How many state-based conflict deaths (total of all civilian and combat deaths, including both Ukrainian and Russian combatants) will be reported by ACLED in Ukraine in May, 2025?
Here’s what Phil’s pgodzinai predicts today:
* Less than 500: 1%
^ Between 500 and 1000: 3%
* Between 1000 and 1500: 7%:
* Between 1500 and 2000: 14%
* Greater than 2000: 75%
Full Report
Perplexity response:
{think}
Okay, let’s tackle this question about the number of state-based conflict deaths in Ukraine in May 2025 as reported by ACLED. The user wants a detailed rundown of the most relevant news sources to inform their superforecaster’s analysis.
First, I need to focus on the latest data from ACLED since they’re the specified source. The user provided several search results, but I should check each one for relevance and recency. Let’s go through each result:
1. The first result from ACLED’s Conflict Monitor (updated January 2025) gives weekly updates and key trends up to January 18-24, 2025. It mentions Russian advances and civilian deaths, with 24 civilians killed in one week and intercepted strikes. Notably, it’s dated April 30, 2025, which is recent. However, the data inside is from January, so it’s a bit older but still relevant for understanding ACLED’s methodology.
2. The second link from ReliefWeb (May 1, 2025) discusses the period April 12-18, 2025, and reports 71 civilian deaths from Russian shelling and attacks. This is more recent, just a couple of weeks before May, so this could indicate trends leading into May.
3. The third result from TVP World (May 6, 2025) mentions Ukraine as the second-deadliest conflict globally in 2025, after Gaza. This is the most recent, dated today (May 6, 2025). It says Ukraine ranks second in deaths, which suggests high ongoing casualties.
4. The fourth link from THE BUZZ (May 1, 2025) states over 40,000 civilian casualties, 4 million displaced, and 6.8 million refugees. While these are cumulative numbers, the page was updated May 1, so it’s recent but doesn’t specify May 2025 deaths.
5. The fifth result from Sharing4good (May 3, 2025) talks about global conflicts doubling, with 233,000 deaths estimated in the past year. It mentions Ukraine as the deadliest conflict, but the numbers here are global and not specific to May 2025.
The user’s query is about May 2025, so I need to focus on the most recent data leading up to that month. The ReliefWeb update (April 12-18) shows 71 civilian deaths in one week, and the TVP World article (today) ranks Ukraine as second-deadliest, which might imply continued high casualty rates.
ACLED’s Conflict Monitor is updated weekly, but the latest available in the search results is from April 30, which includes data up to January. However, ReliefWeb’s info for mid-April is more recent. Without explicit May data, we have to infer from recent trends.
The April data (71 civilian deaths in a week) and the TVP World note that Ukraine remains one of the deadliest conflicts suggest that the monthly death toll in May could be high. However, ACLED’s state-based conflict deaths include both combatants and civilians. The April data mentions 4 civilian deaths from Ukrainian actions and 24 from Russian actions, plus intercepted strikes that might have prevented more deaths.
But the user is asking for the total state-based deaths, including combatants. The available sources don’t explicitly break this down, so we need to consider that civilian deaths are a subset. If April saw 71 civilian deaths in a week, extrapolating that (assuming similar rates) would be around 284 civilian deaths in a month, but combatant deaths are typically higher.
However, the TVP World article states that Ukraine is the second-deadliest conflict, which might indicate higher overall numbers. Given that the user’s options start at ‘Less than 500’, up to ‘Greater than 2000’, we need to assess whether the monthly total would be in any of these brackets.
Considering that in April, a single week had 71 civilian deaths, and including combatants, the total could be significantly higher. For example, if combatant deaths are 3-4 times civilian deaths (common in conflicts), 71 civilians would mean around 250-300 combatants, totaling 320-400 state-based deaths in a week. Over a month, that’s around 1,280-1,600, which would fall into the ‘Between 1000 and 1500’ or ‘Between 1500 and 2000’ brackets.
But this is speculative. The sources don’t provide exact numbers for May, so we have to rely on recent trends. The most recent data point (April 12-18) shows high civilian casualties, and the TVP World article reinforces that Ukraine is among the deadliest conflicts, suggesting sustained high death rates.
Given that, the answer should present the available data, highlight the lack of May-specific numbers, and use recent trends to infer possible ranges. The superforecaster will need to consider that without explicit May data, the projection is based on recent weeks’ trends, possibly indicating a higher death toll, but uncertainty remains.
**Relevant Sources for Ukraine Conflict Death Projections (May 2025)**
### 1. **ACLED Ukraine Conflict Monitor (Updated April 30, 2025)**
– **Date**: April 30, 2025
– **Key Details**: Provides weekly updates on Russian advances, civilian casualties, and intercepted strikes. For January 18–24, 2025, ACLED recorded **24 civilian deaths** from Russian actions and **4 from Ukrainian actions**, alongside **18 long-range missile/drone strikes** intercepted in western regions[1].
– **Trend**: Highlights sustained violence, including settlement captures near Pokrovsk and Kupiansk, indicating continued front-line clashes.
### 2. **ReliefWeb Ukraine War Situation Update (April 12–18, 2025)**
– **Date**: May 1, 2025
– **Key Details**: Reports **71 civilian deaths** in Russian attacks across six regions (Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Sumy, Zaporizhia). No combatant deaths explicitly mentioned[2].
– **Trend**: Marks a sharp escalation in civilian fatalities compared to earlier weeks, suggesting heightened military strikes in April.
### 3. **TVP World Peace Report (May 6, 2025)**
– **Date**: May 6, 2025
– **Key Details**: Ranks Ukraine as the **second-deadliest conflict globally** in 2025, after Gaza, with ongoing high-intensity clashes[3].
– **Context**: Reinforces Ukraine’s status as a major conflict hotspot, implying sustained or rising death tolls.
### 4. **THE BUZZ Russia-Ukraine War Updates (May 1, 2025)**
– **Date**: May 1, 2025
– **Key Details**: Notes **over 40,000 civilian casualties** and **4 million displaced** since 2022. Cumulative refugee figure cited as **6.8 million**[4].
– **Limitation**: Aggregate figures lack granularity for May-specific combatant or state-based deaths.
### 5. **Sharing4good Global Conflict Summary (May 3, 2025)**
– **Date**: May 3, 2025
– **Key Details**: Estimates **233,000 conflict-related deaths globally** in the past year, with Ukraine among the deadliest[5].
– **Insight**: Contextualizes Ukraine’s conflict within global trends, suggesting severe violence persistence.
—
### **Analysis for May 2025 Projections**
1. **Recent Trends**:
– **April 2025**: ReliefWeb reports **71 civilian deaths** in one week (April 12–18), indicating elevated Russian shelling and missile strikes[2].
– **Comparative Context**: TVP World’s ranking of Ukraine as the **second-deadliest conflict** (after Gaza) signals high combat intensity[3].
2. **Combatant vs. Civilian Deaths**:
– **Civilian Deaths**: April saw ~71 civilian fatalities in a week; extrapolating to a month (~280 civilian deaths), but actual totals likely higher due to underreporting.
– **Combatant Deaths**: Often 3–4x civilian deaths in state-based conflicts. If April’s civilian deaths were ~280/month, combatants could add **840–1,120**, totaling **~1,120–1,400** state-based deaths monthly.
3. **ACLED Methodology**:
– ACLED tracks **state-based conflict deaths** (including both sides’ combatants) but does not publish cumulative monthly totals. Weekly reports highlight key incidents, not aggregate figures[1].
4. **Options Consideration**:
– **Less than 500**: Unlikely given April’s ~280 civilian deaths alone and combatant inclusion.
– **Between 500–1,000**: Possible if combatant deaths are moderate, but recent escalation suggests higher.
– **Between 1,000–1,500**: Most plausible range, aligning with April’s trend and conflict intensity.
– **Between 1,500–2,000 / Greater than 2,000**: Less likely without evidence of extreme escalation.
—
**Conclusion**: Based on April’s civilian death rates and combat intensity, the most probable range for May 2025 is **Between 1,000 and 1,500 state-based conflict deaths**. However, ACLED’s lack of explicit monthly totals introduces uncertainty. Superforecasters should monitor ACLED’s weekly updates for fresh data.
AskNews Deep Usage:
prompt_tokens=23024 completion_tokens=3727 total_tokens=0
AskNews Deep Search Response:
Based on analysis of recent reports (all from May 2025 unless noted):
**Key Data & Trends:**
1. **Military Casualty Rates**:
– Russian forces sustained ~1,200 daily casualties (killed/wounded) in April 2025 [[4][6][23]], with UK intelligence noting no significant slowdown in early May 2025. Extrapolated to May 2025, this implies **~36,000–37,000 total Russian casualties** for the month.
– Ukrainian losses were estimated at ~35,000 monthly in early 2025 [[3]], though exact combatant deaths are unclear.
2. **Civilian Impact**:
– Drone/artillery strikes on cities (e.g., Kyiv, Cherson) continued into early May, causing dozens of civilian casualties per week [[11][14][15]].
3. **Territorial Dynamics**:
– Russian advances slowed to ~217 km² captured in April 2025 at a cost of 36,570 casualties [[8]], suggesting continued attritional tactics rather than breakthroughs.
**ACLED-Specific Considerations**:
– ACLED historically includes **both combatant and civilian deaths in state-based conflicts**. The Ukrainian General Staff reported **140,650 Ukrainian military casualties** from January–April 2025 [[3]] (avg ~35,163/month), while independent Russian sources identified **106,745–106,223 confirmed Russian military deaths** from 2022–April 2025 [[3][2]].
– Applying the current casualty rate (1,200 daily) and assuming a **conservative 25% killed ratio**, May 2025 could see **~9,000 Russian military deaths + ~2,000 Ukrainian military deaths** + **hundreds of civilians**, totaling >11,000 deaths. However, **ACLED verification delays** and narrower criteria (e.g., excluding indirect deaths) may reduce reported numbers.
**Resolution Source Check**:
– As of May 5, 2025, ACLED’s Ukraine dashboard ([source](https://acleddata.com/ukraine-conflict-monitor/)) does not yet publish May 2025 data. The latest available ACLED data (December 2024) reported **~19,600 conflict deaths** that month. The 2025 escalation suggests May’s toll will likely **exceed 2,000**, aligning with current casualty trends.
**Recommendation for Superforecaster**:
Given the **persistently high attrition rates** and no evidence of de-escalation in early May, the most probable range is **”Greater than 2000″**. Lower brackets (e.g., 1,500–2,000) would require an unprecedented sudden decline in fighting intensity, which current frontline reports [[8][11][30]] do not support.
*Caveats*:
– ACLED’s methodology may undercount due to verification lags.
– Russian offensive operations around Kupiansk/Chasiv Yar [[29]] could disproportionately increase deaths in late May.
**Citations**: Daily casualty rates [4][6][23], territorial dynamics [8][29], Ukrainian/Russian loss estimates [2][3][30].
GPT News Summary:
The ongoing conflict in Ukraine remains intensely violent, with both Ukrainian and Russian forces experiencing significant casualties. Recent reports are critical for understanding potential deaths in May 2025:
1. **Civilian Casualties**: As of early May 2025, the conflict has continued to claim civilian lives. For instance, between April 28 and May 5, Ukrainian forces reportedly killed 8 civilians and injured 45 others in the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) ([rossaprimavera.ru](https://rossaprimavera.ru/news/39c31d04), May 06, 2025). Similarly, the UN reported that despite peace talks, civilian casualties have increased markedly since February 2025, with 848 civilians killed or injured in just the first 24 days of April ([24tv.ua](https://24tv.ua/geopolitics/mirni-zusillya-trampa-sprichinili-zrostannya-kilkosti-zhertv_n2814475), May 04, 2025).
2. **Russian Military Losses**: 2024 was declared the deadliest year for Russian forces, with an estimated 164,223 to 237,211 soldiers killed. The beginning of 2025 has already seen approximately 160,000 Russian losses by the end of April, indicating a continuation of high casualties despite the lack of significant territorial gains ([nv.ua](https://nv.ua/world/countries/poteri-rf-2024-god-stal-samym-smertonosnym-dlya-rossiyskoy-armii-50511367.html), May 05, 2025; [Tengrinews.kz](https://tengrinews.kz/world_news/britanskaya-razvedka-nazvala-masshtabyi-poter-rossii-ukraine-569294/), May 04, 2025).
3. **Ukrainian Military Losses and Activity**: Ukrainian forces have been active, with reports suggesting they achieved significant strike capabilities, destroying over 83,000 targets in April alone ([nv.ua](https://nv.ua/ukr/world/countries/vtrati-rf-2024-rik-stav-naybilsh-smertonosnim-dlya-rosiyskoji-armiji-50511367.html), May 05, 2025). Ukrainian military reported 140,650 casualties since the start of 2025 alone, reflecting the sustained intensity of conflict on both sides ([nv.ua](https://nv.ua/world/countries/poteri-rf-2024-god-stal-samym-smertonosnym-dlya-rossiyskoy-armii-50511367.html), May 05, 2025).
4. **Trends and Predictions**: British Intelligence suggests that 2025 may surpass previous years in terms of Russian casualties, contributing to what could be the highest death toll since the war’s start in February 2022 ([Infobae](https://www.infobae.com/america/mundo/2025/05/03/reino-unido-advirtio-que-las-tropas-rusas-podrian-sufrir-en-2025-su-mayor-numero-de-bajas-desde-el-inicio-de-la-invasion-a-ucrania/), May 03, 2025).
Overall, the conflict remains at a highly lethal intensity, with both sides experiencing substantial losses. The current data coupled with recent trends suggest a high likelihood of continued significant casualties throughout May 2025.
Extracted resolution criteria links:
[]
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Anthropic response:
# Forecast: Ukraine Conflict Deaths for May 2025
## Initial Analysis of Data Sources
The research assistants have provided several data points about the ongoing Ukraine-Russia conflict, with varying degrees of recency and reliability. Let me evaluate these sources and their implications.
The most relevant information comes from ACLED’s recent updates and independent intelligence sources. ACLED data from January 2025 showed 24 civilian deaths from Russian actions and 4 from Ukrainian actions in a single week. More recently, ReliefWeb reported 71 civilian deaths in a single week in mid-April 2025. These civilian death counts represent only a fraction of total state-based conflict deaths, which include combatant casualties.
Multiple sources indicate that the conflict remains highly intense in early 2025. The second research assistant cites reports of approximately 1,200 daily Russian casualties (killed and wounded) in April 2025, with no indication of slowdown in early May. This implies around 9,000 Russian military deaths in May assuming a 25% killed-to-wounded ratio. Ukrainian military casualties appear similarly high.
## Historical Context and Trends
The conflict death trend appears to be rising or at least maintaining a high plateau throughout early 2025. The third research assistant noted that the UN reported 848 civilians killed or injured in just the first 24 days of April 2025, indicating an increase since February. British intelligence suggests 2025 could surpass previous years for Russian casualties.
ACLED’s methodology includes both combatant and civilian deaths in state-based conflicts. According to the second research assistant, ACLED reported approximately 19,600 conflict deaths in December 2024. Given the reported escalation in 2025, we would expect May 2025’s figures to be at least as high and likely higher.
## Mathematical Analysis
Let’s perform a rough calculation based on available data:
1. **Civilian deaths**: ReliefWeb reported 71 civilian deaths in one week in April 2025. Extrapolating to a full month (4.3 weeks) yields approximately 305 civilian deaths.
2. **Combatant deaths**: Using the figures from the second research assistant (1,200 daily Russian casualties with a 25% killed ratio), we get approximately 9,000 Russian military deaths in May. Ukrainian military deaths are harder to estimate, but if they’re even half the Russian rate, that would add another 4,500 deaths.
3. **Total deaths**: This conservative estimate gives us approximately 13,800 state-based conflict deaths for May 2025.
However, we must consider ACLED’s verification processes and criteria, which likely result in lower reported figures compared to raw estimates. The second research assistant mentioned that ACLED reported about 19,600 conflict deaths in December 2024, which provides a useful benchmark. Given that 2025 has reportedly seen intensification rather than de-escalation, May 2025’s figures would likely be comparable or higher than this December 2024 figure.
## Uncertainties and Caveats
Several factors introduce uncertainty into this forecast:
1. **ACLED’s verification delays**: ACLED requires verification of deaths, meaning their reported figures may lag behind actual deaths.
2. **Potential for rapid conflict changes**: With over a month between today and the resolution date, major operational changes could occur, though the conflict’s intensity has remained high throughout 2025 so far.
3. **Data reliability**: Military casualty figures are often contested and may include propaganda elements from both sides.
4. **Definitional issues**: ACLED has specific criteria for what constitutes a state-based conflict death, which may not align perfectly with raw casualty reports.
## Final Assessment
Based on the most reliable data available, particularly ACLED’s own December 2024 reporting of 19,600 conflict deaths and the sustained or increased conflict intensity throughout early 2025, it appears highly probable that May 2025 will see more than 2,000 state-based conflict deaths in Ukraine.
Even conservative estimates based on civilian death rates and combatant casualty reports point to figures well above 2,000. While ACLED’s verification process might reduce the reported number somewhat, it’s difficult to imagine a scenario where the total would fall below 2,000 given the conflict’s current intensity.
The only scenario where the total would be lower than 2,000 would require both a dramatic de-escalation in the conflict and significant underreporting or verification delays by ACLED. Given the available evidence, such a scenario appears highly unlikely.
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 2
Option_C: 5
Option_D: 12
Option_E: 80
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 500’: 0.01, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.05, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.12, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.8}
________________________
Anthropic response:
# Analysis of State-Based Conflict Deaths in Ukraine for May 2025
## Current Conflict Intensity Assessment
The Russia-Ukraine conflict remains one of the deadliest ongoing conflicts globally as of May 2025, with the research assistants confirming Ukraine ranks as the second-deadliest conflict worldwide after Gaza. This indicates persistently high casualty rates continuing into May 2025.
Several data points from April 2025 provide important context:
– 71 civilian deaths were reported in just one week (April 12-18) across six Ukrainian regions
– Russian forces reportedly sustained approximately 1,200 daily casualties (killed and wounded combined)
– The UN reported 848 civilians killed or injured in the first 24 days of April, showing an upward trend
## Military Casualty Analysis
The research assistants provide substantial information about current casualty rates that help inform projections for May 2025:
1. **Russian military losses**: Recent British intelligence indicates Russian forces sustained approximately 1,200 daily casualties (combined killed and wounded) in April 2025. Using a standard military estimation that 25-30% of casualties represent fatalities, this suggests approximately 300-360 Russian combatant deaths daily.
2. **Ukrainian military losses**: While precise daily figures for Ukrainian forces aren’t provided, one research assistant notes Ukrainian military reported 140,650 casualties since the start of 2025 (roughly 35,000 monthly). Assuming a similar killed-to-wounded ratio, this would suggest approximately 8,750-10,500 Ukrainian combatant deaths monthly.
3. **Territorial dynamics**: Russian advances have slowed (217 km² captured in April) but fighting continues at a high intensity, particularly around Kupiansk and Chasiv Yar. This pattern of attritional warfare with limited territorial gains typically results in sustained high casualties.
## ACLED’s Methodology and Historical Reporting
ACLED’s methodology is critical to this forecast as they’re the specified resolution source. ACLED tracks “state-based conflict deaths” which includes both civilian and military fatalities. Their reporting often lags real-time events due to verification processes.
One research assistant notes that ACLED reported approximately 19,600 conflict deaths in December 2024. This provides a useful baseline, though casualty rates appear to have remained high or even increased in early 2025 based on multiple sources.
## May 2025 Projections
Given these data points, we can make the following projections for May 2025:
1. **Civilian deaths**: Extrapolating from the 71 civilian deaths in one week of April would suggest roughly 280-300 civilian deaths for the full month of May. However, the UN reporting 848 civilians killed/injured in 24 days suggests this might be an underestimate.
2. **Military deaths (both sides)**: If Russian forces are sustaining 300-360 deaths daily (using the 25-30% fatality ratio from 1,200 daily casualties), this projects to 9,000-11,000 Russian military deaths for May. Ukrainian military deaths are harder to project but likely number in the thousands based on the conflict intensity.
3. **Total state-based conflict deaths**: Combining civilian and military deaths, and accounting for ACLED’s verification processes (which might undercount immediate casualties), the most likely range appears to be well above 2,000 deaths for May 2025.
## Uncertainty Factors
Several factors introduce uncertainty:
1. **Verification lag**: ACLED reports often lag real-time events as they verify information. This might result in lower reported numbers for May than actually occur.
2. **Potential escalation/de-escalation**: The forecast is being made early in the month (May 6), giving time for conflict intensity to change. However, multiple sources indicate continued high-intensity combat with no signs of immediate de-escalation.
3. **Reporting biases**: Both Russian and Ukrainian sources may over-report enemy casualties and under-report their own, making precise estimates challenging.
Despite these uncertainties, the weight of evidence strongly indicates that May 2025 will continue the pattern of high casualties that has characterized 2025 so far.
## Conclusion
Based on the available information about recent casualty rates, ongoing territorial conflicts, and ACLED’s historical reporting patterns, there is compelling evidence that May 2025 will see state-based conflict deaths in Ukraine significantly exceeding 2,000. The high daily casualty rates reported by multiple sources make it extremely unlikely that the total would fall below 1,500, and virtually impossible that it would fall below 1,000 without a dramatic and immediate ceasefire.
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 2
Option_C: 6
Option_D: 18
Option_E: 73
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 500’: 0.01, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.06, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.18, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.73}
________________________
Anthropic response:
# Analysis of Ukraine State-Based Conflict Deaths Forecast (May 2025)
## Current Situation Assessment
Based on the research provided, I’ll evaluate the likely number of state-based conflict deaths in Ukraine for May 2025 as recorded by ACLED. This requires careful analysis of recent trends, contextual factors, and an understanding of ACLED’s methodology.
The research indicates the conflict remains highly active and lethal. Multiple sources confirm this is one of the world’s deadliest ongoing conflicts, with Ukraine ranked as the second deadliest globally in 2025 according to the TVP World Peace Report. This suggests casualty rates remain significant.
## Recent Casualty Trends
Looking at the most recent data:
1. **Civilian Deaths**: ReliefWeb reported 71 civilian deaths in just one week (April 12-18, 2025), which if extrapolated would suggest approximately 280-300 civilian deaths per month. The UN reported 848 civilians killed or injured in the first 24 days of April, further supporting high civilian casualty rates.
2. **Military Deaths**: Russian forces reportedly sustained around 1,200 daily casualties in April (killed and wounded combined). Applying a conservative 25% killed-to-wounded ratio would suggest approximately 9,000 Russian military deaths for a month. Ukrainian military losses appear substantial as well, with reports indicating 140,650 Ukrainian casualties since the start of 2025 (averaging around 35,000 monthly, though this includes wounded).
3. **Intensity Indicators**: British intelligence suggests 2025 may surpass previous years for Russian casualties. The continued drone and artillery strikes on cities, and Russian advances (albeit slow) all indicate sustained combat operations.
## ACLED Methodology Considerations
ACLED’s reporting includes both combatant and civilian deaths from state-based violence, but several factors affect their totals:
1. **Verification Delays**: ACLED has rigorous verification processes, meaning their counts often lag behind real-time events.
2. **Conservative Estimates**: ACLED typically provides conservative counts compared to claims by warring parties.
3. **Historical Reporting**: The latest available ACLED data mentioned (from December 2024) reportedly showed approximately 19,600 conflict deaths that month, providing a baseline for comparison.
## Forecast Considerations
For May 2025 specifically:
1. **Timing**: Today is May 6, 2025, so we already have partial data for the month, suggesting combat operations continue at high intensity.
2. **No De-escalation Signals**: None of the research indicates a significant de-escalation or ceasefire in effect or imminent. On the contrary, reports suggest continued or increasing intensity.
3. **Seasonal Factors**: May historically allows for increased military mobility compared to winter months, potentially enabling more offensive operations.
4. **Verification Time**: Even if fighting were to decrease dramatically today, ACLED would still report deaths from early May and possibly late April incidents verified during May.
## Probability Assessment
Given the extensive military casualties on both sides, plus civilian deaths, and considering ACLED’s methodology:
– **Less than 500**: This appears highly unlikely given the current intensity. Even civilian deaths alone could approach this number, before adding combatant casualties which are much higher. Probability: 3%
– **Between 500 and 1000**: This would represent a dramatic and immediate reduction in conflict intensity from April levels with no apparent catalyst. While possible if there were a sudden ceasefire, no evidence suggests this. Probability: 7%
– **Between 1000 and 1500**: This would require a significant reduction from apparent current levels. While possible if ACLED’s verification process substantially reduces the count compared to reports, it still seems lower than likely. Probability: 15%
– **Between 1500 and 2000**: This represents a moderate decline from reported casualty figures but remains plausible if ACLED’s verification process excludes some reported deaths. Probability: 30%
– **Greater than 2000**: Given the reported casualty rates (especially when combining Russian, Ukrainian, and civilian deaths), and previous ACLED reporting of ~19,600 deaths in December 2024, this appears most likely. However, I’m accounting for potential verification delays and conservative counting. Probability: 45%
Option_A: 3
Option_B: 7
Option_C: 15
Option_D: 30
Option_E: 45
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 500’: 0.03, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.07, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.15, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.3, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.45}
________________________
Anthropic response:
# Analysis of Ukraine Conflict Deaths for May 2025
## Current Conflict Context and Trends
The Russia-Ukraine conflict continues to be one of the world’s most lethal ongoing conflicts, ranking as the second deadliest globally according to recent reports. After examining the research provided, it’s clear that casualties remain at extremely high levels in the early part of 2025.
Looking at the most recent data, several critical patterns emerge:
1. **High Casualty Rate Persistence**: Russian forces are reportedly sustaining approximately 1,200 daily casualties (killed and wounded) as of April 2025. This translates to roughly 36,000-37,000 total Russian casualties per month. Using a conservative wounded-to-killed ratio of 3:1 (which is standard in military analysis), this would suggest approximately 9,000 Russian military deaths per month.
2. **Ukrainian Casualties**: Ukrainian forces have reportedly suffered around 35,000 monthly casualties in early 2025, though the exact proportion of deaths is less clear. If we apply similar wounded-to-killed ratios, this would suggest approximately 8,000-9,000 Ukrainian military deaths monthly.
3. **Civilian Impact**: Reports indicate dozens of civilian casualties weekly from continued drone and artillery strikes in Ukrainian cities. One report cited 71 civilian deaths in a single week in April 2025, which would extrapolate to roughly 280-300 civilian deaths monthly.
4. **ACLED Reporting Methodology**: It’s important to note that ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project) includes both combatant and civilian deaths in their state-based conflict death figures. However, they have strict verification processes that may result in lower reported figures than actual casualties, and they typically experience delays in data verification.
## Recent Escalation and Historical Context
Several sources indicate an escalation in conflict intensity since February 2025, with British intelligence suggesting 2025 could surpass previous years in terms of Russian casualties. The UN reported 848 civilians killed or injured in just the first 24 days of April 2025, indicating a significant spike in civilian impacts.
Looking at historical ACLED data, the research suggests that December 2024 reported approximately 19,600 conflict deaths. With multiple sources indicating an escalation rather than de-escalation in early 2025, we should expect May 2025 figures to be at least comparable to, if not higher than, late 2024 figures.
## May 2025 Forecast Considerations
1. **Time Horizon**: Today is May 6, 2025, so we’re forecasting deaths for the current month, which is already underway. This means there’s limited time for significant changes in conflict dynamics to impact the final death count.
2. **Current Intensity**: Multiple independent sources confirm very high casualty rates continuing into early May 2025, with no evidence of de-escalation.
3. **Localized Offensives**: Reports indicate Russian offensive operations around Kupiansk and Chasiv Yar, which could lead to concentrated periods of higher casualties.
4. **Seasonal Factors**: May typically sees increased military activity after the spring thaw in Eastern Europe, allowing for greater mobility of forces.
## Integration of Military and Civilian Death Estimates
Combining the available data:
– ~9,000 Russian military deaths/month (based on 1,200 daily casualties with 25% killed)
– ~8,000-9,000 Ukrainian military deaths/month (based on similar casualty patterns)
– ~300 civilian deaths/month (based on April data showing 71 deaths in one week)
This suggests a total of approximately 17,000-18,000 state-based conflict deaths per month. However, ACLED’s verification processes and reporting delays typically result in lower reported figures than actual casualties. If we conservatively estimate that ACLED captures 50-70% of actual deaths due to verification constraints, this would suggest a reported figure of approximately 8,500-12,600 deaths for May 2025.
## Resolution Range Probability Assessment
Given the above analysis, let’s assess the probability for each range:
1. **Less than 500**: Extremely unlikely given current conflict intensity. Even in periods of relative lull, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has consistently produced casualties well above this threshold. With current daily casualty rates and no signs of ceasefire, this outcome is virtually impossible.
2. **Between 500 and 1000**: Highly unlikely given multiple sources confirming high casualty rates. This would require an immediate and dramatic ceasefire or radical decline in fighting that is not evident in any reporting.
3. **Between 1000 and 1500**: Unlikely based on current trends. This would represent a significant reduction from historical ACLED reporting (19,600 in December 2024) and would contradict the observed escalation in early 2025.
4. **Between 1500 and 2000**: Possible but still represents a substantial reduction from recent trends and historical ACLED reporting. This would require a significant de-escalation that is not currently evident.
5. **Greater than 2000**: Most likely outcome based on current conflict intensity, recent ACLED reporting history, and multiple independent sources confirming high and sustained casualty rates.
## Final Probability Assessment
Taking into account the full analysis above, the current conflict intensity, historical ACLED reporting patterns, and allowing for some uncertainty:
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 4
Option_C: 10
Option_D: 15
Option_E: 70
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 500’: 0.01, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.04, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.1, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.15, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.7}
________________________
Anthropic response:
# Analysis of State-Based Conflict Deaths in Ukraine (May 2025)
## Assessment of Information Sources
The research assistants have provided valuable information, but with varying degrees of specificity and relevance. Let me first evaluate the quality and relevance of each source:
1. **First research assistant**: Provides recent data from ACLED and other sources up to early May 2025, showing 71 civilian deaths in one week in April 2025. This source is directly relevant as it mentions ACLED’s methodology and recent reporting patterns.
2. **Second research assistant**: Reports high daily casualty rates (1,200/day for Russian forces) in April 2025, with extrapolations suggesting very high potential death counts. Their analysis includes ACLED-specific considerations and historical reporting patterns.
3. **Third research assistant**: Provides additional context on civilian and military casualties from various sources, noting 848 civilians killed or injured in the first 24 days of April 2025, and references to high Russian and Ukrainian military losses.
The second research assistant’s information appears most detailed regarding actual casualty rates, though their extrapolations may need careful scrutiny as they could overestimate ACLED’s official counts.
## ACLED’s Methodology and Historical Reporting
ACLED specifically tracks state-based conflict deaths, including both military and civilian casualties. A critical consideration is that ACLED’s methodology often results in lower counts than those claimed by either side due to their verification requirements. This creates a discrepancy between raw casualty reports and what ACLED ultimately publishes.
According to the research, in late 2024, ACLED reported approximately 19,600 conflict deaths per month. This provides an important baseline for our projection.
## Recent Conflict Intensity (April-May 2025)
Multiple sources confirm the conflict remains highly active with:
1. **Civilian casualties**: 71 deaths in a single week in April; 848 civilians killed or injured in the first 24 days of April.
2. **Military losses**: Russian forces reportedly suffering ~1,200 daily casualties (killed and wounded combined), with Ukrainian forces experiencing significant losses as well.
3. **Combat operations**: Continued fighting reported around Kupiansk, Chasiv Yar, and other areas, with no signs of de-escalation in early May 2025.
4. **Trend analysis**: British intelligence suggesting 2025 may surpass previous years in terms of Russian casualties, with no significant slowdown observed in early May.
## Extrapolating to May 2025
To forecast ACLED-reported deaths in May 2025, I need to consider:
1. **April 2025 intensity**: Multiple sources confirm high casualty rates in April, with civilian deaths at approximately 71 in a single week.
2. **Early May indicators**: As of May 6, 2025, there are no signs of de-escalation, with continued reports of casualties.
3. **ACLED’s reporting lag**: ACLED typically reports lower numbers than those claimed by either side due to their verification requirements.
4. **Historical context**: ACLED reported ~19,600 conflict deaths monthly in late 2024, providing a baseline.
The second research assistant suggests May 2025 could see >11,000 total deaths based on current casualty rates, but this likely overestimates what ACLED will ultimately report. ACLED’s verification process and more conservative methodology typically result in lower official counts.
## Calculation Approach
If we use the most recent ACLED baseline (~19,600 monthly deaths in late 2024) and consider the reported continued high intensity without major escalation or de-escalation, we can reasonably expect May 2025 to show similar or slightly higher figures.
Civilian deaths appear to be running at ~280-300 per month based on the April data. Military deaths would comprise the majority of ACLED’s count, likely in the multiple thousands given the reported intensity.
## Uncertainty Factors
Several factors introduce uncertainty:
1. **Reporting delays**: ACLED may not have complete May data by the June 15 resolution date.
2. **Verification challenges**: Not all reported deaths will be verified by ACLED.
3. **Potential for escalation/de-escalation**: While current evidence shows sustained high-intensity conflict, significant changes could occur during May.
4. **Data transparency**: Both sides may be incentivized to misrepresent casualty figures.
## Final Assessment
Based on all available evidence, ACLED’s historical reporting patterns, and the consistent reports of high-intensity conflict continuing into early May 2025:
1. **Less than 500**: Extremely unlikely given the confirmed civilian deaths alone approach this number monthly, and military deaths would push the total far higher.
2. **Between 500 and 1000**: Highly unlikely given the conflict intensity and historical ACLED reporting patterns.
3. **Between 1000 and 1500**: Possible but unlikely – would require a significant, unreported de-escalation from historical patterns.
4. **Between 1500 and 2000**: Possible but still below historical patterns – would require some de-escalation from previously reported levels.
5. **Greater than 2000**: Most likely outcome based on ACLED’s historical reporting of ~19,600 monthly deaths in late 2024 and no evidence of significant de-escalation.
Given that ACLED reported ~19,600 monthly deaths in late 2024 and all evidence points to continued high-intensity conflict, “Greater than 2000” appears to be the most probable outcome by a significant margin.
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 3
Option_C: 7
Option_D: 14
Option_E: 75
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 500’: 0.01, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.03, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.07, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.14, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.75}
GPT Multiple Choice JSON response:
The critical consideration is how ACLED has been counting fatalities throughout the war. For nearly every month since mid-2022 ACLED’s “state-based conflict deaths” in Ukraine have exceeded 2 000, often by an order of magnitude. Their counts incorporate large daily claimed Russian (and sometimes Ukrainian) KIA tallies as well as geolocated civilian deaths. December 2024, for example, shows roughly 19 600 fatalities in the public dataset; other late-2024 months are in the 10 000-20 000 range. There is no evidence that ACLED has stopped coding those daily casualty events or that fighting intensity has dropped sharply—if anything, April reporting indicates continued high casualties and Ukraine is still described by multiple monitors as the world’s second-deadliest conflict in 2025.
The only plausible path to a May total below 2 000 would be a major methodological change, data-release interruption, or massive under-reporting. While possible, ACLED has not signalled such a shift, and nothing similar has happened mid-year in past releases. Allowing some probability for unforeseen disruptions, the overwhelmingly likely outcome remains a May total well above 2 000.
Option_A: 2
Option_B: 4
Option_C: 7
Option_D: 12
Option_E: 75
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 500’: 0.02, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.04, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.07, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.12, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.75}
GPT Multiple Choice JSON response:
Russia’s full-scale invasion has now entered its fourth spring. In 2023 ACLED logged roughly 25 000 conflict deaths in Ukraine, or a little over 2 000 per month on average, but the distribution was highly skewed: huge battle fatalities were coded in the first half of 2022, whereas 2023–24 monthly tallies typically ran between about 800 and 1 800. Civilian deaths, the only category regularly highlighted in ACLED’s weekly Ukraine Conflict Monitor, have averaged fewer than 150 per month since mid-2023; most of ACLED’s monthly total comes from the smaller number of battle events for which credible fatality figures are available.
Recent signals do not point to either a dramatic escalation or a sudden collapse of fighting in May 2025. Front-line activity remains intense but broadly similar to the past six-plus months: Russian forces continue costly, grinding assaults around Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka’s outskirts, and the Kupiansk axis; Ukraine maintains a rolling deep-strike campaign. News-media-verified reports of large, single-incident combatant death tolls remain scarce, meaning ACLED’s coding will likely stay within its recent bandwidth. Weekly civilian fatality counts published by ACLED or relayed via ReliefWeb (e.g., 71 civilians killed 12-18 April) translate into perhaps 250-350 civilian deaths for a full month. If we assume the familiar 3-to-5× multiplier that ACLED’s coding usually adds for combatant deaths, May’s state-based total should again land in the low-to-mid-thousands, most plausibly near 1 200–1 600.
Because ACLED often under-captures frontline combatant losses that are reported only in official communiqués, there is a meaningful chance that the logged total dips below 1 000. Conversely, a sharp local breakthrough or a mass-casualty strike (e.g., on troop concentrations) could push the coded tally above 1 500, though past months show that even fierce offensives rarely lift ACLED numbers above 2 000 unless there is an exceptionally well-documented mass battle.
Balancing these considerations and allowing for sizeable uncertainty about what ACLED will ultimately verify and publish, the probabilistic forecast is:
Option_A: 12
Option_B: 30
Option_C: 28
Option_D: 18
Option_E: 12
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 500’: 0.12000000000000001, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.30000000000000004, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.2800000000000001, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.18000000000000002, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.11999999999999979}
Gemini Multiple Choice response:
None
GPT Multiple Choice JSON response:
The ACLED dataset is known to under-count the real – often much higher – casualty figures in Ukraine because it records only fatalities that can be tied to specific, source-verified events. In 2023 the ACLED monthly fatality total for Ukraine rarely fell below ~700 and rarely exceeded ~1 200. Through 2024 front-line fighting intensified, but ACLED’s methodology and sourcing did not change, so reported monthly fatalities mostly crept into the 800-1 400 band, with only occasional excursions above 1 500. Nothing in the first week of May 2025 (as reflected in press and NGO reporting) suggests a step-change either in violence that ACLED would capture or in ACLED’s coding practice. The most likely outcome is therefore a total somewhere inside the historical upper middle of the distribution (1 000-1 500). Still, there is genuine two-sided uncertainty: a quieter frontline or reporting delays could push the tally under 1 000, while unusually well-documented mass-fatality events or a surge around Chasiv Yar/Kupiansk could push it above 1 500.
Option_A: 08
Option_B: 30
Option_C: 35
Option_D: 17
Option_E: 10
probability_yes_per_category: {‘Less than 500’: 0.08, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.3, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.35, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.17, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.1}
Task failed with error:
Traceback (most recent call last):
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 107, in fetch_gemini_multiple_choice_prediction
return await fetch_sync(get_gemini_multiple_choice_prediction, title, perplexity_summary_report, asknews_summary, asknews_deep_research, vision_analysis, today, resolution_date, background, fine_print, resolution_criteria, options)
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 61, in fetch_sync
return await asyncio.get_event_loop().run_in_executor(
asyncio.exceptions.TimeoutError
Task failed with error:
Traceback (most recent call last):
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 75, in fetch_gpt_multiple_choice_prediction
return await fetch_sync(get_gpt_multiple_choice_prediction, title, perplexity_summary_report, asknews_summary, asknews_deep_research, vision_analysis, today, resolution_date, background, fine_print, resolution_criteria, options)
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 61, in fetch_sync
return await asyncio.get_event_loop().run_in_executor(
asyncio.exceptions.TimeoutError
Task failed with error:
Traceback (most recent call last):
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 75, in fetch_gpt_multiple_choice_prediction
return await fetch_sync(get_gpt_multiple_choice_prediction, title, perplexity_summary_report, asknews_summary, asknews_deep_research, vision_analysis, today, resolution_date, background, fine_print, resolution_criteria, options)
File “/home/runner/work/metaculus-forecasting-llm/metaculus-forecasting-llm/src/main.py”, line 61, in fetch_sync
return await asyncio.get_event_loop().run_in_executor(
asyncio.exceptions.TimeoutError
All predictions:
[{‘Less than 500’: 0.03, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.07, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.15, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.3, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.45}, {‘Less than 500’: 0.01, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.04, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.1, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.15, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.7}, {‘Less than 500’: 0.01, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.06, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.18, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.73}, {‘Less than 500’: 0.01, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.03, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.07, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.14, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.75}, {‘Less than 500’: 0.02, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.04, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.07, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.12, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.75}, {‘Less than 500’: 0.01, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.05, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.12, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.8}]
Filtered predictions:
[{‘Less than 500’: 0.01, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.04, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.1, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.15, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.7}, {‘Less than 500’: 0.01, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.06, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.18, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.73}, {‘Less than 500’: 0.01, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.03, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.07, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.14, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.75}, {‘Less than 500’: 0.02, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.04, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.07, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.12, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.75}]
Averaged predictions:
{‘Less than 500’: 0.02, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.04, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.07, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.12, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.75}
Median reasoning:
All Predictions:
[{‘Less than 500’: 0.03, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.07, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.15, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.3, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.45}, {‘Less than 500’: 0.01, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.04, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.1, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.15, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.7}, {‘Less than 500’: 0.01, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.06, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.18, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.73}, {‘Less than 500’: 0.01, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.03, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.07, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.14, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.75}, {‘Less than 500’: 0.02, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.04, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.07, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.12, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.75}, {‘Less than 500’: 0.01, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.05, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.12, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.8}]
Median Reasoning:
EXTRACTED_PROBABILITIES: [1, 3, 7, 14, 75]
Model’s Answer:
# Analysis of State-Based Conflict Deaths in Ukraine (May 2025)
## Assessment of Information Sources
The research assistants have provided valuable information, but with varying degrees of specificity and relevance. Let me first evaluate the quality and relevance of each source:
1. **First research assistant**: Provides recent data from ACLED and other sources up to early May 2025, showing 71 civilian deaths in one week in April 2025. This source is directly relevant as it mentions ACLED’s methodology and recent reporting patterns.
2. **Second research assistant**: Reports high daily casualty rates (1,200/day for Russian forces) in April 2025, with extrapolations suggesting very high potential death counts. Their analysis includes ACLED-specific considerations and historical reporting patterns.
3. **Third research assistant**: Provides additional context on civilian and military casualties from various sources, noting 848 civilians killed or injured in the first 24 days of April 2025, and references to high Russian and Ukrainian military losses.
The second research assistant’s information appears most detailed regarding actual casualty rates, though their extrapolations may need careful scrutiny as they could overestimate ACLED’s official counts.
## ACLED’s Methodology and Historical Reporting
ACLED specifically tracks state-based conflict deaths, including both military and civilian casualties. A critical consideration is that ACLED’s methodology often results in lower counts than those claimed by either side due to their verification requirements. This creates a discrepancy between raw casualty reports and what ACLED ultimately publishes.
According to the research, in late 2024, ACLED reported approximately 19,600 conflict deaths per month. This provides an important baseline for our projection.
## Recent Conflict Intensity (April-May 2025)
Multiple sources confirm the conflict remains highly active with:
1. **Civilian casualties**: 71 deaths in a single week in April; 848 civilians killed or injured in the first 24 days of April.
2. **Military losses**: Russian forces reportedly suffering ~1,200 daily casualties (killed and wounded combined), with Ukrainian forces experiencing significant losses as well.
3. **Combat operations**: Continued fighting reported around Kupiansk, Chasiv Yar, and other areas, with no signs of de-escalation in early May 2025.
4. **Trend analysis**: British intelligence suggesting 2025 may surpass previous years in terms of Russian casualties, with no significant slowdown observed in early May.
## Extrapolating to May 2025
To forecast ACLED-reported deaths in May 2025, I need to consider:
1. **April 2025 intensity**: Multiple sources confirm high casualty rates in April, with civilian deaths at approximately 71 in a single week.
2. **Early May indicators**: As of May 6, 2025, there are no signs of de-escalation, with continued reports of casualties.
3. **ACLED’s reporting lag**: ACLED typically reports lower numbers than those claimed by either side due to their verification requirements.
4. **Historical context**: ACLED reported ~19,600 conflict deaths monthly in late 2024, providing a baseline.
The second research assistant suggests May 2025 could see >11,000 total deaths based on current casualty rates, but this likely overestimates what ACLED will ultimately report. ACLED’s verification process and more conservative methodology typically result in lower official counts.
## Calculation Approach
If we use the most recent ACLED baseline (~19,600 monthly deaths in late 2024) and consider the reported continued high intensity without major escalation or de-escalation, we can reasonably expect May 2025 to show similar or slightly higher figures.
Civilian deaths appear to be running at ~280-300 per month based on the April data. Military deaths would comprise the majority of ACLED’s count, likely in the multiple thousands given the reported intensity.
## Uncertainty Factors
Several factors introduce uncertainty:
1. **Reporting delays**: ACLED may not have complete May data by the June 15 resolution date.
2. **Verification challenges**: Not all reported deaths will be verified by ACLED.
3. **Potential for escalation/de-escalation**: While current evidence shows sustained high-intensity conflict, significant changes could occur during May.
4. **Data transparency**: Both sides may be incentivized to misrepresent casualty figures.
## Final Assessment
Based on all available evidence, ACLED’s historical reporting patterns, and the consistent reports of high-intensity conflict continuing into early May 2025:
1. **Less than 500**: Extremely unlikely given the confirmed civilian deaths alone approach this number monthly, and military deaths would push the total far higher.
2. **Between 500 and 1000**: Highly unlikely given the conflict intensity and historical ACLED reporting patterns.
3. **Between 1000 and 1500**: Possible but unlikely – would require a significant, unreported de-escalation from historical patterns.
4. **Between 1500 and 2000**: Possible but still below historical patterns – would require some de-escalation from previously reported levels.
5. **Greater than 2000**: Most likely outcome based on ACLED’s historical reporting of ~19,600 monthly deaths in late 2024 and no evidence of significant de-escalation.
Given that ACLED reported ~19,600 monthly deaths in late 2024 and all evidence points to continued high-intensity conflict, “Greater than 2000” appears to be the most probable outcome by a significant margin.
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 3
Option_C: 7
Option_D: 14
Option_E: 75
=== Forecast Result ===
{
“probability_yes”: null,
“probability_yes_per_category”: {
“Less than 500”: 0.0125,
“Between 500 and 1000”: 0.0325,
“Between 1000 and 1500”: 0.07500000000000001,
“Between 1500 and 2000”: 0.1475,
“Greater than 2000”: 0.7324999999999999
},
“continuous_cdf”: null
}
=== Reasoning ===
All Predictions:
[{‘Less than 500’: 0.03, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.07, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.15, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.3, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.45}, {‘Less than 500’: 0.01, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.04, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.1, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.15, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.7}, {‘Less than 500’: 0.01, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.06, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.18, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.73}, {‘Less than 500’: 0.01, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.03, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.07, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.14, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.75}, {‘Less than 500’: 0.02, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.04, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.07, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.12, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.75}, {‘Less than 500’: 0.01, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.02, ‘Between 1000 and 1500’: 0.05, ‘Between 1500 and 2000’: 0.12, ‘Greater than 2000’: 0.8}]
Median Reasoning:
EXTRACTED_PROBABILITIES: [1, 3, 7, 14, 75]
Model’s Answer:
# Analysis of State-Based Conflict Deaths in Ukraine (May 2025)
## Assessment of Information Sources
The research assistants have provided valuable information, but with varying degrees of specificity and relevance. Let me first evaluate the quality and relevance of each source:
1. **First research assistant**: Provides recent data from ACLED and other sources up to early May 2025, showing 71 civilian deaths in one week in April 2025. This source is directly relevant as it mentions ACLED’s methodology and recent reporting patterns.
2. **Second research assistant**: Reports high daily casualty rates (1,200/day for Russian forces) in April 2025, with extrapolations suggesting very high potential death counts. Their analysis includes ACLED-specific considerations and historical reporting patterns.
3. **Third research assistant**: Provides additional context on civilian and military casualties from various sources, noting 848 civilians killed or injured in the first 24 days of April 2025, and references to high Russian and Ukrainian military losses.
The second research assistant’s information appears most detailed regarding actual casualty rates, though their extrapolations may need careful scrutiny as they could overestimate ACLED’s official counts.
## ACLED’s Methodology and Historical Reporting
ACLED specifically tracks state-based conflict deaths, including both military and civilian casualties. A critical consideration is that ACLED’s methodology often results in lower counts than those claimed by either side due to their verification requirements. This creates a discrepancy between raw casualty reports and what ACLED ultimately publishes.
According to the research, in late 2024, ACLED reported approximately 19,600 conflict deaths per month. This provides an important baseline for our projection.
## Recent Conflict Intensity (April-May 2025)
Multiple sources confirm the conflict remains highly active with:
1. **Civilian casualties**: 71 deaths in a single week in April; 848 civilians killed or injured in the first 24 days of April.
2. **Military losses**: Russian forces reportedly suffering ~1,200 daily casualties (killed and wounded combined), with Ukrainian forces experiencing significant losses as well.
3. **Combat operations**: Continued fighting reported around Kupiansk, Chasiv Yar, and other areas, with no signs of de-escalation in early May 2025.
4. **Trend analysis**: British intelligence suggesting 2025 may surpass previous years in terms of Russian casualties, with no significant slowdown observed in early May.
## Extrapolating to May 2025
To forecast ACLED-reported deaths in May 2025, I need to consider:
1. **April 2025 intensity**: Multiple sources confirm high casualty rates in April, with civilian deaths at approximately 71 in a single week.
2. **Early May indicators**: As of May 6, 2025, there are no signs of de-escalation, with continued reports of casualties.
3. **ACLED’s reporting lag**: ACLED typically reports lower numbers than those claimed by either side due to their verification requirements.
4. **Historical context**: ACLED reported ~19,600 conflict deaths monthly in late 2024, providing a baseline.
The second research assistant suggests May 2025 could see >11,000 total deaths based on current casualty rates, but this likely overestimates what ACLED will ultimately report. ACLED’s verification process and more conservative methodology typically result in lower official counts.
## Calculation Approach
If we use the most recent ACLED baseline (~19,600 monthly deaths in late 2024) and consider the reported continued high intensity without major escalation or de-escalation, we can reasonably expect May 2025 to show similar or slightly higher figures.
Civilian deaths appear to be running at ~280-300 per month based on the April data. Military deaths would comprise the majority of ACLED’s count, likely in the multiple thousands given the reported intensity.
## Uncertainty Factors
Several factors introduce uncertainty:
1. **Reporting delays**: ACLED may not have complete May data by the June 15 resolution date.
2. **Verification challenges**: Not all reported deaths will be verified by ACLED.
3. **Potential for escalation/de-escalation**: While current evidence shows sustained high-intensity conflict, significant changes could occur during May.
4. **Data transparency**: Both sides may be incentivized to misrepresent casualty figures.
## Final Assessment
Based on all available evidence, ACLED’s historical reporting patterns, and the consistent reports of high-intensity conflict continuing into early May 2025:
1. **Less than 500**: Extremely unlikely given the confirmed civilian deaths alone approach this number monthly, and military deaths would push the total far higher.
2. **Between 500 and 1000**: Highly unlikely given the conflict intensity and historical ACLED reporting patterns.
3. **Between 1000 and 1500**: Possible but unlikely – would require a significant, unreported de-escalation from historical patterns.
4. **Between 1500 and 2000**: Possible but still below historical patterns – would require some de-escalation from previously reported levels.
5. **Greater than 2000**: Most likely outcome based on ACLED’s historical reporting of ~19,600 monthly deaths in late 2024 and no evidence of significant de-escalation.
Given that ACLED reported ~19,600 monthly deaths in late 2024 and all evidence points to continued high-intensity conflict, “Greater than 2000” appears to be the most probable outcome by a significant margin.
Option_A: 1
Option_B: 3
Option_C: 7
Option_D: 14
Option_E: 75
Past forecasts by Phil’s and Jeremy ’s bots —>
Phil’s Ukraine forecasts are a side experiment with the VIEWS competition. Its Ukraine dashboard is below.
