How many conflict deaths will there be in Sudan in 2025?
Jeremy’s most recent version of his Multi-AI Oracle is a side competitor with the machine forecasting bots of the VIEWS competition.
Obtaining outside data. Checking internet sources, using keywords: Sudan conflict deaths 2025
Results from around the web: {think}
Okay, I need to address the user’s query about Sudan conflict deaths in 2025 using the provided search results. Let me start by going through each source to extract relevant data.
First, search result [1] from ACLED mentions over 28,700 reported fatalities by November 2024, including 7,500 civilians. It also notes that some estimates suggest up to 150,000 deaths. This source is from December 2024, which is recent and reliable.
Result [5] from Genocide Watch in January 2025 states that in Khartoum alone, over 61,000 people were killed, with 26,000 direct war deaths. They also mention a UN report estimating 150,000 civilian deaths by November 2024. This aligns with ACLED’s higher estimate.
Search result [9] from Science.org in February 2025 discusses varying estimates, ranging from 20,000 to 150,000. It references ACLED’s 28,700 figure and a model suggesting 61,000 deaths in Khartoum from all causes. The article also mentions a multiplier method estimating 62,000 total deaths by October 2024.
Result [7] from Wikipedia, updated as of March 2025, cites at least 61,000 killed in Khartoum State alone, with 26,000 direct deaths. It also notes over 8.8 million displaced internally and 3.5 million refugees.
Putting this together, the key figures are the ACLED’s 28,700 reported fatalities, the Genocide Watch and Wikipedia’s 61,000 in Khartoum, and the higher estimates up to 150,000. The user asked for a time series table, but the data points are sporadic. I can create a table summarizing the available data by source, period, and estimates. Also, since the current date is April 2025, the latest data points are up to early 2025. I need to present this clearly, cite each source properly, and highlight the uncertainty in the numbers.
The conflict in Sudan continues to escalate, with widely varying death toll estimates from different sources. As of April 2025, key findings include:
## Reported Fatalities
– **ACLED** recorded **28,700+ direct conflict deaths** by November 2024, including 7,500+ civilians killed in attacks[1][9]
– **Genocide Watch** reported **61,000+ deaths in Khartoum** alone (26,000 direct war deaths)[5], with UN estimates suggesting **150,000+ civilian deaths** nationwide by November 2024[1][5]
– **Science.org** analysis shows:
– 50% increase in mortality rates in Khartoum (61,000 total deaths April 2023-June 2024)[9]
– Multiplier models estimate **62,000+ total deaths** by October 2024[9]
## Humanitarian Impact
– **14M+ displaced** (30% of population)[1][7]
– **65% of Darfur** lacks basic medical services[5][6]
– **Famine alerts** in five regions with 30M needing aid[5][6]
## Data Challenges
– **90% of Khartoum deaths** go unrecorded[5][9]
– Competing methodologies:
1. Direct conflict counting[1]
2. All-cause excess mortality[9]
3. Multiplier models (3-15× baseline)[9]
(Carolyn’s note: Below, from a comma separated variables file not easily handled by Jeremy’s Multi-AI Oracle, which I slightly cleaned up:)
The conflict’s complexity and access restrictions create significant data gaps, with most experts considering reported figures substantial underestimates[1][5][9]. Current trends suggest mortality rates continue rising as fighting intensifies and humanitarian access deteriorates[5][7][9].
OpenAI gives a base rate of probability of death toll being in the range of 8000 to 12000.
The question difficulty is rated 8 (0 to 10)
Sufficient news to provide a good forecast? 1 (0 or 1)
News is relevant, topical and unbiased? 1 (0 or 1)
Question classification: scenario_based_forecast
Expected time (days) until question close: 270
The following were considered in order to produce this base rate:
The base rate is influenced by ACLED’s 28,700 recorded fatalities by late 2024 and the higher estimates of up to 150,000 mentioned by several sources. The range of estimates and the reported number of deaths within Khartoum and nationwide contributes to the uncertainty.
Ideally, the news feed would contain the following sorts of information for a better forecast: It would be beneficial to have access to reliable, ground-level data from independent observers in Sudan and increased synergy between reporting agencies to ensure figures are cross-referenced and errors minimized.
Some potential divergent considerations that might affect the base rate:
Potential changes in conflict intensity, increased international intervention, or improved humanitarian access could drastically affect the fatality numbers. Conversely, if the situation worsens, the death toll would likely exceed even the current high estimates.
The following chain of events are necessary for the question to resolve positively:
Continued conflict escalation in Sudan Very likely – Restricted humanitarian access persists Likely – Accurate reporting on casualties remains difficult Very likely
Querying Claude (AI predicts: [“Less than 1000”: 0.01, “Between 1000 and 3000”: 0.02, “Between 3000 and 5000”: 0.05, “Between 5000 and 8000”: 0.12, “Between 8000 and 12000”: 0.35, “More than 12000”: 0.45] – confidence: 6)
Querying Mistral (AI predicts: [“Less than 1000”: 0.01, “Between 1000 and 3000”: 0.05, “Between 3000 and 5000”: 0.1, “Between 5000 and 8000”: 0.24, “Between 8000 and 12000”: 0.4, “More than 12000”: 0.2] – confidence: 6)
Querying OpenAI (AI predicts: [“Less than 1000”: 0.01, “Between 1000 and 3000”: 0.05, “Between 3000 and 5000”: 0.1, “Between 5000 and 8000”: 0.2, “Between 8000 and 12000”: 0.3, “More than 12000”: 0.34] – confidence: 5)
Question Type: Multiple Choice
Confidence: 6
# LLM responses: 3
Model value:
* Less than 1000: 1% (Carolyn’s note: Although currently there are reports of over 1000 fatalities, sometimes these numbers are adjusted downward due to new information)
* Between 1000 and 3000: 5%
* Between 3000 and 5000: 10%
* Between 5000 and 8000: 19%
* Between 8000 and 12000: 33%
* More than 12000: 33%
The various AI analyses agree that the conflict in Sudan is experiencing high fatalities with estimates ranging widely from 28,700 to 150,000 deaths by late 2024. The disparity in figures suggests significant challenges in accurate reporting, likely indicating underreporting of deaths. The key factors contributing to the high death tolls are continuous conflict escalation, restricted humanitarian access, and complex data collection processes. Despite the dire situation, potential developments such as peace agreements, international intervention, or enhanced humanitarian access could reduce casualties. However, the ongoing nature of the conflict and restricted access continue to pose serious challenges, maintaining the probability of high fatality estimates, although there is also a chance that these numbers could be inflated or affected by methodological issues. Overall, while the situation remains grave, there is room for optimism if positive changes occur in the conflict dynamics or international responses.
Past forecasts on Sudan’s conflict fatalities —>
Guide to Multi-AI Oracle’s Reports (some of these only apply to older versions)
Median: We collect the output values from the LLMs in an array. We then take the median value. This is between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0.15 = 15%).
Base rate: Currently we take OpenAI’s value as the base rate. We are working on a better value using a different prompt that takes into account process. The base rate helps to determine if the median makes sense.
SD: The standard deviation between the median and the base rate.
Confidence: We query each of the LLMs on how confident they are of their predictions (between 0 and 10) and take a median. Because the LLMs tend to be overconfident, we take anything lower than 6 as being low confidence. This factors into the overall model.
Conf Mode: Based on the confidence value. >=9 is high confidence. Below 6 is low confidence (this is also triggered by an exceptionally high SD).
Mellers: This refers to Barbara Mellers, specifically a paper she wrote that includes a formula for moving values towards an extreme (i.e. 0 or 1).
Reverse Mellers: This uses the formula from above, but with a sub-1 coefficient to move the values closer to 50%.
Theory of Mind: We ask the LLMs what they think other LLMs would predict. We hope that this makes them consider the questions more deeply.
Beta Distribution: Currently unused, but possibly of interest. This is based on the median, the base rate and the SD.
Close Type: We noticed that the appropriate base case for some questions is closer to the extremes, while others are closer to 50%. When we have a low confidence value, this helps us to determine whether to extremize or de-extremize the value. ‘A’ implies closer to zero. ‘B’ implies closer to 50%. ‘C’ implies closer to 100%.
# LLM Responses: The count of LLMs that responded. We query 5 currently, but they have a relatively high API failure rate.
Model value: For normal confidence mode, this is the median. For high confidence, this is the Mellers value. For low confidence, this is either the Mellers or Revers
Background on VIEWS: Near the end of 2024, the latest forecasting competition of the Violence and Impacts Early-Warning System (VIEWS) was launched. On Dec. 4, 2024, during a telecon, a group of machine forecasting experts involved in VIEWS observed Jeremy’s demonstration of his Multi-AI Oracle. Although it was too late for Jeremy to sign up as a VIEWS competitor, they urged him to run a side competition for everyone’s benefit. Jeremy chose their Sudan conflict deaths question.
Background on the Sudan conflict, as evaluated by the team of Jeremy Lichtman and Carolyn Meinel:
(1) The importance of the Sahel, a region in Africa that includes Sudan:
Why the Sahel Actually Matters (Possibly To You, Too)
(2) April 29, 2024: Today, a Russian diplomat is negotiating gold mining with the Sudanese Minister of Minerals.
(3) June 3, 2024: Today the African Union Announced Plans to Mediate in Sudan’s Civil War
(4) Sept. 11, 2024 Over 100K starvation deaths 96% likely in Sudan by 1 Jan 2025
Carolyn has checked Sudan’s news sites below to ensure that they are still in operation. However, given the widespread violence in Sudan, any of these could go offline without warning.
https://www.alnilin.com/
https://www.alrakoba.net/
https://www.altaghyeer.info/ar/
https://www.altaghyeer.info/en/
https://www.alttahrer.com/
https://www.alzaeemsd.com/
https://www.assayha.net
https://www.cover-sd.com/
https://kushnews.net/
https://rakobanews.com
https://www.sudanakhbar.com/
https://sudanjem.com/
https://suna-sd.net/en
https://sudantimes.net/
https://www.sudantribune.net/
https://www.sudantribune.com/
https://sudaneseonline.com/
https://www.sudanile.com/
https://sudanow-magazine.net/
https://www.sudaress.com/
https://www.tagpress.net/
Below, a screenshot from VIEWS forecasting conflict fatalities in Sudan through January 2028. Below that, satellite images of the devastation in Sudan.
Below, before and after pictures of the devastation of the civil war in Sudan.
