How many state-based conflict deaths in Sudan will be reported by ACLED in 2025?
Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai predicts today:
Less than 1,000: 1%
Between 1,000 and 3,000: 4%
Between 3,000 and 5,000: 25%
Between 5,000 and 8,000: 45%
Between 8,000 and 12,000: 20%
More than 12,000: 5%
12–15 minutes read (This is a condensed version of pgodzinai’s results.Full rationale here —>)
Perplexity response:
## Citation Analysis
** Arab News – UN Report on Civilian Killings (September 26, 2025)**
*Significant rise in civilian killings in Sudan war this year, says UN*
Published: September 26, 2025
The UN Human Rights Office reported at least 3,384 civilians killed between January and June 2025, representing nearly 80% of all civilian casualties documented in 2024. The majority of deaths resulted from artillery shelling, air strikes, and drone attacks in densely populated areas, particularly during RSF offensives. This data shows a dramatic acceleration in civilian casualties compared to the previous year.
** Arab News – El Fasher Mosque Attack (September 26, 2025)**
*Paramilitary drone attack on a mosque in Sudan kills at least 70*
Published: September 26, 2025
Reports detail ongoing RSF attacks in El Fasher with over 400 civilians killed since April 10, 2025, including a major offensive that captured the Zamzam displacement camp. The RSF has conducted summary executions, sexual violence, and attacks on civilians in bomb shelters. Healthcare remains largely inaccessible under the siege conditions in El Fasher.
** Critical Threats Project – Sudan Conflict Analysis (September 25, 2025)**
*DRC Ceasefire Collapse; Turkish Troops To Niger; El Fasher On The Brink*
Published: September 25, 2025
Analysis indicates RSF’s potential capture of El Fasher would consolidate control over nearly all of Darfur region. References RSF’s campaign against Massalit ethnic group from April-November 2023 that killed thousands, with UN estimates reaching 15,000 killed. The US declared RSF committed genocide against the Massalit in January 2025, indicating escalating international recognition of atrocities.
## Key Trends and Current Status
The available data shows a significant escalation in conflict-related deaths in Sudan during 2025. The UN reported 3,384 civilian deaths in just the first six months, which already approaches 80% of the total civilian casualties documented for all of 2024. This suggests a dramatic acceleration in the intensity of the conflict.
## Major Conflict Zones and Patterns
**El Fasher Siege**: The ongoing siege of El Fasher has been a major driver of casualties, with over 400 civilians killed since April 10, 2025]. The RSF’s assault on the Zamzam displacement camp resulted in over 1,500 civilian deaths according to reports.
**Darfur Region**: The majority of documented civilian deaths occurred in Darfur, where ethnic violence has intensified significantly[1]. The RSF’s targeting of non-Arab communities has continued the pattern established in 2023 when their campaign against the Massalit ethnic group killed thousands.
**Important Note**: The search results do not contain current ACLED data specifically, which is the authoritative source for the resolution criteria. The UN civilian casualty figures represent a different methodology and scope than ACLED’s state-based conflict death reporting. ACLED typically includes combatant deaths and uses different verification standards than UN human rights reporting.
## Trajectory Assessment
The conflict shows no signs of de-escalation through September 2025. The ongoing siege of El Fasher, continued ethnic targeting in Darfur, and sustained military operations suggest high casualty rates will likely continue through the remainder of 2025. The January 2025 US declaration of genocide against the Massalit indicates international recognition of the conflict’s severity[4].
Grok response:
**Title:** Ethnically-driven killings in Sudan’s war have jumped this year, UN says | Reuters
**Description:** A Reuters analysis of the rise in civilian deaths in Sudan, attributed to ethnic violence and state-based conflicts.
**Date of Publication:** 2025-09-19
**Three-Sentence Summary:** The article reports a significant increase in civilian killings in Sudan during the first half of 2025, with the UN documenting at least 3,384 deaths, mostly in Darfur. It attributes this surge to ethnic violence and indiscriminate attacks by state actors, which could factor into ACLED’s state-based conflict tallies. The piece highlights expert warnings from UN human rights officials about the potential for further escalation, underscoring the need for monitoring through sources like ACLED.
**Title:** More than 70 killed in attack by Sudan paramilitary in al-Fashir, Sovereignty Council says | Reuters
**Description:** A Reuters report on a specific incident of violence in Sudan, illustrating the ongoing state-based conflicts.
**Date of Publication:** 2025-09-19
**Three-Sentence Summary:** This article documents a drone strike by Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces that killed over 70 people in al-Fashir, highlighting state-based actors’ roles in the violence. It connects this event to the broader trend of rising deaths, with UN estimates suggesting thousands more in 2025. The report underscores recent updates that could contribute to ACLED’s year-end tally, emphasizing the conflict’s intensity in Darfur.
**Title:** Sudan Conflict Civilian Deaths Spike, UN Reports – (from posts found on X)
**Description:** A summary of sentiment from posts on X regarding UN data on Sudan’s conflict deaths, reflecting public and expert discussions.
**Date of Publication:** Approximately 2025-09-23 (based on aggregated posts)
**Three-Sentence Summary:** Posts on X discuss UN reports of 3,384 civilian deaths in the first half of 2025, portraying Sudan as a site of one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. They highlight the rapid increase in violence and its implications for state-based conflicts, often referencing ACLED for tracking. While these posts express concern and cite expert opinions, they are inconclusive and should be viewed alongside verified sources like UN reports.
**Title:** The UN human rights office reported a sharp rise in civilian deaths in Sudan – (from posts found on X)
**Description:** Aggregated X posts summarizing UN findings on Sudan’s conflict escalation.
**Date of Publication:** Approximately 2025-09-20
**Three-Sentence Summary:** Posts on X highlight the UN’s report of at least 3,384 fatalities in the first half of 2025, linking them to state-based actors and predicting further rises. They incorporate expert opinions on the humanitarian fallout, including displacement affecting millions. While useful for context, these posts are inconclusive and should be cross-referenced with official sources like ACLED for accurate data.
Extracted resolution criteria links:
[‘https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2025/sudan/’, ‘https://acleddata.com/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/’]
GPT Multiple Choice JSON response:
As of late September 2025 there are multiple corroborating signals that 2025 is a high‑fatality year in Sudan: (a) the UN reported ~3,384 civilian deaths Jan–Jun 2025 (Reuters/UN reporting mid‑Sept 2025); (b) ACLED’s 2025 watchlist and dashboard referenced in our research show Sudan totals already in the multiple‑thousands by mid‑September (research assistant noted ACLED >3,500 state‑based fatalities as of mid‑Sept); and (c) intense, concentrated campaigns (e.g., Darfur / El Fasher sieges, RSF offensives, drone/air strikes, and mass attacks on displacement camps) continued through Q3 and into Q4 2025. ACLED historically recorded very large totals in 2023–2024 (the visualization we reviewed showed total fatalities for 2024 on the order of ~24k and state‑based fatalities for 2024 roughly 11–12k), so the baseline for 2025 is already high.
Calibration and uncertainty
I deliberately avoid extreme certainty. ACLED numbers can be revised upward with late reporting or downward if classification changes; conflict trajectories can change quickly. The probabilities above reflect those uncertainties and place most weight on the plausible continuation of mid‑2025 trends through year‑end.
Final probabilities
Less than 1,000: 1%%
Between 1,000 and 3,000: 2%
Between 3,000 and 5,000: 15%
Between 5,000 and 8,000: 45%
Between 8,000 and 12,000: 25%
More than 12,000: 12%
(Carolyn‘s note: Anthropic’s response was identical to “Model’s Answer” below, so I edited it out.)
Model’s Answer:
The most critical data comes from the ACLED screenshots and social media research indicating that ACLED has already recorded over 3,500 state-based conflict deaths through mid-September 2025. This provides a solid baseline for the minimum expected total. However, there’s important context from the 2024 data showing 24,850 total fatalities with state forces involved in approximately 11,000-12,000 of those deaths, representing roughly 45-50% of all conflict deaths.
The UN data, while not directly from ACLED, provides corroborating evidence of conflict intensity with 3,384 civilian deaths in just the first half of 2025. This represents nearly 80% of all civilian casualties documented in 2024, indicating significant escalation. The ongoing siege of El Fasher has produced over 400 civilian deaths since April alone, with reports of continued RSF offensives and ethnic violence particularly in Darfur.
The historical ACLED data shows a dramatic escalation pattern: from around 900 fatalities in 2022 to approximately 16,000 in 2023, then 24,850 in 2024. If we apply the state-based proportion (45-50%) to these totals, 2024 likely saw 11,000-12,000 state-based conflict deaths. The current 2025 data suggesting over 3,500 deaths by mid-September indicates we’re on track for a lower total than 2024, but still significantly elevated compared to pre-2023 levels.
Extrapolating from the current data requires careful consideration. If ACLED has recorded approximately 3,500 state-based deaths through mid-September (roughly 260 days into the year), this suggests a daily average of about 13.5 deaths. Projecting this rate through December 31 (105 more days) would add approximately 1,400 deaths, yielding a total around 4,900. However, this assumes constant intensity, which may not hold given seasonal patterns and the ongoing El Fasher siege.
The conflict shows no signs of de-escalation. The US declaration of genocide in January 2025, continued RSF offensives, and the potential fall of El Fasher all suggest sustained or potentially escalating violence through year-end. The September reports of drone strikes killing 70+ people in single incidents indicate the capacity for mass casualty events remains high.
Three critical assumptions that could drastically alter this forecast:
1. **The mid-September ACLED figure of “over 3,500” is accurate and represents approximately 3,500-3,800 deaths** (80% confidence in accuracy). If this baseline is significantly higher (say 4,500+), it would push the total toward higher brackets. The vague phrasing “over 3,500” introduces uncertainty.
2. **The conflict maintains roughly current intensity through Q4 2025** (70% confidence). Historical patterns show Q4 often sees escalation due to dry season military operations. If violence escalates significantly as suggested by the El Fasher situation, deaths could spike. Conversely, international pressure or exhaustion could reduce intensity.
3. **ACLED’s methodology and coverage remain consistent with previous years** (85% confidence). Changes in data collection, verification standards, or geographic coverage could affect reported numbers. The 2024 spike might partly reflect improved reporting rather than just increased violence.
Given the confirmed baseline of over 3,500 deaths through mid-September and the need to account for the remaining quarter of the year, the most likely outcome falls in the 5,000-8,000 range. This accounts for continued violence at current rates plus some potential escalation. The 3,000-5,000 range is possible if violence decreases or if the current count is closer to 3,500 and Q4 sees minimal activity. The 8,000-12,000 range becomes plausible if there’s significant Q4 escalation or if current totals are already higher than reported. The extreme brackets (under 3,000 or over 12,000) are highly unlikely given the existing data.
The distribution should center on 5,000-8,000 with significant probability mass, moderate weight on adjacent brackets, and minimal probability on the extremes. This reflects both the data constraints from having 75% of the year complete and the uncertainty in exact current totals and Q4 trajectory.
Less than 1,000: 1%
Between 1,000 and 3,000: 4%
Between 3,000 and 5,000: 25%
Between 5,000 and 8,000: 45%
Between 8,000 and 12,000: 20%
More than 12,000: 5%
Past forecasts by Phil’s and Jeremy ’s bots —>
Below, a forecast of state-based conflict fatalities for Sudan in the VIEWS machine forecasting competition, which is an aggregate of the forecasts of twenty competitors. Our botmasters, Phil Godzin and Jeremy Lichtman, are conducting a side experiment with VIEWS.
