, approximately 8 months remain in the year. If the current intensity continues or escalates, the death toll for these 8 months could easily reach the higher ranges of the options provided.
3. **Underreporting Factors**: Both research assistants highlight severe underreporting due to attacks on journalists, limited access to RSF-controlled areas, and communications blackouts. This suggests actual death tolls are likely higher than reported figures.
4. **Indirect Deaths**: The severe humanitarian crisis, with 15 million children requiring aid and widespread malnutrition, will contribute significantly to conflict-related deaths beyond direct violence.
## Estimating Probabilities
If the violence seen in April 2025 is representative of the rest of the year, with 400+ deaths in a single multi-day attack, and additional smaller attacks causing dozens more, the monthly death toll could easily exceed 1,000-1,500 deaths per month. Over 8 months, this would accumulate to 8,000-12,000+ deaths.
However, I must also account for:
1. **Potential Peace Initiatives**: While no significant breakthrough has been reported, international pressure could potentially lead to ceasefires or reductions in violence.
2. **Conflict Dynamics**: The intensity could fluctuate, with periods of lower violence interspersed with high-casualty events.
3. **Seasonal Factors**: Weather conditions and seasonal patterns might affect military operations and humanitarian conditions.
Given the documented intensity in April 2025, the entrenched positions of both sides, the strategic focus on capturing El Fasher, and the severe humanitarian crisis, the most likely outcome appears to be in the higher ranges. The “More than 12,000” category seems particularly probable given the current trajectory, but I need to distribute probability across multiple outcomes to account for uncertainty.
## Final Probability Distribution
Considering all factors and accounting for uncertainty:
Option_A: 2
Option_B: 5
Option_C: 8
Option_D: 18
Option_E: 25
Option_F: 42
=== Forecast Result ===
{
“probability_yes”: null,
“probability_yes_per_category”: {
“Less than 1000”: 0.014000000000000002,
“Between 1000 and 3000”: 0.044000000000000004,
“Between 3000 and 5000”: 0.094,
“Between 5000 and 8000”: 0.20800000000000002,
“Between 8000 and 12000”: 0.27999999999999997,
“More than 12000”: 0.36
},
“continuous_cdf”: null
}
=== Reasoning ===
All Predictions:
[{‘Less than 1000’: 0.03, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.09, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.19, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.29, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.26, ‘More than 12000’: 0.14}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.23, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.28, ‘More than 12000’: 0.32}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.15, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.35, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.26, ‘More than 12000’: 0.18}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.04, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.1, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.25, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.35, ‘More than 12000’: 0.25}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.08, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.18, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.25, ‘More than 12000’: 0.42}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.14, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.3, ‘More than 12000’: 0.45}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.05, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.07, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.24, ‘More than 12000’: 0.5}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.03, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.06, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.25, ‘More than 12000’: 0.53}, {‘Less than 1000’: 0.01, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’: 0.02, ‘Between 3000 and 5000’: 0.05, ‘Between 5000 and 8000’: 0.12, ‘Between 8000 and 12000’: 0.25, ‘More than 12000’: 0.55}]
Median Reasoning:
EXTRACTED_PROBABILITIES: [2, 5, 8, 18, 25, 42]
Model’s Answer:
# Analysis of Conflict Deaths in Sudan for 2025
## Current Situation Assessment
The conflict in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has been ongoing since April 2023, with devastating humanitarian consequences. According to recent reports, the cumulative death toll since the conflict began is significant, with UN estimates suggesting over 20,000 direct conflict deaths, while some local sources put the figure as high as 150,000 when including indirect deaths from disease, starvation, and lack of medical care.
Most critically, recent developments show a marked escalation in violence, particularly in Darfur. In April 2025 alone, RSF attacks on displacement camps near El Fasher resulted in 400+ deaths in a multi-day attack around mid-April, followed by another 30+ deaths in a subsequent attack on April 20-22. This suggests that even in a short timeframe of just one month, the conflict has already caused hundreds of documented deaths.
## Pattern of Violence and Acceleration
The pattern of violence is showing signs of intensification rather than abatement. Several factors support this assessment:
1. **Territorial Focus**: The RSF is regrouping in Darfur after losing ground in Khartoum, signaling a geographical shift in violence rather than a reduction.
2. **Strategic Objectives**: RSF is attempting to establish a parallel government, with a focus on capturing El Fasher, the last major army-held city in Darfur, suggesting prolonged and intense fighting ahead.
3. **Urban Warfare**: Both sides continue to use heavy artillery in populated areas, leading to high civilian casualties.
4. **Humanitarian Crisis**: Severe food insecurity, with half the population (24.6 million people) severely food insecure, combined with blockades of humanitarian aid, suggests indirect conflict deaths will increase significantly.
## Estimating 2025 Deaths
To forecast the death toll for the remainder of 2025, I need to consider:
1. **Recent Death Rate**: The April 2025 attacks in Darfur resulted in at least 430 documented deaths in a very short period. This suggests a high-intensity conflict with the potential for thousands of deaths per month if similar patterns continue.
2. **Time Remaining**: As of April 22, 2025, approximately 8 months remain in the year. If the current intensity continues or escalates, the death toll for these 8 months could easily reach the higher ranges of the options provided.
3. **Underreporting Factors**: Both research assistants highlight severe underreporting due to attacks on journalists, limited access to RSF-controlled areas, and communications blackouts. This suggests actual death tolls are likely higher than reported figures.
4. **Indirect Deaths**: The severe humanitarian crisis, with 15 million children requiring aid and widespread malnutrition, will contribute significantly to conflict-related deaths beyond direct violence.
## Estimating Probabilities
If the violence seen in April 2025 is representative of the rest of the year, with 400+ deaths in a single multi-day attack, and additional smaller attacks causing dozens more, the monthly death toll could easily exceed 1,000-1,500 deaths per month. Over 8 months, this would accumulate to 8,000-12,000+ deaths.
However, I must also account for:
1. **Potential Peace Initiatives**: While no significant breakthrough has been reported, international pressure could potentially lead to ceasefires or reductions in violence.
2. **Conflict Dynamics**: The intensity could fluctuate, with periods of lower violence interspersed with high-casualty events.
3. **Seasonal Factors**: Weather conditions and seasonal patterns might affect military operations and humanitarian conditions.
Given the documented intensity in April 2025, the entrenched positions of both sides, the strategic focus on capturing El Fasher, and the severe humanitarian crisis, the most likely outcome appears to be in the higher ranges. The “More than 12,000” category seems particularly probable given the current trajectory, but I need to distribute probability across multiple outcomes to account for uncertainty.
## Final Probability Distribution
Considering all factors and accounting for uncertainty:
Option_A: 2
Option_B: 5
Option_C: 8
Option_D: 18
Option_E: 25
Option_F: 42
## Final Forecast
Based on the analysis of recent developments, historical patterns, and the current trajectory of the conflict, my forecast for Sudan conflict deaths in 2025 is:
Model value:
* Less than 1000: 1%
* Between 1000 and 3000: 3%
* Between 3000 and 5000: 11%
* Between 5000 and 8000: 26%
* Between 8000 and 12000: 35%
* More than 12000: 24%
Past forecasts by both Phil and Jeremy on Sudan’s conflict fatalities —>
Background on VIEWS: Near the end of 2024, the latest forecasting competition of the Violence and Impacts Early-Warning System (VIEWS) was launched. On Dec. 4, 2024, during a telecon, a group of machine forecasting experts involved in VIEWS observed Jeremy’s demonstration of his Multi-AI Oracle. Although it was too late for Jeremy to sign up as a VIEWS competitor, they urged him to run a side competition for everyone’s benefit. Jeremy chose their Sudan conflict deaths question.
Below, map of control in Sudan’s civil war as of April 15, 2025.
Below, before and after pictures of the devastation of the civil war in Sudan.
Carolyn has checked Sudan’s news sites below to ensure that they are still in operation. However, given the widespread violence in Sudan, any of these could go offline without warning.
https://www.alnilin.com/
https://www.alrakoba.net/
https://www.altaghyeer.info/ar/
https://www.altaghyeer.info/en/
https://www.alttahrer.com/
https://www.alzaeemsd.com/
https://www.assayha.net
https://www.cover-sd.com/
https://kushnews.net/
https://rakobanews.com
https://www.sudanakhbar.com/
https://sudanjem.com/
https://suna-sd.net/en
https://sudantimes.net/
https://www.sudantribune.net/
https://www.sudantribune.com/
https://sudaneseonline.com/
https://www.sudanile.com/
https://sudanow-magazine.net/
https://www.sudaress.com/
https://www.tagpress.net/
