How many state-based conflict deaths in Syria will be reported by ACLED for the month of July, 2025?
Here’s what Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai predicts today:
Less than 100: 1%
Between 100 and 250: 3%
Between 250 and 500: 8%
Between 500 and 1,000: 28%
Greater than 1,000: 60%
15–19 minutes read (Carolyn’s note: This is a condensed version of pgodzinai’s results. Full rationale here —>)
Perplexity response:
{think}
Okay, let’s tackle this question about how many state-based conflict deaths ACLED will report in Syria for July 2025.
**Citations and Key Details**
1. **ReliefWeb: Updated Figures on Suwaida Violence (July 18)**
– Reports 321+ deaths ( includings 6 children, 9 women) as of July 13.
– Documents clashes in Suwaida Governorate involving Druze militias and regime forces[1].
– Source: Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR)[1].
2. **ACLED Expert Comment on Israeli Campaign (July 18)**
– Details Israel’s strikes in Suwaida, Daraa, and Damascus.
– Notes intercommunal violence surge in Suwaida, with “hundreds killed” in initial clashes[2].
– Mentions UN reports of summary executions by regime-linked forces[2].
3. **Daily Sun: South Syria Violence Update (July 24)**
– Reports UN figure of 1,000+ deaths and 128,000 displaced.
– Attributes calm restoration post-violence, with focus on southern Syria[4].
– Mentions July 21 as the cutoff for this data[4].
AskNews Deep Search Response:
To assess state-based conflict deaths in Syria for July 2025, **the most recent and critical data points focus on sectarian violence in Sweida province** beginning July 13, with key ACLED-relevant updates from authoritative and recent sources (July 9–24, 2025):
### 1. **Sweida Province Conflict Dynamics**
– **Over 1,000 fatalities** reported in Druze-Bedouin clashes in Sweida between July 13–23, per multiple NGOs and media outlets. Ceasefire agreements ([12][19]) were repeatedly violated, leading to sustained high casualties [5][8][16].
– Syrian government forces intervened, suffering casualties and engaging in armed clashes, making this a state-involved conflict [16][21].
### 2. **Key Citations and Statistics**
1. **[5] Le Monde (July 23):** Over 1,000 deaths in Sweida since July 13, per transitional government investigations.
2. **[8] France 24 (July 22):** 1,000+ deaths attributed to sectarian fighting and Israeli airstrikes, displacing 93,000 people.
3. **[11] ReliefWeb (July 21):** 1,120 deaths reported since July 13, with displacement of 92,600 people.
4. **[16] ga.de (July 19):** 940 total fatalities in Sweida by mid-July, including 406 deaths in the province.
### 3. **Ceasefire Impact and Trends**
– A ceasefire announced July 18 ([11][12]) temporarily reduced violence, but clashes resumed before month-end [13][23]. Local sources indicate fatalities continued to accumulate into late July [5][8].
GPT News Summary:
Here is a concise and detailed rundown of the most relevant news regarding state-based conflict deaths in Syria as of late July 2025:
1. **Sectarian Violence and Clashes in Coastal Syria**:
– Recent reports indicate that over 1,426 people were killed in sectarian violence in the coastal regions of Latakia and Tartus in March 2025. These incidents have been attributed to a large-scale attack by approximately 200,000 non-government-affiliated armed fighters. The violence was motivated by revenge rather than ideological reasons (Al Jazeera, July 22, 2025; Daily Sabah, July 22, 2025; AA, July 22, 2025).
– The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that between July 13 and now, 1,265 people have been killed in Syria, suggesting ongoing conflict despite a ceasefire (Rojeva Kurd, July 22, 2025).
2. **Ongoing Conflict and Tension in Northern and Western Syria**:
– Despite the ceasefire, hostilities have resumed, particularly with drone bombings reported in the city of Shehba, resulting in civilian casualties (Rojeva Kurd, July 22, 2025).
– Sectarian violence remains a concern, as indicated by a recent attack on a church, killing at least 25 civilians (ReliefWeb, July 7, 2025).
3. **Internal Reports and Government Reactions**:
– A Syrian investigation committee has issued a final report, emphasizing a lack of conclusive evidence but recommending systematic reforms and further investigations into the March violence. The report calls for legal reforms and reparations for victims (Haberler, July 22, 2025).
– The Syrian government has vowed to prevent future violations, suggesting an increased focus on national dialogue and social cohesion (Arab48, July 20, 2025).
4. **Humanitarian Concerns and Responses**:
– Human Rights Watch and international organizations have raised concerns about abuses and the potential for permanent displacement due to ongoing violence (WSLS, July 22, 2025; AA, July 22, 2025).
– The Syrian Arab Red Crescent is actively working on evacuations and providing aid amidst continued violence in southern Sweida province (WSLS, July 22, 2025).
This information underscores a continuation of violence and instability in Syria, with a complex mix of sectarianism, revenge-driven attacks, and government efforts to manage the aftermath of significant past incidents. The data from these reports and monitoring suggest that conflict-related fatalities are expected to continue, impacting the number of deaths that ACLED might report for July 2025.
Extracted resolution criteria links:
[‘https://acleddata.com/2025/03/14/q-a-what-happened-in-the-coastal-region-of-syria-last-week/‘]
Anthropic response:
## Current Situation Assessment
Based on the research assistants’ reports, there is an ongoing serious conflict in Syria as of July 2025, with particular intensity in Suwaida (also spelled Sweida) province. This conflict appears to involve multiple parties, including Syrian government forces, Druze militias, Bedouin groups, and possibly other actors. The conflict escalated significantly starting around July 13, 2025.
Multiple sources provide casualty estimates, with varying figures:
– The Syrian Network for Human Rights reported at least 321 deaths as of July 13
– One research assistant cites reports of 940 fatalities in Sweida by mid-July
– Several sources, including Le Monde (July 23) and France 24 (July 22), report over 1,000 deaths
– ReliefWeb (July 21) cites 1,120 deaths since July 13
– Another research assistant mentions 1,265 deaths reported by SOHR between July 13 and July 22
A ceasefire was reportedly announced around July 18, but reports indicate it was violated and violence continued.
## Time Period Analysis
Today is July 24, 2025, and we’re predicting the total for the month of July 2025. This means:
1. We have data up to approximately July 22-23 from various sources
2. There are 7-8 days remaining in the month
3. The conflict appears to be ongoing despite ceasefire attempts
## Key Uncertainties
1. **ACLED’s Classification Methodology**: What portion of the reported deaths will ACLED classify as “state-based” rather than communal or other categories? If the majority of deaths are from Druze-Bedouin fighting without direct state involvement, ACLED might report a lower number than the total conflict deaths.
– Probability of significant difference between total deaths and state-based deaths: 65%
2. **Continuation of Violence**: Will the violence continue at the same intensity for the remainder of July, increase, or decrease?
– Probability of continued high-intensity violence: 70%
– Probability of significant de-escalation: 30%
3. **Reporting Delays**: ACLED data typically involves some delay in collection and verification. Will all July events be captured in their July report?
– Probability of significant reporting delays affecting the July total: 45%
## Statistical Projections
The most recent reliable figures suggest:
– 1,000+ deaths over approximately 10 days (July 13-23)
– This averages to roughly 100 deaths per day during this intense period
– If this rate continued for the remaining 7-8 days of July, it would add 700-800 more deaths
However, considering:
– The ceasefire attempt suggests some desire to reduce violence
– Conflict intensity often fluctuates rather than maintaining peak levels
– Not all deaths may be classified as “state-based”
## Forecast Rationale
Looking at the multiple sources of information, it appears that by July 22-23, the total conflict deaths were already over 1,000. However, the key question is how many of these ACLED will classify as “state-based.”
If we assume that approximately 60-80% of the deaths involved state actors (given Syrian government involvement), and considering the reported 1,000+ deaths by July 22-23, plus additional deaths likely to occur in the remaining days of July, the most probable outcome is that ACLED will report more than 1,000 state-based conflict deaths for July 2025.
However, if ACLED classifies a significant portion of the Druze-Bedouin violence as communal rather than state-based, the number could fall into the 500-1,000 range.
Gemini Multiple Choice response:
The available information strongly indicates a significant escalation of violence, primarily centered around the Suwaida/Sweida Governorate and broader southern Syria. Multiple independent sources report substantial death tolls for the period between July 13 and July 23, 2025. ReliefWeb, citing the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), reported at least 321 deaths as of July 13. More critically, by July 21-23, several outlets including Le Monde, France 24, and ReliefWeb, citing various NGOs and the UN, indicated that fatalities in Sweida and surrounding areas had surpassed 1,000, with specific figures like 1,120 and 1,265 being mentioned. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) also reported 1,265 people killed between July 13 and July 22 [RA3]. These figures represent cumulative deaths over approximately two to three weeks of July.
The key factor for this forecast is whether these reported deaths qualify as “state-based conflict deaths” under ACLED’s classification. The provided context explicitly mentions the involvement of Syrian government forces and “regime-linked groups” in the clashes. This direct or indirect participation by state actors makes it highly probable that a substantial portion of these fatalities will be categorized as state-based conflict deaths by ACLED.
Considering that the current date is July 24, 2025, the vast majority of July’s events have already transpired. The reported death tolls, which are already well over 1,000 by the third week of the month, suggest that the final reported figure for the entire month will likely remain high. While there is a possibility that ACLED’s verification process or specific attribution rules might result in a slightly lower number than preliminary NGO or media tallies, it is unlikely to drastically reduce the figure to below 500, given the consistent reporting of large-scale fatalities across multiple credible sources.
The fact that several sources already specify numbers like 1,120 or 1,265 strongly points towards the total exceeding 1,000. Therefore, the “Greater than 1000” category is the most probable outcome.
Model’s Answer:
There is an ongoing serious conflict in Syria as of July 2025, with particular intensity in Suwaida (also spelled Sweida) province. This conflict appears to involve multiple parties, including Syrian government forces, Druze militias, Bedouin groups, and possibly other actors. The conflict escalated significantly starting around July 13, 2025.
Multiple sources provide casualty estimates, with varying figures:
– The Syrian Network for Human Rights reported at least 321 deaths as of July 13
– One research assistant cites reports of 940 fatalities in Sweida by mid-July
– Several sources, including Le Monde (July 23) and France 24 (July 22), report over 1,000 deaths
– ReliefWeb (July 21) cites 1,120 deaths since July 13
– Another research assistant mentions 1,265 deaths reported by SOHR between July 13 and July 22
A ceasefire was reportedly announced around July 18, but reports indicate it was violated and violence continued.
## ACLED Classification Considerations
The question specifically asks about “state-based conflict deaths” as reported by ACLED. This is a critical distinction, as not all deaths in the conflict may be classified as “state-based” by ACLED’s methodology. ACLED defines state-based violence as involving at least one government actor. While the research indicates that Syrian government forces are involved in the conflict, it’s unclear what proportion of the total deaths would be classified as “state-based” versus other categories like “communal violence” (which ACLED tracks separately). The reports suggest the conflict involves both state forces and inter-communal violence between Druze and Bedouin groups. Some of the deaths may be categorized differently depending on ACLED’s assessment of which actors were directly involved.
## Time Period Analysis
Today is July 24, 2025, and we’re predicting the total for the month of July 2025. This means:
1. We have data up to approximately July 22-23 from various sources
2. There are 7-8 days remaining in the month
3. The conflict appears to be ongoing despite ceasefire attempts
## Key Uncertainties
1. **ACLED’s Classification Methodology**: What portion of the reported deaths will ACLED classify as “state-based” rather than communal or other categories? If the majority of deaths are from Druze-Bedouin fighting without direct state involvement, ACLED might report a lower number than the total conflict deaths.
– Probability of significant difference between total deaths and state-based deaths: 65%
2. **Continuation of Violence**: Will the violence continue at the same intensity for the remainder of July, increase, or decrease?
– Probability of continued high-intensity violence: 70%
– Probability of significant de-escalation: 30%
3. **Reporting Delays**: ACLED data typically involves some delay in collection and verification. Will all July events be captured in their July report?
– Probability of significant reporting delays affecting the July total: 45%
## Statistical Projections
The most recent reliable figures suggest:
– 1,000+ deaths over approximately 10 days (July 13-23)
– This averages to roughly 100 deaths per day during this intense period
– If this rate continued for the remaining 7-8 days of July, it would add 700-800 more deaths
However, considering:
– The ceasefire attempt suggests some desire to reduce violence
– Conflict intensity often fluctuates rather than maintaining peak levels
– Not all deaths may be classified as “state-based”
## Forecast Rationale
Looking at the multiple sources of information, it appears that by July 22-23, the total conflict deaths were already over 1,000. However, the key question is how many of these ACLED will classify as “state-based.” If we assume that approximately 60-80% of the deaths involved state actors (given Syrian government involvement), and considering the reported 1,000+ deaths by July 22-23, plus additional deaths likely to occur in the remaining days of July, the most probable outcome is that ACLED will report more than 1,000 state-based conflict deaths for July 2025. However, if ACLED classifies a significant portion of the Druze-Bedouin violence as communal rather than state-based, the number could fall into the 500-1,000 range. Given the magnitude of the reported violence, the involvement of government forces, and the ongoing nature of the conflict, it is extremely unlikely that the state-based conflict deaths would be less than 250 for the month.
## Final Probability Assessment
Weighing all factors, including classification uncertainties and the remaining days in the month:
Less than 100: 1%
Between 100 and 250: 3%
Between 250 and 500: 8%
Between 500 and 1,000: 28%
Greater than 1,000: 60%
Full details of pgodzinai’s forecast rationale —>
Past forecasts by Phil’s and Jeremy ’s bots —>
Below, a forecast of state-based conflict fatalities for Syria in the VIEWS machine forecasting competition, which is an aggregate of the forecasts of twenty competitors. Our botmasters, Phil Godzin and Jeremy Lichtman, are conducting a side experiment with VIEW
