How many state-based conflict deaths will be reported by ACLED for the month of May 2025?
Here’s what Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai predicts today:
* Less than 1000: 1%
* Between 1000 and 3000: 3%
* Between 3000 and 5000: 8%
* Between 5000 and 8000: 15%
* Between 8000 and 12000: 38%
* More than12000: 35%
Perplexity response:
{think}
Okay, let’s tackle this question step by step. The user wants to know the number of state-based conflict deaths ACLED will report in Syria for May 2025. They provided some search results, so I need to go through those carefully.
**Detailed Context for ACLED’s Syria Conflict Deaths in May 2025**
### Key Sources and Summaries
1. **Le Monde (May 3, 2025)**
– **Title:** Syria news: All the articles, features, photos, and videos from Le Monde.
– **Summary:** Reports on government-led operations since March 6, 2025, resulting in nearly 1,000 civilian deaths. Updates on March 9–10, 2025, describe two days of clashes and revenge killings that left over 1,000 people dead. violence targeting the Alawite minority in Syria is highlighted, with President Ahmed al-Sharaa appealing for civil peace amid ongoing conflict[5].
2. **ACLED (May 2, 2025)**
– **Title:** Iron Wall or iron fist? Palestinian militancy and Israel’s campaign to reshape the northern West Bank.
– **Summary:** Focuses on violence in the West Bank (Jenin, Tulkarm) with 340 incidents recorded between October 2023 and January 2025. **Not directly relevant to Syria**[1][3].
3. **The Defense Post (May 6, 2025)**
– **Title:** Two Killed in Jihadist Attack in Northern Mozambique.
– **Summary:** Details a jihadist attack in Niassa, Mozambique, killing two rangers. **No relevance to Syria**[2].
4. **Millennium Post (May 3, 2025)**
– **Title:** Feasting on the Fallen.
– **Summary:** Discusses global political violence trends, including 2.23 million deaths from small arms in 2021. **No direct Syria data**[4].
—
### Analysis of Syria-Specific Data
The most recent Syria-related data comes from Le Monde’s May 3, 2025, article, which references **over 1,000 deaths in March 2025** from clashes and government operations[5]. While this does not specifically cover May, it indicates intense violence in the preceding months.
**Critical Uncertainty**:
– **ACLED’s May Data**: The provided search results lack explicit ACLED figures for May 2025. The March figures (1,000+ deaths) reflect a baseline, but projections depend on whether violence persisted into May.
– **Conflict Context**: The March clashes marked a major escalation, and ongoing government operations could sustain high casualty rates. However, without May-specific reports, extrapolation is speculative.
—
### Resolution Perspective
The user’s resolution criteria prioritize ACLED data. Since the latest Syria data in the sources pertains to March 2025, and no May figures are available, **the answer depends on extrapolation**:
– If violence persisted at March levels, **“Greater than 1000”** is plausible.
– If conflict eased, lower ranges (e.g., 500–1,000) might apply.
**Final Consideration**: Given the absence of May-specific data, **“Greater than 1000”** aligns with the severity of March clashes and the context of ongoing conflict[5].
AskNews Deep Search Response:
Based on current reporting and available data up to May 8, 2025, ACLED has not yet released official figures for conflict deaths in Syria for May 2025. However, recent developments and historical patterns provide context:
1. **Recent Conflict Trends** (as of early May 2025):
– Sectarian clashes in Damascus and surrounding areas killed 74 civilians in early May due to renewed violence between Sunni forces and the Druze minority [7][10].
– Ongoing instability persists in coastal Syria, where over 1,000 deaths occurred in March 2025 amid clashes between security forces and former regime loyalists [32][39].
2. **Post-Assad Power Struggles**:
– Since Bashar al-Assad’s ouster in December 2024, clashes between factions (e.g., Druze militias, Interim President Salih’s forces, and remnants of Assad’s regime) have continued, particularly in Latakia, Tartus, and Homs [15][18][39].
3. **Humanitarian & Security Context**:
– The UN highlights “worsening sectarian violence” in Syria, with 1169 civilians killed in March 2025 alone during coastal clashes [39]. By April 2025, the WHO documented attacks on healthcare facilities and ongoing displacement [32].
4. **Authoritative Source Check (ACLED)**:
– While the provided resolution criteria link (ACLED’s March 14, 2025 update) is outdated for May 2025, ACLED’s most recent global report (April 2025) noted Syria as one of 10 active conflict zones with “high civilian lethality trends” [4].
**Key Considerations for May 2025**:
– **Escalation Risks**: Israeli strikes in southwestern Syria (e.g., April 2025 attacks killing 9 civilians [35]) and ISIS resurgence in the northeast [20] could increase fatalities.
– **Data Lag**: ACLED typically publishes Syria data with a 1–3 week delay. As of May 8, 2025, no official May figures are available.
– **Historical Baseline**: April 2025 saw ~100–250 conflict deaths/month in Syria based on news reports [7][32][35].
**Conclusion**:
Absent finalized ACLED data, current trends suggest May 2025 deaths are likely to fall in **”Between 100 and 250″**, given sustained clashes but no catastrophic escalation reported as of early May. Monitor ACLED’s updates at [https://acleddata.com/](https://acleddata.com/) for confirmation.
GPT News Summary:
Here is a detailed rundown of recent news relevant to forecasting the number of state-based conflict deaths reported by ACLED in Syria in May 2025:
1. **Sectarian Clashes and Violence:**
– **Recent Sectarian Clashes:** Significant violence has erupted in Syria’s Damascus countryside and Sweida region, resulting in dozens of deaths among civilians and local armed groups (Al Araby, May 7, 2025). The clashes have been attributed to a leaked audio recording from a Druze cleric, creating sectarian tensions.
– **SOHR Reporting:** An ongoing series of violent conflicts between Druze militiamen and forces supporting Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in the suburbs of Damascus has resulted in the deaths of at least 119 people last week. Most of these casualties are Druze militiamen, with a significant number of civilian deaths reported as well (VG, May 6, 2025).
2. **Unexploded Ordnance and Civilian Casualties:**
– **Explosive Relics in Deir ez-Zor:** A significant issue in Deir ez-Zor is the unexploded ordnance from the civil war, which has caused casualties among civilians. Reports indicate 89 victims between January 1 and April 14, 2025, surpassing the previous year’s tally of 74 (Le Monde, May 8, 2025).
3. **Humanitarian Concerns:**
– **Call for International Intervention:** Sheikh Hakeem al-Hajj and other leaders in the Druze community have urged international intervention for civilian protection amidst the escalating violence, warning against the deteriorating situation and potential for further clashes (Almasry Alyoum, May 1, 2025).
4. **External Influence and Escalation:**
– **Israeli Involvement:** Israel’s military operations in Syria have intensified, with recent reports of interventions and airstrikes, ostensibly to protect the Druze community amidst the conflict (France24, May 6, 2025; Star Local Media, April 30, 2025).
5. **Overall Conflict and Instability:**
– **Death Toll and Displacement:** Reports from March 2025 indicate a substantial toll from ongoing hostilities in the coastal and other regions. Over 1,000 fatalities were reported in a short span, highlighting the severity of the violence, including mass executions largely targeting civilians (Syrian Observatory, March 9, 2025; ReliefWeb, March 12, 2025).
6. **Recent Conflict Data:**
– **Casualties in Clashes:** Specific numbers from a conflict between security forces and Druze groups report 74 deaths in 48 hours in Sweida province and other Syrian regions (Jiji, May 1, 2025).
– **Ongoing Hostilities:** Recent conflicts have seen further casualties with ongoing battles in regions historically tied to sectarian divisions, bringing additional deaths among combatants and non-combatants alike (Hani News, May 2, 2025).
The current landscape in Syria as of May 2025 suggests continued volatility linked to sectarian tensions and external military interventions. The ongoing clashes and high civilian toll are likely predictors of the continued high or increasing casualty numbers that might be reported by ACLED for this period.
(Carolyn’s note: Full report on how pgodzinai calculated its results —>)
Model’s Answer:
# Analysis of ACLED State-Based Conflict Deaths in Syria for May 2025
## Contextual Analysis
The question asks for the number of state-based conflict deaths ACLED will report for Syria in May 2025. Today is May 8, 2025, which means we’re already into the first week of the month in question, and we have some early May data to work with, though not complete.
Looking at the research assistants’ inputs, we have conflicting interpretations of the current situation. The first assistant highlights a major outbreak of violence in March 2025 that caused over 1,000 deaths, but doesn’t provide clear May 2025 data. The second assistant suggests approximately 100-250 deaths per month recently, with specific mention of 74 civilians killed in early May. The third assistant provides more granular detail, citing 119 deaths in recent Druze-government clashes and 74 deaths in 48 hours in Sweida province.
## Historical Context and Current Trends
Syria has undergone significant political change with Assad’s overthrow in December 2024, leading to ongoing instability and sectarian violence. The most severe recent violence appears to have occurred in March 2025, with over 1,000 deaths reported during clashes in the coastal region. However, the intensity appears to have somewhat decreased since then.
Key patterns from the research:
1. **Sectarian violence continues**: Clashes between Druze militias and government forces in early May have resulted in significant casualties.
2. **Regional hotspots**: Violence is concentrated in Damascus suburbs, Sweida, coastal regions, and areas with remnant ISIS activity.
3. **Death reporting pattern**: Multiple sources indicate around 74-119 deaths in early May from specific incidents.
## Time Considerations
We’re forecasting for the entire month of May 2025, with 8 days already elapsed. Any deaths that have occurred in these first 8 days will count toward the total, and we have approximately 23 more days of potential violence to account for.
## Mathematical Projection
Based on the data points provided:
– 74-119 deaths reported in the first week of May
– If this rate continues (which is uncertain), we might expect approximately 3-4 times this number for the full month, suggesting around 222-357 deaths
– However, conflict intensity can fluctuate significantly, either escalating or de-escalating
## Uncertainty Factors
Several factors increase uncertainty in this forecast:
1. **Possible escalation triggers**: Israeli involvement, ISIS resurgence, and sectarian tensions could lead to sudden increases in violence.
2. **Possible de-escalation**: International pressure or successful peace initiatives could reduce violence.
3. **Reporting delays**: ACLED data often has reporting lags, especially in conflict zones.
4. **Incomplete information**: We don’t have ACLED’s official methodology for counting state-based conflict deaths specifically in Syria.
## Probability Distribution Analysis
Given the evidence, I’ll assign probabilities to each option:
– **Less than 100**: This appears unlikely given that we already have reports of 74-119 deaths in early May alone. While violence could suddenly cease, this would be a significant departure from current patterns.
– **Between 100 and 250**: This range has moderate probability. If current violence levels continue at a reduced rate or if the early May reports represent most of the month’s violence, this outcome is possible.
– **Between 250 and 500**: This range has substantial probability. It aligns with a straight-line projection of the early May death rates (74-119 deaths in a week suggesting ~300-500 for the month).
– **Between 500 and 1000**: This range has moderate probability. If violence escalates beyond current levels but doesn’t reach March 2025 levels, this outcome could occur.
– **Greater than 1000**: This has lower probability but is certainly possible. If violence returned to the extreme levels seen in March 2025, or if a major new conflict erupted, this outcome could occur.
Based on this analysis and incorporating uncertainty, I’ll assign the following probabilities:* Less than 1000: 1%
* Between 1000 and 3000: 3%
* Between 3000 and 5000: 8%
* Between 5000 and 8000: 15%
* Between 8000 and 12000: 38%
* More than12000: 35%
Past forecasts by Phil’s and Jeremy ’s bots —>
Below, a forecast of state-based conflict fatalities for Syria in the VIEWS machine forecasting competition, which is an aggregate of the forecasts of twenty competitors. Our botmasters, Phil Godzin and Jeremy Lichtman, are conducting a side experiment with VIEWS.
