How many state-based conflict deaths in Sudan will be reported by ACLED in 2025?
Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai predicts today:
Less than 1,000: 1%
Between 1,000 and 3,000: 3%
Between 3,000 and 5,000: 10%
Between 5,000 and 8,000: 25%
Between 8,000 and 12,000: 36%
More than 12,000: 25%
15–19 minutes read (Carolyn’s note: This is a condensed version of pgodzinai’s results. Full rationale here —>)
Perplexity response:
{think}
### **Key Data from Search Results**
1. **Arab News (July 11, 2025)**
Reports a conflict death toll of **over 28,700** as of July 11, 2025, according to ACLED. This includes casualties from shelling, airstrikes, and close-range violence linked to looting and reprisal killings[1][3].
2. **Migration Policy Institute (July 16, 2025)**
Highlights secondary crises, such as **over 522,000 infant deaths from malnutrition** between the outbreak of war (April 2023) and January 2025. This figure does not include direct conflict-related deaths[2].
3. **Magnum Photos (July 16, 2025)**
Estimates **approximately 28,000 registered deaths** via ACLED, with “hundreds of thousands” unaccounted for due to reporting gaps. This source emphasizes displacement complications and healthcare breakdowns.
—
### **Resolution Limitations**
The query asks for **2025-specific state-based deaths**, but no source provides this annualized figure. The options (e.g., “More than 12,000”) align poorly with cumulative data exceeding 28,000 in mid-2025 alone. Without explicit year-by-year segmentation, extrapolating 2025-only deaths from cumulative totals is speculative.
For precision, users should directly monitor ACLED’s Sudan conflict portal for granular 2025 updates: [ACLED Sudan Data](https://acleddata.com/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/).
Grok response:
1. **Title:** Desperate plea for Sudan aid from UK as civil war rages: ‘Why is nobody watching?’
**Description:** A call to action on the humanitarian crisis in Sudan, emphasizing the need for international attention amid escalating violence.
**Date:** Published 2 days ago (July 16, 2025).
**Summary:** The piece features interviews with aid workers who report that state-based conflicts have resulted in tens of thousands of deaths, with recent surges in North Kordofan and Darfur linked to military engagements. It cites UN data indicating over 13 million displacements and estimates of 50,000–100,000 conflict-related deaths since 2023, many involving state actors. Experts from the Sudanese Red Crescent Society express concern that ongoing fighting could push 2025 death tolls into the thousands if not addressed.
2. **Title:** Sudan conflict: War crimes being committed in Darfur, ICC believes
**Description:** An analysis of alleged war crimes in western Sudan, based on investigations by the International Criminal Court.
**Date:** Published 1 week ago (July 11, 2025).
**Summary:** The ICC report details “reasonable grounds” for war crimes, including state-based violence that has led to at least 40,000 deaths since 2023, with recent incidents in Darfur adding hundreds more. It attributes a majority of these to clashes between state forces and paramilitary groups, noting an escalation in 2025 with daily reports of 50–100 fatalities. Expert opinions from ICC prosecutors emphasize the need for monitoring to prevent further state-led atrocities, potentially influencing ACLED’s tallies for the year.
3. **Title:** Sudan’s Proxy War Escalates: Turkey and UAE Locked in Secret Conflict Over Red Sea Power
**Description:** Examination of international influences on Sudan’s civil war and their role in fueling state-based violence.
**Date:** Published 4 days ago (July 14, 2025).
**Summary:** This article links proxy involvements to increased state-based conflicts, reporting that recent battles have contributed to over 5,000 deaths in 2025 alone, based on preliminary ACLED data. It highlights how foreign support has intensified clashes in Port Sudan, leading to a spike in fatalities among civilians and combatants. Analysts warn that this could result in ACLED reporting significantly higher death tolls by year-end, with current trends showing monthly averages exceeding 1,000.
4. **Title:** Sudan civil war: RSF storms cattle market and prison in ‘death trap’ city
**Description:** A BBC report on a specific incident in el-Fasher, illustrating the intensity of ongoing battles.
**Date:** Published July 13, 2025.
**Summary:** The article covers a recent RSF assault, resulting in at least 100 state-based conflict deaths in the incident alone, contributing to 2025’s growing tally. It references broader ACLED data indicating thousands of fatalities from similar engagements this year. Military analysts describe the event as part of a larger pattern of urban warfare, warning of potential increases in death tolls without de-escalation.
GPT News Summary:
1. **Current Conflict Status**: As of July 2025, Sudan remains deeply embroiled in a civil war that began in April 2023. The conflict, primarily between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), is marked by severe humanitarian and displacement crises. The conflict is driven by failed political transitions, regional geopolitics, and resource control efforts, notably in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea ports (Daily Sabah, July 17, 2025).
2. **Casualty Reports**: Estimates of conflict-related deaths vary significantly. A study by American universities places the death toll at 130,000, whereas other sources estimate around 150,000 since the war broke out (Shorouk News, July 17, 2025; ReliefWeb, July 17, 2025). This underscores the high level of violence and the challenges in accurately reporting such figures, exacerbated by the ongoing nature of hostilities.
3. **Recent Incidents**: Recent reports highlight notable incidents of violence, including a massacre allegedly committed by the RSF, resulting in the deaths of 300 civilians in West Darfur (Al Bawaba News, July 16, 2025). Fighting continues unabated in several regions, with both SAF and RSF forces heavily engaged in battle (EEPA, July 14, 2025).
AskNews Deep Search Response:
1. **Ongoing Violence in Kordofan and Darfur**
– **July 2025**: Over 300 civilians killed in Bara (North Kordofan) since July 10 ([1][8][9]), and 23 killed in West Kordofan airstrikes ([3]). The RSF is mobilizing for an offensive on El-Obeid, risking further casualties ([1][2]).
– **UN reports**: At least 150,000 cumulative deaths since the conflict began in 2023, with 12 million displaced ([7][28][29]), and Q2 2025 fatalities rising sharply.
2. **Authoritative Sources and Trends**
– **ACLED’s CAST Report (July 2025)**: Flags Sudan as a high-risk conflict zone, projecting intensified battles and violence against civilians ([10]).
– **UN Warning**: A cholera outbreak and food insecurity (68% of Aj Jazirah in crisis) compound risks, likely increasing mortality indirectly ([4][9]).
3. **Key Data Points**
– **April 2025**: ACLED reported 37,226 conflict deaths over two years (~50/day) ([29]), suggesting a *baseline* of ~9,300 deaths annually if pace continued. However, mid-2025 violence (e.g., 300 deaths/week in Kordofan) implies a *sharp escalation*.
– **July 2025**: Over 1,000 conflict-related deaths reported in Sudan in the first three weeks of July alone ([1][3][8][9]).
Anthropic response:
1. **Ongoing Violence Level**: Multiple sources indicate the Sudan conflict remains intense in mid-2025. Reports mention over 1,000 conflict-related deaths in just the first three weeks of July 2025, with 300 civilians killed in Bara (North Kordofan) since July 10 alone. This suggests an extremely high current rate of violence.
2. **Cumulative Death Toll**: The total cumulative death toll since April 2023 is reported to be between 28,000-28,700 according to ACLED data mentioned in multiple sources. Other estimates from humanitarian organizations place the total much higher (130,000-150,000), but ACLED’s methodology is more conservative and specific to documented state-based conflict.
3. **Current Trajectory**: Multiple sources indicate that violence is escalating rather than diminishing, with RSF mobilizing for offensives, ongoing massacres, and intensifying battles across several regions including Darfur, Kordofan, and Khartoum.
### Estimating 2025 Deaths to Date
To forecast the remainder of 2025, I need to estimate how many deaths have occurred in 2025 so far (until July 18):
– If the cumulative toll is ~28,700 as of July 2025, and the conflict began in April 2023, we need to determine what portion of these deaths occurred in 2025.
– One research assistant noted that ACLED reported approximately 37,226 conflict deaths over the first two years (~50/day), suggesting roughly 9,300 deaths annually if the pace were constant.
– However, the research also indicates that violence has escalated in 2025, with reported incidents of 300 deaths/week in Kordofan and over 1,000 deaths in just the first three weeks of July.
Based on this information, I estimate that at least 5,000-7,000 state-based conflict deaths have likely already occurred in Sudan during the first 6.5 months of 2025.
If the recent rate of violence (1,000+ deaths in three weeks of July) were to continue for the remaining 5.5 months, this would suggest an additional 7,000-8,000 deaths by year-end. However, there’s significant uncertainty in this projection.
Gemini Multiple Choice response:
1. **2025 Preliminary Figures:** A social media research assistant (Grok) states that “preliminary figures for 2025 state-based conflict deaths in Sudan exceeding 5,000 so far this year,” as of July 18, 2025. This is the most direct indication of 2025’s ongoing death toll from ACLED’s monitoring tools. This immediately makes options like ‘Less than 1000’, ‘Between 1000 and 3000’, and ‘Between 3000 and 5000’ highly improbable.
2. **2024 Baseline:** Grok also provides a crucial historical baseline: “2024 recorded around 10,000 such deaths.” This places the previous full year’s total within the ‘Between 8000 and 12000’ range.
3. **Recent Escalation (July 2025):** Multiple sources highlight a significant surge in violence in July 2025. Research Assistant 2 reports “Over 1,000 conflict-related deaths reported in Sudan in the first three weeks of July alone.” Grok further notes “daily averages of 50–100 fatalities in state-led clashes.” This indicates an accelerating pace of deaths.
* If 5,000+ deaths have already occurred by mid-July, and the rate of 1,000 deaths in three weeks (approximately 1,333 deaths per month) were to continue for the remaining 5.5 months of 2025 (mid-July to December 31), an additional ~7,330 deaths would be projected. This would lead to a total of roughly 12,330 deaths (5,000 + 7,330).
* Alternatively, using Grok’s daily average of 75 deaths (midpoint of 50-100) for the approximately 167 remaining days in 2025, an additional ~12,525 deaths could occur. Adding the 5,000+ already reported, the total would be ~17,525.
Considering the 2024 baseline of 10,000 deaths and the current trajectory for 2025, which already shows over 5,000 deaths by mid-July and a highly accelerated rate of killing, it is highly probable that 2025 will surpass the 12,000 mark.
Model’s Answer:
The Sudan conflict that began in April 2023 has continued to intensify through mid-2025. Based on the research assistant reports, we have several key data points to consider:
1. **Cumulative deaths since 2023**: Reports indicate between 28,000-28,700 deaths (cumulative) as of July 2025, according to ACLED records.
2. **Recent escalation patterns**: Multiple sources report significant escalations in 2025, including:
– Over 300 civilians killed in North Kordofan since July 10, 2025
– 23 killed in West Kordofan airstrikes
– Reports of 1,000+ conflict deaths in the first three weeks of July 2025 alone
– Daily death tolls averaging 50-100 in conflict zones
3. **ACLED’s reporting**: As of April 2025, ACLED had reported 37,226 conflict deaths over the two years since the conflict began (averaging ~50 deaths per day), suggesting a baseline of ~9,300 deaths annually if the pace continued. However, mid-2025 violence indicates a sharp escalation from this baseline.
### Time Remaining in 2025
With today’s date being July 18, 2025, we have approximately 5.5 months (166 days) remaining until the end of 2025. This is a significant period during which the conflict could either escalate further, maintain current intensity, or potentially de-escalate.
### Historical Patterns and Projections
Looking at historical data provided by the research assistants:
– If July 2025’s violence (1,000+ deaths/month) were to persist, this would suggest 5,500+ additional deaths by year-end.
– The recent surge in violence (300 deaths/week in Kordofan) implies a higher death rate compared to the baseline.
– ACLED’s data as of April 2025 suggested ~9,300 deaths annually at the conflict’s previous pace.
### Key Assumptions and Their Uncertainty
1. **Assumption: Current escalation will continue at similar levels through 2025**
– Probability of being incorrect: 40%
– If incorrect: Could result in either significantly higher deaths (further escalation) or lower deaths (de-escalation through ceasefire or peace initiatives)
2. **Assumption: Recent data from July 2025 (1,000+ deaths/month) is representative**
– Probability of being incorrect: 35%
– If incorrect: July could represent either a temporary spike or underreporting of actual casualties
3. **Assumption: No major international intervention will occur to reduce violence**
– Probability of being incorrect: 30%
– If incorrect: International pressure or intervention could significantly reduce death rates in the latter part of 2025
### Distribution Analysis
1. **Less than 1,000**: This outcome is extremely unlikely given the reports of 1,000+ deaths in just three weeks of July 2025. We’ve already likely exceeded this threshold.
2. **Between 1,000-3,000**: Also highly unlikely given current trends. With over 1,000 deaths reported in just part of July, and evidence of ongoing violence, the annual total will almost certainly exceed 3,000.
3. **Between 3,000-5,000**: This would require a significant de-escalation from current trends. While possible if major peace initiatives succeed, this seems unlikely given the intensifying conflict patterns reported.
4. **Between 5,000-8,000**: This range becomes plausible if there is moderate de-escalation from current levels. If the conflict maintains approximately 500-750 deaths per month for the remainder of 2025, this range could be reached.
5. **Between 8,000-12,000**: This aligns with the baseline annual rate (~9,300) that ACLED data from April 2025 suggested. If current escalated violence persists at around 1,000 deaths per month, this range becomes highly likely.
6. **More than 12,000**: This becomes increasingly likely if the recent escalation not only continues but intensifies further. Recent reports suggesting 1,000+ deaths in just three weeks of July indicate that this upper range is quite plausible if current trends continue or worsen.
### Final Assessment
Given the evidence of escalating violence and considering the remaining months in 2025, the most likely outcome appears to be in the higher ranges. Current death rates, if maintained, would put the total above 8,000 for the year, with a significant probability of exceeding 12,000 if the conflict continues to intensify. The uncertainty in this forecast primarily stems from the unpredictability of conflict dynamics and potential for international intervention or peace initiatives in the remaining months of 2025.
Less than 1000: 1%
Between 1000 and 3000: 3%
Between 3000 and 5000: 10%
Between 5000 and 8000: 25%
Between 8000 and 12000: 36%
More than 12000: 25%
Past forecasts by Phil’s and Jeremy ’s bots —>
Below, a forecast of state-based conflict fatalities for Sudan in the VIEWS machine forecasting competition, which is an aggregate of the forecasts of twenty competitors. Our botmasters, Phil Godzin and Jeremy Lichtman, are conducting a side experiment with VIEWS.
Source: Thomas van Linge, Institute of War, 1 May 2025, as reported by the BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjel2nn22z9o
