Updates from BestWorld’s AI Botmaster Jeremy Lichtman of Nov. 13, 2024

What is the probability of the US Steel/Nippon Steel merger being officially announced before January 21, 2025?

Welcome to the Multi-AI Oracle. Today, 23%, up from yesterday’s 15%. 

“The potential merger between US Steel and Nippon Steel, valued at $14.9 billion, is currently facing several obstacles, including delays in regulatory review by the US Committee on Foreign Investment and political opposition from President Joe Biden and other politicians who cite national security and job market concerns. In addition, the United Steelworkers Union has expressed opposition, necessitating further negotiations. Despite these challenges, US Steel CEO David Burritt remains optimistic about the merger’s prospects, highlighting anticipated benefits for both companies and the industry. However, the announcement of the merger before January 21, 2025, remains uncertain, with a decision expected post-November 2024’s presidential election.”

Fact-checking news summary: Certainly! Here is a list of specific facts stated in the summary, along with an assessment of their correctness and relevance to the outcome:

1. **Fact:** The potential merger is valued at $14.9 billion.
– **Correctness:** Assuming this is reported accurately from credible sources, it should be true. However, without additional verification, we cannot definitively confirm its accuracy.
– **Relevance:** True. The valuation of the merger is relevant to understanding its magnitude and potential implications, which could influence the probability of an announcement.

2. **Fact:** The merger is facing delays in regulatory review by the US Committee on Foreign Investment.
– **Correctness:** This is plausible given the nature of such mergers, but specific confirmation from regulatory sources would be needed to verify its accuracy.
– **Relevance:** True. Delays in regulatory review are directly relevant to the timeline and probability of the merger announcement.

3. **Fact:** Political opposition from President Joe Biden and other politicians is present, citing national security and job market concerns.
– **Correctness:** This is also plausible but requires external confirmation. Politicians often weigh in on significant mergers affecting national interests.
– **Relevance:** True. Political opposition is highly relevant as it could significantly affect the merger’s approval and timing.

4. **Fact:** Opposition from the United Steelworkers Union necessitates further negotiations.
– **Correctness:** This is plausible given the union’s interest in protecting workers’ rights, but external confirmation is needed.
– **Relevance:** True. The union’s stance is relevant as it may influence the merger terms and approval process.

5. **Fact:** US Steel CEO David Burritt remains optimistic about the merger’s prospects.
– **Correctness:** Internally consistent since a CEO of a company involved in the merger might publicly express optimism.
– **Relevance:** True. CEO optimism could affect internal stakeholder morale and strategy, impacting the merger’s progress.

6. **Fact:** The probability of a merger announcement before January 21, 2025, remains uncertain.
– **Correctness:** True, based on the contextual information provided; uncertainty is inherent in such complex processes.
– **Relevance:** True. This statement directly addresses the original question about the timing of the announcement.

7. **Fact:** A decision is expected post-November 2024’s presidential election.
– **Correctness:** Assuming this is based on industry insight or strategic planning, it is plausible but requires external confirmation.
– **Relevance:** True. The timing of a decision relative to the election could influence its feasibility and announcement probability.

Overall, while external verification is generally necessary for complete accuracy, the provided facts align with plausible scenarios in merger discussions and are relevant in evaluating the likelihood of an announcement.

Fact-checked summary: The probability of the US Steel/Nippon Steel merger being officially announced before January 21, 2025, remains uncertain due to several factors. Delays in regulatory review by the US Committee on Foreign Investment could impact the timeline of the merger announcement. Political opposition from President Joe Biden and other politicians, citing national security and job market concerns, is likely to influence the merger’s approval and timing. Furthermore, opposition from the United Steelworkers Union necessitates additional negotiations, which could also affect the timeline. US Steel CEO David Burritt’s optimism might influence internal stakeholder perception, but uncertainty in such complex processes remains. Additionally, a decision is expected after the November 2024 presidential election, potentially affecting the announcement’s feasibility.

OpenAI gives a base rate of 0.25
The following were considered in order to produce this base rate:

The base rate reflects the likelihood of a complex international merger being announced within a specific timeframe, considering the additional factors provided. Historically, such mergers face significant challenges due to regulatory hurdles and political opposition, which are both present in this scenario. The involvement of national security concerns typically lowers the probability of a straightforward process, while union negotiations introduce further complexity. Given recent news, the timeline is particularly tight with key decisions likely influenced by the outcome of the November 2024 presidential election. Thus, the base rate of 0.25 accounts for these difficulties and aligns with similar historical cases.

The following chain of events are necessary for the question to resolve positively:
– Regulatory approval from the US Committee on Foreign Investment, which has a moderate likelihood.
– Political considerations, including President Joe Biden and other politicians not blocking the merger, which has a low likelihood due to expressed opposition and national security concerns.
– Successful negotiations with the United Steelworkers Union, which has a moderate likelihood given past negotiation challenges.
– Final agreement from US Steel and Nippon Steel internal stakeholders, which has a high likelihood given CEO David Burritt’s optimism.
– The announcement must occur before January 21, 2025, which has a moderate likelihood given the expected decision timing post-election.

Querying Perplexity (AI predicts: 0.25 – confidence: 6)
Querying Claude (AI predicts: 0.15 – confidence: 5)
Querying Mistral (AI predicts: 0.3 – confidence: 5)
Querying OpenAI (AI predicts: 0.2 – confidence: 5)

Median from LLMs: 0.23
Base rate: 0.25 (from OpenAI) 

SD: 0.06
Confidence: 5
Conf Mode: Normal
Mellers: 0.14
Reverse Mellers: 0.31
Theory of Mind: 0.3 (What did the LLMs think other LLMs predicted?)
Beta Distribution: 0.66
Close Type: A (B = cautious # closer to 50%; A/C = closer to extremes)
# LLM responses: 4
Model value (not submitted): 0.23

We queried Perplexity, Claude, Mistral, OpenAI. A summary of what the responding AIs considered is as follows:
The consensus among the analyses is that the US Steel/Nippon Steel merger announcement before January 21, 2025, faces significant challenges, leaving its likelihood low. Key factors contributing to this conclusion include potential regulatory hurdles from the US Committee on Foreign Investment due to national security concerns, strong political opposition led by President Joe Biden, and the necessity of successful negotiations with the United Steelworkers Union. The tight timeline exacerbates these challenges as the decision is expected post-election, leaving limited room for complex approvals. CEO David Burritt’s optimism is noted as a factor for potential success in internal stakeholder agreement, but historical precedents of similar international mergers with national security implications point to the low probability of success. However, this prediction could change if regulatory reviews are expedited, political opposition softens, union negotiations are more successful than anticipated, or national security concerns are effectively addressed.

Runtime: 86 seconds.

Given the agreement of the Dock Workers to salary increases, both union and the port will return to the bargaining table on Jan. 15, 2025 to discuss automation and other issues, what’s the probability of a strike in Q1 2025.

Welcome to the Multi-AI Oracle. Today, 44%, down from yesterday’s 53%.

Obtaining outside newsfeed.  Summarizing outside newsfeed:

.”The dockworkers’ strike in the U.S. has been temporarily suspended following an agreement between the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) and the U.S. Maritime Alliance (USMX) to return to work until January 15, 2025. This pause aims to allow time for negotiations on key issues such as salary increments and the impacts of automation on jobs. Concerns remain regarding the potential for job losses due to increased automation, a significant point of contention in discussions. If the negotiations do not yield a satisfactory new contract by the set deadline, there is a possibility that the strike could resume in early 2025. Caution is advised regarding the reliability of these developments as sources may vary in accuracy and objectivity.”

Fact-checking news summary: Here is a list of specific facts from the summary, along with their truth status and relevance to the original question about the probability of a strike in Q1 2025:

1. **Fact:** The dockworkers’ strike in the U.S. has been temporarily suspended.
– **Truth:** True. (It is stated as a fact in the summary and not contradicted by any internal information.)
– **Relevance:** True. (Relevant to the probability of a strike in Q1 2025 since it indicates the current status of the strike.)

2. **Fact:** An agreement was made between the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) and the U.S. Maritime Alliance (USMX).
– **Truth:** True. (The summary specifies the parties involved in the agreement, and no contradictory information is provided.)
– **Relevance:** True. (Relevant because the agreement impacts the potential for a strike.)

3. **Fact:** The dock workers will return to work until January 15, 2025.
– **Truth:** True. (It reflects the agreed timeline outlined in the summary.)
– **Relevance:** True. (Relevant as it provides context for the negotiating timeline and potential strike resumption.)

4. **Fact:** The negotiations will cover issues such as salary increments and the impacts of automation on jobs.
– **Truth:** True. (These are specified as the key negotiation topics.)
– **Relevance:** True. (Relevant since these issues are central to the negotiations, affecting strike probability.)

5. **Fact:** There is concern regarding job losses due to increased automation.
– **Truth:** True. (The summary mentions job losses as a significant point of contention.)
– **Relevance:** True. (Relevant because it could influence the outcome of negotiations and strike probability.)

6. **Fact:** If negotiations do not yield a satisfactory new contract by the deadline, the strike may resume in early 2025.
– **Truth:** True. (The condition and potential outcome are clearly stated.)
– **Relevance:** True. (Relevant as it directly impacts the probability of a strike in Q1 2025.)

7. **Fact:** Caution is advised regarding the reliability of these developments as sources may vary in accuracy and objectivity.
– **Truth:** True. (The summary advises caution about sources.)
– **Relevance:** True. (Relevant to assess how much weight should be given to current developments when considering strike probability.)

Each fact is consistent both internally and, where applicable, with information presumed to be known about the dockworkers’ situation and negotiation process. These facts collectively inform the probability of a strike in Q1 2025.

Fact-checked summary: The probability of a strike in Q1 2025 is influenced by several key facts. The dockworkers’ strike in the U.S. has been temporarily suspended, and an agreement was reached between the International Longshoremen’s Association and the U.S. Maritime Alliance. The dock workers will return to work until January 15, 2025, when discussions on issues such as salary increments and the impacts of automation on jobs will resume. There is concern about job losses due to increased automation, which remains a significant point of contention in the negotiations. If a satisfactory new contract is not achieved by the deadline, the strike may resume in early 2025. These facts collectively impact the likelihood of a strike in Q1 2025, indicating a potential for resumed industrial action dependent on the negotiation outcomes.

OpenAI gives a base rate of 0.35 The following were considered in order to produce this base rate:

To arrive at the base rate, we considered the history of labor negotiations in this sector and the current state of the dockworkers’ agreement. Historically, similar negotiations often result in temporary suspensions rather than long-term resolutions, particularly when automation and job security are involved. Past events suggest an average likelihood of around 30-40% for strikes if contentious issues remain unresolved by deadlines. Given the temporary suspension and the critical impact of automation which is a highly likely stressor, we set the base rate on the lower end of this range. The likelihood of resumed industrial action by Q1 2025 hinges significantly on the ability of both parties to negotiate satisfactorily regarding automation concerns and wage increases before the January 15, 2025 deadline.

The following chain of events are necessary for the question to resolve positively:
– Failure to reach a satisfactory new contract agreement by January 15, 2025. (Moderately likely)
– Continued concerns about job losses due to automation. (Highly likely)
– Insufficient progress in salary increment negotiations. (Moderately likely) – A resurgence of union solidarity and pressure to strike. (Moderately likely)

Querying Perplexity (AI predicts: 0.42 – confidence: 7)
Querying Claude (AI predicts: 0.65 – confidence: 6)
Querying Mistral (AI predicts: 0.45 – confidence: 7)
Querying OpenAI (AI predicts: 0.4 – confidence: 6)

Median from LLMs: 0.44
Base rate: 0.35 (from OpenAI)

SD: 0.1
Confidence: 6.5
Conf Mode: Normal
Mellers: 0.41
Reverse Mellers: 0.46
Theory of Mind: 0.25 (What did the LLMs think other LLMs predicted?)
Beta Distribution: 0.19
Close Type: B (B = cautious # closer to 50%; A/C = closer to extremes)
# LLM responses: 4
Model value (not submitted): 0.44

We queried Perplexity, Claude, Mistral, OpenAI. A summary of what the responding AIs considered is as follows:

The various AIs predict a moderate likelihood of a dockworkers’ strike in Q1 2025, primarily due to unresolved issues surrounding automation and job security. Despite a temporary agreement to resume negotiations until the deadline of January 15, 2025, historical patterns indicate a 30-40% chance of strikes in similar scenarios, particularly if critical issues remain unresolved. The temporary suspension of the strike shows willingness to negotiate, yet concerns about job losses due to automation persist. However, the prediction could be wrong if significant progress is made in negotiations, influenced by factors like economic pressures, technological solutions, or political interventions. These could lead to a satisfactory agreement before the deadline, reducing the likelihood of a strike. External pressures might also prompt union leaders to seek compromise rather than industrial action.

Runtime: 74 seconds.



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Bots vs Staff Forecasts

BestWorld’s staff of Brian LaBatte and Carolyn Meinel are forecasting the US Steel/Nippon Steel Merger in competition with Jeremy’s Multri-AI Oracle. Their version has two sub-questions:

(1) Will the US Steel / Nippon Steel merger be approved by the White House before Jan. 21. 2025?” Brian’s latest forecast is 80%; Carolyn’s is 70%. Michael’s is 35%.

(2) If yes, when will US Steel investors relations announce the final outcome of the acquisition with Nippon Steel?
a. Before November 5, 2024
b. Between November 6 and December 31, 2024
c. January 1 to 20, 2024
d. After January 21, 2024

Brian’s latest forecasts are 0%, 20%, 20%, and 60%.

Carolyn’s are  0%, 20%, 20%, and 60%.

Our spreadsheets below:



Our past forecasts below:

Nov. 12, 2024
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Guide to our Multi-AI Oracle’s Reports 

Median from the bestworldbots: We collect the output values from the LLMs in an array. We then take the median value. This is between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0.15 = 15%).
Base rate: Currently we take OpenAI’s value as the base rate. We are working on a better value using a different prompt that takes into account process. The base rate helps to determine if the median makes sense.
SD: The standard deviation between the median and the base rate.
Confidence: We query each of the LLMs on how confident they are of their predictions (between 0 and 10) and take a median. Because the LLMs tend to be overconfident, we take anything lower than 6 as being low confidence. This factors into the overall model.
Conf Mode: Based on the confidence value. >=9 is high confidence. Below 6 is low confidence (this is also triggered by an exceptionally high SD).
Mellers: This refers to Barbara Mellers, specifically a paper she wrote that includes a formula for moving values towards an extreme (i.e. 0 or 1).
Reverse Mellers: This uses the formula from above, but with a sub-1 coefficient to move the values closer to 50%.
Theory of Mind: We ask the LLMs what they think other LLMs would predict. We hope that this makes them consider the questions more deeply.
Beta Distribution: Currently unused, but possibly of interest. This is based on the median, the base rate and the SD.
Close Type: We noticed that the appropriate base case for some questions is closer to the extremes, while others are closer to 50%. When we have a low confidence value, this helps us to determine whether to extremize or de-extremize the value. ‘A’ implies closer to zero. ‘B’ implies closer to 50%. ‘C’ implies closer to 100%.
# LLM Responses: The count of LLMs that responded. We query 5 currently, but they have a relatively high API failure rate.
Model value: For normal confidence mode, this is the median. For high confidence, this is the Mellers value. For low confidence, this is either the Mellers or Reverse Mellers (depending on the Close Type).

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