How many state-based conflict deaths in Syria will be reported by ACLED for the month of September 2025?
Here’s what Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai predicts today:
Less than 100: 73%
Between 100 and 250: 22%
Between 250 and 500: 4%
Between 500 and 1,000: 1%
Greater than 1,000: 0%
10–13 minutes read. This is a condensed version of pgodzinai’s results. Full rationale here —>)
Perplexity response:
Let me analyze the search results:
## Data Availability Limitations
The most recent detailed ACLED data available in these sources extends only through February 28, 2025[1]. While the ACLED September 2025 Middle East Overview exists[3], specific state-based conflict death numbers for Syria in September 2025 are not provided in the available search results.The trend data suggests a significant reduction in traditional battlefield deaths (battles down 38%) but concerning increases in civilian-targeted violence, which may or may not be classified as “state-based” depending on the perpetrators and context of each incident.
Grok response:
– **Statistics and data:** As of September 18, ACLED reports 45 state-based conflict deaths for the month, based on verified incidents. Historical data from the past year shows seasonal fluctuations, with drops between Q4 2024 and Q1 2025, and year-over-year guidance from ACLED indicating a 60% reduction in deaths compared to September 2024
Extracted resolution criteria links:
[‘https://acleddata.com/2025/03/14/q-a-what-happened-in-the-coastal-region-of-syria-last-week/‘]
GPT Multiple Choice JSON response:
– Current snapshot and trend: ACLED’s country dashboard and the ACLED Middle East overview (September 2025) indicate that Syria’s violence intensity has fallen substantially since the major political changes in late 2024. Multiple mid-September updates (ACLED dashboard, UN/OCHA situational updates, and independent monitors) show preliminary state-based conflict deaths for Syria in September 2025 of roughly 30–60 as of ~18 Sep. August 2025’s ACLED-counted state-based deaths were reported in the low hundreds (~120 by one mid-month citation), but the most recent monthly trend is downward from the wartime highs of earlier years. ACLED typically revises and finalizes monthly totals after the month ends, but the mid-month total gives a reasonable baseline.
– Uncertainty and base-rate weight: Given ACLED’s historical monthly variability in 2024–2025 and the current low-intensity pattern, the base case is that September will remain a relatively low month for state-based deaths (i.e., <100). However, the tail risks of a mid/late-month escalation (local operations in western governorates, an unexpected cross-border incident, or a chain of high-fatality attacks) are material and justify a meaningful probability mass on the 100–250 bucket and small probabilities for larger buckets.
Final probabilistic forecast (all probabilities sum to 100)
Less than 100: 65%
Between 100 and 250: 28%
Between 250 and 500: 5%
Between 500 and 1,000: 1%
Greater than 1,000: 1%
Anthropic response:
**Current Data Assessment**
The most recent information indicates that as of September 18, 2025, ACLED has recorded approximately 45 state-based conflict deaths in Syria for the month so far. With about 12 days remaining in September, this provides a strong baseline for projection. The daily average so far is approximately 2.5 deaths per day. If this rate continues, we would expect around 75 total deaths for the month.
**Recent Historical Context**
The data shows a clear downward trend in Syrian conflict intensity since Assad’s fall in December 2024. Key statistics include: August 2025 had around 120 deaths, representing the recent baseline. Post-Assad data through February 2025 showed battles decreased 38% and explosions/remote violence decreased 51%, though violence against civilians increased 81%. The overall violence decreased by 27% in the immediate post-Assad period. These trends suggest a fundamental shift from high-intensity state warfare to lower-intensity, more localized conflicts.
**Nature of Current Conflicts**
The conflicts are now primarily concentrated in western Syria, particularly in Alawite-majority areas like Tartus and Latakia. These appear to be remnant loyalist activities rather than major military operations. The localized nature of these conflicts suggests limited potential for sudden escalation within the remaining days of September. The shift from widespread civil war to targeted incidents indicates a structural change in conflict dynamics that makes very high death tolls increasingly unlikely.
**Statistical Analysis and Projection**
With 45 deaths in 18 days (2.5 per day average), simple extrapolation suggests approximately 75 total deaths for September. However, conflict deaths often cluster around specific incidents rather than occurring uniformly. The standard deviation in daily deaths could lead to some variation. Given the recent monthly range of 120 (August) as a baseline and the current lower pace, the most likely range appears to be 60-90 deaths for the full month.
**Final Assessment**
The convergence of current data (45 deaths in 18 days), recent monthly baseline (120 in August), and structural conflict changes strongly favor the lower categories. The most likely outcome is 60-90 total deaths, firmly in the “Less than 100” range. Some probability must be allocated to “Between 100 and 250” to account for data uncertainty and escalation risk, but higher categories appear extremely unlikely given both the time constraint and current conflict dynamics.
Less than 100: 73%
Between 100 and 250: 22%
Between 250 and 500: 4%
Between 500 and 1,000: 1%
Greater than 1,000: 0%
Gemini Multiple Choice response:
The most critical piece of information comes from the provided “SocialMediaResearch”, which directly references ACLED data: “preliminary data as of September 18 shows approximately 45 state-based conflict deaths reported through their platform up to this date.” [SocialMediaResearch]. This is a crucial real-time data point.
To project for the entire month, we can use this preliminary figure. If 45 deaths occurred in the first 18 days, the average daily rate is 45 deaths / 18 days = 2.5 deaths per day. (Carolyn‘s note: Gemini crashed on this arithmetic problem. I’ll finish: 2.5*30 days = 75 deaths.)
Model’s Answer:
**Current Data Assessment**
The most recent information indicates that as of September 18, 2025, ACLED has recorded approximately 45 state-based conflict deaths in Syria for the month so far. With about 12 days remaining in September, this provides a strong baseline for projection. The daily average so far is approximately 2.5 deaths per day. If this rate continues, we would expect around 75 total deaths for the month.
**Recent Historical Context**
The data shows a clear downward trend in Syrian conflict intensity since Assad’s fall in December 2024. Key statistics include: August 2025 had around 120 deaths, representing the recent baseline. Post-Assad data through February 2025 showed battles decreased 38% and explosions/remote violence decreased 51%, though violence against civilians increased 81%. The overall violence decreased by 27% in the immediate post-Assad period. These trends suggest a fundamental shift from high-intensity state warfare to lower-intensity, more localized conflicts.
**Nature of Current Conflicts**
The conflicts are now primarily concentrated in western Syria, particularly in Alawite-majority areas like Tartus and Latakia. These appear to be remnant loyalist activities rather than major military operations. The localized nature of these conflicts suggests limited potential for sudden escalation within the remaining days of September. The shift from widespread civil war to targeted incidents indicates a structural change in conflict dynamics that makes very high death tolls increasingly unlikely.
**Statistical Analysis and Projection**
With 45 deaths in 18 days (2.5 per day average), simple extrapolation suggests approximately 75 total deaths for September. However, conflict deaths often cluster around specific incidents rather than occurring uniformly. The standard deviation in daily deaths could lead to some variation. Given the recent monthly range of 120 (August) as a baseline and the current lower pace, the most likely range appears to be 60-90 deaths for the full month.
**Key Assumptions and Uncertainties**
Three critical assumptions underpin this analysis:
1. **No major escalation events** (20% chance of being wrong): The forecast assumes no significant military operations or massacres occur in the remaining 12 days. While the current environment suggests low probability of escalation, the volatile post-regime context and ongoing tensions in western Syria create non-trivial risk. A single major incident could add 20-50 deaths.
2. **Data completeness and accuracy** (25% chance of significant incompleteness): ACLED’s current count of 45 deaths may be incomplete due to reporting delays, especially from remote areas. Historical patterns show initial counts often increase by 10-30% as verification completes. This could push the final number higher than current projections.
3. **Continuation of current conflict patterns** (15% chance of disruption): The analysis assumes the localized, low-intensity pattern continues. However, Syria remains unstable with multiple armed groups, and September historically shows slight upticks in violence due to seasonal political activities.
**Resolution Considerations**
Given that we’re already 60% through September with solid data, the uncertainty range is considerably narrowed compared to a full-month forecast. The “Less than 100” category appears highly probable given current pace and recent trends. The “Between 100 and 250” category serves as a hedge against potential escalation or data incompleteness, but would require either a significant incident or substantial upward revision of current figures.
The higher categories (250+) would require a dramatic escalation completely inconsistent with current trends and the structural shift in Syrian conflict dynamics. While not impossible given Syria’s volatility, such scenarios would represent a major departure from the established post-Assad pattern.
**Final Assessment**
The convergence of current data (45 deaths in 18 days), recent monthly baseline (120 in August), and structural conflict changes strongly favor the lower categories. The most likely outcome is 60-90 total deaths, firmly in the “Less than 100” range. Some probability must be allocated to “Between 100 and 250” to account for data uncertainty and escalation risk, but higher categories appear extremely unlikely given both the time constraint and current conflict dynamics.
Less than 100: 73%
Between 100 and 250: 22%
Between 250 and 500: 4%
Between 500 and 1,000: 1%
Greater than 1,000: 0%
Full details of pgodzinai’s forecast rationale —>
Past forecasts by Phil’s and Jeremy ’s bots —>
Below, a forecast of state-based conflict fatalities for Syria in the VIEWS machine forecasting competition, which is an aggregate of the forecasts of twenty competitors. Our botmasters, Phil Godzin and Jeremy Lichtman, are conducting a side experiment with VIEWS.
Source: https://data.viewsforecasting.org/
Above, Control of terrain in Syria as of Sept. 11, 2025. Source: Institute for the Study of War and Critical Threats
