How many state-based conflict deaths will be reported by ACLED for the month of May 2025?
Here’s what Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai predicts today:
Model’s Answer:
Final Probability Distribution:
Less than 100: 10%
Between 100 and 250: 45%
Between 250 and 500: 30%
Between 500 and 1000: 12%
Greater than 1000: 3%
Perplexity response:
{think}
Okay, let’s tackle this question step by step. The user wants to know the number of state-based conflict deaths in Syria reported by ACLED for May 2025. The possible options are ‘Less than 100’, ‘Between 100 and 250’, ‘Between 250 and 500’, ‘Between 500 and 1000’, or ‘Greater than 1000’. The background mentions using the provided link as a source for the latest updates.
First, I need to check the search results provided. Let’s look through each source to find relevant information about Syria in the context of conflict deaths, especially around May 2025 or recent data that could indicate a trend.
Starting with the first result from ACLED’s website (search result [1]), it mentions the 2025 Conflict Watchlist and the Middle East Crisis, including Syria. However, the content here is more about identifying crisis areas rather than specific death tolls. The page also refers to the Conflict Index for December 2024, which might have data from the previous year but not specifically May 2025.
Search result [2] is a Telegraph article from May 22, 2025. It states that the Middle East, including the Gaza conflict, hasn’t reached the death tolls seen a decade ago during the Syrian civil war’s peak. It also compares Ukraine’s high death toll in 2024 to Myanmar’s fragmented conflict. This suggests that while conflicts in the Middle East are escalating, Syria’s current death toll might not be as high as past peaks. However, it doesn’t provide specific numbers for May 2025.
Moving to search result [3], ACLED’s press and media page mentions recent events in Lebanon but doesn’t give data on Syria. Search result [4] includes analysis on Syria, specifically mentioning that after HTS forces took over Damascus in December 2024, Israeli airstrikes reached an all-time high. The article from December 19, 2024, notes the fall of the Assad regime and increased Israeli military activity. However, this is four months prior to May 2025, so it’s not the latest data.
Search result [5] discusses Mexico’s security situation, ranking Mexico fourth in the ACLED Conflict Index. It mentions Syria as third, but again, this is from December 2024 data, not May 2025.
The user provided a specific URL in the background (https://acleddata.com/2025/03/14/q-a-what-happened-in-the-coastal-region-of-syria-last-week/), but unfortunately, that link isn’t included in the search results. Without access to that specific page, I have to rely on the provided search results.
Given that the latest mention of Syria in the search results is from December 2024, which is several months before May 2025, there’s no direct data for May 2025. However, we can infer trends. The Telegraph article from May 22, 2025, states that while the Middle East has seen rising fatalities due to the Gaza conflict, Syria’s death toll isn’t expected to match past peaks. This suggests that Syria’s conflict, while active, may not have reached the high numbers seen in previous years.
Additionally, the ACLED Conflict Index from December 2024 ranks Syria as the third most dangerous country. However, the index uses a broader assessment including factors beyond just death tolls, like geographic diffusion and group fragmentation. Even though Syria is ranked high, the specific death tolls in May 2025 aren’t provided.
Considering that the user’s background link isn’t accessible, and the most recent info is from December 2024 and May 2025 (Telegraph article), which doesn’t give exact figures, we have to look at the available data. The absence of recent specific death tolls for May 2025 in the search results means we can’t cite exact numbers. However, historical context from the provided sources indicates that Syria’s conflict has been intense but perhaps not reaching the highest tiers in death tolls compared to other regions like Myanmar or Ukraine.
The options given are ranges. If we consider that in 2024, Ukraine had over 67,000 deaths but ranked lower due to less fragmentation, and Myanmar with fewer deaths but more fragmentation ranks higher, Syria’s position as third in December 2024’s index (from search result [5]) suggests a high level of conflict. However, without specific 2025 data, we have to infer that if the trend continues, Syria’s state-based conflict deaths in May 2025 might fall under a higher range. But the Telegraph article mentions that despite rising fatalities in the Middle East, experts don’t anticipate reaching past peaks. This could imply that the death tolls are increasing but not astronomically high, possibly staying in the mid to higher ranges.
But since the user’s question is about May 2025, and the latest data we have is from December 2024 and May 2025 (Telegraph), which doesn’t provide exact numbers, the answer has to be based on the available information. The lack of specific data points makes it challenging. However, given that Syria is ranked third in the ACLED Conflict Index and the ongoing conflict, it’s possible that the death tolls could be in the mid to higher ranges. But the Telegraph article’s note that the Middle East’s death tolls aren’t expected to reach past peaks (like Syria’s civil war) suggests that even with increased activity, the numbers might not exceed certain thresholds.
Taking all this into account, and considering that the most recent info (May 2025) doesn’t provide exact figures but indicates ongoing conflict with possible escalation, the safest bet is to consider the higher ranges. However, without explicit data, it’s speculative. The user’s options require choosing between ranges, so based on Syria’s ranking and the mention of ongoing conflict, perhaps the answer leans towards the higher end, but given the ambiguity, the most cautious approach is to consider that without recent data, it’s hard to say. But since the user wants a forecast, the assistant must provide the best possible guess using available info.
Looking at the ACLED data up to December 2024, Syria was third. If the conflict continued into 2025 with similar intensity, the death tolls could be substantial. However, the Telegraph article from May 22, 2025, mentions that the Middle East’s death tolls aren’t reaching past peaks, which could mean that even with current conflicts, the numbers are lower than historical highs. Given that, the death toll for May 2025 might be in the higher ranges but not exceeding 1000. But this is speculative.
In the absence of precise data, the answer must rely on the available sources. Since the latest info doesn’t specify May 2025 numbers, the answer must state that there’s insufficient data but provide analysis based on trends. However, the user is a superforecaster, so they need the best possible context. The answer should highlight that recent reports indicate ongoing conflict in Syria but lack specific May 2025 figures, leading to a cautious estimate likely in the mid to higher ranges.
**Relevant Context for May 2025 State-Based Conflict Deaths in Syria**
1. **ACLED 2025 Conflict Watchlist** (May 16, 2025)
– Identifies Syria as part of the Middle East crisis area, though specific May 2025 data isn’t provided. Focuses on complex crises rather than death tolls[1].
– Previous ACLED data (December 2024) ranks Syria third in global conflict danger due to factors like geographic diffusion and armed group fragmentation[1][5].
2. **Telegraph Report on Global Conflict Trends** (May 22, 2025)
– Notes rising fatalities in the Middle East due to the Gaza conflict but states experts don’t anticipate death tolls reaching levels seen during Syria’s civil war peak[2].
– Highlights ACLED’s methodology considering civilian impact, fragmentation, and geographic spread—not just death counts. Syria’s conflict is intensifying but lacks clarity on May 2025 figures[2].
3. **ACLED Analysis of Syria** (December 19, 2024)
– Reports all-time high Israeli airstrikes in Syria post-Assad regime fall, indicating escalated state-based violence. However, this data is from late 2024, not May 2025[4].
4. **Mexico’s ACLED Conflict Index Ranking** (December 2024)
– Syria ranked third (behind Myanmar and Palestine) in ACLED’s December 2024 index. While death tolls are a factor, Syria’s ranking reflects broader metrics like civilian danger and conflict diffusion[5].
5. **South Sudan and Somalia Trends** (January 31, 2025)
– Demonstrates ACLED’s focus on regional violence patterns, but no Syria-specific data[4].
—
**Key Observations**
– **No Direct May 2025 Data**: Available sources (up to May 22, 2025) don’t specify state-based conflict deaths in Syria for May.
– **Trend Indicators**:
– **Ongoing Escalation**: Israeli airstrikes in Syria reached record levels by late 2024, suggesting sustained state-based violence[4].
– **Regional Context**: Middle East fatalities are rising (e.g., Gaza), but Syria’s toll is unlikely to match civil war-era peaks[2].
– **Conflict Fragmentation**: Syria’s lower ranking compared to Myanmar (higher fragmentation) implies state-based deaths may be significant but not at the highest tier[2][5].
—
**Conclusion**
While exact May 2025 figures are unavailable, ACLED’s December 2024 ranking and ongoing military activity suggest state-based conflict deaths in Syria could fall into **higher ranges** (e.g., 500–1,000), but historical comparisons caution against assuming peak levels[2][4][5]. The absence of recent granular data limits precision.
AskNews Deep Search Response:
Based on available data through May 22, 2025, here is the most relevant context for forecasting ACLED’s Syrian state-based conflict deaths in May 2025:
**Key Citations**
1️⃣ **[1]** – *Global conflicts reach highest level since WWII, data reveals* (May 22, 2025)
– Syria’s conflict death toll has not spiked significantly since the Syrian civil war’s peak, per ACLED founder Clionadh Raleigh. Middle East violence remains below earlier highs.
2️⃣ **[3]** – *UN Envoy warns of Syria’s “conflict renewal” risks* (May 21, 2025)
– Geir Pedersen highlights unresolved sectarian tensions (e.g., Alawite attacks in March, Druze violence in April), noting ongoing risks of escalation.
3️⃣ **[6]** – *U.S. warns of Syria’s potential “full-scale civil war”* (May 21, 2025)
– Over 100 deaths in March/April clashes, including 900 Alawite civilians killed in March and Damascus-Druze violence in April. Sectarian strife persists despite transitional government claims.
4️⃣ **[10]** – *UN Commission: Fragile Syria peace at risk* (May 2, 2025)
– Report cites >100 deaths in late April sectarian clashes in Damascus suburbs/Sweida, driven by social media-fueled hate speech.
5️⃣ **[15]** – *Sectarian violence resurges in Damascus region* (May 1, 2025)
– 40 Druze combatants killed in Sweida ambushes, 30 security forces dead in Jaramana/Sahnaya.
**Recent Patterns (May 2025)**
– **Early May**: Violence between Druze militias and security forces persists, with localized clashes (e.g., 3 deaths in Sweida on May 20 [7]). No large-scale offensives reported.
– **Sectarian Dynamics**: Post-Assad governance struggles to contain factions. ACLED’s March 2025 Q&A noted coastal region instability but no nationwide escalation [Resolution Criteria link].
**Limitations**
– No **May 2025 ACLED report** is publicly cited yet (as of May 22).
– Conflict remains fragmented; deaths are concentrated in hotspots (Damascus suburbs, Sweida) rather than nationwide.
**Key Inference**
Recent trends (low triple-digit monthly deaths) and ACLED’s historical data suggest fatalities in May 2025 are most likely **”Between 100 and 250″**, contingent on localized flare-ups. Early May clashes (3–40 deaths per incident) and the absence of large battles or ISIS resurgence (as in 2017–2019) reduce likelihood of exceeding 1,000.
[1][3][6][10][15]
GPT News Summary:
Given the recent dynamics in Syria and the broader region, here’s a concise rundown to help forecast state-based conflict deaths in Syria for May 2025 as likely to be reported by ACLED:
1. **Current Status of Violence in Syria:**
– Recent news indicates a decline in armed confrontations in northern Syria following a peace deal between the Syrian interim government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) [ACLED Regional Overview, May 9, 2025].
– However, there are rising sectarian tensions in southern Syria between the government and Druze militias, suggesting localized conflicts may still contribute to casualties [ACLED Regional Overview, May 9, 2025].
2. **Historical Context of Violence:**
– While the global conflict death toll is notably high, the Middle East, including Syria, has not experienced a significant increase in death tolls since the peak of the Syrian civil war [Global Conflicts Reach Highest Level Since WWII, May 22, 2025].
– The escalation of violence in Syria’s coastal regions was significant earlier in the year, with reports of over 1,300 deaths, including massive civilian casualties due to clashes and sectarian violence [March 2025 sources: SOHR, WHO, UN].
3. **Recent Incidents:**
– Syrian authorities intercepted weapons intended for Lebanon, indicating potential spillover of violence and arms trade in the region [Syrian Authorities Seize Weapons, May 20, 2025].
– Reports of ongoing military engagements by external forces, such as Israeli operations targeting influence in Syria, contribute to the complexity of the conflict environment [ACLED Regional Overview, March 2025].
4. **Civilian Impact and Casualties:**
– Explosive violence, identified as a major cause of civilian casualties, was noted to increase by 60% globally in 2024. This underscores the potential for significant harm if explosive weapons are used in populated Syrian areas [Civilian Casualties from Explosive Weapons Rise, May 22, 2025].
– Syria remains one of the countries heavily affected by explosive weapons, with damage to civilian infrastructure, including hospitals and schools [EWIPA-Monitor 2024, May 21, 2025].
5. **Current Forecasting Indicators:**
– Despite localized de-escalations in parts of Syria, ongoing sectarian tensions and external military interests suggest that violence could still result in significant casualties in May 2025.
– Escalations or new fronts of violence may arise due to geopolitical tensions, such as those involving neighboring countries, proxy battles, and international military objectives in the region.
Overall, while certain areas in Syria have seen peace agreements that may reduce violence, other persistent regional tensions and external dynamics could lead to a notable number of state-based conflict deaths as reported by ACLED for May 2025.
Model’s Answer:
.
Final Probability Distribution:
Less than 100: 10
Between 100 and 250: 45
Between 250 and 500: 30
Between 500 and 1000: 12
Greater than 1000: 3
=== Reasoning ===
All Predictions:
[{‘Less than 100’: 0.2, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.35, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.25, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.15, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.05},
{‘Less than 100’: 0.07, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.33, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.36, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.19, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.05},
{‘Less than 100’: 0.15, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.45, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.25, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.1, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.05},
{‘Less than 100’: 0.1, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.45, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.3, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.12, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.03},
{‘Less than 100’: 0.15, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.45, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.25, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.1, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.05},
{‘Less than 100’: 0.3, ‘Between 100 and 250’: 0.45, ‘Between 250 and 500’: 0.2, ‘Between 500 and 1000’: 0.04, ‘Greater than 1000’: 0.01}]
Median Reasoning:
EXTRACTED_PROBABILITIES: [10, 45, 30, 12, 3]
Model’s Answer:
Final Probability Distribution:
Less than 100: 10%
Between 100 and 250: 45%
Between 250 and 500: 30%
Between 500 and 1000: 12%
Greater than 1000: 3%
Complete details from today’s pgodzinai’s forecasting run –>
Past forecasts by Phil’s and Jeremy ’s bots —>
Below, a forecast of state-based conflict fatalities for Syria in the VIEWS machine forecasting competition, which is an aggregate of the forecasts of twenty competitors. Our botmasters, Phil Godzin and Jeremy Lichtman, are conducting a side experiment with VIEWS.
