How many state-based conflict deaths in Syria will be reported by ACLED for the month of July, 2025?
Carolyn‘s note: ACLED’s final July results won’t be in for another week or two given the data gathering complexities in Syria. Hence, an August forecast for July data.
Here’s what Phillip Godzin’s pgodzinai predicts today:
Less than 100: 0%
Between 100 and 250: 1%
Between 250 and 500: 15%
Between 500 and 1000: 50%
Greater than 1000: 34%
7–9 minutes read. This is a condensed version of pgodzinai’s results. Full rationale here —>)
Model’s Answer:
The core of this forecast relies heavily on interpreting the most direct information provided about ACLED’s preliminary reporting for July 2025. The question asks for state-based conflict deaths *reported by ACLED*. Therefore, any direct or preliminary figures from ACLED itself are paramount.
The most critical piece of information comes from the third research assistant, who states: “ACLED’s latest report indicates… In July 2025, preliminary data suggest that 450 conflict-related deaths were reported, a 5% increase from June’s reported deaths (428).” This statement provides a specific, albeit preliminary, figure directly attributed to ACLED for July 2025. This figure, 450, falls squarely within the “Between 250 and 500” category.
However, several factors introduce uncertainty and necessitate considering adjacent categories:
1. **”Preliminary Data”**: The figure of 450 is described as “preliminary data.” Preliminary figures can be subject to revision as more information is processed by ACLED. While usually, such revisions are not extreme, they can shift a number slightly up or down, potentially pushing it into an adjacent category.
2. **Scope of “Conflict-Related Deaths”**: The term “conflict-related deaths” used by the research assistant is slightly broader than “state-based conflict deaths.” While ACLED primarily tracks political violence and state-based conflicts, there might be subtle definitional differences that could influence the final count.
3. **Other Sources Indicating Higher Violence**: Other research assistants and cited sources highlight significant conflict in Syria during July 2025. For example, the BBC reported “nearly 600 deaths in southern Syria during July 2025 clashes, involving state forces and local groups,” which aligns well with state-based conflict and would place the number in the “Between 500 and 1000” category. SNHR’s mention of 1,013 deaths linked to Suwayda events “potentially involving state-based conflicts” and Al Jazeera’s report of “over 1,400 deaths from sectarian violence” suggest even higher, albeit less directly categorized, figures that *could* influence ACLED’s final tally if these events are largely classified as state-based conflict.
4. **ACLED’s Own Assessment of Escalation**: The ACLED Q&A from July 25, 2025, itself notes “mid-July 2025 escalation in southern Syria and Israel’s military response,” indicating a period of heightened violence. This context supports the idea that the death toll for July could be significant.
Given the direct preliminary figure of 450, the “Between 250 and 500” range is the most probable. However, to account for the “preliminary” nature of this data and the higher figures reported by other reputable sources (like BBC) that also point to state-involved conflict, a notable probability must be assigned to the “Between 500 and 1000” range. Less than 250 seems unlikely given the preliminary 450 figure and widespread reports of escalation. Greater than 1000 is a lower
Model’s Answer:
The core of this forecast relies heavily on interpreting the most direct information provided about ACLED’s preliminary reporting for July 2025. The question asks for state-based conflict deaths *reported by ACLED*. Therefore, any direct or preliminary figures from ACLED itself are paramount.
The most critical piece of information comes from the third research assistant, who states: “ACLED’s latest report indicates… In July 2025, preliminary data suggest that 450 conflict-related deaths were reported, a 5% increase from June’s reported deaths (428).” This statement provides a specific, albeit preliminary, figure directly attributed to ACLED for July 2025. This figure, 450, falls squarely within the “Between 250 and 500” category.
However, several factors introduce uncertainty and necessitate considering adjacent categories:
1. **”Preliminary Data”**: The figure of 450 is described as “preliminary data.” Preliminary figures can be subject to revision as more information is processed by ACLED. While usually, such revisions are not extreme, they can shift a number slightly up or down, potentially pushing it into an adjacent category.
2. **Scope of “Conflict-Related Deaths”**: The term “conflict-related deaths” used by the research assistant is slightly broader than “state-based conflict deaths.” While ACLED primarily tracks political violence and state-based conflicts, there might be subtle definitional differences that could influence the final count.
3. **Other Sources Indicating Higher Violence**: Other research assistants and cited sources highlight significant conflict in Syria during July 2025. For example, the BBC reported “nearly 600 deaths in southern Syria during July 2025 clashes, involving state forces and local groups,” which aligns well with state-based conflict and would place the number in the “Between 500 and 1000” category. SNHR’s mention of 1,013 deaths linked to Suwayda events “potentially involving state-based conflicts” and Al Jazeera’s report of “over 1,400 deaths from sectarian violence” suggest even higher, albeit less directly categorized, figures that *could* influence ACLED’s final tally if these events are largely classified as state-based conflict.
4. **ACLED’s Own Assessment of Escalation**: The ACLED Q&A from July 25, 2025, itself notes “mid-July 2025 escalation in southern Syria and Israel’s military response,” indicating a period of heightened violence. This context supports the idea that the death toll for July could be significant.
Given the direct preliminary figure of 450, the “Between 250 and 500” range is the most probable. However, to account for the “preliminary” nature of this data and the higher figures reported by other reputable sources (like BBC) that also point to state-involved conflict, a notable probability must be assigned to the “Between 500 and 1000” range. Less than 250 seems unlikely given the preliminary 450 figure and widespread reports of escalation. Greater than 1000 is a lower probability, as it would require the very high numbers from other sources to fully translate into ACLED’s specific “state-based conflict deaths” definition, which isn’t guaranteed.
The resolution date is close (August 30, 2025), which means ACLED’s formal July report might be released shortly, or the preliminary data will solidify. There is limited time for the situation on the ground to change or for completely new data to emerge that dramatically alters the July figure. Therefore, the forecast leans heavily on the existing preliminary report and contextual corroboration.
Less than 100: 2%
Between 100 and 250: 8%
Between 250 and 500: 55%
Between 500 and 1000: 30%
Greater than 1000: 5%
Full details of pgodzinai’s forecast rationale —>
Past forecasts by Phil’s and Jeremy ’s bots —>
Below, a forecast of state-based conflict fatalities for Syria in the VIEWS machine forecasting competition, which is an aggregate of the forecasts of twenty competitors. Our botmasters, Phil Godzin and Jeremy Lichtman, are conducting a side experiment with VIEWS.
